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IntroductIon, MetHodoloGy And defInItIonAl consIderAtIons
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither 
external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government 
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but 
experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
James Madison, 17881
1. The Exclusion of Individuals by International Institutions:  
A General Problem
The most notorious example of decision-making by international institutions directly 
affecting individuals is the un security council sanctions committees’ listing in the context 
of countering terrorism. The vast majority of these individuals is listed by the ‘un security 
council sanctions committee of the 1267 IsIl (‘da-esh’) and Al-Qaida and associated 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities’ (‘sanctions committee’ or ‘IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida sanctions committee’). The sanctions committee’s list contains the names of 
more than 80 entities and 245 individuals. designated individuals are often unable to access 
their property or receive social security benefits. In addition, they may face work-related 
problems and are restricted in their ability to travel, either domestically or internationally. 
Being designated not only affects those who are actually listed, who have aptly been referred 
to as “prisoners of the state” but also their spouses and families. designated individuals 
face serious difficulties in challenging these decisions: they are often not informed of the 
reasons for listing, have no access to any underlying evidence, nor do they know which state 
proposed the listing, all of which have detrimental consequences on the effectiveness of their 
scarce legal remedies. 
1 J. Madison, ‘The federalist no. 51- The structure of Government Must furnish the Proper checks 
and Balances Between different departments’ (1788) Independent Journal, available at <http://www.
constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm> (last accessed: december 18, 2019) All websites in this manuscript 
have been last accessed on december 18, 2019.
2 https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list these statistics are from 
december 2019. 
3 The term designation is used in un sanctions committee documents and in the literature to refer to 
the listing of individuals and/or entities in the context of counter-terrorism sanctions. In official un 
security council documents and in literature the term listed and designated is used interchangeably. 
4 sedley lJ (court of Appeal Judge), in A and others v. HM Treasury [2008] ewcA civ. 1187 [2009] 3 
wlr 25, §125. see also Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Jabar Ahmed and others; Her Majesty’s 
Treasury v. Mohammed Al-Ghabra; R v. Her Majesty’s Treasury [2010] uksc 2, Judgment, (January 7, 
2010) §38-39, see further, e.g., R(M) v. HM Treasury (note) [2008] ukHl 26 [2008] 2 All er 1097.
5 e.g., A. Bianchi, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of the un security council’s Anti-terrorism Measures: 
The Quest for legitimacy and cohesion’ (2007) 17 EJIL 881–919; A. von Bogdandy, P. dann and M. 
Goldmann, ‘developing the Publicness of Public International law: towards a legal framework for 
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
other international institutions have similarly adopted decisions affecting individuals and have 
faced comparable criticism as to the extent to which those affected are included in the decision-
making procedure and/or have access to legal avenues to challenge the decision(s) in question. 
Illustrative examples are the unHcr Mandate refugee status determination procedures 
(‘Mandate rsd procedures’, ‘Mandate rsd’ or ‘rsd procedures’), the world Bank decisions 
on the financing of development projects and the administration of territories by international 
institutions. for instance, the unHcr determines the status of refugees when states are unable 
or unwilling to do so. In 2016 alone, more than 200,000 applications for Mandate rsd were 
Global Governance activities’ in: A. von Bogdandy, r. wölfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. dann, and M. 
Goldmann (eds.) The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International 
Institutional law (Heidelberg, springer 2010) 3-32; c.A. feinaugle, ‘The un security council Al-Qaida 
and taliban sanctions committee: emerging Principles of International Institutional law for the 
Protecting of Individuals’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1513-1538; l. van den Herik, ‘The security 
council’s targeted sanctions regimes’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal of International Law 797-807; watson 
Institute for International studies ‘Addressing challenges of targeted sanctions’ (2009) available at 
http://watsoninstitute.org/project_detail.cfm?id=4 and its update: watson Institute for International 
studies, Brown university, Addressing Challenges to Targeted Sanctions: An Update of the “Watson 
Report”, (october 2009), available at http://hdl.handle.net/1887/43690. 
6 The term international institutions is used instead of international organizations to include a broader 
definitional scope, including not only formal international organizations but also subsidiary bodies of 
formal international organizations exercising public power. see further section 6.1 of this chapter. 
7 see, e.g., M. Alexander, ‘refugee status determination conducted by unHcr’ (1999) 11 International 
Journal of Refugee Law 251-289; Amnesty International, selective Protection: discriminatory treatment 
of non-european refugees and Asylum seekers, eur 44/16/94 (1994); Human rights watch, 50 Years 
on: What Future for Refugee Protection? (2001); M. kagan, ‘The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection 
challenges Posed by unHcr refugee status determination’ (2006) 18 International Journal on Refugee 
Law 1-29; J.c. simeon, ‘The response to rapidly fluctuating refugee status and Asylum Applications’ 
(2010) 22 International Journal of Refugee Law 72-103; M. kagan, ‘Assessment of refugee status 
determination Procedure at unHcr’s cairo office 2001-2002’ American University in Cairo Forced 
Migration and Refugee Studies Working Paper No. 1 (2002) available at www.auceypt.edu/academic/
fmrs; M. Pallis, ‘The operation of unHcr’s Accountability Mechanisms’ (2005) NYU Journal of 
International Law and Politics 869-918; M. smrkolj, ‘International Institutions and Individualized 
decision-Making: an example of unHcr’s refugee status determination’ (2008) German Law Journal 
1779; rsdwatch.org, No Margin for Error: Implementation of UNHCR’s Procedural Standards for refugee 
status determination at selected unHcr field offices in 2006 (september 2006), available at: https://
rsdwatch.com/no-margin-for-error/.
8 see, e.g., A. naudé fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight (utrecht, 
eleven International Publishing 2009); e. Hey, ‘Global environmental law and Global Institutions: a 
system lacking “Good Process”’ in: r. Pierik and w. werner, Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives 
from International Law and Political Theory (cambridge, cambridge university Press 2010), 45-72. 
9 see, e.g., A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial Administrations – a Public Law 
Approach (utrecht, eleven Publishing 2011); c. stahn, The Law and Practice of International Territorial 
Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (cambridge, cambridge university Press 2008); european 
commission for democracy through law of the council of europe (venice commission), Opinion 
on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High Representative 
(venice, March 11, 2005) cdl-Ad (2005)004; Parliamentary Assembly of the council of europe, 
resolution 1384 (2004), available at http://assembly.coe.int.
10 The term Mandate RSD procedures is used in the literature in order to distinguish between the rsd 
procedures conducted by states and those conducted by the unHcr.
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submitted to unHcr field offices. The Mandate rsd procedures have been criticized for failing 
to implement necessary procedural safeguards to protect against flawed or arbitrary decision-
making. Although the unHcr has significantly improved its procedural safeguards, 
the main criticism still holds: asylum seekers have no access to the evidence used in their 
procedure, they may not access their personal file, and the decision to reject refugee status 
is not reviewed by an independent review body. The world Bank decisions on the financing 
of development projects and the administration of territories by international institutions 
face similar criticism of the lack of accountability vis-à-vis those affected. 
The exclusion – or inadequate inclusion – of individuals from decision-making procedures 
poses a prevalent problem in international law. while other international institutions carry 
out their decision-making in ways not identical to that of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
11 unHcr Global trends, forced displacement in 2016, (report) http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf. 
26,300 asylum applications were filed in countries were the unHcr determines the refugee status 
jointly with the host-government. 
12 see, e.g., M. Alexander, ‘refugee status determination conducted by unHcr’ (1999) 11 IJRL 251; 
Amnesty International, ‘selective protection: discriminatory treatment of non-european refugees 
and Asylum seekers’ eur 44/16/94 (1994); Human Rights Watch, 50 years on: What future for Refugee 
Protection? (2001).
13 These measures include the publication of the Procedural standards for rsd under unHcr’s Mandate 
(unHcr, Geneva, 2005, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/4316f0c02.html); a progressive increase of 
rsd staff at field offices; and expansion of the role of the refugee status determination unit in Geneva, 
which supports rsd operations in the field through various activities. It does so, for instance, by 
providing advice to field offices on procedural as well as substantial issues pertaining to rsd, including 
facilitating the development of appropriate standard operating procedures in rsd operations, and 
evaluating unHcr rsd operations. The procedural safeguards are currently under review, with several 
chapters of the 2003 Procedural safeguards Handbook having been updated, including the chapter 
on legal representation (un High commissioner for refugees (unHcr), UNHCR RSD Procedural 
Standards - Legal Representation in UNHCR RSD Procedures, 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.
org/docid/56baf2c84.html) and on Appeal (un High commissioner for refugees (unHcr), UNHCR 
RSD Procedural Standards - Appeal of Negative RSD Decisions, 2017, available at: http://www.refworld.
org/docid/5915c1b14.html. see chapter 8 for a brief discussion of the extent to which the unHcr 
provides inclusionary governance to those affected. 
14 see, e.g., A. naudé fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight (utrecht, 
eleven International Publishing 2009); e. Hey, ‘Global environmental law and global institutions: a 
system lacking ‘good process’ in: r. Pierik and w. werner, Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives 
from International Law and Political Theory (cambridge, cambridge university Press 2010) 45-72.
15 see schaap (2011) for a detailed assessment of a claim/demand for inclusionary processes in ItAs, 
M. schaap, ‘contextualizing a claim for Inclusionary Governance by International territorial 
Administrations’ (2011) (2) International Journal of the Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human 
Rights 107-120. see further, for instance, A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial 
Administrations – a Public Law Approach (utrecht, eleven Publishing 2011); c. stahn, The Law 
and Practice of International Territorial Administration: Versailles to Iraq and Beyond (cambridge, 
cambridge university Press 2008); european commission for democracy through law of the council 
of europe (venice commission), Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Powers of the High Representative (venice, March 11, 2005) cdl-Ad (2005)004; european stability 
Initiative, Legal Dynamite: how a Bosnian Court may bring closer the end of the Bosnian protectorate 
(March 12, 2007) available at <www.esiweb.org>. Parliamentary Assembly of the council of europe, 
resolution 1384 (2004), available at <http://assembly.coe.int>.
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sanctions committee, their outcome is largely comparable in the way individuals are 
impacted by decisions of international institutions. Moreover, individuals affected by their 
decisions face similar difficulties in holding any such international institution to account. 
They are, for example, barred from directly challenging such decision at a domestic level 
due to the immunity of international institutions. some regional courts have adopted ad 
hoc solutions in order to marginally review the effects of a decision and to address the lack 
of procedural guarantees as well, in particular, the lack of effective legal remedies for those 
affected. However, these courts are not in a position to directly review a decision adopted 
by an international institution, let alone, offer a viable solution remedying the wrong done to 
16 The immunity of international institutions is generally based on the principle of functional necessity, 
meaning that international institutions need immunity to be able to function. n. Blokker, ‘International 
organizations: The untouchables?’ (2013) 10 International Organizations Law Review 259 at 260. for an 
introduction to the immunities of, for example, the un, see the convention on Privileges and Immunities 
of the un in which the immunities and privileges of the united nations have been stipulated (february 
13, 1946) 1 u.n.t.s. 15, Article II section 2. see further, e.g., ectHr, Waite and Kennedy v. Germany, 
application no. 26083/94, judgment (february 18, 1999), §63. for a recent successful challenge of the 
immunity of an international institution, see us supreme court, Jam v. International Finance Corp. 586 
us _ (2019), in which it was held that international financial institutions can be subject to lawsuits when 
their investing in international development projects is allegedly causing harm to local communities. 
for an analysis as well as a background of the case, see, e.g., e. kim, ‘The supreme court rules in Jam v. 
International finance corporation’ lawfare blog entry, https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-
rules-jam-v-international-finance-corporation (March 1, 2019). with regard to un security council 
sanctions, the majority of the challenges focuses on the domestic administrative act implementing the 
un sc listing. In the context of the un peacekeeping missions, there are several examples of court 
cases confirming the immunity enjoyed by un peacekeepers from national jurisdiction. see, e.g., the 
dutch supreme court, Mothers of Srebrenica association et al. v. the State of the Netherlands and the 
United Nations (April 13, 2012), case no. 10/04437; ectHr, stichting Mothers of srebrenica and others 
v. The netherlands, Application no. 65542/12 (June 11, 2013). Both the dutch supreme court and the 
european court of Human rights concluded that the un enjoyed absolute immunity in this case.
17 some successful claims for judicial review have been made. Most of them relate to the un security 
council counter-terrorism listings. The best-known regional court judgments are the joined cases 
c-402/05 and c-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Bakaraat International Foundation v. Council 
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities [2008] ecr I-6356; ectHr, 
Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v. Switzerland, 5809/08, ecHr 2013; ectHr, Nada v. 
Switzerland, no. 10593/08 (2012). domestic courts have also adopted creative approaches to assess – to 
a certain extent – international institutions’ decisions. see, e.g., Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed 
Jabar Ahmed and others; Her Majesty’s Treasury v. Mohammed Al-Ghabra; R v. Her Majesty’s Treasury 
[2010] uksc 2, Judgment (January 27, 2010). for a further discussion of the different ways in which 
national courts have approached legal challenges of un security council sanctions in their judgments, 
see tzanakopoulos (A. tzanakopoulos, ‘domestic court reactions to un security council sanctions 
in: A. reinisch (ed.) Challenging Acts of International Organisations before National Courts (oxford 
university Press 2010) 54-76. He recognized four different outcomes when domestic courts assessed 
un sc resolutions: (1) abstention, (2) low-intensity review (i.e., compatibility with ius cogens norms), 
(3) interpretations meant to avoid conflict between international and national spheres, and lastly, (4) the 
quashing of domestic measures, which gave a prevalent effect to the international decision concerned. 
The ectHr’s presumption of the equivalent-protection methodology and the approach taken by the 
cJeu can also be categorized along these lines. on the regional and national responses to the sanctions 
committee procedure evaluated in this research, see further k.e. Boon, A. Haq, d.c. lovelace Jr. (eds.) 
Terrorism Commentary on Security documents (vol. 122) UN Response to Al Qaeda – Developments 
through 2011 (oxford university Press 2012). 
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the individual concerned. Instead, the only institution that would be in a position to remedy 
a wrongdoing is the international institution in question. However, as the examples show, 
international institutions are often insufficiently prepared for such remedying.
This exclusion from decision-making procedures is symptomatic of a lack of accountability 
of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. Accountability in its 
most basic form refers to a duty to account for the exercise of public power. This research 
focuses on said lack of accountability of international institutions that adopt decisions 
directly affecting individuals and examines the way in which the accountability problem 
can be properly analyzed and may be addressed.
2. Explaining the Public Law Approach 
As illustrated, international institutions increasingly exercise a form of public power that 
directly affects individuals. even though it is widely acknowledged that international institutions 
ought to be accountable to some extent towards third parties, there is no proper legal framework 
for analyzing and addressing the accountability deficit of international institutions. 
The law of international institutions does not provide any benchmarks for assessing the 
exercise of public power by international institutions vis-à-vis third parties. Instead, it 
18 International law Association, committee on Accountability of International organisations, final 
report (Berlin conference 2004) at 5 (hereinafter IlA final report) at 5. 
19 This term will be further explained in section 6 below. 
20 The concept of public power as used by Allot refers to the exercise of authority or power that “constructs 
the public plane or space,” P. Allot, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (oxford: oxford university 
Press 1990) at 336-337. see also the definition used in the IPA project of the MPI (Heidelberg) in 
which the exercise of international public authority is defined as “any kind of governance activity by 
international institutions, be it administrative or intergovernmental” when “it determines individuals, 
private associations, enterprises, states or other public institutions” (A. von Bogdandy, P. dann and M. 
Goldmann, ‘developing the Publicness of Public International law: towards a legal framework for 
Global Governance Activities’ at 5, infra). In this research, however, the focus is on the administrative 
governance activity that determines individuals. 
21 see, e.g., G. verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians (cambridge university 
Press 2011); with regards to the unHcr, see above n. 6, with regard to the ItAs n. 14, and the world 
Bank n. 13. In general see, e.g., IlA final report at 5; A. von Bogdandy, r. wölfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. 
dann, and M. Goldmann (eds.) The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing 
International Institutional law (Heidelberg, springer 2010); B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The 
emergence of Global Administrative law’, IILJ Working Paper 2004/1 (Global Administrative law 
series), available at www.iilj.org. 
22 see, for instance, J. klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (cambridge: cambridge 
university Press 2006); H.G. schermers and n.M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Brill, 
2005 5th ed.); c. f. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 
(cambridge studies in International and comparative law) (cambridge: cambridge university Press 
2005); P. klein, Bowett’s: Law of International Institutions (sweet & Maxwell 2009); J. klabbers and A. 
wallendahl, Research Handbook on the Law of International Organisations (research Handbooks in 
International law series) (cheltenham edward elgar Publisher limited 2011). 
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provides a more functionalist approach. The law has not been developed to such extent 
that it contains a set of external standards (meaning standards unrelated to any particular 
international institution) to be used to evaluate an institution’s exercise of public power. 
Although some attempts have been made to identify general international rules on the 
accountability of international institutions, they do not provide a clear benchmark: both the 
report of the International law Association (IlA) on the Accountability of International 
organizations and the draft Articles on the responsibility of International organizations 
(dArIo) of the International law commission (Ilc) fall short of offering a yardstick to 
analyze or address the accountability problem in a systematic manner. 
The Ilc draft Articles on the responsibility of International organizations set out the 
conditions under which international institutions may be held responsible for international 
wrongful acts. There are two conditions that have to be met: (1) the occurrence of an 
23 J. klabbers, ‘eJIl foreword: the transformation of International organizations law’ (2015) 26 European 
Journal of International Law 9-82. 
24 J. klabbers, ‘Paradox of International Institutional law (2008) 5 International Organizations Law Review 
1 at 15. see chapter 2, section 1.1, below for a discussion of the extent to which the law of international 
institutions addresses the accountability of international institutions; B. kingsbury and l. casini, ‘Global 
Administrative law dimensions of International organizations law’ (2010) Global Administrative Law 
Series, IILJ Working Paper 2009/9, available at http://iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/kingsbury-
GAl-dimensions-of-International-organizations-law.pdf at 7.
25 The IlA, a non-governmental organization, has as its main goal “the study, clarification and development 
of international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and 
respect for international law.” The IlA is open to all members (non-state) that are interested in its 
objectives and includes members from academia and practice. The committee on the Accountability 
of International organizations (1996-2004) produced its final report in 2004, which lists recommended 
practices and rules on the accountability of international organizations. The reports will be addressed 
in greater detail in chapter 2. see further http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/9 .
26 The Ilc was established by the un General Assembly and has as its mandate to promote “the 
progressive development of international law and its codification,” article 1(1) Ilc statute. The 
members of the commission have “recognized competence in international law” and are elected by the 
General Assembly after being nominated by a united nations’ member state. from 2002-2011, the Ilc 
considered the topic of the responsibility of international organizations, which resulted in draft Articles 
on the responsibility of international organizations. see further http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/9_11.shtml.
27 The IlA final report (2004) will be further discussed in chapter 2. In short, the IlA report cannot 
serve as a stand-alone yardstick for analyzing the accountability of international institutions as it is not 
sufficiently precise nor is it clear whether the principles formulated are more descriptive or normative 
in nature. The IlA report serves, however, as a good point of departure in the search for generally 
recognized standards of inclusionary governance. 
28 report of the International law commission, responsibility of International organizations, Text and 
Titles of Draft Articles 1 to 67 Adopted by the Drafting Committee on Second Reading in 2011, 63rd 
session (May 30, 2011) un doc. A/cn.4/l.778; see in general c. Alhborn, ‘The roles of International 
organizations and the law of International responsibility (2011) International Organizations Law 
Review 397-482; c.f. Amerasinghe, ‘comments on the Ilc’s draft Articles on the responsibility of 
International organizations’ (2012) 9 International Organizations Law Review 29-31; J. d’Aspremont, 
‘The Articles on the responsibility of International organizations: Magnifying the fissures in the law 
of International responsibility’ (2012) 9 International Organizations Law Review 15-28. 
29 Article 1 dArIo.
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international wrongful act that (2) is attributable to the international institution. An 
international wrongful act is defined as a breach of an international obligation of the 
international institution that may be either an act or omission. such an obligation may 
derive from a treaty provision, a rule of customary international law or a general principle 
of law applicable to the international institution in question. However, dArIo does not 
“attempt to identify the obligations binding an international institution,” and instead 
focuses only on the consequences of a breach of an international obligation. As a result, the 
question which international rules are applicable to international institutions is left open. 
In general, the normative relevance of dArIo is quite limited for this research. first of all, 
dArIo addresses solely the rules for international wrongful acts attributable to international 
institutions, thus excluding any liability for damage caused by the lawful exercise of public 
power. More importantly, dArIo focuses only on ex-post situations, which are those where 
a rule of international law has been breached. The concept of accountability as defined in this 
research includes both prospective (before the decision has been made) and retrospective 
(after the decision has been made) elements; section 6 will discuss this definition of the 
concept of accountability in greater detail. More generally, dArIo does not accord those 
individuals who are affected by an international institution’s decision-making any procedural 
rights in the decision-making procedure, nor does dArIo provide a benchmark against 
which the conduct of international institutions can be assessed. An additional limitation of 
dArIo is that only injured states or international institutions may invoke the responsibility 
of an international institution, thus excluding individuals from invoking it as a third party. 
klabbers, for instance, argues therefore that the Ilc Articles have a rather civil-law paradigm, 
addressing the responsibility between, and among, actors of equal standing, and they do not 
contain a public-law paradigm, which he referred to as a missed opportunity. 
The IlA report on the Accountability of International organizations (IlA report) does 
provide more guidance than the Ilc Articles; the IlA report identifies Recommended Rules 
and Practices (rrPs) to enhance the accountability of international organizations vis-à-vis 
30 Article 10 dArIo.
31 Introductory note to the dArIo by special rapporteur Gaja at 5. 
32 see also I.f. dekker ‘Making sense of Accountability in International Institutional law (2007) 36(1) 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 83 at 93-94, which discusses the limited scope of the Articles. 
33 Article 43 dario, see also articles 49 and 50; a state may however invoke the responsibility of an 
international institution by bringing a claim for the diplomatic protection of its nationals. In 
practice, it would require an individual to ask the state of nationality to invoke the responsibility 
of the international organization in question after the individual exhausted all local remedies 
(if they exist at the level of that particular international institution). see also A. von Bogdandy 
and M.s. Platise, ‘dArIo and Human rights Protection: leaving the Individual in the 
cold’ (2012) 9 International Organizations Law Review 67 at 73.
34 klabbers referred to P. cane (responsibility in law and Morality (2002)), who drew the distinction of 
a civil law and a public law paradigm; J. klabbers, ‘eJIl foreword: the transformation of International 
organizations law’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 9 at 73. 
  1
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
a variety of stakeholders, including third parties. The recommended rules and Practices 
derive from two different types of sources: (1) primary rules of international and domestic 
law, and (2) rules of international institutions (i.e., constituent instruments, decisions made 
and resolutions adopted by the institution in question, and said institution’s established 
practice). Although discussed in greater detail in chapter 2, it is important to note that the 
IlA report in itself cannot serve as a normative yardstick for analyzing the accountability 
of international institutions. The rrPs are not sufficiently precise. It is furthermore unclear 
whether the formulated rrPs find their origin in existing standards, or whether they concern 
preferred standards; that is, whether they concern rules de lege lata or de lege ferenda. In 
other words, it is not clear to what extent they reflect the practice of international institutions. 
Thus, current international law does not provide an adequate legal framework that imposes 
constraints on the public power exercised by international institutions. 
This research adopts a public law approach to address the accountability deficit of 
international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decision. The relevance of a public 
law approach to address and analyze an international institution’s exercise of public power 
is increasingly recognized. Public law has both a constituting and constraining function 
in any national legal order, the latter being the most relevant for this research. The main 
justification for the public law approach is the functional similarity that exists between the 
way in which an international institution exercises its public power and the way in which 
domestic public authorities exercise theirs. Individuals are affected by these decisions made 
in a similar manner, whether it is by a state’s or international institution’s conduct, hence 
creating a common zone of impact. As a result, the addressees of national and international 
legal orders are increasingly merged which necessitates a different approach in terms of 
the law; it is consequently unwarranted to uphold a strict separation between the two legal 
orders. It is not desirable in such situations to focus on the characterization of the actor 
exercising the public power – in other words, an international institution or state – in order 
35 IlA final report (2004) at 7. 
36 IlA final report (2004) at 6; the IlA accountability principles will be further discussed in chapter 2. 
37 see, e.g., e. Hey, ‘Global environmental law: common Interests and the (re)constitution of Public 
space’ (2009) 39(3) Environmental Policy Law at 152, 156; l. casini, ‘Beyond the state: the emergence 
of Global Administration’ in s. cassese and others, Global Administrative Law Case Book (2008) 
available at http://www.iilj.org/gal/GAlcasebook.asp, 18, at 24; A. von Bogdandy, P. dann and M. 
Goldmann, ‘developing the Publicness of Public International law: towards a legal framework for 
Global Governance Activities’ in: A. von Bogdandy, r. wölfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. dann, and M. 
Goldmann (eds.) The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International 
Institutional law (Heidelberg, springer 2010) 3; A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial 
Administrations – a Public Law Approach (utrecht, eleven Publishing 2011).
38 A. Momirov. and A. naudé fourie, ‘vertical comparative law Methods: tools for conceptualizing the 
International rule of law’ (2009) 2(3) Erasmus Law Review 291. 
39 Idem, 291. 
40 Momirov and naudé fourie at 292.
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to answer the question what an accountability framework should look like. conversely, this 
research asserts that what should be decisive is how public power is exercised and the impact 
a decision has on an affected individual. As argued by von Bogdandy:
… the more an international authority impacts an individual, the stronger the assumption is 
that international principles require legal arrangements which are functionally equivalent to 
what is to be expected in the domestic realm.
The public law approach adopted in this book is used to examine the extent to which 
public international norms and principles mould, constrain and/or guide the exercise of 
public power by domestic public authorities. The aim of using said approach is to identify 
general standards, common denominators and deviating practices across international 
instruments constraining the exercise of public power at a national level. Accordingly, the 
consensus reached between member states of the respective instruments on the formulation 
of certain international norms combined with an authoritative interpretation of said norms 
by treaty monitoring bodies and the international compliance mechanism in place for their 
enforcement contributes to a further substantiation of the normative relevance of these 
norms. 
Moreover, the aforementioned approach is supported by the interaction between the 
two types of legal order and between their norms. The standards applicable in a national 
or international context increasingly “interact with and influence each other, resulting in 
some degree of normative integration between the international and national contexts.” 
41 see also klabbers, who argues that a focus on international institutional law would enable concentrating 
not so much on the actor but on how public authority is exercised; J. klabbers, ‘Paradox of International 
Institutional law (2008) 5 International organizations Law Review 1, 22-23. As demonstrated, a focus on 
the actor’s identity will moreover bring no answers as to the accountability framework for international 
institutions, as international (institutional) law has not been developed in such a way as to provide 
external benchmarks.
42 A. von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority’ in: A. von Bogdandy, r. 
wölfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. dann, and M. Goldmann (eds.) The Exercise of Public Authority by 
International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional law (2010) at 727. see also above 
klabbers (2008), note 40. 
43 see, for example, also naudé fourie, who conducted a comparative study of (quasi-)judicial review 
mechanisms in national and the eu legal order, to develop an analytical lens to assess the world Bank 
Inspection Panel; A. naudé fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight 
(utrecht, eleven International Publishing 2009); Momirov adopted a public law approach to assess 
the exercise of public power by international territorial administrations, A. Momirov, Accountability 
of International - Public Law Approach (2011). other research similarly adopts a public law approach 
even though they take a more theoretical approach. for instance, Global Administrative law and the 
International Public Authority project both rely on domestic public law concepts. It is however less 
explicit where the precise notions are derived from; it often concerns rather internal normative notions. 
see further chapter 2.
44 J. ebbesson, ‘Public Participation’ in d. Bodansky, J. Brunneé and e. Hey (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (oxford, oxford university Press 2007).
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similarly, some national-level international standards have been deemed relevant for 
international institutions. furthermore, various international institutions themselves refer 
to international standards applicable at a domestic level in order to justify their exercise of 
public power or to explain the procedural safeguards that they have in place. for instance, 
several international institutions, quasi-judicial review mechanisms in particular, refer to 
concepts developed at a national level or to relevant domestic court cases for determining the 
interpretation of a rule of international law. However, the general argument is that although 
those norms are relevant to an international institution, the context in which it operates 
should also be taken into account in the interpretation and application of the norm. 
3. Research Question 
no normative yardstick currently exists with which one can analyze and address in a 
systematic manner the accountability of international institutions in regards to those affected 
by their decisions. It is therefore this research’s main objective to develop such a yardstick. 
The overarching research question is: 
Based on a public law approach, what are the elements of a normative yardstick to analyze the 
accountability of international institutions that adopt decisions directly affecting individuals? 
The research adopts the following two underlying criteria for the development of such a 
yardstick: 
1. The yardstick identifies the procedural arrangements necessary to decrease the 
accountability deficit; 
2. In the identification of the elements of the yardstick, a proper balance is to be struck 
between the general nature of the accountability problem and each institution’s specific 
circumstances.
Ad 1: Procedural arrangements necessary to decrease the accountability deficit
literature review shows that an accountability framework for international institutions 
adopting decisions that directly affect individuals generally contains three (main) elements: 
a right to information, a right to participate in decision-making procedures and access 
45 see, for example, decision Iv/3 (2011) ece/MP/pp/2011.crP.5 in which Parties to the unece 
convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in decision-Making, and Access to Justice 
in environmental Matters (the Aarhus convention, which is in principle applicable at a national level) 
deemed the convention to be relevant within the framework of international organizations. 
46 see, for example, A. naudé fourie, ‘The world Bank Inspection Panel’s normative Potential: A critical 
Assessment, and a restatement’ (2012) 59 Netherlands International Law Review 199-234. similarly, 
see the discussing of the standard of review adopted by the ombudsperson to the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-
Qaida sanctions committee and how said standard takes into account the different national standards 
of review in chapter 7, section 6.2.5. 
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to an effective remedy. said three dimensions can also be discerned from the practice 
of international institutions. Access to information in this context refers to the right to 
seek and receive information from public authorities. Participation in decision-making 
procedures means the right to be heard before a decision is made. Access to an effective 
remedy refers firstly to the right to a reconsideration by a review body, and secondly, to the 
right to reparation to remedy the harm done. This research suggests that a combination 
of these three dimensions may serve to address the accountability deficit of international 
institutions vis-à-vis individuals, which would further justify the use of the overarching 
term inclusionary governance for the accountability framework. This project asserts that the 
aforementioned procedural arrangements – either in combination with substantive rules or 
by themselves – can decrease said accountability deficit of international institutions. 
The term inclusionary governance is used to refer to the way in which individuals are (to 
be) included in an international institution’s decision-making procedure. so far, inclusionary 
governance has been used mainly in the context of migration research to describe a type of 
governance that ensures the proper inclusion of migrants in society as well as to refer to 
policies aiming to empower migrants to reach a position similar to that of other individuals 
in that same society. This research, to the best of its author’s knowledge, is the first to use the 
47 Global Administrative law has identified these three principles as the core elements of administrative 
decision-making, B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’, 
IILJ Working Paper 2004/1 (Global Administrative law series), available at www.iilj.org; see also the 
swedish government’s official assessment of procedural principles recognized within all eu countries, 
which includes: access to information, the right to a fair hearing, the obligation to provide written 
reasons for decisions reached and the obligation to inform one about the right to appeal, quoted in 
e. schmidt-Aßmann, ‘verwaltungsverfahren und verwaltungskultur’ (2007) Neue Zeitschrift für 
Verwaltungsrecht 40 at 43. J. ebbesson, ‘Public Participation’ in d. Bodansky, J. Brunneé and e. Hey 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (oxford, oxford university Press 
2007). 
48 see, for example, the IlA final report on the Accountability of International organizations (2004), 
which formulates recommended practices for international organizations vis-à-vis third parties, which 
will be extensively discussed in chapter 2. 
49 It should be noted that the term participation has a different meaning depending on its context. It may 
sometimes be referred to as a thick concept, such as democratic participation, or as a thin concept when 
it only refers to the possibility of having one’s view expressed before a decision is made. In the context of 
this research, the thin concept of participation is used, and it focuses only on administrative decision-
making. 
50 see, similarly, the Global Administrative law Project of the Institute for International law and Justice, 
new york university school of law, which stipulates that procedural arrangements are required in 
order to address the legitimacy deficit. for an overview on the Global Administrative law project, see: 
B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’ (2005) 15.
51 Inclusive policies focus on ensuring inclusive social development of migrants, which often has both a 
financial and social component. see, for example, Global Migration Group, ‘Brief no. 3: Migration as an 
enabler for Inclusive social development’; see also Migration Policy Initiative, Building inclusive cities 
challenges in the Multidimensional Governance of Immigrant Integration in europe, by d. Gebhardt, 
(september 2014), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/building-inclusive-cities-
challenges-multilevel-governance-immigrant-integration-europe; similarly see for the usage of the 
term inclusionary governance, albeit with a focus on general development studies, the book Achieving 
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term inclusionary governance in relation to international institutions exercising public power 
that affects individuals directly. 
Governance in this context refers to the broader notion of exercise of public power, and it is 
therefore not limited to one government structure in particular or only to formally binding 
decisions. Although the term “means different things in different contexts,” the concept 
in general “relates to group decision-making to address shared problems.” when applied 
to international institutions, however, it concerns “less than global government, a task for 
which no international organization is equipped, but [it concerns] more than the power to 
determine policy or initiate the process of international law-making.” The term governance 
is also justified when one considers recent developments in international law: a variety of 
actors are exercising public power more and more, and such power is increasingly exercised 
in an informal manner. Most decisions that directly affect individuals are not made by 
central organs of international institutions but by expert bodies, agencies, or subsidiary 
organs instead. Accordingly, a more all-inclusive working concept of the exercise of public 
power is required, hence the term governance. even though the necessity of the three elements 
of inclusionary governance for international institutions is increasingly recognized, their 
exact scope is not well-defined in the literature. A further characterization of each element 
of inclusionary governance is therefore required, particularly because developing a standard 
for inclusionary governance for international institutions is the main object of this research. 
sections 4 and 5 will explain how this yardstick will be developed.
Inclusionary Governance: Advancing Peace and Development in First and Third World Nations (Brill 
2000) by t.e. Paupp, who uses the concept to describe an inclusive way of governing, focusing on 
fostering social, economic, political rights for all individuals governed.
52 see for an overview of the term governance: M.P. ferreira-snyman and G.M. ferreira, ‘Global Good 
Governance and Good Global Governance’ (2006) 31 South African Yearbook of International Law 52-
94; see also d.c. esty, ‘Good Governance at the supranational scale: Globalizing Administrative law’ 
(2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1490; common on Global Governance, our Global neighborhood: the 
report of the commission on Global Governance 2 (1995) (“governance is the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions ... manage their common affairs”). 
53 esty, ‘Good Governance at the supranational scale: Globalizing Administrative law’ (2006) at 1497.
54 Idem. 
55 P. Birnie and A. Boyle, ‘International Governance and the formation of environmental law and Policy’ 
in P. Birnie and A. Boyle, (eds.) International Law and the Environment (ouP 2002) at 34-3.
56 see, e.g., A. von Bogdandy, P. dann, and M. Goldmann ‘developing the Publicness of Public 
International law: towards a legal framework for Global Governance activities’ (2010), at 7. 
57 for instance, the subsidiary organs of the un security council, the un sanctions committees, decide 
on the designation of individuals and not the un General Assembly. The unHcr field offices (often 
comprised of max. four unHcr staff members) also determine the refugee status. 
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Ad 2: Striking a balance: assessing the relevance of an international institution’s specific 
circumstances 
first, it is important to differentiate this research’s approach to the accountability problem 
of international institutions from other existing approaches. The normative yardstick is 
not intended to serve as a blueprint for an accountability framework or to merely list best 
practice for all international institutions. A blueprint approach would not do justice to the 
diversity among the various international institutions. Moreover, attaining accountability 
is a continuous process; it is not a final end result. A best-practice approach would not 
manage to set common minimum standards applicable to all international institutions. The 
yardstick should embrace a certain level of flexibility to strike this balance. The standards 
underlying such a yardstick should therefore be of a sufficiently general nature to address the 
accountability problem of all international institutions that adopt decisions directly affecting 
individuals. At the same time, the standards ought to allow institutions a certain discretion 
and to take into account the context in which each international institution operates. 
said context is assumed to be relevant in identifying not only potential differences and 
similarities between international institutions but also possible differences between 
international institutions and domestic public authorities that exercise similar powers. This 
book draws inspiration from research engaging in legal transplanting where important 
notions from one legal order are transplanted into a different legal order. However, as 
pointed out by della cananea: 
A generalized, indiscriminate ‘transplant’ of legal principles and tools would entail the risk 
of jeopardizing the contribution which international institutions are expected to provide 
precisely because they differ from states. 
58 see, for example, Peerenboom, who criticized these approaches in relation to rule of law reforms, r. 
Peerenboom, ‘towards a Methodology for successful legal transplants’ (2013) 1 Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law 4 at 5. 
59 In other words, it is a process instead of a checklist. regarding the international rule of law, see similarly 
chesterman, ‘An International rule of law’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 3331.
60 when engaging in these methods, one needs to have a thorough understanding of the object of study. 
As described by Mcdougal:
 The demand for inquiring into function is, however, but the beginning of insight. further questions 
are ‘functional’ for whom, against whom, with respect to what values, determined by what decision-
makers under what conditions, how, with what effect.
 M.s. Mcdougal, ‘The comparative study of law for Policy Purposes: value clarification as an Instrument 
of democratic world order’ (1952) Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 2475, http://digitalcommons.law.
yale.edu/fss_papers/2475 at 31.
61 G. della cananea, ‘Procedural due Process of law Beyond the state in: exercise of Public Authority’ 
in: A. von Bogdandy and others (eds.) The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: 
Advancing International Institutional Law (2010) 965 at 969.
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solutions offered at a national level or particular international standards developed for use 
at a national level may therefore not be fully appropriate or adequate at an international 
level. Accordingly, the question how the context of international institutions exercising 
public power should be taken into account will be assessed throughout the research and 
while developing the yardstick. This is further reflected in the way in which said yardstick 
will be developed, as will be discussed in the next two sections. 
4. Approach: Developing the Yardstick in Four Steps
This research develops the yardstick (‘Inclusionary Governance Model for International 
Institutions’ or ‘Model’) in four steps. 
4.1. Step 1: A Conceptual Model for Inclusionary Governance 
In step 1, a conceptual model for inclusionary governance (conceptual Model) will be 
developed based on an assessment of the existing approaches to the accountability problem 
of international institutions. This step’s underlying analysis involves an assessment of current 
international norms and of existing theoretical scholarly approaches to the problem. 
The analysis’ point of departure is a basic understanding of the three-dimensional concept 
of inclusionary governance. The conceptual Model is drafted in two separate steps. firstly, 
it is examined whether and to what extent existing international law imposes constraints 
on an international institution’s exercise of public power that directly affects individuals; 
the 2004 IlA recommended rules and Practices for the accountability of international 
organizations are of particular importance to this assessment. The second step comprises an 
evaluation of existing approaches to the accountability problem of international institutions 
and the extent to which these theories address the relation between international 
institutions and individuals. The focus of the analysis is on global administrative law and 
62 see, e.g., Hey in relation to international environmental law: 
 national public law offers a language in which we can conceptualize the problems at stake. However, 
the solutions adopted at the national level probably cannot and should not be replicated at the 
international level. Instead, I suggest we need to be more creative and develop solutions that enable 
integrated approaches to the decision-making patterns involved in global environmental law. 
 e. Hey, ‘Global environmental law: common Interests and the (re)constitution of Public space’ (2009) 
39(3) Environmental Policy Law; see also e. Hey, ‘Global environmental law and Global Institutions: a 
system lacking “Good Process” ’ in: Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives from International Law 
and Political Theory (2010) 45 at 46-48. 
63 see particularly steps 3 and 4 of the model-building, sections 4.3 and 4.4. 
64 even though the global administrative law project originates from nyu, other research projects 
similarly study the existence, or development, of global or transnational administrative law. These 
other research projects were also considered relevant in the context of this research such as the IrPA 
(rome) and IPA (Heidelberg) project. see, e.g., B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence 
of Global Administrative law’ (2005), 15. A. von Bogdandy, M. Goldmann and I. venzke ‘from Public 
International to International Public law – translating world Public opinion into International Public 
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the constitutionalization of international law. The conceptual Model serves as a lens for 
the legal survey conducted in step 2. 
4.2. Step 2: Developing the Yardstick’s Building Blocks
In step 2, the yardstick’s building blocks will be identified and developed through an extensive 
legal survey of relevant international instruments that addresses the exercise of public power 
by public authorities at a national level. relevant instruments include international and 
regional human rights instruments, environmental law instruments addressing domestic 
decision-making procedures, and oecd instruments. The following questions have been 
asked in the legal survey: 
- what is the legal basis for the right in question? 
-   who is (are) the holder(s) of the right? 
-   How is the right defined?
-   what is the scope of the authorities’ obligations? 
-   what procedure should be followed? 
-   Are there any recognized limitations to the right, if so which ones? 
This research aims to identify patterns, similarities and differences between the various 
international standards and the way they have been interpreted by, for instance, treaty 
monitoring bodies. Moreover, international standards developed in the context of a treaty 
regime do not operate in a vacuum, and instead such standards are often influenced and 
strengthened by norms of other treaty regimes. certain legal norms show similarities in their 
scope and significance regardless of the treaty regime in which they operate. Moreover, the 
norms further interact through cross-references by treaty monitoring bodies, through the 
overlapping of the norms’ scope of applicability in a specific region, and as a result of treaty 
monitoring bodies’ overlapping mandates. Throughout the survey, the relative normative 
relevance of a given standard and of the respective instrument was evaluated to examine 
whether it constitutes a generally recognized standard for inclusionary governance. In other 
words, it matters whether a standard can only be found in a regional instrument with a 
specific scope of application, or whether it can be found in an instrument of universal and 
general character. The outcome of this step is a draft Inclusionary Governance Model (‘draft 
Authority’ (september 18, 2015) working paper, available at ssrn: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2662391. 
65 see, e.g., s. Besson, ‘whose constitution(s)? International law, constitutionalism, and democracy’ in: 
J. l. dunoff and J.P. trachtmann, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (cambridge university Press 2009), 381; A. wiener, A.f. lang jr., J. tully, M. Poiares 
Maduro and M. kumm, ‘Global constitutionalism: Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law’ 
(editorial) (2010) Global Constitutionalism 1(1) 1.
66 This includes, amongst others, all specialized un human rights treaties, and the ectHr, IActHr, 
IccPr and Icescr. 
67 for instance, the survey took into account the provisions of the Aarhus convention on Access to 
Information, Participation and Access to Justice. 
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IGM’ or ‘draft Model’), which will serve as a draft yardstick to assess the accountability of 
public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. 
4.3. Step 3: Testing the Functionality of the Draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
In step 3, the draft IGM will be tested by applying it to the designation procedure of the 
un security council IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee. The purpose of its 
testing is two-fold. firstly, the application of the draft IGM to the sanctions committee’s 
designation procedure aims to demonstrate the functioning of the draft IGM as a draft 
yardstick to analyze the extent to which the sanctions committee is accountable to those 
affected by its designations. The analysis gives insight into existing inclusionary processes 
within the sanctions committee. It also enables the identification of patterns and practices 
that may contribute to further accountability and those that may have a negative impact on 
the accountability process. 
secondly, the draft Model will be tested to assess whether certain adjustments may be 
necessary to better take into account the context in which international institutions operate. 
The building blocks developed in step 2 define the three dimensions of inclusionary governance 
– in terms of its standards, constraints and parameters – based on the aforementioned survey. 
Through the testing of the draft Model, it is examined whether a translation or adjustment 
of the building blocks developed in step 2 may be necessary in light of the circumstances in 
which each international institution operates. taking these considerations into account, the 
following questions guide will be asked in this testing phase: 
1. Is the formulation of the different benchmarks of the building blocks of the draft Model 
sufficiently clear to be applied as a yardstick to international institutions? 
2. do the dynamics and contextual factors identified by the draft Model sufficiently capture 
the context in which each international institution operates? 
3. Is the draft Model complete as well as sufficiently sophisticated to deal with the everyday 
reality of international institutions, or are there any other issues that the draft IGM does 
not yet sufficiently capture?
The rationale for choosing the sanctions committee’s designation procedure to test the 
functionality of the draft IGM is two-fold. first, the sanctions committee has been strongly 
criticized for the lack of properly including the individual in its decision-making procedures; 
particularly considering the enormous impact of its decisions on the lives of those designated. 
There is a strong demand for further accountability of the sanctions committee vis-à-vis 
those affected. second, the sanctions committee improved its decision-making procedure 
to become more accountable, largely in reaction to the judicial contestations at a national 
and regional level. The sanctions committee has adopted a narrative, which is based on the 
68 see, e.g., the text in and around this chapter’s footnotes 4 and 16. 
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context in which the sanctions committee operates, in which it justifies the deviation from 
the accountability standards that apply domestically. 
At the end of the testing phase, potential shortcomings in the draft Model will be identified 
and it will be analyzed whether and to what extent certain adjustments are necessary to 
better take into account the context in which international institutions operate. 
4.4. Step 4: Evaluation – an Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions
In step 4, the draft Inclusionary Governance Model will be fine-tuned based on the 
outcome of step 3. In other words, any potential shortcoming(s) identified in the draft 
IGM will be evaluated, and the yardstick will then be adjusted where necessary to address 
these shortcomings. The outcome will be a fine-tuned Inclusionary Governance Model 
for international institutions (Model). The following section will discuss the methodology 
employed to develop this Model.
5. Methodology 
The main methodology used throughout the research is doctrinal legal research by way 
of reviewing primary sources and literature review. said methodology was supplemented 
by other research methodologies to meet this research’s objective. to answer the research 
question posed and the research objectives formulated, this project also engaged in 
model-building and used comparative methods to identify the elements of the normative 
yardstick. 
The term model is used in this book to distinguish the normative yardstick from those 
developed from blue-print approaches and lists of general practice. The former (blue 
print approaches) are too static in that they serve as a checklist that needs to be completed 
without offering the possibility to take into account the context in which international 
institutions operate. Blue-print approaches have been criticized for this rigidness and lack 
of flexibility, particularly in the context of rule of law approaches. The latter (the lists of 
69 see, e.g., un sc res. (2368) (2017), which makes several references to the need to uphold human rights 
and respect international law while emphasizing the need to take all necessary means to address any 
threats to international peace and security: 
 Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the charter of the united nations 
and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, 
and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts, stressing in this regard the important role the united nations plays in leading and coordinating 
this effort, (Preamble, 11th paragraph). 
70 similarly see A. Momirov and A. naudé fourie, ‘vertical comparative law Methods: tools for 
conceptualizing the International rule of law’ (2009) at 302. 
71 see, e.g., r. Peerenboom, ‘towards a Methodology for successful legal transplants’ (2013), at 5.
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general or recommended practice) do not provide sufficiently normative guidance as to 
what elements are required to ensure the accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis 
those affected. The Model developed in this research defines the elements of the normative 
evaluative yardstick that are necessary to be able to analyze and address in a systematic 
manner the aforementioned accountability. The yardstick is expected to incorporate a norm-
flexibility that has regard to the context in which international institutions exercise public 
power. Thus, the term model is used to highlight the richness of the yardstick’s elements and 
the incorporated flexibility of the norms.
The approach adopted (model-building) was developed for this particular research to 
answer its research question. Model-building is used in various disciplines; its aim however 
is often different from the one employed in this research. It is most commonly used in the 
discipline of economics, where both theoretical models and empirical models are developed 
with a specific aim. In simple terms, models are used to understand what is happening 
and to predict what may happen. for instance, trachtmann explains in his work on the 
economic structure of international law that modelling 
…is a source of predictions and hypotheses. once a Model has been validated by empirical 
testing, it might be appropriate to engage in normative public policy on the basis of the Model 
itself. 
72 see, e.g., the discussion of the IlA final report in chapter 2, section 1, which provides the recommended 
rules and practices for the accountability of international organizations.
73 The model-building approach is guided by public law considerations as explained in section 2 of 
this chapter. In short, the public law approach adopted in this book is deployed to examine how the 
exercise of public power by domestic authorities directly affecting individuals is constrained by public 
international law.
74 Theoretical models are generally developed “for consideration of data for the purpose of specification or 
calibration.” (Boland at 10) when empirical models are used as instruments, one examines the available 
data and looks for patterns and then form a conjecture as to the course of the pattern. l.A. Boland, 
Model-Building in Economics, its purposes and limitations (cambridge university Press 2014) at 10.
75 for instance, in systems dynamics, modeling is used as a term to describe: 
 a process by which formal models are built. A formal model is an explicit representation or a 
construction of a reality... [a model] is normally a conceptual construction of an issue under study. 
Modeling, according to the constructivist position, is the construction of a subjective reality. The 
modeler is an observer who, by the act of observing or modeling, creates “a new world” (cf. von 
foerster, 1984). 
 M. schwaninger and s. Groesser, ‘Modeling as Theory-Building’, working paper 26th  International 
system dynamics conference, Athens (June 2008) at 4.
76 J. trachtman, The Economic Structure of International Law (Harvard university press, 2008) at 4. His 
book adapts tools used for the economic analysis of the law for the study of international law (at 8). It “is 
based on the idea that international law is produced in order to allow states to achieve their preferences 
with greater effectiveness through the exchange of authority” (at 11). Generally speaking, the core of 
the analysis conducted in this book addresses the allocation of authority in international law (at 22). 
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In contrast, the Inclusionary Governance Model is a normative evaluative model: it does 
not derive its elements from (economic or statistical) data but rather from an evaluation of 
positive law. 
A combination of comparative methodologies is used to identify the elements of the 
normative yardstick. They can be divided into two categories: those addressing the level 
at which a comparison is performed and those explaining how a comparison is conducted. 
regarding the former, this research engages in a horizontal and a vertical legal comparison. 
Horizontal comparative methods involve a comparison of legal structures of systems at 
the same level: it compares various national legal systems or international bodies of law. 
vertical methods encompass a comparison of legal structures of systems at different levels: 
from national law to structures in international law, for example. 
77 The different comparative methods are not mutually exclusive, and a combination is often warranted 
in order to meet the research objective. M. van Hoecke, ‘Methodology of comparative legal research’ 
(2015) Law and Method at 9.
78 see, e.g., Momirov and naudé fourie, ‘vertical comparative law Methods: tools for conceptualizing 
the International rule of law’, 291-309.
79 The usage of vertical comparative law methods is justified by the emergence of a common zone of impact. 
The addressees of both legal orders are increasingly merged, which requests a different approach in 
terms of the law and makes it therefore unwarranted to uphold a strict separation between the two 
legal orders. see, e.g., Momirov and naudé fourie, at 292. section 2, which introduced and justified the 
public law approach, explained further why a public law framework applicable to public authorities at 
a domestic level is of relevance for the exercise of public power by public authorities at an international 
level. 
  1
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
The ways in which both methods are used in this research are summarized in the table below. 
concerning the latter, with regard to how a comparison is conducted, several comparative 
methods have influenced to a greater or lesser extent the process of model-building and the 
identification of the yardstick’s elements. to sum up, the following methods are considered 
useful for the analysis conducted: 
- The functional method that looks “at the actual societal problem … and the way this 






The steps in the model-building process Type of comparison
Table 1: Horizontal and vertical comparative methods used
Result
existing international rules 
applicable to international 
institutions and existing theoretical 
approaches to international 
institutions are compared with each 
other.
The conceptual Model is used as 
a lens for a comparative analysis 
of international instruments 
constraining the exercise of public 
power at a national level. 
The functionality of the draft IGM 
is demonstrated and tested by 
way of applying it to the decision-
making procedure of the sanctions 
committee. 
In this step, the draft IGM is fine-
tuned by addressing the findings of 
step 3. In addition, the functioning 
and general relevance of the 
Inclusionary Governance Model 
is illustrated by making reference 
to non-exhaustive functional 
studies into the practice of other 
international institutions that 
make decisions directly affecting 
individuals
Horizontal comparison at an 
international level
Horizontal comparison of 
international norms applicable at a 
national level; vertical comparison 
of international norms applicable at 
a national level with international 
norms applicable to international 
institutions 
vertical comparison (bottom-up) 
where the elements identified in 
the draft IGM are tested for their 
suitability to analyze and address 
the accountability of international 
institutions in systematic manner. 
less extensive horizontal 
comparison (non-exhaustive 
functional studies) of the practice 















IntroductIon, MetHodoloGy And defInItIonAl consIderAtIons
is [addressed] in different jurisdictions … along similar or different roads … and with 
similar or different results … The focus is on the societal problem and the actual result of 
the legal approach to that problem.” 
- The analytical method that encompasses the analysis of “(complex) legal concepts and 
rules … in different legal systems in such a way that common parts and differences are 
detected.”
- The structural method that focuses “on the framework of the law or of the elements 
reconstructed through an analytical approach.”
- The common-core method that searches “for commonalities and differences between 
legal systems in view of the question to what extent harmonization on certain points 
would be possible among the compared legal systems,” or the question “how a regional/
international rule could be best interpreted to encompass the different legal traditions.”
- The law-in-context method that studies the broader social context in which the law 
operates and considers a “much broader context when compared to the functional or 
analytical method [which] implies the use of (results from) other disciplines.” 
These comparative methods are used to develop the yardstick. The first step of this research’s 
model-building, the development of the conceptual Model, will be based on an evaluation 
of existing approaches to the accountability problem of international institutions. A 
conceptual model is something that: 
is constructed, not found. It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but the 
structure, the overall coherence, is something that [the researcher builds], not something that 
exists ready-made. 
80 van Hoecke at 28; r. Michaels, ‘The functional Method of comparative law’ in: r. reimanns and 
r. Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (oxford, oxford university Press 2008) 
339 at 344-345. k. Zweigert and H. kotz, An introduction to Comparative law – the Framework (tony 
weir, translated, 3rd edition 1998) at 34; A. Peters and H. schwenke, (2000) 49(4) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 800 at 809-81. 
81 van Hoecke at 28.
82 Idem at 29; it should be noted that this does not constitute “the structure of each of the compared legal 
systems, but just one way of looking at them, which proves to be revealing for answering the research 
question”(idem at 29). 
83 van Hoecke at 29.
84 Idem.
85 van Hoecke at 29.
86 The model’s four steps were discussed in the preceding section (section 4.1 discussed the development 
of the conceptual Model). 
87 J. A. Maxwell, ‘designing a qualitative study’ in: l. Bickman, and d.J. rog, The SAGE handbook of 
applied social research methods (Thousand oaks, cA, sage Publications 2009) 214-253 at 223. Maxwell 
explained that a conceptual framework discusses “the system[s] of concepts, assumptions, expectations, 
beliefs, and theories that suppor[t] and inform… your research” (Maxwell (2009) at 222); see also 
A. naudé fourie, who explains how she uses conceptual models in her research that are developed 
through a combination of legal and non-legal methods, at 109; see further the text in and around n. 73 
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In the second step of this research, the conceptual Model will serve as the framework or lens 
to conduct the extensive legal survey of the relevant international instruments that address the 
exercise of public power by public authorities and that directly affects individuals. This step 
will involve a horizontal comparison of the relevant standards in international instruments. 
The various sources of international law will therefore be compared to each other with the 
aim to identify normative patterns across these instruments in the way in which the exercise 
of public power is constrained by international law and in which the inclusion of individuals 
is realized. By doing so, the conducted research resembles comparative work focusing on 
the identification of common denominators and/or a common core across different legal 
systems. Although the exercise is similar, the purpose of this work is however slightly 
different: the comparison is not made to improve the international law applicable to public 
authorities, but instead it contributes to the identification of the elements for the normative 
yardstick. The aim of the research bears resemblance to those research studies that focus on 
legal transplants(that is, research that transplants important notions from one legal order 
to a different legal order).
of the article, ‘expounding the Place of legal doctrinal Methods in legal-Interdisciplinary research: 
experiences with studying the Practice of Independent Accountability Mechanisms at Multilateral 
development Banks’ (2015) 8(3) Erasmus Law Review 95-110; o. Brand, ‘conceptual comparisons: 
towards a coherent Methodology of comparative legal studies’ (2007) 32 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 405 at 436.
88 for example, van Hoecke identified this type of comparative method to focus on identifying a “common 
core in view of the (possible) harmonization of a certain part of the law” (van Hoecke, 20). 
89 In this research, the common core comparison constitutes one of the factors that contribute to the 
identification of the normative yardstick’s elements. The yardstick is developed in 4 steps that involve a 
variety of comparative methods and other research methods.
90 van Hoecke, who explains that “[l]egal transplants are rather an aim or a result, not a comparative 
method in its own right,” at 30. della cananea warns that, when engaging in this type of research, it is 
essential to take into account the context in which international institutions operate to acknowledge 
whether and to what extent the exercise of public power by international institutions differs from that 
exercised by states. della cananea, ‘Procedural due Process of law Beyond the state in: exercise of 
Public Authority’ (2010) 965 at 969.
91 The public law approach adopted in this book is deployed to find an answer to the accountability 
problem of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. The argument is that 
an international institution’s exercise of public power is quite similar to that of public authorities and 
that individuals are affected in a rather similar way. As the exercise of public power by international 
institutions is not sufficiently constrained by international law, it is beneficial to assess how the exercise 
of public power by (domestic) public authorities that adopt decisions affecting individuals is restricted. 
This research examines the extent to which public international norms and principles mould, constrain 
and/or guide the exercise of public power by domestic authorities. Its outcome will form the basis for 
the yardstick used to analyze the accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected. see 
above in section 2, in which the public law approach was further explained and justified. 
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In general, the legal survey’s lens, or the frame for the comparison, does not include a fixed 
and exhaustive set of standards. Its point of reference is the public law approach adopted 
to analyze the accountability deficit of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected. 
Accordingly, the aim is to (1) identify – and thus compare – international standards that 
aim to constrain the exercise of public power by public authorities that affects individuals, 
and/or (2) address the necessary procedural arrangements to realize the accountability of 
public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. It is therefore anticipated that 
the interpretation of the standards may vary depending on the context in which they are 
used, and/or that different types of standards may be identified than those defined in the 
conceptual Model. Accordingly, one needs to maintain an open mind when conducting 
the legal survey. After all, one should keep reassessing what is considered relevant and what 
is not, and whether the evolving analytical framework is sufficiently clear. 
treaty interpretation concerns an important component of the work since a large part of 
the research concerns a survey of the relevant international legal instruments addressing 
the exercise of public power by international and/or national public authorities. General 
legal interpretative methods are used to interpret the scope and applicability of the various 
standards and to examine possible similarities and differences between them. These include, 
for instance, the rules regarding the interpretation of treaty instruments as laid down in the 
vienna convention on the law of treaties. 
92 In the context of comparative law, the term used is tertium comparationis, or second-order language. 
In the context of functional comparative methods, the yardstick for comparison is referred to as the 
tertium comparationis (r. Michaels, ‘The functional Method of comparative law’ in: r. reimanns and 
r. Zimmerman (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (oxford, oxford university Press 2008) 
339 at 367-369). Before the tertium comparationis can be developed, a hypothesis needs to be formulated 
first on the basis of an observation of similarities between problems and solutions (praesumptio 
similitudinis). see further Michaels, ‘The functional Method of comparative law,’ at 371, and Zweigert 
and kotz, An Introduction to Comparative law – the Framework (1998) at 40. van Hoecke explains 
however that it is better for legal comparatists to develop, “through their research … [,] a comparative 
second-order language” instead of “looking for tertia comparationis,” Hoecke at 28. The comparative 
second-order language refers to “a, relatively neutral, second-order language describing the concepts 
that constitute the different legal systems,” instead of using and relying on first-order languages (in 
other words, concepts derived from the respective legal system, culture). Hoecke, idem; see also n. 
Jansen, ‘comparative law and comparative knowledge’ in: M. reimann and r. Zimmermann (eds.), 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (oxford: oxford university Press 2006), 305 at 330. 
93 In comparative work and in legal research in general, there is a need to take the context into account. 
see, for instance, A. Peters and H. schwenke, (2000) 49(4) The International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 800 at 832.
94 see also Maxwell, who explains that in a qualitative study “research design should be a reflexive process 
operating through every stage of a project” (quoting Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995, p. 24), Maxwell, 
‘designing a Qualitative study’ (2009), at 214. nevertheless, one cannot expect a complete absorption 
of the legal systems that one compares. There is a trade-off to be made between being thorough enough 
and keeping an eye on any constraints based on time, costs, and language. Momirov and naudé fourie, 
‘vertical comparative law Methods: tools for conceptualizing the International rule of law’ (2009), 
at 297-298; see similarly van Hoecke at 18.
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Article 31 stipulates that:
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
treaty provisions are evaluated and compared to determine their normative relevance in 
the context of the legal survey’s purpose. for instance, as treaties only bind those states that 
are party to the agreement (pacta sunt servanda), for the purpose of this research treaties 
with (near) universal ratification are considered to have a higher relative normative value 
than those with only a small number of member states. However, the extent to which a 
treaty has nearly been universally ratified is only one of the factors influencing a treaty’s 
relative normative value. Judicial decisions (and other treaty interpreting documents of 
treaty monitoring bodies) and writings further aid in understanding the relative normative 
value of the various norms identified. 
In general, there is no hierarchy between the primary sources of international law: treaties, 
customary law and general principles of law. However, a limited category of substantive 
rules is considered to have a higher status than other sources of international law: the ius 
95 Article 31 of the vienna convention on the law of treaties (vclt), united nations, Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, united nations, treaty series, vol. 1155, p. 331, see also articles 
32 and 33 in this regard. These rules on the interpretation of treaty law are considered to constitute 
customary law as the International court of Justice consistently held in its case law, see, e.g., IcJ, LaGrand 
(Germany v. United States) [2001] IcJ rep. 466, §99; IcJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico 
v. United States) [2004] IcJ rep 12, §83; similarly see ectHr, Golder v. United Kingdom (february 
21, 1975), series A no. 18, §29. see also the vienna convention on the law between International 
organizations, which addresses treaties concluded between states and international organizations or 
between international organizations themselves. However, the convention has not yet entered into 
force. see articles 31-33, vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and International 
organizations or between International organizations (adopted: March 20, 1986, not yet entered into 
force) (1986) 25 IlM 543. 
96 see in this regard article 38 IcJ statute, which is “widely recognized as the most authoritative and 
complete statement as the sources of international law” (shaw at 70). Paragraph 1 of article 38 reads: 
 1. The court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: 
 (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized 
by the contesting states; 
 (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
 (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
 (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly 
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.
 The court thus differentiates between the former three (treaties, customary law and general principles 
of law) and sources of subsidiary meaning (judicial decisions and writings). for the purpose of this 
research, judicial decisions and writings are taken into account in the interpretation of identified 
standards. see further, e.g., shaw, International Law (cambridge, 6th edition 2008), at 123 and ff. 
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cogens norms. These are peremptory norms of international law from which no derogations 
are permitted. Besides the higher status of ius cogens norms, there are certain general 
hierarchy rules that give guidance on the evaluation of the various sources of international 
law: newer rules precede older rules (lex posterior derogate priori), and special or specific 
rules prevail over a rule with a general character (lex specialis derogate generali). even in 
cases when there is a newer rule and/or a specialized rule in international law, the ius cogens 
norm will nevertheless precede. In general, the legal survey defines normative patterns and 
cross-references between the various instruments and the respective treaty monitoring 
bodies, which aids in identifying generally recognized standards. 
Any research that determines patterns, standards, and/or develops a normative framework 
makes choices as to what constitutes a general standard and what not, what is normatively 
relevant and what is not. Particularly in the field of comparative law, there is a danger of 
“systematic ‘cherry picking’ of friendly examples.” one should therefore be “mindful of key 
methodological considerations.” In other words, one should be explicit and clear about 
these choices and what led to them. In this light, it needs no explanation that more than half 
of this book is spent on demonstrating, explaining and justifying the yardstick’s elements, 
being the building blocks of the Model, and which derive from the extensive legal survey 
conducted. 
6. Defining Accountability 
This research adopts a broad definition of the concept of accountability. Accountability 
encompasses more than the formal and limited models of controlling international 
institutions like liability and responsibility. Accountability refers to “the obligation of 
97 see, e.g., articles 53 and 64 of the vclt that addresses ius cogens norms (peremptory norms). see 
further shaw, International Law, at 125-127.
98 see section 1 of chapter 2, in which it is argued that international institutions should be considered to 
be bound by ius cogens norms. 
99 r. Hirsch, editorial, (2013) I•CON, 1 at 10.
100 Idem; similarly see Mak, who explains that “the construction of a legal analysis based on comparative 
knowledge requires an explicit justification of methodological choices,” e. Mak, ‘watch out for the 
under toad: role and Method of Interdisciplinary contextualisation in comparative legal research’ 
(2015) (2) Erasmus Law Review 65, 67. 
101 liability refers to the extent to which international institutions are liable for damage caused in the 
lawful exercise of authority; liability concerns the second level of accountability in the IlA report, see 
IlA report (2004) at 226.
102 responsibility concerns the third level of accountability as defined in the IlA report (2004) at 226. 
The Ilc Articles on the responsibility of International organizations address the circumstances under 
which international institutions may be held responsible for international wrongful acts. There are 
two conditions that have to be met: (1) the occurrence of an international wrongful act that (2) is 
attributable to the international institution. There is however quite some criticism on the limited scope 
of these Articles and the extent to which they rely too heavily on the Articles on state responsibility. 
J. Brunnee, ‘International legal Accountability Through the lens of the law of state responsibility’ 
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international institutions to give a reasoned account of the manner in which they exercise 
public authority.” This research includes both prospective and retrospective elements 
in the definition. The IlA concluded along similar lines by saying that the first level of 
accountability involves:
the extent to which International organisations, in the fulfilment of their functions as 
established in their constituent instruments, are and should be subject to, or should exercise, 
forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and 
subsequent liability and/or responsibility.
However, the concept of accountability as it is used in this research, needs to be further 
defined. As argued by de wet, when developing a workable accountability notion or 
framework, “conceptual clarity is of the essence.” This section will therefore further outline 
how the concept of accountability is understood in this research, and to that end, it describes 
in greater detail three elements of the notion of accountability: (1) who should be held 
accountable, (2) for what may they be held accountable, and (3) to whom they may be 
accountable. These elements will be discussed below. 
(2006) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 at 22.
103 e. de wet, ‘Holding international institutions accountable’, in: The Exercise of Public Authority by 
International Institutions: Advancing International Institutional law (2010), 855 at 856; see for a narrower 
definition, for example, Bovens, who focuses solely on ex post accountability processes and excludes ex 
ante inputs in governance: 
 accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to 
explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgment and the 
actor may face consequences.
  M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: a conceptual framework’ (2007) European Law 
Journal 447 at 450 and 467. 
104 An example of a prospective element is, for instance, the duty to inform affected individuals about 
the decision-making procedure and the possibility to participate before a decision is made. An 
example of a retrospective element is the possibility to request a review of a decision made. krisch 
argued that “focusing on those ex post checks may miss a significant part of the picture and may lead 
to distorted normative assessment” in n. krisch, ‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional 
Ambition’ (2009) under 17. However, kirsch also notes that one needs to be careful as broadening 
the understanding of a concept may make it more difficult to delineate the boundaries. see further, 
e.g., de wet, 859-860, who discusses the concept of accountability as used by the IlA. It should be 
noted that unlike this research, de wet (p. 860) limited her research to address only retrospective 
elements of accountability, acknowledging that the prospective elements are indeed complementary to 
accountability but should instead be seen as a separate concept. see also d. curtis and A. nollkaemper, 
‘conceptualizing Accountability in International and european law’ (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law 6 at 8.
105 liability constitutes the second level of accountability and responsibility the third level in the IlA 
report.
106 IlA report 2004 at 5. see further chapter 2, section 1, in which the IlA report and the approach 
adopted to accountability will be discussed in greater detail.
107 e. de wet, ‘Holding International Institutions Accountable’, at 860. 
108 see, e.g., M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: a conceptual framework’ (2007) 
European Law Journal 447 at 454. 
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6.1. Who Should be Held Accountable: The International Institution Exercising Public 
Power 
This research adopts a broad working definition of what constitutes an international 
institution and focuses on those institutions that exercise public power that affects individuals. 
The definition includes formal international organizations and other international 
institutions (that is: institutions created by treaty; those created by any other instrument 
governed by international law, including (subsidiary) organs of international institutions, 
such as the un security council; and agencies that work autonomously). regarding the 
latter, for instance, the unHcr administers refugee camps and conducts Mandate refugee 
status determination if states are not willing or able to do so. In such situations, agencies 
(such as the unHcr) often have “control over technical expertise and information”; they 
109 It is therefore also a way of including in the definition those variations of institutions one sees in 
practice. for academic attempts to provide a legal definition, see, for instance, H.G. schermers and n.M. 
Blokker, International Institutional Law (4th edition, 2003, Martinus nijhoff) 30; see also J. klabbers, an 
Introduction to International Institutional Law (cambridge university Press 2002) 6 ff. They sketch the 
academic debate on the search for a legal definition. 
110 The definition of the vienna convention on the law of treaties between states and International 
organizations or between International organizations themselves in article 2 (1)(i) is too limited for 
this research as it focuses on international governmental organizations, thus excluding organizations 
containing members other than states or those created by states through organs of international 
organizations; Ilc commission report on the work of the 55th session (2003) un doc. A/58/10 
commentary to draft Article 2 at 39-39; see also G. verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who 
Guards the Guardians (cambridge university Press 2011) 14.
111 for instance, the IlA report on the Accountability of International organizations adopts a more 
stringent definition, and it addresses only formal intergovernmental organizations and defines its 
object of study to be the “intergovernmental organisations in the traditional sense, i.e. created under 
international law by an international agreement amongst states, possessing a constitution and organs 
separate from its Member state,” report of the 68th IlA conference held at taipei, p. 587; IlA final 
report under 4. chapter 2 will extensively discuss the content of the IlA report, including the narrow 
definition of international organizations. 
112 see the Ilc definition, which adopts such a broad (working) definition. Article 2, draft Articles on 
the responsibility of International organizations (Ilc report on the work of the 61th session (2009) 
un doc. A/64/10 at 20. see also G. Gaja, seventh report on the responsibility of International 
organizations by the special rapporteur, 61st session of the Ilc (2007) un doc. A/cn.4/610 at 4. 
113 The term autonomy refers to the extent to which the agency can operate independently from the parent 
organ that created it. G. verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians (2011) at 16-19.
114 The unHcr Mandate note explains that the unHcr forms a “multilateral, intergovernmental 
institution,” established by the un General Assembly (un GA) as its subsidiary organ (un GA 
resolution 319 A (Iv) of december 3, 1949). As explained further in the unHcr Mandate note: 
 It was the intention of the GA to ensure that the High commissioner, supported by his office, “would 
enjoy a special status within the un ... possess[ing] the degree of independence and the prestige 
which would seem to be required for the effective performance of his functions.” 
 unHcr, division of International Protection note on the Mandate of the High commissioner for 
refugees and his office (october 2013), under 1, available at https://www.unhcr.org/protection/
basic/526a22cb6/mandate-high-commissioner-refugees-office.html. The note further explains how the 
mandate derived both from the un GA resolutions and international treaty law (i.e., the 1951 refugee 
convention and its 1967 Protocol), which gives “the High commissioner as well as his office its unique 
identity, specific legal authority and independence,” unHcr Mandate note under 2. 
115 M. Barnett and M. finemore, ‘The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International organizations’ 
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work autonomously and can be qualified as autonomous agencies meeting the definition 
of international institutions. Although there are some structural differences between the 
various international institutions, similarity exists in how they exercise public power and 
the way in which their decisions impact individuals. The Inclusionary Governance Model 
focuses on this similarity and thus applies to all international institutions – whether an 
agency, subsidiary body or intergovernmental organization – that meet the definitional 
scope of accountability as addressed in this section. 
6.2. For What May They Be Held Accountable: The Decision-Making Procedures that 
(May) Directly Affect Individuals 
This research focuses on the exercise of public power by international institutions that 
directly affects individuals. It concerns decisions of an administrative nature – including 
infrastructure projects, administrative sanctions, and refugee status determination 
procedures – and not procedures that are norm-developing, such as the development of 
legislation. The actual nature of the decision-making procedure is leading in a procedure’s 
qualification; the label given to a decision-making procedure by public authorities is merely 
indicative. The nature of various international institutions’ decision-making procedures 
suggests that they are administrative procedures; amongst others, the unHcr refugee status 
(1999) 53 International Organizations 699 at 704 and further. 
116 see, e.g., klabbers, who argues:
 [international institutional law], being a broader, more comprehensive concept, would seem the 
more natural term to use if the ambition is to control public authority. speaking of the “law of 
international organizations” focuses too strongly on “who” exercises power, and might allow some to 
slip through the net; this is less obviously a risk with “international institutional law,” which allows for 
a concentration not on actors, but on how public authority is exercised.
 J. klabbers, ‘Paradox of International Institutional law’ (2008) 5 International Organizations Law 
Review 1 under 22. 
117 even though the model has a general nature and can be applied to all the international institutions 
adopting decisions directly affecting individuals, the research acknowledges the relevance of the context 
in which each institution operates. As chapters 6 and 8 will further illustrate, the draft Model has a 
dynamic nature. 
118 e. Hey, ‘International Institutions’ in: d. Bodansky, J. Brunnée and e. Hey (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (oxford, oxford university Press 2007), 749 at 760, see also 764, 
768.
119 see for similar reasoning, for instance, the work of the various international human rights bodies, 
Hrcee, General Comment 32 (2007), §15; see also Hrcee, Perterer v. Austria, communication no. 
1015/2001, §9.2.; in relation to the ectHr, see, e.g., ectHr, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, (June 8, 
1976) app. no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/73, §82-83; ectHr, Adolf v. Austria (March 26, 
1982) app. no. 8269/78 §30; the reasoning that a label should not be leading and that one needs to look 
at other factors too has similarly been used by different bodies in different contexts. see, e.g., the Aarhus 
convention where the compliance committee argued that, in order to determine whether an activity 
falls under the scope of article 6 or 7, one should make such determination on a “contextual basis, taking 
into account the legal effects of each decision” (communication concerning Austria, ACCC/C/2008/26 
(february 8, 2011) §50). By doing so, one should therefore look at the legal functions and effects of a 
decision instead of the label given to it in domestic law; Accc, Communication concerning Belgium, 
ece/MP.PP/c.1/2006/4/Add. 2, §29. 
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determination procedure and the sanctions committee’s listing of individuals suspected 
of terrorism have been qualified as such. similarly, these international institutions have 
themselves qualified these decision-making procedure as being administrative in nature.  
only those administrative decision-making procedures that directly affect the lives of 
individuals fall within the ambit of this research. In determining the potential impact of 
a decision-making procedure, it is decisive whether a decision has a de facto impact on an 
individual’s rights and interests and therefore not whether the individual or group concerned 
is the de jure decision’s addressee. for instance, large-scale development projects affect not 
only the addressees of a decision concerning the financing or permitting of such a project but 
also those who will be affected by the project. for example, the building of a dam affects both 
the addressees of the decision whether or not to build the dam and those that live in the area 
where the dam will be build. said decision has a de facto impact on the latter. 
similarly, decision-making procedures of international institutions may not result in formal 
binding decisions on individuals, but they do have a de facto impact on the daily lives of 
individuals or groups of individuals. The unHcr refugee status determination procedure, 
for instance, does not result in a formal binding decision in which refugee status is given to 
an asylum seeker; but in practice, the unHcr refugee status certificate does have a similar 
impact on an asylum seeker. said certificate is determinative for those who depend on 
unHcr officers for protection from a forcible return to their country of origin. 
In conclusion, those decision-making procedures of international institutions that have an 
administrative nature and have– at a minimum – a de facto impact on the lives of individuals 
or groups of individuals fall within the ambit of this research. 
120 see, e.g., the website of the unHrcr at http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a16b1d06.html; un sc targeted 
sanctions regime, see, e.g., ombudsperson kimberly Prost’s explanation on the administrative nature of 
the sanctions regime, see https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/approach-and-standard; 
the un sc emphasizes in its resolutions that its sanctions are not criminal in nature, thus justifying the 
conclusion that they are administrative in nature, see, e.g., un sc res 2253 (december 17, 2015), §44. 
121 see, e.g., e. de wet ‘Holding International Institutions Accountable’ (2010), 855 at 856; see, e.g., the 
research conducted by naudé fourie on the accountability of the world Bank and by Momirov on that 
of the administration of territories by the un. Both focus particularly on affected individuals and less 
on the addressees of any decisions rendered. A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial 
Administrations – a Public Law Approach (2011) and A. naudé fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel 
and Quasi-Judicial Review Oversight, in Search for the ‘Judicial Spirit in Public International law’. (2009). 
122 see, for example, under 8.1 of the unHcr procedural safeguards for unHcr-led rsd procedures. see 
further, e.g., M. smrkolj, ‘International Institutions and Individualized decision-Making: an example 
of the unHcr’s refugee status determination’, at 1782.
123 see also M. kagan, the Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection challenges Posed by unHcr refugee 
status determination (2006) 18 International Journal on Refugee Law 1. It should be noted though that 
the effects of the unHcr-issued rsd decisions vary per country, in regard to both the host country 
and possible resettlement countries. see for a brief overview smrkolj, at 1787-1789. 
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6.3. To Whom May They Be Accountable: Defining Who May Be Affected by Decisions of 
International Institutions 
This research addresses the accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected 
by their decisions. The question who may be affected is answered in the broadest sense and 
includes all kinds of third parties – for instance, individuals, groups of individuals, entities 
or nGos. for the sake of clarity, whenever this research refers to affected individuals, it also 
includes groups of individuals and other non-state actors unless stated otherwise. 
often, international institutions formulate a basic principle of who is considered to be affected 
by their decision-making procedure and should therefore be included in their procedure. for 
instance, the unHcr recognizes asylum seekers who apply for refugee status through the 
unHcr offices as affected individuals, the un security council sanctions committees 
recognizes individuals and entities designated, and the world Bank developed the term 
project affected people to refer to those affected by development projects it financed or co-
financed. It should be noted though that the research conducts an independent assessment 
as to who should be considered an affected individual. Accordingly, both the policy adopted 
by international institutions in which they define who is affected by their decisions and its 
application in practice will be scrutinized.
124 Affected individuals are those who have applied for refugee status; they are the addressees of any 
decisions made. see, e.g., the introduction (at 1-2) and paragraphs 3.1.2., 3.1.3 of the Procedural 
safeguards Handbook of the unHcr Mandate refugee status determination Procedures, (2005) 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/4317223c9.pdf. 
125 Affected individuals are those who have been designated as such (as well as their direct family members) 
by the sanctions committee. The un sc adopts the resolution, and sanctions committees subsequently 
add names to the consolidated list. un member states are then obliged to implement the sanction and 
to impose (implement at a national level) a travel ban and freeze any assets. The resolutions are thus 
directed at the un member states. Although resolutions to designate individuals are addressed to the 
un member states, those who are affected are the de facto addressees of the adopted resolution. see, 
e.g., un sc res. 2253 (december 17, 2015) un doc. s/res/2253, §54, in which it was stipulated that 
the ombudsperson review procedure is open for any “individuals, groups, undertakings or entities 
seeking to be removed from the IsIl (da’esh) & Al-Qaida sanctions list.” 
126 The world Bank policies and procedures address the its management and the borrower’s obligations 
to those affected. see, e.g., operational Policy 4.12 (december 2001) (involuntary resettlement) where 
paragraph 3 explains who is considered to be an affected party and should thus be offered further 
guarantees. The world Bank Inspection Panel exercises quasi-judicial oversight of the conduct of the 
world Bank management, for instance, in the application of procedural safeguards in practice. see, for 
example, 1999, China Western Poverty Reduction, Ir in §79 and 278. see further naudé fourie, The 
World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Review Oversight, in Search for the ‘Judicial Spirit in 
Public International Law’ (2009) at 238-240. she discusses the world Bank Inspection Panel’s case law 
on the definition and quantification of project affected people.
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7. Delimitation of the Research 
This research addresses the question how public power is, and should be, exercised by 
international institutions. It does not address the issue whether they should exercise such 
public power at all, nor does it deal with the question whether an international institution 
is permitted to exercise public power in a given case. even though both questions are worth 
researching, it falls outside the scope of this research. In other words, the origin of an 
international institution’s powers and the legitimacy of the exercise of said powers will not be 
addressed. This research takes it as a given that international institutions have such powers 
but assesses the legal framework that needs to be applied to constrain them in order to hold 
an institution accountable to those affected. 
127 for a critical account of the exercise of authority by international institutions with a specific focus 
on the unHcr, see, for example, smrkolj, ‘International institutions and individualized decision-
making: an example of the unHcr’s refugee status determination’, 1779-1804; in relation to the legality 
of the un sanctions regime, see verdirame, for example, above n. 49, under 304-306; in relation to 
international institutions in general, see J. klabbers, for example, ‘The changing image of international 
organizations’ in: J-c. coicaud and v.A. Heiskanen (eds.) the Legitimacy of International Organizations 
(un university Press 2001) 221 at 222; J.e. Alvarez, ‘International organizations: Then and now’ 
(2006) 100 American Journal of International Law 324; B.s. chimni, ‘International Institutions today 
an Imperial Global state in the Making’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 1. 
128 Legitimacy is a term that is often used in scholarly work, but it can have various meanings. It 
encompasses more than the legality of the exercise of authority: it concerns the justification of the 
exercised authority. legality is hence only one of the dimensions of legitimacy. for example, see d. 
Beetham, The legitimation of Power (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International Inc. 1991) 
at 3-9, 57. see also Boission de chazournes, who discusses the role of legal legitimacy versus legality. 
she argues, for instance in relation to transparency, that a norm produced by an organization through a 
transparent procedure will in this way not be more legal, but it may have a higher legitimacy. l. Boisson 
de chazournes, ‘changing roles of International organizations: Global Administrative law and the 
Interplay of legitimacies’ (2009) 6 International Organizations Law Review 655 at 664. r. wölfrum, 
‘legitimacy of International law and the exercise of Administrative functions: the example of the 
International seabed Authority, the International Maritime organization (IMo) and International 
fisheries organizations’ in: The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing 
International Institutional Law (Heidelberg: springer, 2010), 917 at 919. see also Bodanksy, who 
mentioned, for example, tradition, rationality, legality and democracy as a possible basis for legitimacy, 
d. Bodanksy ‘The legitimacy of International Governance: a coming challenge for International 
environmental law? (1999) 93(3) American Journal of International Law 596 at 601; see further esty, 
who discusses six forms of legitimacy: democratic legitimacy, results-based legitimacy, order-based 
legitimacy, systemic legitimacy, deliberative legitimacy and procedural legitimacy. He argues that 
the various forms of legitimacy may in some cases reinforce each other while in other ones they may 
be in tension, d.c. esty, ‘Good Governance at the supranational scale: Globalizing Administrative 
law’ (2006) 115 Yale Law Journal 1490 at 1515-1523; d’Aspremont and de Brabandere categorize the 
different approaches to legitimacy into two categories: the legitimacy of exercise and the legitimacy of 
origin, J. d’Aspremont and e. de Brabandere, ‘The complementary faces of legitimacy in International 
law: the legitimacy of origin and the legitimacy of exercise’ (2010-2011) 34 Fordham International 
Law Journal 190 at 190; the basis for this distinction can be found in J. d’Aspremont, ‘legitimacy of 
Governments in the Age of democracy’ (2006) 38 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 887 at 
894.
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8. Outline of the Book 
Increasingly, international institutions exercise a form of public power that directly affects 
individuals without providing a legal framework commensurate with said power. This book 
examines this accountability deficit of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by 
their decisions. Although the literature has recognized this problem, there is no yardstick 
to address and analyze the accountability of international institutions to those affected in a 
systematic manner. Therefore, the main aim of this book to develop such yardstick.  
This book’s structure follows the model-building process: its four parts represent the four 
steps in which the normative evaluative yardstick will be developed. The yardstick should 
include the elements of the procedural arrangements that are necessary to address the 
accountability deficit, and it should also strike a proper balance between the general nature 
of the accountability problem and the specific context in which international institutions 
operate. As a point of departure, this research suggests that a combination of the various 
procedural arrangements (such as access to information, participation in the decision-
making procedure and access to an effective remedy (inclusionary governance)) may serve to 
address the accountability deficit. In Part I (step 1), the conceptual Model will be developed 
through an analysis of the existing approaches to the accountability problem. Both the extent 
to which international law currently constrains international institutions in their exercise 
of public power and theoretical approaches to the accountability problem will be charted 
to identify the common elements that address the aforementioned accountability. The 
conceptual Model will then serve as a lens for an extensive legal survey conducted in Part 
II of the research. 
Part II (step 2) will identify the elements of the draft IGM. chapters 3-5 will describe the 
building blocks of the three dimensions of the draft Model: access to information, a right 
to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure concerned, and access to an 
effective remedy. The analysis differentiates between general and deviating standards across 
the instruments and accords proper weight to the normative relevance of each respective 
instrument (for instance, a human rights instrument of universal or regional character). As 
a result, these chapters, with their in-depth discussion of the generally recognized standards, 
provide the elements of the draft IGM: its benchmarks and building blocks. chapter 6 will 
reveal that the draft Model is dynamic in nature. As one may witness throughout the book, 
it is only through a contextual analysis taking into account the whole picture that a proper 
analysis of the level of inclusionary governance offered may be realized. In general, the 
identified benchmarks serve as minimum standards, and public authorities enjoy discretion 
in the fulfilment of their obligations under the draft Model. The dynamic aspect implies 
that – depending on the context – further protection of those affected may be warranted, and 
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public authorities may consequently enjoy less discretion in how to achieve the envisaged 
result. Moreover, the legal survey revealed that the inclusionary governance norms interact 
with each other and do not operate in a vacuum. lastly, a schematic overview of the draft 
IGM will be given, and the steps how to apply it will be identified and discussed. 
In Part III (step 3), the functionality of the draft IGM will be tested by applying the draft 
Model to the designation procedure of the aforementioned IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions committee. The analysis in chapter 7 will demonstrate how the draft IGM serves as 
a yardstick to analyze the accountability of an international institution vis-à-vis those affected 
by its decisions. secondly, the draft IGM as developed in Part II will be tested to examine 
whether, and to what extent, its elements are sufficiently clear for the intended analysis of 
the accountability or whether any elements require fine-tuning to better accommodate the 
context in which international institutions operate. chapter 7 will conclude that, overall, the 
draft IGM functions well as a yardstick to analyze the accountability; however, its elements 
require fine-tuning to sufficiently grasp the complexity and context of multi-layered 
governance by international institutions. 
The draft Inclusionary Governance Model will therefore be fine-tuned in part Iv (step 4) 
considering the shortcomings identified in the previous chapter. chapter 8 will present the 
dynamic fine-tuned Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions. some 









Part I constitutes the first step of the model-building process: the development of a conceptual 
model for inclusionary governance (conceptual Model). By evaluating and comparing the 
various existing approaches to the accountability problem of international institutions vis-
à-vis those affected by their decisions, several common elements are identified across the 
various approaches. The developed conceptual Model serves as a lens for the legal survey 
conducted in step 2 of the model-building process, the results thereof will be discussed in 
Part II of this book.  2 
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This chapter develops the conceptual Model which serves as a point of reference for the 
legal survey to be conducted in Part II of this research. It will deal with an evaluation of 
the state of play of the rules on the accountability of international institutions. firstly, it will 
evaluate existing rules on the accountability of international institutions in order to assess 
whether, and to what extent, these rules give guidance on possible standards for inclusionary 
governance. secondly, various theoretical approaches to the accountability problem of 
international institutions will be assessed to examine whether, and to what extent, they 
address inclusionary governance processes. The chapter will conclude with a schematic 
overview of the conceptual Model.
1. The Accountability of International Institutions towards Third 
Parties: in Search of Legal Standards
In the advisory opinion Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1991 between the WHO 
and Egypt (Advisory opinion) of the International court of Justice (IcJ), the court stated 
that: 
… there is nothing in the character of international organizations to justify their being 
considered as some form of “super-state” (Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 179). International organizations are 
subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them 
under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international 
agreements to which they are parties. 
International institutions are thus bound by the obligations laid down in their statutes or 
constituent documents as well as by those laid down in the international agreements to 
which they are party. treaty obligations only bind the institutions that are party to the treaty, 
and these obligations are therefore not of a general character. The International court of 
Justice’s statement “bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules 
of international law” has led to vigorous debate in academia. May one infer from this 
1 IcJ, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1991 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory opinion, 
IcJ reports 1980, §37.
2 As defined in chapter 1 this research uses the term international institutions and not the term 
international organizations to include not only formal intergovernmental organizations also other 
international institutions (that is: institutions created by treaty; those created by any other instrument 
governed by international law, including (subsidiary) organs of international institutions, such as the 
un security council; and agencies who work autonomously. In literature, the term international 
organizations is used to refer to only formal intergovernmental organizations and/or to the broader 
term of international institutions. for sake of clarity, this research will use the term international 
institutions throughout the analysis. where necessary, a distinction will be made between international 
institutions and international organizations when it implies a difference in scope of the concept. 
3 klabbers stated for instance: 
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Advisory opinion that general rules of international law, such as general principles of law 
and/or customary international law, bind international institutions? And if not, what rules 
do constitute general rules of international law that bind international institutions? for 
example, klabbers reasons that the Advisory opinion should be interpreted as to imply that 
only a subset of such general rules binds international institutions. However, some scholars 
argue that a broader set of said general rules bind international institutions, including for 
example, customary international law and the universal declaration on Human rights. In 
other words, there is no normative agreement as to how to interpret the Advisory opinion 
 [t]he discipline may claim, following the IcJ in 1980, that international organizations are subjects of 
international law, and thus also subject to international law, but it remains unclear which international 
law and why: there is no plausible theory of obligation. 
 J. klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional law’ (2008) 5 International Organizations 
Law Review 151 at 165; similarly, cannizzaro and Palchetti argue that ‘one can hardly draw from this 
dictum much indication that is useful for clarifying the issue’; e. cannizzaro’s and P. Palchetti’s in 
J. klabbers and A wallendahl (eds.), Research Handbook on the Law of International Organizations 
(london, edward elgar publishing 2011), 365‐397, at 370; similarly, daugirdas argued that the wHo-
egypt opinion cannot settle the question of the obligations of international institutions or even shed 
much light on it, k. daugirdas, ‘How and why International law Binds International organizations 
(2016) 57 Harvard International Law Journal 325 at 332; for a general discussion of the normative value 
of this Advisory opinion by the IcJ, see c.M. Brölmann, ‘The significance of the 1980 IcJ Advisory 
opinion Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the who and egypt’ (May 29, 
2015) Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-17; Amsterdam center for International law 
no. 2015-08. Available at ssrn: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611976 and J. klabbers, ‘eJIl foreword: 
the transformation of International organizations law (2015) 26 European Journal of International 
Law 9 at 59-63.
4 J. klabbers, ‘Book review: Guglielmo verdirame, The un and Human rights: who Guards the 
Guardians?’ 11 International Organizations Law Review (2014) 235 at 237 (2014) see further, J. klabbers, 
The sources of International organizations law, in J. d’Aspremont and s. Besson (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook on Sources of International Law (oxford university Press 2018).
5 daugirdas maps the debate on the interpretation of the IcJ statement in academia, k. daugirdas, ‘How 
and why International law Binds International organizations’ (2016) 57 Harvard International Law 
Journal 325 at 331-335; A. reinisch, ‘Adapting to change: The role of International organizations’ 2015 
AsIl Annual Meeting (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fw-yr6Hqw0, quoted in 
k. daugirdas at 331.
6 Benvenisti, quoted in daugirdas: 
 [A]s an international person, an [international institution] is subject to general international law. 
Therefore [international institutions] are subject to customary international law and general principles 
of law.
 e. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (The Hague: Hague Academy of International Law, 
2014) at 99; A. reinisch, ‘securing the Accountability of International organizations’ (2001) 7 
Global Governance 131 at 136. August reinisch, ‘developing Human rights and Humanitarian law 
Accountability of the security council for the Imposition of economic sanctions’ (2001) 95 American 
Journal of International Law 851 at 858.
7 de schutter states: 
 we may conclude that international organizations, as subjects of international law, must comply with 
general public international law in the exercise of their activities, and that this includes a requirement 
to comply with the universal declaration on Human rights as general principles of law.
 o. de schutter, ‘Human rights and the rise of International organisations’, in: J. wouters, et al (eds.) 
Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Intersentia, 2010), 51, at 
72–73.
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and which general rules of international law bind international institutions. However, the 
debate on the rules of international law that bind international institutions is broader than 
the discussion of the interpretation of the International court of Justice’s statement. There 
are numerous discussions within academia as to whether and to what extent international 
institutions are bound by human rights; human rights constitute a particular subset of general 
international norms which constrain the exercise of public power of public authorities. The 
IlA committee noted, for instance, that: 
Human rights obligations, which are increasingly becoming an expression of the common 
constitutional traditions of states, can become binding upon Io-s in different ways: through 
the terms of their constituent instruments; as customary international law; or as general 
principles of law or if an Io is [authorized] to become a party to a human rights treaty. 
However, although one might be able to convincingly argue that international institutions 
generally ought to comply with (some) human rights standards, the challenging part is to 
identify what obligations bind international institutions and to what extent. This research 
holds that, at a minimum, all subjects of international law, including international institutions, 
are bound by peremptory norms of international law – that is, ius cogens norms. said norms 
include the most fundamental human rights norms, which must be respected by all subjects 
8 IlA final report (2004), 22; It should be noted that the IlA upholds a narrower definition than 
international institutions, and instead, it focuses only on international intergovernmental organizations, 
this point is further addressed further below in chapter 2.
9 Idem, IlA report 23-25; several authors therefore argued in general or in regards to certain organizations 
or certain exercises of public powers that the international institution in question is bound by human 
rights. for example, see r. wilde, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? why and how unHcr governance 
of “development” refugee camps should Be subject to International Human rights law’ (1998) Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal, at 5; ‘1995 supplement to An Agenda for Peace’, A/50/60, 
§75; Millennium report of the secretary-General of the united nations: “we the Peoples”: The role of 
the united nations in the 21st century, (un department of Public Information, 2000), at 49.
10 Ius cogens norms are defined as “rules from which no derogation is permitted and which can be amended 
only by a new general norm of international law of the same value”, d. shelton ‘International law and 
“relative normativity”’ in M.d. evans, International Law (ouP, 4th edition, 2014) at 142. Article 50 of 
the vienna convention on the law of treaties (1966); see also International court of Justice, Barcelona 
Traction Case (second phase), IcJ reports (1970) 3, at 32. see also IlA final report (2004), 18; report 
of Mr Jose Maria Beneyto, ‘Accountability of International organizations for Human rights violations,’ 
Parliamentary Assembly of the council of europe, doc. 13370 (december 17, 2013); c; tomuschat, 
‘ensuring the survival of Mankind on the eve of a new century’ 62 Recueil des Cours (1999) 23 at 135.
11 It should be noted that ius cogens norms cannot only be human rights norms. for example, the 
prohibition to use force by states against other states constitutes similarly a peremptory norm. for 
the purpose of this research, however, human rights norms provide a more interesting starting point. 
see on ius cogens norms in general, for example, I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 
(ouP, 7th ed. 2008), 510-513; d. shelton ‘International law and “relative normativity” in M.d. evans, 
International Law (ouP, 4th edition, 2014) 142-152. 
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under international law under all circumstances; these norms include the prohibition of 
torture and the prohibition of slavery, for instance.
In the constituent documents of several international institutions, references can be found 
to human rights obligations. It depends from international institution to international 
institution what human rights (or other international) norms are considered to be binding, 
legally and/or morally. An institution may have incorporated human rights language and/
or commitments in its constituent documents, it may have joined treaties that contain 
human rights obligations and/or its various organs or agents may make reference to 
human rights norms in non-binding documents. However, one cannot deduce a general 
12 report of Mr Jose Maria Beneyto, ‘Accountability of International organizations for Human rights 
violations’ , council of europe, (2013), see its attachment ‘Background study which lead to council 
of europe Parliamentary Assembly resolution 1979 (Jan 2014) on the Accountability of International 
organizations’. 
13 In general, see the IlA report (2004), at 22; see also f. Mégret and f. Hoffmann ‘fostering Human 
rights Accountability: An ombudsman for the united nations (2005) Global Governance 317-318; see 
further Momirov, (2009) at 115-128.
14 see, for example, un charter, art. 24(2). This is however of a rather general nature. In un sc res. 
1244 (1999), it was held that protecting and promoting human rights was one of the main tasks of the 
international territorial administration in kosovo, §11 (j); similarly, see the report of the secretary-
General on the situation in east-timor in relation to the Administration to untAet, un doc 
s/1999/1029 (october 4, 1999), section Iv, and §29(h). It should be noted that in these instances the 
human rights language would rather focus on general obligations promoting and protecting human 
rights. It is not directly aimed at limiting the exercise of public powers to certain human rights 
obligations.
15 In general, multilateral rights-based treaties are only open for states to accede to. one of the exceptions 
is the Aarhus convention, which states in art. 17 that regional economic integration organizations may 
accede to the convention: 
 This convention shall be open for signature (…) by regional economic integration organizations 
constituted by sovereign states members of the economic commission for europe to which their 
member states have transferred competence over matters governed by this convention, including the 
competence to enter into treaties in respect of these matters. 
 The (then) european commission adopted the decision to accede to the Aarhus convention on 
february 17, 2005, [decision 2005/370/ec] and is party to the convention since May 2005. for the 
eu legislation implementing the Aarhus convention principles, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
aarhus/legislation.htm. The european union is similarly party to the un convention on the rights of 
Persons with disabilities, united nations, treaty series, vol. 2515, p. 3 (december 13, 2006); the eu 
adopted its formal confirmation on december 23, 2010. see further https://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/
people-disabilities/eu-crpd-framework in which the eu framework implementing the convention is 
explained. similarly, the council of europe adopted protocol 14, which started the process of allowing 
the eu to join the european convention on Human rights. see for the latest status https://www.echr.
coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/accessioneu&c 
16 Broader human rights norms are often mention, such as due process and fair trial, without specific 
reference to a particular treaty provision or regime. for example, see one of the latest un sc resolutions 
reaffirming the need of and framework for the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee and its 
ombudsperson review procedure:
 Reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the charter of the united nations 
and international law, including applicable international human rights law, international refugee law, 
and international humanitarian law, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts, stressing in this regard the important role the united nations plays in leading and coordinating 
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standard of being bound by human rights or by another accountability standard from 
these references alone. 
The committee on the Accountability of International organizations (1996-2004) of the 
International law Association (IlA) conducted an extensive study of what measures should 
be adopted to ensure the accountability of international organizations (Ios), which study 
aids in understanding whether general norms can be deduced from current international 
law practice. It should be noted that the 2004 IlA final report (IlA report) addresses 
the accountability of international intergovernmental organizations and therefore upholds a 
narrower definition than the definition of international institutions used in this research. 
said IlA report identified recommended rules and practices (rrPs) that contribute to 
ensuring the accountability of international organizations. These recommendations are 
based on two different types of sources: (1) primary rules of international and domestic law, 
and (2) rules of international institutions (that is, constituent instruments, decisions and 
resolutions adopted by the institution in question, and an institution’s established practice). 
However, the IlA report does not specify from what sources it deduces its recommended 
rules and practices. further, the rrPs constitute a mixture of existent and preferred, yet 
currently non-existent rules and practices (that is, de lege lata and de lege ferenda) without 
specifying whether the rule and/or practice referred to derives from an international 
this effort, (…) “Recognizing that development, security, and human rights are mutually reinforcing 
and are vital to an effective and comprehensive approach to countering terrorism, and underlining that 
a particular goal of counter-terrorism strategies should be to ensure sustainable peace and security. 
 Preamble, un sc res 2368 (2017).
17 According to the IlA constitution, its objective is: “the study, clarification and development of 
international law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international understanding and 
respect for international law”, article 3 of the constitution of the Association (adopted at the 77th 
conference, 2016), available at http://www.ila-hq.org/images/IlA/docs/constitution_english_adopted_
johannesburg_2016.pdf. As an international nGo, the IlA has a consultative status with various un 
specialized agencies. 
18 IlA, Accountability of International organizations, Berlin conference, final report (2004); see also 
I.f. dekker ‘Making sense of Accountability in International Institutional law (2007) 36(1) Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law 83 at 87. 
19 The definitional considerations as explained in the IlA final report (2004) at 4: 
 The committee’s focus ratione personae is on intergovernmental organisations in the traditional 
sense, i.e. created under international law by an international agreement amongst states, possessing a 
constitution and organs separate from its Member states. (report of the sixty-eighth IlA conference 
held at taipei, at p. 587). The committee’s work is intended also to cover organisations where not 
only states are members, but not to cover anomalous cases in which intergovernmental organisations 
do not possess a legal personality of their own in international law. since autonomous institutional 
arrangements established by treaty (treaty-organs) and entrusted with monitoring functions over 
the implementation of such treaties by the states parties to them generally have not been created 
as international legal persons, they are not covered by the present report unless stated otherwise. 
However, treaty organs are usually closely linked to Io-s and their functioning has raised a number of 
accountability questions of a similar nature to those relating to Io-s.
20 IlA final report (2004) at 7. 
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institution’s existing or preferred practice. regardless of these shortcomings, the report is 
considered to be an authoritative source, a good point of departure, for the analysis of the 
accountability of international organizations. 
This section therefore discusses the abovementioned rrPs for the first level of accountability 
(1.1.) and those identified in the context of remedies against international organizations 
(1.2). This first level of accountability is defined by the IlA to encompass:
the extent to which international [organizations], … are and should be subject to, or should 
exercise, forms of internal and external scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and 
subsequent liability and/or responsibility. 
The second and third level of accountability discussed in the IlA report address the 
responsibility for wrongful acts and the liability for lawful acts. Both notions are less 
21 Idem, at 6: 
 The general rubric “recommended rules and Practices” was specifically chosen so as not to prejudge 
whether any rrP should be seen as a recommendation for sound internal practice or whether it 
was operative on a legal level, and in the latter case whether it was de lege lata or de lege ferenda; no 
qualification of status under international law may be inferred from the use of the term “should”. 
Although many of the rrPs reflect existing rules of international law, the committee’s terms of 
reference did not preclude it from formulating rules constituting, to a reasonable extent, progressive 
development.
22 for a critical reflection on the approach adopted in the IlA final report, see, for example, I.G. dekker 
‘Accountability of International organizations: An evolving legal concept?’ in J. wouters and others 
(eds.) Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations (Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010), 23, 36. d. curtin and A. nollkaemper, ‘conceptualizing Accountability in International law and 
european law (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 at 19. for scholars who refer to 
the IlA report in the context of research focusing on the accountability of international institutions, 
see, for example, Momirov, (2009) who takes this definition as a point of departure for his analysis of 
the exercise of public power by international organizations in the context of international territorial 
administrations. A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial Administrations: a Public Law 
Approach (2009), 29 and further; see similarly, A. naudé fourie, World Bank Accountability: in Theory 
and Practise (2016), at 26-27. see also A. von Bogdandy and others, ‘developing the Publicness of Public 
International law’ in: The Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions (2010) 3 at 22-23, 
A. von Bogdandy, ‘General Principles of International Public Authority: sketching a research field’ in: 
The Exercise of Public Authority by international institutions (2010) 727, at 746-748 and further. see also 
the report by the rapporteur (J.M. Beneyto) of the coe Parliamentary Assembly committee on legal 
Affairs and Human rights, ‘Accountability of International organizations for Human rights violations’ 
(2013), which discusses the relevance of the IlA report in search of an accountability framework for 
international organizations.
23 This constitutes Part Iv of the IlA report; see for a discussion of the entire IlA final report (2004), for 
example, I.f. dekker ‘Making sense of Accountability in International Institutional law (2007) 36(1) 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 83-115. see also curtin and nollkaemper, ‘conceptualizing 
Accountability in International and european law’ (2005) 3-20; J. Brunnée, ‘International legal 
Accountability through the lens of the law of state responsibility’ 36(1) Netherlands Yearbook of 
International Law (2005), 21-56. 
24 emphasis added, IlA final report (2004) at 5. 
25 later, the question of responsibility was further developed in the Ilc draft Articles on the responsibility 
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relevant for this research because, in short, their scope is too limited in light of the adopted 
broad working definition of the concept of accountability, which contains both prospective 
and retrospective elements. 
The analysis conducted in the subsequent two paragraphs answers the question whether, and 
to what extent, the recommended rules and Practices provide legal standards to address 
the accountability deficit of international organizations that exercise public power directly 
affecting individuals. It answers in particular the question about the way in which individuals 
should be included. 
1.1. Recommended Rules and Practices: First Level of Accountability 
This paragraph discusses the recommended rules and Practices identified for the first 
level of accountability and the extent to which they are of relevance for an accountability 
framework for international institutions adopting decisions that affect individuals. The IlA 
committee identified eight distinctive relevant principles for this level of accountability: 
1. The principle of good governance
2. The principle of good faith 
3. The principles of constitutionality and institutional balance
4. The principle of supervision and control
5. The principle of stating the reasons for decisions or a particular course of action
6. The principle of procedural regularity
7. The principle of objectivity and impartiality
8. The principle of due diligence
some principles are more relevant than others in the context of this research and are therefore 
discussed in greater detail. In general, the principles can be divided into two groups: those 
that address the relation of international organizations with third parties, and those that 
impose constraints on an international organization’s exercise of public power irrespective 
of whom is affected by such exercise of public power. 
of International organizations, which were discussed in more detail in paragraph 2 of the Introduction. 
see above, chapter 1, in the text in and around footnote 80. 
26 see further chapter 1, section 6, in which the concept of accountability is defined for the purpose of this 
research. 
27 Paragraphs 1.1-1.3 address the recommended rules and practices as derived from the IlA report 
for the Accountability of International organizations vis-à-vis those affected. In section 2, the wider 
definition of international institutions is upheld. section 3 explains whether, and to what extent, this 
differentiation influences the conceptual Model. 
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The relation of international organizations with third parties 
In the context of the principle of good governance, the IlA committee identified six 
interconnected elements. The elements of transparency, of a participatory decision-making 
process, and of access to information address the relation of the international organizations 
with other actors, including third parties. The other three elements (a well-functioning 
international civil service, sound financial management and, lastly, sound reporting and 
evaluation) focus rather on the management of the international organization in question 
and not on the relation with external actors. The latter three will be discussed below in 
the context of constraints on the exercise of public power. The element of transparency is 
primarily applicable to the quasi-legislative procedures of international organizations. non-
state entities are to be accorded an “appropriate status” in relation to decisions that affect 
them. Although this element hints at inclusion, it focuses more on processes of normative 
development and not so much on administrative decision-making procedures. The element 
of participatory decision-making processes refers to the need to include an international 
organization’s member states in the decision-making procedures of its various organs. In 
such an organization’s plenary organs, all member states should be able to participate. In 
regard to decision-making by non-plenary organs, those member states whose interests 
are to be specifically affected should have the opportunity to present their views when it 
concerns decisions on coercive measures. Hence, the first two elements particularly address 
the relation of an international organization with its member states and do not address 
transparency or participatory duties that the organization may owe to affected third parties. 
The third element, access to information, encompasses both the obligations owed by an 
international organization to its member states and those owed to third parties. The IlA 
report lists an obligation to handle information in its possession with care and a duty to 
communicate policy strategies and activities of the (organs of the) institution to member 
states. further, the IlA report lists three points under the header of access to information 
that are of particular relevance in the context of this research:
28 The IlA explains that the good-governance principle is to provide “the necessary guidance as to the 
institutional and operational activities of an Io”, IlA final report (2004) at 8.
29 Idem, at 8. 
30 Idem. 
31 The IlA committee defines ‘coercion’ broadly: “The term ‘coercive’ is here used in its widest sense, 
including not just economic coercion, but also measures related to, for example, membership.” IlA 
final report (2004) at 9.
32 Idem, at 9-10, see particularly element 3(1), (4)-(7). 
33 In particular, the IlA report sets out under 10 that: 
 documents should be made available to member states, restrictions on access to information should 
be regularly reviewed; There is an obligation to formulate and publish general policy strategies; non-
plenary organs should provide information about their activities to all member states; institutions 
ought to regularly report on measures they have taken to implement measures on access to 
information.
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- International organizations when they engage in operational activities, whether it 
is of a peacekeeping, development, or humanitarian nature, should properly inform 
“individuals and groups whose interests are particularly affected by such an operation to 
enable them to make their point of view known in a timely fashion”. 
- International organizations should ensure that everyone has access to information held 
by the organization. Access may only be refused for “compelling reasons on limited 
grounds such as privacy, commercial and industrial secrecy, or protection of the security 
of [member states] or private parties.”
- International organizations should protect confidential information that came into their 
possession and, as a result, should not disclose this information to third parties without 
the consent of the owner of the information. 
The IlA report considers the duty to provide reasons to be pivotal in the accountability of 
international organizations. It describes it as follows:
compliance with this principle will contribute to greater transparency, it will have an impact 
on the kind of procedure for the decision-making process, it will reduce the possibility to 
misuse power, and it will undoubtedly enhance the chances of accountability to operate 
properly, inter alia through the exercise of supervision and control, even when no mechanism 
of judicial review is available or has been put into operation. 
International organizations have a duty to state the reasons for an adopted decisions whenever 
it is considered necessary from the point of view of their accountability. when decisions 
are made that “directly and immediately [affect] rights and obligations of particular [s]tates 
and non-[s]tate entities”, an organization has the obligation to not merely provide general 
reasons but to provide the specific reasons for that particular decision, which includes “the 
principal issues of law and fact upon which the decision is based.” 
In conclusion, the IlA report recognizes a wide duty to inform: to duly inform those 
potentially affected by certain types of operational activities, to provide access to information, 
and to protect the confidentiality of information in its possession. furthermore, there should 
be a possibility to present one’s view in relation to certain operational activities, and there is 
a duty to provide reasons. The duty to inform is more extensive when decisions are adopted 
that directly affect the rights and obligations of, for example, non-state entities. 
34 IlA final report (2004), element 3(3), access to information.
35 Idem, element 3(4), access to information.
36 Idem, at 9, element 3(3) access to information. 
37 Idem at 14. 
38 Idem.
39 IlA final report (2004), 13. 
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Constraints on the exercise of public powers by international institutions 
The majority of the principles in the IlA report addresses the proper functioning of an 
international organization and the proper exercise of public powers by the international 
organization in question with some being more relevant to this research than others. 
The principle of good faith establishes criteria as to how public power should be exercised. 
for instance, good faith implies that organs and its agents may not abuse the rights 
accorded to them. The IlA committee links the principle of good faith to the need for 
standards of honesty, fairness, reasonableness and “consistency in treatment in like cases.” 
The principle of constitutionality and institutional balance refers to the duty of organizations 
to exercise public power in accordance with its own constitution and to organs and agents 
not being allowed to exceed their mandate. In other words, the IlA committee recognizes 
the constituent document of each institution as the source of its exercise of public powers 
and as the main factor of constraint for these powers. The principle of objectivity and 
impartiality requires an Io to be impartial and objective in its exercise of public powers; this 
principle is applicable to the decision-making bodies and review bodies of the international 
organization in question. In the execution of their tasks, officers of an organization’s organ 
are expected to act in a fair and impartial manner. The principle of supervision and control 
refers to the power that parent organs (should) have over their subsidiary organs. The 
IlA committee stipulates that “parent organs have a duty to exercise a degree of control 
and supervision over subsidiary organs which corresponds to the functional autonomy 
granted.” In practice, this could imply that a parent organ may overrule a decision 
adopted by a subsidiary organ if it is of the opinion that the decision contravenes any 
applicable legal (internal) rules. considering the level of autonomy exercised by several 
subsidiary organs, and/or the complex relation with the parent organ, however, a reporting 
or monitoring function seems better. The principle of procedural regularity implies that 
international organizations should have a regulatory framework in place that is applicable 
to its organs, subsidiary organs and/or agents to prevent abuse of discretionary powers, to 
avoid errors of fact or of law, and to ensure respect for due process and fair treatment in 
an international organization’s exercise of public power, especially when organs exercise 
discretionary powers. The principle of due diligence refers to the fundamental obligation 
that an international organizations’ member states and agents have to ensure the lawfulness 
of actions and decisions of (organs of) that particular international organization. It 
40 IlA final report (2004), 12.
41 Idem.
42 IlA final report (2004), 13.
43 Idem, at 14.
44 IlA final report (2004), 13. 
45 Idem.
46 IlA final report (2004), 14. 
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further seems to impose a duty on members of an international organization to “exercise 
adequate supervision of the [international organizations ]”. This requires scrutiny of the 
extent to which the organization acts to protect not only its own interests and that of other 
members but also to protect the interests of third parties. In the context of the principle 
of good governance, the IlA report additionally stipulates the need for a well-functioning 
international civil service and ensure good financial management. The latter refers to an 
international institution’s duty to adopt a transparent and consistent budgetary process, 
which facilitates proper internal and external auditing and accountability. The last element 
of good governance, reporting and evaluation, refers to the necessity of regularly having 
internal evaluations in the organization. 
In conclusion, the IlA report identifies the recommended rules and practices for internally 
and externally scrutinizing and/or monitoring the conduct of international organizations 
regardless of questions of liability and responsibility. As the analysis showed, the majority of 
the rrPs focus on the proper exercise of public power – that is, the limits and/or scope of the 
(limited) recognized constraints and how an international organization should be managed/
organized internally. There is, though, a duty to inform third parties and a duty to provide 
reasons for decisions adopted.
overall, these principles serve as broad parameters for regulating the exercise of public 
power of international organizations. The next paragraph will address the rrPs for remedies 
against international organizations, as discussed in the IlA report. However, as the next 
section will show, there are less rrPs to rely on. 
1.2. Recommended Rules and Practices for Remedies against International Organizations
The IlA report also addresses the recommended rules and practices for remedies against 
international organizations, which refers to “the implementation of the accountability regime 
i.e. the ways of undertaking remedial action against [international organizations], and the 
various difficulties faced by those claiming to raise that accountability”. The term remedies 
in the IlA report refers to: 
an acceptable outcome arrived at through a procedure instigated by an aggrieved party and is 
intended to include, in addition to remedies of a formal kind, other means of redress which 
47 This refers to the obligation to ensure that the secretariat of an Io complies with:
 the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity and enforce the principles of impartiality, 
loyalty to the aims and purposes of the Io, functional independence and discretion, and the principles 
of equitable geographical representation and gender balance 
 IlA final report (2004), 10. 
48 IlA final report (2004), 11.
49 Idem, element 6, at 12. 
50 IlA final report (2004) at 32. 
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might be more appropriate to the circumstances of the case e.g. prospective changes of policy 
or practice by the [international organization]. 
In general, the remedies are provided in relation to the three levels of accountability discussed 
in the IlA report. The right to a remedy – a general principle of law and basic human rights 
standard according to the IlA – also applies to international organizations in their dealings 
with non-state parties. Private parties are explicitly mentioned as being entitled to file a 
claim for an international organization’s accountability. The IlA report sets out, “[a]s a 
pre-remedial measure, Io-s should inform parties potentially affected by their decisions or 
actions of the accountability mechanisms that are open to them.” furthermore, no legal 
interest needs to be proven in order to trigger the accountability of an organization. 
The section of the IlA report on the rrPs for remedies is slightly different than the 
previous two sections, which is not surprising considering the law and practice being less 
developed in this respect. The clarity and detail with which the rules are set out suggest a 
difference, conceptually and normatively. In general terms, the IlA committee explains that 
the remedies could be both legal and non-legal; however, they should – at a minimum – 
be “adequate, effective and in the case of legal remedies enforceable”. The IlA committee 
does not further define when a remedy is deemed effective and/or adequate. International 
organizations have an obligation to establish a remedial mechanism for those affected by 
their exercise of public power. A lack of remedies, termed in the IlA report as “a denial 
of justice”, constitutes a separate ground for an organization’s international responsibility. 
further, an international organization has a duty to inform those affected by its decision of 
the available remedial mechanisms. The substantive outcome of a remedial action initiated 
by private claimants against an international organization should be made public. And 
lastly, the IlA committee noted that: 
Io-s should also set up a mechanism to determine criteria for offering ex gratia payments 
as a speedy and alternative means of remedial action towards non-state parties claiming 
[organizational] liability/responsibility.
51 Idem, at 32. It should be noted that the IlA report’s section on remedies is largely based on a book by 
wellens: k. wellens, Remedies against International Organisations (cuP 2002). 
52 IlA final report, Part Iv, section 1(1). 
53 IlA report, 68th session IlA conference in taipei, at 600-601; Berlin conference, at 5. 
54 IlA final report, at 32. 
55 IlA report, 68th session at 603.
56 IlA final report (2004), Part Iv, section 1(2), final report at 33. 
57 IlA final report (2004), Part Iv, section 1(4), at 33. 
58 Idem, Part Iv, section 1(3). 
59 IlA final report (2004), Part Iv, section 1(6). 
60 Idem. 
61 IlA final report (2004), at 33. 
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In the design of an accountability framework, the IlA committee expects that international 
organizations keep the balance between “preserving the necessary autonomy in decision-
making of international organizations and guaranteeing that the international organizations 
will not be able to avoid accountability.” 
one may conclude that, although the IlA report stipulates that remedies offered by 
international organizations to those affected should be adequate and effective, it does not 
give much further guidance as to its content and scope. 
1.3. Conclusions
The IlA report constitutes the first extensive and authoritative study of the practice of 
international organizations in the recognition and application of accountability principles. 
Although the normative relevance of the IlA report is limited by the narrow definition 
of international organizations it adopted, the introduction to the IlA report does hint at 
the fact that other institutions may be expected to face similar problems and that the rrPs 
identified in the IlA report can be of relevance in this context. The principles recognized by 
the IlA committee provide further guidance as to what is required to hold an international 
organization to account. There is a duty to inform, to ensure access to information for 
everyone, and to give those affected a timely opportunity to present their views. International 
organizations have a duty to provide reasons for their adopted decisions. furthermore, they 
have to provide remedies to third parties in relation to the three levels of accountability, 
which remedies must be adequate and effective. However, the emphasis in the report lies 
on the proper exercise of public power, which is reflected in the requirement of good faith, 
procedural regularity, and internal and external scrutiny and monitoring of international 
organizations. 
The next section will examine whether, and to what extent, the various (legal) theories 
have recognized and addressed the problem of the accountability deficit of international 
institutions (that is, not only international organizations) vis-à-vis those affected and the 
extent to which principles of a similar nature can be identified. 
2. Existing Theoretical Approaches Addressing the Accountability 
Problem of International Institutions 
This section will discuss the way in which the different theories mentioned above contribute 
to understanding and addressing the accountability deficit of international institutions 
exercising public power that directly affects individuals. This research identifies two broad 
62 Idem. 
63 IlA final report (2004), at 5. 
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categories: theories focusing on global or transnational administrative law (2.1) and those 
with a constitutional mind-set (2.2). These theories or (theoretical) approaches were chosen 
as they address the phenomenon of global governance, the role of the individual and/or of 
the international institution within the international legal order. with regard to each theory 
and/or approach, the following questions are guiding in the analysis:
•	 Does	the	theory	recognize	the	accountability	problem	that	international	institutions	face	
while exercising powers that directly affect individuals? 
•	 Does	the	theory	study	or	address	the	relation	of	the	institution	vis-à-vis	third	parties	/	
affected individuals? 
•	 Does	 the	 theory	 provide/develop/recognize	 legal	 standards	 for	 the	 accountability	 of	
international institutions vis-à-vis those affected – for instance for the way in which 
individuals have to be included? 
2.1. Global Administrative Law
In addressing the phenomenon of global governance, Global Administrative law (GAl) 
focuses on questions of accountability: on the extent to which a global administrative body 
“gives account and another [actor] has the power or authority to impose consequences as a 
result”. GAl seeks to explore and map current and emerging accountability practices using 
a framework borrowed from (domestic) administrative law. GAl offers a lens, a language, 
to analyze what is happening in terms of governance at an international level. The language 
is derived from the tools of domestic administrative law, as described by krisch:
Administrative law serves as an inspiration and contrast: it serves as a framework for identifying 
converging and diverging developments in institutional practice, and it helps us sharpen our 
sensitivity for the problems and possibilities of establishing accountability mechanisms on 
64 for those who are interested in a broader discussion of the respective theories, reference to the main 
literature on the topic can be found in the footnotes below.
65 even though there is a variety of projects addressing the phenomenon of global governance from 
an administrative perspective, this book focuses on new york university’s research project on this 
subject. The Global Administrative law Project of the Institute for International law and Justice, 
new york university school of law; see for an overview on the Global Administrative law Project: B. 
kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’ (2005) 68(3-4) Law 
& Contemporary Problems 15; see for research conducted under the umbrella of GAl, www.iilj.org. 
see for other projects, for instance, IrPA and also the IPA project in Heidelberg, which focuses on the 
exercise of international public authority. The latter aims to “identify, reconstruct and develop” a theory 
of international public law that governs the exercise of international public authority. see, for example. 
A. von Bogdandy, M. Goldmann and I. venzke ‘from Public International to International Public law 
– translating world Public opinion into International Public Authority’ (sept 18, 2015).
66 n. krisch quoting Black: n. krisch, ‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional Ambition’ 
(2009) LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 10/2009, london school of economics and 
Political science available at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm at 12; J. Black ‘constructing 
and contesting legitimacy and Accountability in Polycentric regulatory regimes’ (2008) Regulation & 
Governance 137 at 150. 
67 n. krisch, ‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional Ambition’ (2009) at 12. 
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the global level. Through reflection on transferability of domestic concepts, the similarities 
and dissimilarities in both institutional structures and environmental conditionals come into 
much clearer view. 
As defined in the project of the Institute for International law and Justice, GAl 
encompasses “the legal mechanisms, principles, and practices, along with supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative 
bodies.” In short, GAl scholars contend that administrative principles should be applied 
whenever administrative action is taken by a global administrative body. kuo explains that a 
GAl framework has as its aim “to make decisions on global regulatory issues more rational, 
acceptable and thus legitimate, by making global administration more participatory and 
more accountable.” Administrative action is broadly defined as including “all rule-making 
and adjudications or other decisions of particular matters that are neither treaty-making nor 
simple dispute settlement between disputing parties.” GAl studies all global administrative 
law bodies that take administrative actions, such as national, international and regional 
bodies as well as public and private bodies. The focus within GAl literature is on procedural 
principles:
The focus of the field of global administrative law is not, therefore, the specific content of 
substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or possible principles, procedural rules 
and reviewing and other mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participation, 
and assurance of legality in global governance.
within GAl, the term procedural participation is broadly defined as the right of affected 
individuals to have their views and information considered before a decision is taken by an 
administrative body. The principle of a reasoned decision refers to the decision-making 
68 Idem, krisch at 13.
69 B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, and J.B. wiener, ‘foreword: Global Governance as Administration 
- national and transnational Approaches to Global Administrative law’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemporary 
Problems 1 at 5; see also B. kingsbury, n. krisch, r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative 
law’, IILJ working paper 2004/1 at 5, in which GAl is defined as comprising “the structures, procedures 
and normative standards for regulatory decision-making including transparency, participation, and 
review, and the rule-governed mechanisms for implementing these standards”.
70 Ming-sung kuo, ‘taming Governance with legality: critical reflections upon Global Administrative 
law as small-c Global constitutionalism’ (2011-2012) 44 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 
55 at 84.
71 At 6; This definition derives from r.B. stewart, ‘us administrative law: a resource for global administrative 
law?’ available at http://www.iilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/stewart-u.s.-Administrative-
law-2005-1.pdf. It also gives insight into one of GAl’s critiques that the research project is a largely 
American undertaking, based on American administrative law conceptions. see further below for a 
discussion of this critique. 
72 B B. kingsbury, n. krisch, and r.B. stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’, at 15-16.
73 Idem at 25. The world Anti-doping Agency and the un security council are mentioned as examples of 
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authorities’ obligation to respond to the major arguments made by the affected parties when 
the former come to a decision. within GAl’s context, the principle of review generally refers 
to a review by a court or other independent tribunal of the decision made by the decision-
making authority in question. kingsbury, krisch and stewart, however, noted already in 
2004 that it is questionable: 
how far a right to a review is accepted in different governance areas, with what limitations, 
and what institutional mechanisms it encompasses, are all unresolved questions. In several 
important areas, despite strong calls for effective review mechanisms, review mechanisms 
have not been instituted. 
Principles of GAl should, however, not be assessed in isolation from constitutional and more 
substantive principles. kingsbury, krisch and stewart identify the substantive standards of 
proportionality, means/ends rationality, avoidance of unnecessarily restrictive means, and 
legitimate expectations as standards of GAl. Their reasoning is the following:
especially where individual rights are placed at the forefront, global administrative law might 
be expected to embody substantive standards for administrative action, like those applied in 
a domestic context. 
a (limited) right to be heard. It should be noted, however, that the working paper setting out the contours 
of the principles of GAl does not recognize transparency as a separate pillar of global administrative, 
however, procedural participation, reasoned decisions and review are recognized as emerging GAl 
principles. see B. kingsbury, n. krisch, and r.B. stewart, (2004) at 24, they (decisional transparency 
and access to information) are however considered to be: 
 important foundations for the effective exercise of participation rights and rights of review. They 
also promote accountability directly by exposing administrative decisions and relevant documents to 
public and peer scrutiny. 
 In this GAl working paper, transparency and the duty to inform are considered to be essential 
components of procedural participation (at 39).
74 B. kingsbury, n. krisch, and r.B. stewart, (2004) at 25.
75 Idem, at 26. The examples mentioned are the world Bank Inspection Panel, which has a mandate to 
receive complaints from project-affected people and to assess the compliance of the Bank’s management 
with the Bank’s rules in their exercise of power, and the court of Arbitration for sports, where those 
sanctioned for alleged use of doping within sports have a right to appeal the underlying decision.
76 kingsbury, krisch, stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’, at 26.
77 The next section will further address the more substantive norms as recognized in the context of 
constitutionalist law approach and how the constitutionalist and global administrative approach are 
complementary to each other.
78 kingsbury, krisch, stewart, ‘The emergence of Global Administrative law’, (2004) at 26.
79 Idem.
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In general, global administrative law presupposes that, for special regimes, different rules 
may apply. for instance, kingsbury and casini argued in relation to the exercise of public 
power by international institutions in emergency actions that global administrative law 
principles would usually apply but that, due to the context, the scope might vary:
In addition to review, other global administrative law principles such as transparency, 
participation, and reason-giving may be applicable to Io emergency actions, but with specific 
limits and inflections for different Ios and in different circumstances. 
In other words, depending on the context in which an institution operates, the way in which 
the principles are applied may vary. further, there are certain constraints, or trade-offs, to be 
taken into account when applying a GAl framework to ensure that demands for remedies 
do not become unrealistic or potentially counter-productive in relation to the administrative 
action taken by the administrative body. 
More recently, certain GAl scholars have started to consider the inclusion of third parties 
and the way GAl can contribute normatively and methodologically to advancing more 
inclusion. stewart identified four inter-related normative strands of GAl: improving the 
effectiveness of regulatory regimes, promoting democracy, promoting more public regard 
in decisions, and securing rights. The latter two are the most relevant for this research and 
address the role of the international institution vis-à-vis those affected. first, stewart refers 
to how GAl can prevent a global body’s unlawful or arbitrary administrative action that have 
a significant effect on individuals. Global administrative law requires “a form of regulatory 
due process” from administrative bodies when they exercise public power: an “impartial 
and accurate execution of general rules in individual cases”. second, stewart discusses the 
problem of disregard in global governance. often the interests and concerns of vulnerable 
groups, less well-resourced societal interests and vulnerable individuals are not taken into 
80 Idem, at 28.
81 B. kingsbury & l. casini, ‘Global Administrative law dimensions of International organizations law’ 
(2010) Global Administrative Law Series, IILJ Working Paper 2009/9, at 12.
82 stewart ‘The normative dimensions and Performance of Global Administrative law’ (2015) at 500.
83 democracy according to stewart refers to assigning a significant role in the decision-making procedures 
being short of voting right to stakeholders (stewart 2015, 504). It mainly refers to the global bodies 
stipulating the need for administrative principles in ‘country-based distributed’ administrations with 
the objective of making such domestic decision-making procedures more democratic. one example 
would be the role of the world Bank Inspection Panel in setting ‘democratic’ standards also for host 
governments in their decision-making procedures.
84 stewart, ‘The normative dimensions and Performance of Global Administrative law’ (2015) at 503. 
85 Idem, stewart, at 503. 
86 Idem. 
87 It should be noted that stewart makes the argument in relation to all administrative actions, thus 
regulatory and decision-making in individual situations, while this research is only addressing the 
decision-making in individual situations.
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account by the various bodies, which may result in decision-making that causes unjustified 
harm to the people affected. stewart therefore argues that applying the GAl principles to 
these administrative actions may ensure better regard for the interests of those affected: 
transparency, participation, reason-giving and review can enable individuals targeted with 
serious deprivations and representatives of weak and marginalized groups and disregarded 
environmental and social interests to have decision-makers consider their views and account 
for them in making decisions
The GAl literature, however, does not further define whose interests should be taken into 
account or how the principles should be applied and/or interpreted in the given context. This 
research shares the normative premise that administrative law-like principles can enhance 
the accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected and ensure their 
(further) inclusion. 
nevertheless, the GAl framework does not currently offer a sufficiently defined yardstick 
to analyze the accountability processes of international institutions. GAl literature focuses 
primarily on how the identified GAl principles are realized in a given context (for example 
in an international institution) and spends less time on defining these principles or justifying 
their origin. In short, it lacks a proper horizontal analysis of existing relevant administrative 
88 stewart, at 220. 
89 Although the mechanisms defined are quite similar to those described in the context of this research, 
stewart does not categorize the former under the accountability. In short, he argues that there are only 
five accountability mechanisms (that is, “electoral, hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, and legal”) and that 
only the legal accountability mechanism is able to a certain extent to remedy the disregard by offering 
a right to a review (stewart, 2015, 248). nevertheless, stewart argues that often the legal accountability 
is not sufficient to ensure that proper regard is given to the interests of all affected. He identified 
seven other mechanisms that can promote regard, competition commodity markets, competition in 
regulatory markets, peer reputational influence, public reputational influence, transparency, non-
decisional participation and reason-giving.
90 stewart, ‘The normative dimensions and Performance of Global Administrative law’ (2015), at 502.
91 e.g. stewart noted that:
 GAl scholarship has largely taken a positivist stance and disaggregated approach, analyzing 
the regulatory programs, structures, and decision-making arrangements of particular global 
administrative bodies, their distributed administrations, and their inter-institutional relations. 
Assessments of GAl’s performance have generally been rosy.
 stewart ‘The normative dimensions and Performance of Global Administrative law’ (2015) at 499; it 
should be noted that the GAl principles first identified in 2004 were considered to emerge from practice, 
but that its contours were not yet clear, nor was its practice uniform. for example, kingsbury and casini 
reason that the specific structured machinery of international organizations aimed to promote and protect 
human rights requires a much more systematic analysis from a global administrative law perspective to 
gain perspective on how the principles are shaped and recognized within these administrative bodies, 
B. kingsbury & l. casini, ‘Global Administrative law dimensions of International organizations law’ 
(2010), at 13-14. kuo also argued in 2012 that “while the values cherished in GAl are widely accepted, 
how they are implemented and translated into diverse administrative fields is not beyond contestation”, 
kuo, ‘taming Governance with legality: critical reflections upon Global Administrative law as 
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principles with defined externalized elements of a yardstick. In the analyses of the practice 
of administrative bodies, the yardstick used is often implicit, which may potentially be a 
problem, particularly when one considers that the GAl project has been criticized for how 
it conceptualizes law. According to somek, there is a strong influence in the approach to 
administrative law from the American legal culture; it is therefore argued that the focus within 
GAl is more on the establishment and exercise of regulatory authority than on individual 
acts. regardless of the question how to define law and the issue of legal obligation, one 
may also argue that, perhaps at this stage, a yardstick with clearly defined elements cannot 
be expected from GAl; moreover, one may also doubt whether this is its aspiration. The 
majority of the work focuses rather on regulatory governance, which seems to require more 
open-ended principles. In this research, as the next paragraph will demonstrate, the GAl 
principles complement the broader constitutionalist values that together form the public law 
approach, the lens used for the survey of generally recognized inclusionary governance 
norms. 
2.2. Constitutionalization of International Law  
Global constitutionalism does not refer to one particular research project, it rather is an 
umbrella term referring to various approaches taken in academia, which term analyzes 
developments in the global public sphere through some form of constitutionalist lens. central 
small-c Global constitutionalism’ (2011-2012) at 94.
92 The central article dealing with the concept of law in global administrative law is from kingsbury 
(2009), B. kingsbury, ‘The concept of law in Global Administrative law’ (2009) 20 European Journal 
of International Law 23-57; for its critique, see particularly A. somek, ‘The concept of law in Global 
Administrative law: a reply to Benedict kingsbury’ (2009) 20 EJIL 985-995; Ming-sung kuo, ‘The 
concept of law in Global Administrative law: a reply to Benedict kingsbury’ (2009) 20 European 
Journal of International Law 997-1004. 
93 A. somek, ‘The concept of law in Global Administrative law: a reply to Benedict kingsbury’ (2009) 
at 985.
94 see also daugirdas, who reasons in two articles how international law binds international institutions 
and why international institutions may comply with non-binding norms. The latter is discussed by 
daugirdas in the context of the Ilc Articles on the responsibility of International organizations, k. 
daugirdas, ‘How and why International law Binds International organizations’ (2016) 57 Harvard 
International Law Journal 325; k. daugirdas, ‘reputation and the responsibility of International 
organizations’ (2014) 25(4) European Journal of International Law 991-1018. similarly, krisch explained 
that much of global regulatory governance takes the form of officially non-binding norms and “many 
of the procedural developments GAl describes are not the result of binding rules either. yet they often 
share many characteristics of law and many of the elements of its particular internal morality.” krisch, 
‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional Ambition’ (2009) at 20. 
95 further, the functional similarity in how a domestic actor exercises this type of public power and how 
it is exercised at the global level may be questioned, which may justify a further differentiating between 
the principles. see section 2 of chapter 1, in which the functional similarity was discussed of the way 
in which domestic actors exercise public power directly affecting individuals and the way in which 
international institutions exercise public power that affects individuals. 
96 The conclusions of section 2.2 and section 3 will further demonstrate how the theories and the IlA 
report are considered in the development of the conceptual framework for inclusionary governance. 
97 A. wiener, A.f. lang jr., J. tully, M. Poiares Maduro and M. kumm, ‘Global constitutionalism: Human 
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to any constitutionalism theory is the enabling and constraining function of a constitution. 
However, often “contributions address [issues of constitutional theory] without a definite 
conception of the complex normative concepts of constitution and constitutionalism”. 
This research understands constitutionalization to refer to the shift from globalized towards 
constitutionalized international relations. As discussed by Peters, constitutionalization in 
the field of international law refers to the “gradual emergence of constitutionalist features in 
international law”, which is expected to “compensate for globalization-induced constitutionalist 
deficits on the national level”. In other words, it refers to a process that in turn refers to the 
“emergence, creation, and identification of constitution-like elements.” 
constitutionalism refers more to a “constitutional mindset”. In general, the normative 
agenda of Global Constitutionalism (Gc) is more ambitious as it refers to a legal system in:
...which the different national, regional and functional regimes form the building blocks 
of the international community that is underpinned by a core value system common to all 
communities and embedded in a variety of decentralized legal structures for its enforcement.
rights democracy and the rule of law’ (editorial) (2010) Global Constitutionalism 1(1) 1 at 4-6.
98 d. Bodanksy, ‘Is there an International environmental constitution’ 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies (2008) 565 at 572. As described by Bodansky, it is possible “to have either constitutions 
without constitutionalism or constitutionalism without constitutions.” 
99 In general, the essence of a constitution is to “create, legitimize, allocate and check power” r. Hirsch, 
‘editorial: from comparative constitutional law to comparative constitutional studies’ (2013) I•CON 
1 at 2.
100 s. Besson, ‘whose constitution(s)? International law, constitutionalism, and democracy’ in: J. l. 
dunoff and J.P. trachtmann, Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global 
Governance (cambridge university Press 2009), 381 at 383. she further argues that:
 Most discussions of international constitutionalism still rely, however, on many a prioris in national 
constitutional theory without questioning or reinterpreting them. Basic constitutional questions 
like those of the constituent and constituted power, those of the values and interest it is meant to 
share in the constitutionalization process … are often settled very intuitively by reference to positive 
international law or simply assumed to be self-evident. The problem is that they are not, and their 
reinterpretation in the international context actually lies at the core of any constitutional inquiry. 
(383)
101 A. Peters, ‘The Merits of Global constitutionalism’ 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies (2009) 
397-411, cited in A. wiener and others, ‘Global constitutionalism: Human rights democracy and the 
rule of law’ (editorial) (2010) Global Constitutionalism 1(1) 1 at 4. 
102 k. Milewicz, ‘emerging Patterns of Global constitutionalization: towards a conceptual framework’ 
(2009) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 413 at 420-421.
103 constitutionalism is differently defined by the various scholars. for instance, neil walker defined it as
 constitutionalism is a deeply contested but indispensable symbolic and normative frame for thinking 
about the problems of viable and legitimate regulations of the complexity overlapping political 
communities of a post-westphalian world. 
 n. walker, ‘Post-national constitutionalism and the Problem of translation’ in: J.H.H. weiler and M. 
wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism beyond the State (cambridge university Press 2003), 53.
104 M. koskenniemi, ‘constitutionalism as Mindset: reflections on kantian Themes about International 
law and Globalization’ 9 Theoretical Inquiries in Law (2007) at 18-19. 
105 e. de wet, ‘The role of european courts in the development of a Hierarchy of norms within 
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dunoff and trachtmann, who adopt a more functionalist approach to constitutionalism, 
argue that constitutionalism “can provide a set of conceptual tools and inquiries that scholars 
can use to identify and evaluate constitutional developments in various international 
domains.” In this regard, the functionalist approach resembles the constitutionalization of 
international law’s approach to international law. regardless of the approach adopted, the key 
question is what values or which conceptual tools fall within the ambit of constitutionalism. 
There is extensive academic debate on which principles and/or human rights norms (should) 
form part of the constitutional principles guiding the international legal system. The main 
reasoning is that constitutionalism embraces two sets of norms: formal norms – rule of law 
elements – that enable and constrain the exercise of public power by governing authorities 
and, secondly, a set of substantive norms aimed at guaranteeing fundamental rights to 
individuals. The rule of law reflects a common idea across various constitutional systems 
and refers (at a minimum) to the fact that domestic “bodies act according to the prescriptions 
of law, and [that] law is structured according to principles restricting arbitrariness.” There 
International law: evidence of constitutionalisation’ (2009) European Constitutional Law Review 284 
at 287; see also Milewicz, who reasons that constitutionalism goes beyond the simple articulation of a 
constitution’s formal rules; instead, it ‘defines rights of, and obligations to, individuals, and thus refers 
to human dignity and the guarantee of fundamental rights to individuals’. Milewicz, ‘emerging Patterns 
of Global constitutionalization: towards a conceptual framework’ (2009) 413 at 419.
106 J.l. dunoff and J.P. trachtman, ‘A functional Approach to International constitutionalization’ in J.l. 
dunoff and J.P. trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World: Constitutionalism, International Law and Global 
Governance (cambridge, cambridge university Press 2009) 1 at 4. 
107 Milewicz, ‘emerging Patterns of Global constitutionalization: towards a conceptual framework’ 
(2009), at 423; see also M. kumm, ‘The legitimacy of International law: A constitutionalist framework 
of Analysis’ European Journal of International Law (2004) 907-9. 
108 waldron adopts, for instance, a wider definition and reasons that the rule of law generally has four 
elements: 
 (1) the power is exercised within a constraining framework of public norms; (2) there are general 
rules that are promulgated in advance so that individuals know beforehand what is required, what 
the legal consequences of their actions will be, and what they can rely on so far as official action is 
concerned; (3) there have to be courts that operate according to recognized standards of procedural 
due process and/or natural justice. said courts also offer an impartial and independent forum 
where disputes can be resolved and which allow people an opportunity to present evidence and 
make arguments challenging the legality of official action, in particular when it impacts on essential 
interests concerning life, liberty, or economic well-being; and (4) a principle of legal equality, which 
ensures that the law is the same for everyone, that everyone has access to the courts, and that no one 
is above the law. 
 J. waldron, ‘Are sovereigns entitled to the Benefit of the International rule of law’ (2011) 22 European 
Journal of International Law 315 at 317.
109 A. sajo, ‘limiting government: An Introduction to constitutionalism’ (central european university 
Press 1999) at 205, quoted in k. Milewicz, ‘emerging Patterns of Global constitutionalization: towards a 
conceptual framework’ (2009); see also t. koopmans, (Courts and Political Institutions: a Comparative 
View (cambridge: cambridge university Press 2003) at 245), who argues that constitutionalism refers 
to an exercise of powers that “are not exercised arbitrarily, reflecting the mere will of the political leaders 
of the day, but in accordance with the law, which creates or recognizes permanent institutions and 
organizes the powers to be exercised by them.” Already in 1788, Madison argued along similar lines: 
 If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external 
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is, however, still quite some discussion what the rule-of-law concept should include and the 
difference between a international and national rule of law. chesterman argues that, over 
time, three core elements have emerged from the rule of law: the government of laws, the 
supremacy of the law, and equality before the law. Those that uphold a more substantive 
understanding of the rule of law, beyond its formal understanding, regard it:
… more broadly as a set of ideals, whether understood in terms of protection of human rights, 
specific forms of organized government, or particular economic arrangements such as free 
market capitalism. 
regardless whether it falls within the substantive understanding of the rule of law or not, 
constitutionalism’s second set of norms are generally the substantive rights that individuals 
should enjoy vis-à-vis public authorities. There is quite some discussion as to which norms 
should be covered. nevertheless, there is broader consensus that, at a minimum, it includes ius 
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
 J. Madison, ‘The federalist no. 51- The structure of Government Must furnish the Proper checks and 
Balances Between different departments’ (1788) Independent Journal, http://www.constitution.org/
fed/federa51.htm; H.l.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (oxford university Press 1994).
110 see, for example, e. Mak and s. taekema, ‘The european union’s rule of law Agenda: Identifying 
its core and contextualizing its Application (2016) 8 Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 25 at 26-30; 
J.e. Alvarez, ‘International organizations and the rule of law’ IILJ Working Paper 2016/4 (Global 
Administrative Law Series) available at www.iilj.org; The secretary General of the un stated that the 
rule of law in the national context refers to: 
 a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, 
including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced 
and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural 
and legal transparency. 
 un secretary General, ‘report of the un secretary General on the rule of law and transitional 
Justice in conflict and Post-conflict societies’ un doc s/2004/616, at 6. for an elaborative discussion 
of how international rule of law “understands, accepts, or resists the national rule of law” (at 269), 
see M. kanetake, ‘The Interfaces between the national and International rule of law: the case of 
un targeted sanctions (2012) International Organizations Law Review 267 at 268-280. see also M. 
kumm ‘International law in national courts: The International rule of law and the limits of the 
Internationalist Model’ (2003-2004) 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 19-32.
111 s. chesterman, ‘An International rule of law?’ (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
331-361; nyu law school, Public law research Paper no. 08-11 at 15; see also A.v. dicey, Lectures 
Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan 1st ed. 1885), 171, discussed in 
chesterman (2008). J. Madison explained the danger of lack of separation of powers: “the accumulation 
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands … may justly be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny.” J. Madison, ‘The particular structure of the new government and the 
distribution of power among its different parts’ (1788) Federalist 47. 
112 chesterman, at 13.
AccountABIlIty of InternAtIonAl InstItutIons: A concePtuAl Model for InclusIonAry GovernAnce
cogens norms. de wet does warn that, noting the limited category of ius cogens norms and 
the debate concerning the erga omnes status (and the customary international law) of human 
rights norms, the international value system is very limited today. regardless of precisely 
which elements are covered by a constitutional theory, one cannot in general expect the exact 
same constitutional elements at an international level as can be expected at a national level. In 
other words, the context in which international institutions operate ought to be taken account. 
There are, however, certain constraints to the normative relevance of norms identified in 
the context of constitutionalist theories. first, constitutionalist approaches focus more on 
the legitimacy of international law or law making, and on the legitimacy of international 
institutions, and less on questions of accountability. second, as chesterman, for example, 
held in relation to the rule of law, “[s]uch a high degree of consensus on the virtues of the rule 
of law is possible only because of dissensus as to its meaning”. considering the wide variety 
of the different approaches within the constitutionalism discourse and the lack of consensus 
on the precise meaning of the different constitutional norms, the theory as it stands lacks 
the precision to serve as a stand-alone yardstick for this research. Moreover, as the theory’s 
focus is mostly on the legitimacy of international institutions (and their lawmaking) the 
normative aim is also different than of this research. 
The normative premises of the GAl and Gc theories are quite different, which affects the 
way in which accountability and legitimacy concerns are addressed. within GAl, states and 
their representatives only play a marginal role: the scope of the global administrative space is 
functionally determined, while it is defined by the source of its delegated authority at a national 
113 In general, see section 1 of this chapter and, in particular, the text in and around footnotes 8-10; e. de 
wet, ‘The role of european courts in the development of a Hierarchy of norms within International 
law: evidence of constitutionalisation’ (2009) European Constitutional Law Review 284 at 289. The 
superiority of these norms is also laid down in Article 53 of the vienna convention on the law of 
treaties (1969). 
114 de wet and others argue that erga omnes obligations seem to be part of the international value system. 
As described by the International court of Justice in the Barcelona traction case, erga omnes obligations 
are the concern of all states, all states have a legal interest in upholding these obligations (Id., at 290); 
IcJ, Barcelona Traction Case, Judgment, IcJ reports (1970) at 3. 
115 There is, for example, extensive debate whether, and to what extent, all human rights standards 
stipulated in the IccPr and the Icescr have become rules of customary international law. see e. de 
wet, ‘The role of european courts in the development of a Hierarchy of norms within International 
law: evidence of constitutionalisation’, at 291. 
116 M. kumm, ‘The legitimacy of International law: A constitutionalist framework of Analysis’ (2004) 
European Journal of International Law 907 at 929. He defines four criteria for legitimacy: (1) legality 
(which is presumed to be present unless rebutted by one of the following three criteria), (2) jurisdictional 
legitimacy (referring primarily to the principle of subsidiarity), (3) procedural legitimacy (including 
participation and accountability), and (4) outcome legitimacy. 
117 s. chesterman, ‘An International rule of law?’ (2008) nyu law school, Public law research Paper 
no. 08-11, available at ssrn: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1081738 at 2. 
118 for the sake of clarity of the argument, all scholarly work addressing/utilizing a constitutionalism/
constitutionalist framework is here considered as one. 
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level. There is a general belief that when the administrative principles of transparency, 
access to a remedy and participation are present, the administrative decision-making 
procedure is (in principle) legitimate and the global administrative bodies in questions are 
accountable. In the context of constitutionalism, the analytical (and normative) framework 
encompasses more than that: there is a stronger focus on the role of the state and the need to 
compensate for the diminished role of the state (and its citizens) within global governance. 
The legitimacy of international law or law-making and international institutions is assessed 
by applying a constitutionalist framework, which encompasses both formal rules derived 
from the rule of law and a more value-laden system, to guarantee rights for individuals. 
krisch therefore explains that GAl has a more limited ambition in comparison to the 
“large-scale, constitutionalist endeavours.” considering that GAl predominantly focuses on 
the accountability of global regulatory governance, it is less prescriptive about the use of 
domestic models, and it operates on a narrower normative basis. constitutionalization 
of international law and global administrative law may fulfil a complementary role. for the 
purpose of this book, the argument is therefore that the strength of the two theories (GAl 
and Gc) lies in combining them, as explained by schwöbel:
Both global constitutionalism and global administrative law attempt to explain the shifting 
power and legal structures that have accompanied the growth in international decision-
making bodies (…) both address concerns of legitimacy and participation that have occurred 
through such a shift.
Moreover, completely separating the two theoretical approaches is complicated and 
unwarranted. krisch similarly argued that:
The adequacy of [GAl] safeguards, though, cannot be assessed without taking into account 
the bigger picture of the overall regime complex, i.e. the different institutions involved, their 
authority, composition, procedures and control mechanisms, and the formal and factual 
links between them. disentangling the ‘administrative’ from the ‘constitutional,’ then looks 
increasingly difficult.
119 Ming-sung kuo ‘Between fragmentation and unity’ (2009) San Diego International Law Journal 439 at 
447-8.
120 It should be noted that this argument should be placed in the context of the general criticism on GAl 
raised in this section (that is, that the yardstick used is not sufficiently externalized nor conceptualized). 
121 krisch, ‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional Ambition’ (2009), at 21. 
122 c.e.J. schwöbel, ‘situating the debate on global constitutionalism’ (2010) 8 I•CON 611 at 621.
123 n. krisch, ‘Global Administrative law and the constitutional Ambition’ (2009) at 16; similarly, Harlow 
reasoned that sometimes “it is difficult to distinguish the values and principles of constitutional and 
administrative law”, c. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative law: The Quest for Principles and values’ (2006) 
17 European journal of International Law 187 at 208. kuo described the interrelation between GAl and 
Gc as followed:
 one the one hand, in attempting to go beyond organizational aspects to the normative issues of global 
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Accordingly, it is also not always necessary – nor warranted – to distinguish sharply between 
the GAl and Gc research. There is an overlap in core principles: for instance, the principle 
of due process, proportionality, legality and transparency are all both administrative and 
constitutional in nature. This resulted in a convergence of norms and principles. Although 
the GAl project’s approach is more aligned with this research’s object and purpose, this 
study therefore argues that a combined approach taking into account GAl and the 
constitutionalization of international law strengthens the analysis. In the conclusions below, 
it will be further explained how this combined approach influences the conceptual Model. 
3. Conclusions: A Conceptual Model for Inclusionary Governance 
In this chapter, a conceptual Model has been set out which will serve as a point of reference 
for the legal survey to be conducted in Part II. section 1 constituted an evaluation of the 
state of play of the rules on the accountability of international institutions. The evaluation 
thereof shows that although there is normative agreement that internationals institutions 
are subjects of international law and are therefore bound by any obligation incumbent upon 
them under general rules of international law, there is still quite some debate as to which 
rules of international law bind international institutions. However, international institutions 
are at minimum bound by ius cogens norms. The IlA report demonstrates that certain 
general principles for the accountability of international institutions can be identified across 
the international organizations concerned. Although the scope of the IlA report is more 
limited, partly due to its narrow definition of international organizations, the principles 
identified in the IlA final report find their reflection in the principles charted in section 
2. said section showed how the principles identified in both global administrative law and 
the constitutionalization of international law complement each other despite the different 
normative aspirations of the two theoretical approaches. In general, the analysis revealed 
that there are two sets of principles that are relevant to realizing the accountability of 
international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions, which is reflected both 
in the IlA report and in the evaluated theories. first, there are the identified duties that 
international institutions owe to third parties; second, there are the recognized constraints 
to the exercise of public power by international institutions. 
governance, [GAl] incorporates values that are derived from national constitutional experiences, 
constituting an integral part of a multilevel global constitutional order. on the other hand, [Gc] refers 
to the development of [GAl] as evidence for the emerging constitutionalization of global governance. 
 Ming-sung kuo ‘Between fragmentation and unity’ (2009), at 465; 
124 A. Peters and k. Armingoen, ‘Introduction: Global constitutionalism from an Interdisciplinary 
Perspective’ (2009) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 385 at 388.
125 Idem, at 388. 
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taking these two sets of principles into account, the analysis conducted in this chapter results 
in the identification of the elements for a conceptual basis for a model for inclusionary 
governance: 
regarding the first set of principles, the duties owed by international institutions to 
individuals can be divided into three broad categories: the duty to inform, the duty to ensure 
participation and the duty to ensure the availability of an effective remedy. These duties 
correspond with the initial working definition of inclusionary governance as adopted in 
the Introduction of this book. The duty to provide reasons is instrumental to said three 
dimensions and forms a separate duty owed by international institutions in the conceptual 
Model. The second set of principles consists of the identified constraints to the exercise of 
public power by international institutions. said constraints aim to prevent an abuse of power 
by ensuring that there is a regulatory framework in place that governs the exercise of public 
power by international institutions. 
Moreover, both the theoretical approaches and the IlA report recognize that the context in 
which an actor operates and exercises its public power matters. Accordingly, any yardstick 
aiming to address the accountability of international institutions should acknowledge this 
context and incorporate a form of norm flexibility to accommodate the specific context in 
which an international institution operates. 
126 see chapter 1, section 3, in which the three-dimensional concept of inclusionary governance was 
introduced. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR INCLUSIONARY GOVERNANCE
An international institution exercising public power directly affecting individuals:
- has to provide access to information; 
- has to duly inform those affected;
- has to provide participation in the decision-making procedure;
- has to provide an effective and adequate remedy; and 
- has to provide reasons for any decision reached.  
In addition, any such public power should be exercised:  
- in accordance with the law; 
- not in an arbitrary manner; and
- in such a way that it does not result into a violation of ius cogens norms. 
- Moreover, any decision-making procedure should ensure a certain quality of the procedure.  
Table 2: Conceptual Model for Inclusionary Governance
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In conclusion, the conceptual Model presented in this section serves as a lens for the legal 
survey to be conducted in Part II. Through the legal survey, the building blocks of the 
draft Inclusionary Governance Model will be identified. It is expected that the two sets of 
principles can similarly be distinguished in the international legal standards that constrain 
the exercise of public power by public authorities at a national level.
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Part II will develop the building blocks of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
through a legal survey of relevant international instruments that address the exercise of 
public power by national public authorities. The point of departure is the three-dimensional 
concept of inclusionary governance and the way in which chapter 2 gave further substance 
to it, as summarized in the conceptual Model. Part I focused on the existing rules on the 
accountability of international institutions and the obligations international institutions 
have under international law to ensure that those affected will be sufficiently included in 
the procedure. As a result, the conceptual Model identifies the duties owed by international 
institutions to third parties, including individuals. 
In Part II it is expected that the legal survey will identify both the duties owed by public 
authorities and the rights enjoyed by individuals. In short, most of the surveyed international 
instruments aim to identify the rights that individuals enjoy in their relation to the state 
parties to the respective instruments. Therefore, the legal survey charts both the way in which 
international law imposes constraints on the exercise of public power by public authorities 
and how it identifies the rights enjoyed by individuals and the obligations owed by public 
authorities. In the concluding chapter of Part II, it will be assessed whether, and to what 
extent, this stronger focus on rights set out in chapters 3-5 influences the draft Inclusionary 
Governance Model.
considering that the rights are recognized across, and shaped by, a variety of treaty regimes, 
which are distinctive in their reach (for example, universal vs. regional, general vs. specific), 
this part will identify the common denominators of the various instruments on a right-
by-right basis. This research anticipates that there will be differences in the scope of each 
right. In the mapping exercise, attention is therefore devoted to the authority and normative 
relevance of the various standards, and the treaty monitoring bodies’ interpretation of 
said standards. The analysis will use terms like general standards, progressive development, 
deviating practice and other similar terms to describe the (relative) normative scope of each 
right surveyed in Part II. 
The three dimensions (right to information, right to participation in the decision-making 
procedure and right to an effective remedy) will each be discussed in a separate chapter 
(chapters 3-5). chapter 6 will present the draft Inclusionary Governance Model and its 
elements and will demonstrate the draft Model’s dynamic aspect. 
3 
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
HoofdstuktItel
 
3 Access to Information

Access to InforMAtIon
This chapter develops the building blocks of the first pillar of the draft Inclusionary 
Governance Model: access to information. The point of departure for the analysis is the 
conceptual Model that includes a duty to inform those affected by decisions of international 
institutions and a right to access information. 
In its basic form, access to information refers to the right of individuals to seek and 
receive information from authorities and the latter’s corresponding duties to provide such 
information. The research will identify two distinctive rights to information that are relevant 
in the context of decision-making procedures that directly affect individuals. The difference 
between the rights lies in the relation of the rights-holder to the information – that is, the 
rationale why someone has a right to receive or access any particular information. The right 
to public interest information (section 1) concerns the right of individuals to access public 
interest information held by authorities. The right to personal information, which is the 
second identified right, concerns the right of individuals to access information concerning 
them that is held, collected and/or stored by public authorities (section 2). each right will 
be discussed in light of its legal bases, the holders of the right, the scope of the right and any 
concomitant duties for the authorities concerned, and lastly, any recognized limitations to 
the right. The chapter will conclude with a schematic overview listing the identified elements 
of each distinctive right, which form the building blocks of the first pillar of the draft 
Inclusionary Governance Model (section 3). 
In this book, only the right to information held by public authorities will be discussed, thus 
excluding any possible duties and obligations of private parties. furthermore, although 
1 It should be noted that, in this and the following chapters, reference is made to the right of individuals, 
which does not imply that nGos, groups of individuals or entities do not have such rights; referring to 
individuals is rather a choice in terms of clarity and style. It will be specified in every chapter when the 
holders of the rights are discussed who has the right and whether the authorities owe an obligation to 
others than individuals. see, for example, section 3.2. 
2 see, in general, on informational rights c.A. Bishop, Access to Information as a Human Right (el Paso: 
lfB scholarly Publishing llc 2012) and M. Mcdonagh, ‘right to Information in International Human 
rights law’ (2013) 13(1) Human Rights Law Review 1. see also an article by weeramantry, former Judge 
of the International court of Justice, who wrote in 1995 that the right to governmental information 
is developing into a new human right. He then identified various formulations of an emerging right 
to information, include those identified in the context of this research. c.G. weeramanty ‘Access to 
information: A new Human right. The right to information’ (1994) Asian Yearbook of International 
Law 99-125.
3 In this chapter, the term a right to public interest information will be used instead of the often-used terms 
of state-held information or government-held information. The latter terms seem to indicate – falsely – 
that the right to personal information is not held, stored or collected by public authorities. 
4 even though the convincing argument can be made that private actors also have certain duties to 
provide information to affected individuals it falls outside the scope of this research; this research 
focuses on international institutions, which (according to the definition adopted in the project) entails 
public actors only (see further chapter 1, section 6.1). section 1.2. will address the question of how to 
define the public authorities that hold public interest information. for research that addresses the role 
of private actors, and particularly the extent to which international human rights norms are applicable 
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the terms transparency and the right to information are sometimes used interchangeably 
in the relevant literature, this work will consider these two concepts to be different. The two 
rights to information identified in this research (public interest and personal information) 
constitute two distinctive substantive rights, whereas transparency refers to an authority’s 
the duty to ensure transparent procedures. As will be further explained in this chapter 
and the following two chapters respectively, this duty includes the duty for authorities to 
properly inform individuals of the decision-making and review procedures and of any 
applicable rules. 
1. The Right to Public Interest Information 
The conceptual Model recognizes a duty to ensure access to information in possession of 
international institutions but offers no further guidance as to the content and scope of this 
duty. Through a survey, this section will examine whether, and to what extent, international 
law recognizes the right to public interest information. firstly, this section will examine 
and compare the legal bases of the right to public interest information in international law 
(1.1) and identfy what constitutes public interest information (1.2). It will then discuss who 
are the holders of said right (1.3), the scope of the obligations for authorities (1.4), and the 
procedure to be followed (1.5). lastly, it will show under what circumstances the right to 
public interest information may be limited (1.6). section 1 will conclude with a schematic 
overview of the building block of the right to public interest information (1.7). 
1.1.  The Right’s Legal Bases
This research distinguishes between an explicit right to public interest information and a non-
explicit or implied right to said information. only the convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in decision-Making and Access to Justice in environmental Matters 
(Aarhus convention) explicitly recognizes a right for individuals to request public interest 
and useful as a framework, see, for instance, temperman who addresses it in light of the right to public 
participation J.d. temperman, ‘Public Participation in times of Privatization’ (2011) 4(2) Erasmus Law 
Review 43. 
5 As highlighted in the introduction to Part II, chapters 3-5 will chart the recognition of the rights to 
information, to participation in the decision-making procedure, and to an effective remedy, which 
is in contrast with the conceptual Model that focused on the duties of international institutions. 
The conceptual Model was developed examining the existing standards applicable to international 
institutions, and accordingly, the focus lies on the obligations of international institutions. In part II, 
the legal survey will sketch whether, and to what extent, international law recognizes and identifies 
constraints on the exercise of public power by public authorities, and more in particular, whether there 
are procedural arrangements in place to ensure the inclusion of individuals (and groups) in a public 
authority’s decision-making procedure. The emphasize in the language lies accordingly on the rights 
enjoyed by individuals as the majority of the surveyed instruments is rights-based; its main aim is the 
recognition and accordance of rights enjoyed by individuals (and groups) vis-à-vis the parties to the 
respective instruments. chapter 6 will address whether, and to what extent, this ‘switch’ influences the 
draft Model developed in part II. 
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information (1.1.1). In the context of other treaty instruments, a right to public interest 
information has been developed over time through the works of treaty monitoring bodies 
who have read a right to public interest information into the substantive rights of the treaties 
they monitor (1.1.2). This section will discuss the two different ways in which a right to 
public interest information has crystallized in international law. 
1.1.1 Explicit Legal Basis
The Aarhus convention is one of the few instruments that contain an explicit legal basis 
for the right to public interest information. It accords the public with procedural rights 
in environmental matters, including the right to access environmental information. 
Article 4 of the Aarhus convention gives everyone – that is, individuals, groups and nGos 
– a right to seek information and imposes a duty on authorities to provide the requested 
environmental information unless duly restricted. The provision sets the criteria for who 
6 similarly, the 2018 regional Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in 
environmental Matters in latin America and the caribbean (‘escazú Agreement’) contains an explicit 
legal basis for the right to public interest information in its article 5 (access to environmental information) 
and article 6 (generation and dissemination of environmental information). The convention was 
adopted in context of the un economic commission for latin-America, on March 4, 2018 in escazú, 
costa rica and has not yet entered into force. so far 5 states have ratified the convention and there 
are 22 signatories. The convention enters into force once there are 11 ratifications. see further, https://
acuerdodeescazu.cepal.org/s1/en. It should be noted that the content of the convention is comparable 
to that of the Aarhus convention, and similarly stipulates extensive rights to information, participation 
and access to justice. 
7 The Aarhus convention, developed by the un economic commission for europe, currently has 47 
parties, including the european union. see for the current status of ratifications, http://www.unece.org/
env/pp/ratification.html. The convention is also open to parties outside the un/ece region subject to 
the approval of the Meeting of the Parties. Interestingly, Article 3(7) of the Aarhus convention stipulates 
the obligation for each of the parties to promote the application of the principles in international fora; 
the Almaty Guidelines in Promoting the Application of the Principles of the Aarhus convention in 
International forums (Annex to decision II/4 (June 20, 2005) doc. ece/MP.PP/2005/2/Add.5) and 
decision Iv/3 (chisinau 2011) reaffirmed the importance of promoting the principles of the convention 
in international fora. However, for a skeptical view of the normative potential of this obligation, see, for 
example, u. Beyerlin, ‘Aligning international environmental Governance with the ‘Aarhus Principles’ 
and Participatory Human rights’ in: A. Grear and l.J. kotzé (eds.) Research Handbook on Human Rights 
and the Environment (edward elgar 2015) 333 at 339. 
8 Article 2(4) of the Aarhus convention defines public as “one or more natural or legal persons, and, 
in accordance with national legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups.” The 
term individuals or groups will hereafter be used to refer to those holding the right for the sake of 
comparability. In section 1.4, the holders of the right to public interest information will be discussed in 
more detail. 
9 The convention follows a rights-based approach just like the human rights treaties. see, e.g., paragraphs 
7-8 of the preamble and article 1 of the convention. As chapters 4 and 5 will show, the convention 
also accords those affected with a right to participation and a right to an effective remedy. for a further 
introduction into the Aarhus convention and its compliance mechanism, see, for example, M. Macchia, 
‘Global Administrative law compliance: the Aarhus convention compliance review system’ (2008) 4 
ERPL/REDP 1317; e. Hey, ‘Human rights and the environment in the european ‘Aarhus space’’ in: A. 
Grear and l.J. kotze (eds.) Research Handbooks on Human Rights and the Environment (edward elgar 
2015).
10 environmental information as defined in article 2(3) by the Aarhus convention concerns: 
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may seek information from public authorities, and it provides guidance on the rules for such 
a procedure. for instance, the requested information has to be made available as soon as 
possible, at the latest within one month after submitting a request to that end. The Aarhus 
convention compliance committee (Accc), the treaty monitoring body of the Aarhus 
convention, provides authoritative interpretations of the obligations of public authorities 
vis-à-vis individuals under the treaty by way of its review mechanism.
In addition to article 4 of the Aarhus convention, which provides a right to request public 
interest information, article 5 of the Aarhus convention recognizes a duty for public 
authorities to collect and disseminate environmental information without a specific request 
to that end. It is a very specific duty, which can similarly be found in the work of some 
of the treaty monitoring bodies, particularly in the context of decision-making procedures 
on environmental matters. Amongst others, the provisions require parties to the Aarhus 
 any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other material form (…): including the state 
of the elements of the environment, facts that affect the environment, decision-making processes, and 
the state of human health and safety. The convention does not qualify the form of the information or 
whether such form maybe in the form of raw or processed data, instead it refers to any information.
 Accc, ACCC/C/2010/53 (United Kingdom), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2013/3 (January 11, 2013), §74.
11 In particular, see paragraphs 1 (no interest to be stated and information in principle to be provided in 
the form requested), 2 (timeframe) and 8 (any costs charged for producing the information may not 
exceed a reasonable amount) for the general conditions. The remaining paragraphs (3-7) set out the 
conditions under which a request for information may be refused and the procedural guarantees that 
have to be in place to avoid an arbitrary decision. In general, the grounds for refusing information have 
to be interpreted restrictively (paragraph 4). 
12 Article 4(2) Aarhus convention; an extension up to two months is permitted when the volume 
and the complexity of the information justifies such an extension. nevertheless, after two months 
authorities must provide access to the information or deny access based on the grounds listed in article 
4 and in accordance with the criteria of article 4(7). see also Accc, ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), ece/
MP.PP/c.1/2009/8/Add.1, (september 30, 2010), §74. 
13 Meeting of the Parties to the Aarhus convention, decision I/7, ece/MP.PP/2/Add.8, (April 2, 2004).
14 Its views, although non-binding, provide an authoritative interpretation of the treaty obligations. for 
instance, the Accc gave guidance on what constitutes environmental information (e.g. ACCC/C/2004/1 
Kazakhstan, §18; ACCC/C/2004/8 (Armenia), §20; ACCC/C/2008/30 Moldova, §29), and how to strike 
a proper balance between the public interest in disclosing certain information and harm to interests 
involved when disclosing this information (e.g., Accc/c/2007/21 (European Community) §30(c)).
15 review by the Aarhus convention compliance committee may be triggered in four different ways. 
first, the Accc may consider a submission from a party about another party’s compliance or that of 
the party itself (this option has so far only been used three times: twice for the compliance of other 
states and once regarding a party’s own compliance), see further https://www.unece.org/submissions.
html. second, it may consider referrals of the Accc’s secretariat concerning a party’s compliance to 
the convention (no referrals thus far, see further http://www.unece.org/env/pp/referrals.html). Third, 
and most commonly, it may consider communications of members of the public concerning a party’s 
compliance with the convention. so far, 174 communications have been submitted by members of the 
public, see for an overview of communications submitted and its status in the process: http://www.
unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.html. lastly, it should be noted that the committee may also examine 
compliance issues on its own initiative and prepare reports on compliance at the request of the Meeting 
of the Parties (MoP). so far, the MoP has issued such a request for three times. (statistics up-to-date 
until december 19, 2019).
16 see in particular the case law of the ectHr in the context of article 8 (right to family life), ectHr, 
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convention to provide information on the type of information held by authorities (meta-
information), the basic terms and the conditions under which the public interest information 
is made available, and the procedure that is to be followed to disseminate information. The 
information must be sufficient, or complete enough, to ensure that the public can effectively 
gain access to information. There are, however, no requirements for the format in which the 
information is to be provided. 
In sum, the Aarhus convention provides an explicit legal basis for the right to public interest 
information. considering that it concerns a regional convention and focuses only on 
environmental information, its normative scope is limited. However, a similar – although 
less extensive – right to public interest information has been developed through the work of 
various treaty monitoring bodies, as the next section will show. 
1.1.2 Authoritative Interpretation   
even though there is no explicit legal provision stipulating a right to public interest 
information in international human rights treaties, the right is firmly recognized by the 
various treaty monitoring bodies in their case law. The treaty monitoring bodies have read 
the right to public interest information into the right to freedom of expression. 
The un Human rights committee (Hrcee) has read a right to public interest information 
into the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information (freedom of expression) as 
stipulated in article 19 of the International covenant on civil and Political rights (IccPr). 
Taşkin v. Turkey (app no 46117/99 (2005), §119; ectHr, Hatton v. United Kingdom, App no 36022/97 
(2003) §99, 128-129; ectHr, Buckley v. United Kingdom, App no 20348/92 (1996); ectHr, Giacomelli v. 
Italy, app no 59909/00 (2007) §82-83; see also p 316-322 of o. de schutter, International Human Rights 
Law (cambridge cambridge university Press, 2010). J. ebbesson, ‘transparency in environmental 
Matters’ in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds) Transparency in International Law (cambridge university 
Press, 2013), 49-74 at 65.
17 Article 5(2) of the convention: the provision must ensure that the way in which environmental 
information is provided is transparent and that the information is effectively accessible. 
18 Article 5(2)(a) of the Aarhus convention. 
19 see n. 5 above. The convention is open to parties outside the european region, but its parties to date 
are primarily based in europe. furthermore, once the escazú Agreement enters into force in the latin 
America and caribbean region, the normative relevance of the conventional rights is expected to 
increase considering that there is an overlap in the type of norms and procedural guarantees stipulated 
in both conventions. see further, n. 6 above. 
20 This research uses the term case law broadly by applying it to all the treaty interpreting documents 
of the treaty monitoring bodies including judgments, non-binding views, and general comments, 
concluding observations, and other documents alike. They all have in common that they are deemed to 
be an authoritative interpretation of the treaty provisions. see, e.g., Michael o’flaherty, ‘The concluding 
observations of united nations Human rights treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 27, 33.
21 International covenant on civil and Political rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 999 un GAor supp. (no 
16) at 52, un doc A/6316 (1966) 999 unts 171 of december 16, 1966 [IccPr] (entered into force on 
March 23, 1976).
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In Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, the Hrcee held that “the reference to the right to ‘seek’ and 
‘receive information’ as contained in article 19(2) of the covenant, includes the right of 
individuals to request public interest information”. This interpretation was reaffirmed by 
the committee in a General Comment on article 19 IccPr, restating that the provision 
embraces “a right of access to information held by public bodies.” 
further, other un human rights instruments similarly contain a provision on the right 
to seek, receive and impart information for individuals; however, the respective treaty 
22 It should be noted that there is discussion whether the views of the Hrcee are legally binding. 
nowak reasons that the views are not binding, but he refers to the views (and general comments) in 
his commentary to the ccPr as an authoritative interpretation of the covenant (M. nowak, CCPR 
Commentary UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (nP engel 2nd rev. ed. 2005), XXvII). scheinin, 
on the other hand, reasons that: 
 It would be wrong to categorize the committee’s views as mere ‘recommendations.’ They are the result 
of a quasi-judicial adversarial international body established and elected by the states Parties for the 
purpose of interpreting the provisions of the covenant and monitoring compliance with them … 
the presumption should be that the committee’s views in optional Protocol cases are treated as the 
authoritative interpretation of the covenant under international law. 
 M.r. Hanski and M. scheinin (eds.) Leading Cases of the Human Rights Committee (2003) at 22. 
Irrespective of whether the views have to be considered as binding, they are at a minimum considered 
to be an authoritative interpretation of the treaty obligations of member states vis-à-vis individuals. 
23 state-held information in this case has to be equated with public interest information. Hrcee, 
Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, Merits, communication no 1470/2006, (March 28, 2011) §6.3, 7.4; Hrcee, 
Rafael Rodríguez Castañeda v. Mexico, communication no. 2202/2012, (2013), §7.4.
24 even though a General comment is not legally binding on a state party, they are of high normative 
relevance. In the un human rights system, all treaty monitoring bodies publish their authoritative 
interpretation of provisions of the respective treaty instrument they oversee in general comments 
or general recommendations. Alston also refers to it as “one of the potentially most significant and 
influential tools available” to the treaty monitoring bodies (P. Alston, ‘The Historical origins of the 
concept of General comments in Human rights law’ in: l. Boisson de chazournes and v. Gowland 
debbas (eds.), The international legal system in quest of equity and universality: liber amicorum Georges 
Abi-Saab (2001) 763). General comments often consist of restatements of case law already established 
by treaty monitoring bodies (J. Th. Moller and A. de Zayas, United Nations Human Rights Committee 
Case Law 1977-2008 a Handbook (nP engel 2009), 50). for instance, they may cover a comprehensive 
interpretation of substantive provisions, wider cross-cutting thematic issues, or provide general 
guidance to states on the information they have to submit as part of the state reporting procedure. see, 
for example. the compilation of the general comments of the un treaty bodies, available at http://www.
ohchr.org/en/HrBodies/Pages/tBGeneralcomments.aspx.
25 Human rights committee, General Comment 34, article 19, Freedoms of opinion and expression, 
(september 12, 2011), §18. see also Hrcee, Rafael Rodriquez Castañeda v. Mexico (2012), §6-7. In 
addition, the un commission on Human rights and the Human rights council recognized a right 
of access to public interest information. see, for instance, un commission on Human rights, res 
2005/38, preamble, §4(I), un doc. e/cn.4/res/2005/38 (April 19, 2005); un Human rights council, 
res 12/16 freedom of expression un doc A/Hrc/12/l.4/rev.1 §5(I) (october 2, 2009). 
26 even though these are un, and thus global, instruments, these conventions are limited, however, in 
their scope as they only address the rights of a particular group of people. see particularly article 13(1) 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child [CRC], (november 20, 1989), united nations, treaty series, 
vol. 1577, p. 3, 196 states are party to the crc; article 13(2) of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, (december 18, 1990) 
A/res/45/158, the Migrant workers convention currently has 48 member states, http://indicators.
ohchr.org/ (last accessed september 12, 2016); article 21 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
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monitoring bodies of these conventions have not yet interpreted the right as including a right 
to public interest information.
At a regional level, the American convention on Human rights (AcHr), the european 
convention on Human rights (ecHr), and the African charter on Human rights (AfcHPr) 
all recognize a right to public interest information, although the scope of the right differs. 
The AcHr contains a provision on the right to seek, receive and impart information, which 
the Inter-American court of Human rights interpreted as including the right to access public 
interest information. several other organs of the organization of American states (oAs) 
adopted a similar interpretation of article 13 AcHr and recognize the right to access public 
interest information. The right to receive information as laid down in the AfcHPr has 
been interpreted by the African commission on Human rights to include the right to public 
interest information. The european court of Human rights (ectHr) has only recently 
Disabilities: resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, (January 24, 2007), A/res/61/106, 166 states 
are party to this treaty, see further http://indicators.ohchr.org/.
27 It should be noted that this section discusses the right to request public interest information, which 
is to be distinguished from the duty to inform as recognized in the context of the right to meaningful 
participation in decision-making procedures. As chapter 4, section 3.1 will show, the duty to inform 
refers to the obligation of authorities to inform those affected of an upcoming decision and the 
participatory process, and to provide them with all information that is necessary to participate in a 
meaningful way in the decision-making procedure. As this information may be of a public-interest 
nature, a certain overlap may therefore be detected between the two in the case law of the various 
courts. This research finds it more useful to distinguish them and discusses them therefore separately.
28 Article 13 of the American convention on Human rights, “Pact of san Jose”, Costa Rica, (november 22, 
1969).
29 IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, ser. c. no. 151, (september 19, 2006), §77; the approach has been 
affirmed in various cases afterwards, including in IActHr, Gomes-Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) 
v. Brazil (november 24, 2010). 
30 see, e.g., Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the right to Access to Information, 
cJI/res. 147 (lXXIII-o/08); Inter-American commission on Human rights, Annual report of the 
special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2003) Inter-Am. cHr oAs doc. oeA/ser.G, cP/doc. 
3790/03, at 8.
31 Article 9 African charter on Human and Peoples’ rights (adopted June 27, 1981, entered into force on 
october 21, 1986) (1982) 21 IlM 58 [African charter].
32 In 2002, the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights adopted a declaration of Principles on 
freedom of expression in Africa to supplement article 9 of the charter. even though the declaration is 
non-binding, it is relevant to interpret said charter provision. Principle 4 (1) of the declaration reads:
 Public bodies hold information not for themselves but as custodians of the public good and everyone 
has a right to access this information, subject only to clearly defined rules established by law.
 declaration of Principles on freedom of expression in Africa, the African commission on Human 
and Peoples’ rights, 32nd session, (october 17-23, 2002: Banjul, The Gambia). further support for 
this reading can be found in other instruments adopted in the African region, including article 9 of 
the African union convention on Prevention and combating corruption, which requires member 
states to adopt legislative measures and alike to “give effect to the right of access to any information 
that is required to assist in the fight of corruption.” see further, the objectives of the African charter on 
democracy, elections and governance, “the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizens 
participation, transparency, access to information.” African union, African charter on democracy, 
elections and Governance (January 30, 2007) (entered into force on february 15, 2012). 
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progressed to recognize a right to public interest information as part of the freedom of 
expression provision of article 10 ecHr (the right to receive and impart information), albeit 
only under specific conditions. The recent council of europe convention on Access to 
official documents does include a right to request information and thereby recognizes a 
right for everyone to request public interest information; however, this convention has not 
yet entered into force.
In conclusion, the right to public interest information finds broad support among the various 
instruments. Although only the Aarhus convention provides an explicit legal basis for the 
right, the Hrcee has read a right to public interest information into the freedom of expression 
provision of the near universally ratified IccPr. In addition, all treaty monitoring bodies of 
the regional human rights instruments have interpreted the freedom of expression provision 
as to include a right to public interest information. The following sections will examine the 
way in which the treaty monitoring bodies interpret the right to public interest information 
and the content and scope of this right. 
33 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §156. Below the position of the ectHr is discussed in 
greater detail. 
34 Article 10 (european) convention for the Protection of Human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
ets no. 5, 213 unts 222, november 4, 1950 (ecHr).
35 within the context of the council of europe, more than 210 treaties (including protocols amending 
treaties) have been concluded. for every treaty, it has been determined whether states outside the coe 
region may also join the treaty. see further https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/about-treaties for 
an overview of the various treaty regimes, and their content and scope. It should be noted that the ectHr 
only has jurisdiction to hear individual complaints of alleged violations of the european convention 
on Human rights, article 32 (1) ecHr. The court does not have jurisdiction to assess compliance 
with any of the other coe conventions. However, sometimes the court refers to other conventions, 
including coe conventions, in its reasoning. In this context, see particularly the discussion of the right 
to personal information and the normative relevance of the standards of other coe conventions. 
36 Article 2(1) stipulates that everyone has the right to access official documents, and article (4) specifies 
that no reasons need to be provided for requesting access to official documents, council of europe 
convention on Access to official documents, cets no. 205 (June 18, 2009) not yet entered into force; 
see further the explanatory report to the coe convention on Access to official documents, §17-19. 
At this moment, 9 countries have ratified the convention. The convention will enter into force after 
ratification by 10 parties. see for an overview of the ratifications and signatures to the convention https://
www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/205/signatures. The convention will 
be referred to where it is relevant to show the comparability with and/or deviations from current human 
rights standards within the council of europe region. Interestingly, in the explanatory report to the 
coe convention, reference is made to the IActHr’s recognition of the aforementioned right in the 
Claude Reyes v. Chile case, explanatory report to the coe convention on Access to Information, Part 
II.
Access to InforMAtIon
1.2. Public Interest Information Defined
All treaty regimes recognize that the right to public interest information has two components: 
(1) the information is in the possession of a public authority, and (2) the information is of 
public interest. 
The concept of public authorities is similarly defined across the various instruments. All 
branches of the state (governmental, legislative and judicial bodies) are public authorities. 
However, several treaty regimes exclude legislative and judicial authorities from being 
required to disclose public interest information upon request. In addition, all authorities 
exercising public power are regarded to be public authorities for such exercise of power, and 
are, in principle, required to disclose public interest information when requested to do so. 
The second component is that the information has to be of public interest. All treaty regimes 
adopt a broad definition as to which type of information is included. for instance, the Aarhus 
convention stipulates that “any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other 
material form” is included and one can find similar phrasing in the context of the IccPr, oAs, 
37 section 1.3. will discuss whether, and to what extent, public authorities have to actively collect 
information, whether information has to be in possession of public authorities or, instead, whether the 
right only applies to information that is already in their possession. 
38 It should be noted that this research only discusses the obligations for public authorities and thus 
excludes any obligations for private actors. This does however not imply that legal or natural persons, 
which are not public authorities, cannot have duties or obligations regarding the right to information. 
Instead, a convincing argument can be made for them still having certain obligations. rather, the 
research’s focus is on international institutions exercising public power, which meet the qualification of 
public authorities. other actors are therefore excluded from the analysis for the sake of clarity and scope 
of the research. see further the introduction to Part II. 
39 Aarhus convention in article 2(2) explicitly excludes bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or 
legislative capacity. with regard to the council of europe, see, for example, committee of Ministers 
recommendation no. r (81) 19 on the Access to Information Held by Public Authorities, (november 
25, 1981), 340th Meeting of Ministers’ deputies, Appendix 1, principle 1. In this recommendation, 
the committee of Ministers excluded legislative bodies and judicial authorities from the definition of 
public authorities, from whom one may request information; see similarly committee of Ministers 
recommendation rec. (2002) 2 on Access to official documents, at 2 (1).
40 see also Bishop, Access to Information, at 75. 
41 Article 2(3) Aarhus convention. The convention does not qualify the form of the information or 
whether it (only) encompasses raw and/or processed data; instead, it refers to any information. Aarhus 
convention compliance committee, ACCC/C/2010/53 (United Kingdom), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2013/3 
(January 11, 2013) at §74.
42 Hrcee, GC 34, §18; see also un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, 1999, un 
doc. e/cn.4/1999/64, §12; un comm. Hr, resolution 1999/36, §2; 2000 Annual report of the un 
special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, un doc. e/cn.4/2000/63 (January 18, 
2000) §43-44.
43 see, e.g., Inter-American commission on Human rights, Annual report of the special rapporteur for 
freedom of expression, August 29, 2003a) at 8; Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the 
right to Access to information, cJI/res. 147 (lXXIII-o/08), principles 1 and 3. Model Inter-American 
law on Access to Public Information General Assembly resolution 2607 (June 8, 2010), preamble and 
provision 1(1) (a), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/AG-res_2607-2010_eng.pdf. 
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the council of europe (coe), and the African union. only the Aarhus convention defines 
what constitutes information, but in the other treaty regimes, it has to be deduced from case 
law of the treaty monitoring bodies. The Aarhus convention starts from the premise that 
“public authorities hold environmental information in the public interest,” and environmental 
information is then broadly defined as: 
Any information … on … the state of the elements of the environment, such as substances, 
energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, including administrative measures, 
environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programmes, affecting or likely to 
affect the elements of the environment (…) the state of human health and safety.
The Accc dealt in various cases with the question whether the information requested was 
of public interest. for instance, the Aarhus convention compliance committee held in 
ACCC/C/2004/1 (Kazakhstan) that the information requested, a feasibility study conducted 
into the draft amendments that would allow for the import and disposal of foreign low-level 
and medium-level radioactive waste in kazakhstan, was considered to be of public interest 
and thus fell within the ambit of article 2, paragraph 3 (b) of the convention.
The approach of the other human rights treaty monitoring bodies considered in the context 
of this research must be deduced from a small number of cases addressing the scope of public 
interest information. overall, the monitoring bodies seem to determine whether the nature 
of the information requested is one of public interest on a case-by-case basis. In general, 
two criteria are referred to by the bodies: the content of the information, and/or to whom 
44 In the council of europe, the focus is on access to documents instead of on access to information: 
committee of Ministers recommendation rec (2002) 2 on Access to official documents, definitions, 
provision 1. see also, article 1(2)(b) of the coe cets 205 convention on Access to official documents 
(2009, not yet entered into force). 
45 Model law on access to information for Africa, in article 1 reads:
 information includes any original or copy of documentary material irrespective of its physical 
characteristics, such as records, correspondence, fact, opinion, advice, memorandum, data, statistic, 
book, drawing, plan, map, diagram, photograph, audio or visual record, and any other tangible or 
intangible material, regardless of the form or medium in which it is held, in the possession or under 
the control of the information holder to whom a request has been made under this Act.
 see also the declaration of Principles on freedom of expression, which in more general terms – in 
relation to the right of freedom of expression and information – embraces a wide definition of 
information in principle 1(1). 
46 It should be noted that the other treaty defining what constitutes information is the coe convention 
on Access to official documents, which has however not yet entered into force. 
47 Aarhus convention, preamble. 
48 Article 2(3) of the Aarhus convention. 
49 see, e.g., Accc, ACCC/C/2004/8 (Armenia), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2006/2/Add.1 (May 10, 2006), §13, 20; 
“contracts for rent of lands” also considered as environmental information in Accc, ACCC/C/2008/30 
(Moldova), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/6/Add.3 (february 8, 2011), §29. 
50 Accc, ACCC/C/2004/1 (Kazakhstan), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2005/2/Add.1 (March 14, 2005), §8, 18. 
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the information relates or who holds it. for instance, the ectHr held in Magyar Helsinki 
Bizottság v. Hungary that, as a general guidance:
[t]he public interest relates to matters which affect the public to such an extent that it may 
legitimately take an interest in them, which attract its attention or which concern it to a 
significant degree, (…) matters which are capable of giving rise to considerable controversy, 
which concern an important social issue, or which involve a problem that the public would 
have an interest in being informed about. 
However, the ectHr held that the right to public interest information does not imply a 
right to all information. for instance, the court considered that not “all the technical details 
relating to the construction of a power station” were of general public interest in Sdruženi 
Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic. turning to the Americas, the IActHr explained in 
Claude Reyes v. Chile that the information requested was of public interest as: 
…it related to the foreign investment contract signed originally between the state and two 
foreign companies and a chilean company (which would receive the investment), in order to 
develop [a] forestry exploitation project that caused considerable public debate owing to its 
potential environmental impact.
The parties involved in the contract, the subject of the contract and the (environmental) 
impact of the contract were therefore considered to be relevant factors in determining 
whether the information was of public interest. 
The Hrcee has not provided criteria to determine the scope of public interest information; 
however, the committee concluded in two cases on the access to information that the 
information requested was of public interest. In Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, the committee 
considered the requested information – the number of individuals sentenced to death in 
51 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §162; for example, the information on how many people 
were subjected to electronic surveillance by a domestic intelligence agency was considered to be of 
public interest, ectHr, Youth initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia. similarly, documents at the Ministry 
of the Interior regarding the functioning of the state security services in Hungary in the 1960s were 
deemed to be of public interest, ectHr, Kenedi v. Hungary, App. no. 31475/05 (May 26, 2009), §43.
52 ectHr, Sdruženi Jihočeské Matky v. Czech Republic (Application no. 19101/03, 2006 admissibility 
decision).
53 IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §73; see also Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the 
right to access to information, cJI/res. 147 (lXXIII-o/08), oAs/ser.Q (August 7, 2008), principle 1.
54 The court further referred to the reason provided for asking the information – namely, to hold the 
authorities to account for a proper exercise of power. Although the rationale for requesting access is not 
of relevance for qualifying the information to be of public interest, it is relevant in light of the general 
features of the right to public interest information. IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §73. see further 1.3 
below. 
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kyrgyzstan – to be of public interest. similarly in Rafael Rodriquez Castañeda v. Mexico, 
the Hrcee considered original ballot papers used in an election to be information of public 
interest. In the African human rights regime it has thus far – to the author’s knowledge – 
not been further defined when information has a public interest nature beyond the general 
phrase that it has to concern information held by public authorities.
1.3. The Scope of the Right
This section will address the scope of the public authorities’ obligations regarding the right to 
public interest information. This research will identify a general standard to disclose requested 
public interest information unless a set of predetermined limitation grounds apply. The 
majority of the treaty instruments therefore refers to a presumption of disclosure for public 
authorities. In article 4, the Aarhus convention stipulates, for instance, a positive obligation 
for authorities to provide the requested information or to provide a written justification for 
the refusal to (partially) disclose the information. Also within the oAs human rights system, 
there exists strong support for the presumption of disclosure of requested public interest 
information. for example, the Inter-American court of Human rights held in Claude 
Reyes v. Chile that the state has a positive obligation to provide the requested public interest 
information unless access to the information is legitimately restricted by authorities. 
55 The committee referred to resolutions of the commission on Human rights and to the copenhagen 
document to prove the public interest nature of the information, Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §6.3.
56 Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §7.2.
57 Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §7.4; article 4(1) Aarhus convention; Accc, ACCC/C/2005/15 
(Romania), ece/MP/PP/2008/5/Add. 7 (April 16, 2008), §30; oAs declaration of Principles on freedom 
of expression (2000), principle 4; IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile (2009); 2004 Joint declaration by the 
un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, osce representative on freedom of 
the Media and oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression, december 6, 2004; Inter-American 
commission on Human rights, Annual report of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, 
(August 29, 2003), at 8; IAcHr, office of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, A 
Hemispheric Agenda for the Defense of Freedom of Expression, oeA/ser.l/v/II/cIdH/rele/Inf.4/09 
(february 25, 2009) §15.
58 Article 4(1) Aarhus convention reads:
 each Party shall ensure that, subject to the following paragraphs of this Article, public authorities, in 
response to a request for environmental information, make such information available to the public, 
within the framework of national legislation, including, where requested and subject to subparagraph 
(b) below, copies of the actual documentation containing or comprising such information…
 see further Accc, ACCC/C2005/15 (Romania), ece/MP/PP/2008/5/Add. 7 (April 16, 2008), §30; 
Accc, ACCC/C/2008/30 (Moldova), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/6/Add.3 (february 8, 2011), §31.
59 within the oAs, it is referred to as the principle of maximum disclosure; oAs declaration of Principles 
on freedom of expression (2000), principle 4; 2004 Joint declaration by the un special rapporteur on 
freedom of opinion and expression, osce representative on freedom of the Media and oAs special 
rapporteur on freedom of expression, december 6, 2004; Inter-American commission on Human 
rights, Annual report of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, (August 29, 2003), at 8; 
IAcHr, office of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, A Hemispheric Agenda for the 
Defense of Freedom of Expression, oeA/ser.l/v/II/cIdH/rele/Inf.4/09 (february 25, 2009) §15.
60 IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §77. 
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similarly, both the Human rights committee and the european court of Human rights 
have held that there is a corollary positive obligation for authorities to disclose requested 
public interest information, albeit under limited circumstances only.
In ectHr’s case law, it has always been a central question whether article 10 can be 
interpreted to include a positive obligation for authorities to disclose information upon an 
individual’s request. Already in 1987, the court established in Leander v. Sweden that “the 
right to freedom to receive information prohibits a Government from restricting a person 
from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.” Thus – 
in principle – article 10 ecHr cannot be interpreted as imposing a positive obligation on 
authorities to disclose information upon request. even though the court still adheres to 
these classic principles, in later case law, it identified two situations in which the right of 
access to information corresponds with a positive obligation to disclose the information. 
first, authorities are required to disclose information when forced to do so by a judicial 
order that has gained legal force. second, authorities have a duty to disclose information 
when access to such information is instrumental in the individual’s exercise of his or her 
right to freedom of expression, in particular the right to receive and impart information. 
In regards to the latter, the court established four cumulative threshold criteria in Magyar 
Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary: 
- the information is of public interest; 
- the information requested contributes to the public debate; 
- the requesting person/entity has to be a social watchdog or perform a similar function; 
and
- the information needs to be readily available to public authorities.
The first two criteria have already been discussed above. The third criterion will be discussed 
below in section 1.4 (rightsholders). In short, the ectHr examines whether the person 
seeking access to the information in question does so intending to inform the public in its 
capacity of a public watchdog. nGos, academics and researchers are considered to fall within 
61 ectHr, Leander v. Sweden at §74; ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §156. 
62 ectHr, Leander v. Sweden §74; ectHr, Guerra and others v. Italy, §53. 
63 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §156. 
64 tsAZ v. Hungary (§ 35) the court reasoned that, in this case, the request of information should not be 
interpreted as a “denial of a general right of access to official documents” but instead as “an interference 
– by virtue of the censorial power of an information monopoly – with the exercise of the functions of a 
social watchdog, like the press.” see also youth initiative for Human rights v. serbia where the ectHr 
concluded that the serbian intelligence agency’s “obstinate reluctance” to comply with the order of the 
serbian Information commissioner to disclose the information constituted a violation of Article 10 
ecHr. This case focused on the refusal of public authorities to comply with a domestic order to release 
information.
65 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary §156.
66 Idem, §156. 
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this category, for instance. The last criterion implies that authorities are not expected to 
actively collect the information requested. Thus, the obligation for authorities only embraces 
a duty to disclose public interest information which is readily available and sought by 
watchdogs and alike for the purpose of contributing to the public debate. As opposed to 
the ectHr’s more stringent approach, other coe organs recognize a wider set of positive 
obligations for public authorities in relation to the right to public interest information, 
including a presumption of disclosure. 
The approach of the Hrcee is less straightforward; its approach has to be deduced from 
one case only. In the case Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, the Hrcee determined that the public 
authorities of kyrgyzstan had a duty to either provide the requested information or to justify 
their refusal to disclose in accordance with article 19(3) IccPr. The committee reasoned 
that when a social watchdog exercises its functions on matters of legitimate public concern, 
it has to be provided with the requested public interest information. The question remains 
whether the committee only recognizes a positive obligation for authorities to provide 
information under these specific circumstances. further, it is not clear how these conditions 
have to be interpreted – for instance, what constitutes a matter of legitimate public concern – 
and whether the same reasoning applies to others exercising such functions.
67 see, e.g., ectHr, Youth Initiative for Human Rights; ectHr, Österreichische Vereinigung Zur Erhaltung, 
Stärkung and Schaffung Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes 
v. Austria (OVESSG v. Austria), application no. 39534/07 (november 28, 2013); ectHr, Kenedi v. 
Hungary, App no 31475/05 (May 26, 2009), §43.
68 council of europe, committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (81) 19 (1981), Appendix 1; coe 
convention on Access to official documents, preamble (not yet entered into force, 2009), preamble.
69 so far, there is no General comment that addresses this issue, and other cases have similarly not touched 
upon this issue. 
70 Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan §7.3 reads: 
 The first issue before the committee is, therefore, whether the right of the individual to receive state-
held information, protected by Article 19, paragraph 2, of the covenant, brings about a corollary 
obligation of the state to provide it, so that the individual may have access to such information or 
receive an answer that includes a justification when, for any reason permitted by the covenant, the 
state is allowed to restrict access to the information in a specific case.
71 It should be noted that the context of a social watchdog asking for the information is relevant for the 
Hrcee at two different levels: at the level of admissibility and at the level of the substantive right to 
access information (see below, section 1.4). 
72 The Hrcee drew a parallel with the case law that had established the necessity for the media to have 
access to information of public interest: 
 The delivery of information to an individual can, in turn, permit it to circulate in society so that the 
latter can become acquainted with it, have access to it, and assess it. In this way, the right to freedom of 
thought and expression includes the protection of the right of access to state-held information, which 
also clearly includes the two dimensions, individual and social. 
 Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §7.4; it should be noted that this phrase is word-for-word the same as the 
reasoning used by the Inter-American court of Human rights in the Claude Reyes v. Chile in case (§77).
73 see Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, however, in which the ectHr deals exactly with this question 
in §156-168. 
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within the African human rights system, there is no single coherent approach to the existence 
and content of positive obligations for authorities. neither is there any relevant case law of 
human rights bodies in the African region that could shed light on the interpretation of the 
right to public interest information. However, the declaration of Principles on the freedom 
of expression in Africa – which is the main source indicating the recognition of a right to 
public interest information – does not stipulate a presumption of disclosure: it only states 
that refusals to disclose information are subject to appeal. The Model law on Access to 
Information in Africa, however, does stipulate that there is a presumption of disclosure of 
requested information. 
treaty monitoring bodies increasingly recognize a duty for authorities to disclose information 
proactively. This positive obligation goes beyond the requirement to disclose information 
upon request and instead requires authorities to release or publish information on their own 
initiative. 
In conclusion, the general standard deduced from the legal survey is that there is a right 
to receive public interest information requested from public authorities. There is a 
corresponding duty for public authorities to disclose the information requested unless a 
limitation applies. Although the approach adopted by the Hrcee and ectHr may condition 
this positive obligation, the duty to disclose public interest information is recognized. 
1.4. Rightsholders 
two different approaches can be discerned as to who has a right to public interest 
information. firstly, the identified general (minimum) standard is that everyone has a right 
to public interest information (that is, no interest to be stated). secondly, a deviating – or 
less progressive – standard can be identified where access to public interest information 
may only be requested by those involved in the legitimate gathering of information, such as 
74 Principle Iv of the 2002 Banjul declaration of Principles on freedom of expression in Africa, the 
African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights.
75 Article 2 (General Principles) (c) of the Model law on Access to Information for Africa, African 
commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, Model law on Access to Information for Africa, (2011,) 
available at http://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2062. 
76 see, e.g., Article 5 of the Aarhus convention. It should be noted that this development is similar to the 
duty to inform those affected, which will be discussed in chapter 4, section 3.1. for instance, Hrcee, 
GC 34, §19 reads “states parties should proactively put in the public domain Government information 
of public interest.” Article 5 Aarhus convention explicitly stipulates the obligation of authorities to 
put into the public domain information of public interest at their own initiative. see further Principle 
Iv of the 2002 Banjul declaration of Principles on freedom of expression in Africa; coe committee 
of Ministers, Recommendation Res. (2002)2, §IX. In its case law addressing environmental decision-
making, the ectHr has also recognized the obligation authorities have to proactively disseminate 
information in the context of article 2 (right to life) and article 8 (right to family life). The ectHr’s 
approach to these provisions will be further discussed in the context of the duty to inform those affected 
by decisions.
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social watchdogs. This section will start with the former and subsequently explain why not 
all treaty monitoring bodies have recognized the right for everyone yet. 
The Aarhus convention stipulates in article 4 that members of the public, including nGos, 
do not need to state their interest in the requested environmental information to be able to 
receive it. In other words, the right to public interest information is a right that belongs to 
everyone. 
similarly, the Inter-American court of Human rights determined in Claude Reyes v. Chile 
that authorities have to provide the requested information without the applicant having 
to prove a direct interest. The court clarified that public interest information is a public 
good and that thus everyone has to have access to this information. The rationale is that 
the information held by the public authorities is information gathered or produced for the 
people, and that it therefore belongs to the people. This approach, adopted by the court, 
has been widely reaffirmed within the oAs human rights regime.
In their 2002 declaration on freedom of expression in Africa, the African commission 
on Human and Peoples’ rights similarly recognized a right to public interest information 
for everyone. further support for a right for the general public to said information can be 
77 Article 4(1)(a) Aarhus convention; Accc, ACCC/C/2004/1 (Kazakhstan), §20.
78 IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §77; IActHr, Case of Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil (Guerrilha do Araguaia), 
judgment (november 24, 2010) series c no. 219, §197.
79 IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §77; see also Inter-American commission on Human rights, Annual 
report of the special rapporteur for freedom of expression, (2001) Inter-Am. cHr oAs doc. oeA/
ser.l/v/II.111, doc 20 rev., cP/doc.3790/03, §18; 2003 report of the oAs special rapporteur on the 
situation of freedom of expression in Haiti, oAs doc. oeA/ser.l/v/II.117, doc. 48, §28; 2003 report 
of oAs special rapporteur on the situation of freedom of expression in Panama, oAs doc. oeA/
ser.l/v/II.117, doc. 47, §128.
80 see, for instance, the special rapporteur of IAcHr who noted that “the owner of the information is the 
individual who has delegated the management of public affairs to his or her representatives”, paragraph 
18 interpreting principle 2, special rapporteur of the IAcHr, The Interpretation of the declaration of 
Principles, as available on the website of the special rapporteur of the IAcHr, accessible via http://
www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showArticle.asp?artId=132 . 
81 for example, the Inter-American Juridical committee’s resolution cJI/res.147 (lXXIII-o/08) on 
‘Principles on the right of Access to Information,’ which confirm in principle 1 that everyone has 
the right to public interest information; 2003 report of the oAs special rapporteur on the situation 
of freedom of expression in Haiti, §28; 2003 report of oAs special rapporteur on the situation of 
freedom of expression in Panama, §128.
82 African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights declaration of Principles on freedom of 
expression in Africa, (2002), principle Iv. In various resolutions, the African commission affirmed 
their commitment to oversee the implementation of the declaration within the African union 
member states. see, e.g., commission res. 122 ‘resolution on the expansion of the Mandate and re-
appointment of the special rapporteur on freedom of expression and Access to Information in Africa’ 
(november 15-28, 2007); the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, resolution no. 167 
‘securing the effective realization of Access to Information in Africa’ (november 10-24, 2010) in which 
the commission noted the importance of implementing the principles of the declaration. However, 
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found in the Model law on Access to Information for Africa, which was developed by the 
special rapporteur who was mandated by the commission to draft the Model law. The 
commission and African court on Human and Peoples rights have not considered the issue 
in individual communications. 
In Toktakunov v. Kyrgyzstan, the Human rights committee held that the kyrgyz public 
authorities had an obligation to provide the information requested (statistics on the 
execution of the death penalty in kyrgyzstan) and that those requesting the information did 
not need to prove a direct interest or personal involvement to obtain the information. so 
far, there have not been other cases in which this approach was affirmed or rejected. neither 
General Comment 34 (on article 19 ICCPR) nor the travaux préparatoires to the IccPr 
address who are the holders of the right. However, the committee did state in Toktakunov v. 
Kyrgyzstan that it mattered who was seeking access to the information and for which purpose 
in the context of the admissibility criteria. The committee drew an analogy between 
members of the media who have a right to access information on public affairs in light of their 
the commission also noted that only a few African states in 2010 had access-to-information laws in 
place. This questions the extent in which access to public interest information is a right that is broadly 
recognized within the region. 
83 see particularly articles 2(a) and 12(1). The Model law, although non-binding, serves the purpose 
of guiding “law makers in translating obligations emanating from international treaties into detailed 
national legislation” (preface), the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, Model law on 
Access to Information for Africa, 2011.
84 By resolution 167 (XlvII), the African commission mandated the special rapporteur on freedom of 
expression and Access to Information (special rapporteur) to lead the process of drafting the Model 
law. He established a ten-member working group of access to information (AtI) experts who were 
tasked with developing an initial draft of the Model law. The process included various expert meetings, 
four sub-regional consultations with stakeholders and a public call for comments on the draft Model 
law. see further at 7-9 of the Model law. The African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, 
Model law on Access to Information for Africa (2011). 
85 see for a complete list of all communications submitted to the commission, http://www.achpr.org/
communications/ with regard to the court see http://en.african-court.org/index.php/cases 
86 Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §6.3. 
87 The only other case on access to public interest information did not restate that the right belongs to 
everyone; however, this could also be caused by the parties’ not contesting this element, see Hrcee, 
Rafael Rodriquez Castañeda v. Mexico (2012).
88 Hrcee, GC 34, §18; interestingly, the committee does explicitly stipulate in the same paragraph that 
every individual “has to have a right to see and rectify personal information” (emphasis added).
89 In the travaux preparatoires to the IccPr, one finds the discussion whether a right to seek information 
is not too ‘aggressive’ and whether a right to gather information would therefore not be better suited. 
However, this proposal was defeated by a vote of 59/25 with 6 abstentions. Among the reasons why a 
right to seek would be better suited was the consideration “that it implied the right of active inquiry 
while ‘gather’ had a connotation of passively accepting news provided by Governments or news 
agencies”, §22; M.J. Bosschuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires” of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (Martinus nijhoff 1987) at 384, referring to the discussion in the 16th session 
of the Third committee, A/5000, §9, 11, 22, 34; see further nowak, at 446-448. 
90 Article 2 of the optional Protocol to the International covenant on civil and Political rights, un 
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) (december 16, 1966, entry into force on March 23, 1976). 
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contribution to public debate and others who similarly exercise “social watchdog functions”, 
including public associations or private individuals. In the case at hand, Mr. toktakunov, a 
legal consultant for an nGo, requested access to the statistics on the execution of the death 
penalty in kyrgyzstan. The committee argued that Mr. toktakunov had a watchdog function 
on issues of public interest. Accordingly, the complaint was deemed admissible: 
due to the particular nature of the information sought, that the author has substantiated, 
for purposes of admissibility, that he, as an individual member of the public, was directly 
affected by the refusal of the state party’s authorities to make available to him, on request, the 
information on use of the death penalty.
Thus, individuals need to prove their interest and demonstrate that they are directly affected 
by the refusal of the requested information to be able to file an admissible complaint to the 
Human rights committee. 
The approach of the european court of Human rights is different than that of the other 
treaty monitoring bodies. The ectHr recognizes a right to public interest information only 
under limited circumstances. In Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, the court confirmed 
its earlier case law and held that it matters who requests public interest information and for 
which purpose. The court drew an analogy with the ectHr’s long-established practice of 
according special protection to the press by restating that the gathering of information is an 
essential preparatory step in journalism and forms an inherent, protected part of the freedom 
of the press. Accordingly, the court recognized an implied right of access to public interest 
information for the media. It is in this light that the court examines whether the person 
seeking access to the information does so in the capacity of a public watchdog with the intent to 
inform the public. The question is who may receive such special protection. In previous cases, 
the court established that nGos, as social watchdogs, have to be offered similar protection 
91 Hrcee, Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan, §6.3.
92 Idem. 
93 Idem at §6.3.
94 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §156. 
95 Idem, §168; see also ectHr, Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, 48135/06 (June 25, 2013), §20:
 “freedom to receive information” embraces a right of access to information. (…) when an nGo is 
involved in matters of public interest, such as the present applicant, it is exercising a role as a public 
watchdog of similar importance to that of the press. (...) applicant’s activities thus warrant similar 
convention protection to that afforded to the press.
 see for further case law confirming this line of the ectHr’s reasoning also ectHr [Gc] Animal 
Defenders International v. United Kingdom Appl. no. 48876/08 (April 22, 2013), §103; ectHr, Tarsasag 
a Szabadsag (TSAZ) v. Hungary application no 37374/05 (merits) (April 14, 2009) §36; see also, e.g., 
ectHr, Jersild v. Denmark, (september 23, 1994), series A no. 298; ectHr, Stoll v. Switzerland, no. 
69698/01, (April 25, 2006); ectHr, Monnat v. Switzerland, no. 73604/01, ecHr 2006-X.
96 The exact same reasoning was used by the Hrcee, in Toktakunov. v. Kyrgyzstan.
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as is provided to the press. similarly, the ectHr has recognized the crucial role of academic 
researchers and authors of literature on matters of public concern, and the court anticipated 
that further categories may warrant similar protection under article 10 in the future. This 
reasoning resembles the reasoning of the Hrcee; for the ectHr, however, the factor who 
requests information and for what purpose is not only of relevance for the admissibility 
of the claim but also for determining the scope of the substantive right to public interest 
information. 
one explanation for the ectHr’s restrictive approach is that the court has construed a right 
to access to information in the context of the freedom to receive information: recognizing a 
right to access information in the course of legitimate information gathering for the purpose 
of contributing to the public debate. on the other hand, the Human rights committee and 
the Inter-American court of Human rights have read a right to public interest information 
into the freedom to seek information. The African commission on Human and Peoples’ 
rights has interpreted the freedom to receive information to include the right to seek 
information and accordingly that there is a right to public interest information. 
other organs of the council of europe do embrace a wider substantive right and recognize 
a right for the general public. A 1981 recommendation of the committee of Ministers 
provided “[e]veryone within the jurisdiction of a member [s]tate shall have the right to 
obtain, on request, information held by the public authorities.” The coe convention on 
97 see also ectHr, Youth Initiative for Human Rights; ectHr, Österreichische Vereinigung Zur Erhaltung, 
Stärkung and Schaffung Eines Wirtschaftlich Gesunden Land- und Forstwirtschaftlichen Grundbesitzes v. 
Austria (OVESSG v. Austria), application no. 39534/07 (november 28, 2013). 
98 for instance, in Kenedi v. Hungary, the ectHr ruled that withholding access to materials “for legitimate 
historical research” violated a historian’s right to information under article 10 ecHr; ectHr, Kenedi 
v. Hungary, App. no. 31475/05 (May 26, 2009), §43; see further for the importance of historical 
studies and thereby the need for access to archives the council of europe, committee of Ministers, 
recommendation no. 13 (2000) ‘on a European Policy on Access to Archives’ (July 13, 2000) available via 
www.coe.int.
99 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary. 
100 ectHr, Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §117, 128, 150-156.
101 see further the travaux preparatoires to the ecHr. It mentions the draft text suggested by the un 
commission on freedom of Information (right to seek, receive, and impart) as one of the two text 
proposals which were discussed in the preliminary drafting phase by the commission of experts, but 
no further reference to a discussion on this phrase was found in the travaux preparatoires. coe, doc. 
dH(56)15, cdH (75) 16 (August 17, 1956). 
102 see, e.g., coe committee of Ministers recommendation r (81) 19 (1981); council of Minister 
recommendations are non-binding. However, they do show the agreement of all the ministers of all the 
member states on the topic; article 4 of the coe convention on Access to official documents.
103 council of Ministers of the council of europe, R (81) 19 (1981); in 2002 the committee of Ministers 
affirmed this approach: 
 Member states should guarantee the right of everyone to have access, on request, to official documents 
held by the public authorities. This principle should apply without discrimination on any ground, 
including national origin. 
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Access to official documents also recognizes a right for everyone to seek access to public 
interest information with no interest having to be stated. 
In conclusion, even though the ectHr has a diverging approach, the general standard 
across the international instruments is that the right to public interest information belongs 
to everyone. Across all treaty monitoring bodies, there is a qualified right to public interest 
information for social watchdogs and (other) individuals who request public interest 
information with the purpose of contributing to the public debate. 
1.5. Procedure
each instrument prescribes that public authorities have to have procedures in place for 
individuals to request access to information, but confers discretion on the parties to the 
conventions in arranging it. The requirements for a procedure to request information seem 
to be rather similar across the various treaty regimes: they have to be low-cost, simple, 
and fast. Authorities are granted wide discretion as to how to fulfil these requirements. 
Accordingly, treaty monitoring bodies apply a lower level of scrutiny when assessing the 
compliance of authorities.
 committee of Ministers, R (2002)2 on Access to Official Documents, (february 21, 2002), §III (emphasis 
added). 
104 Article 2(1) stipulates that everyone has the right to access official documents, and article (4) stipulates 
that no reasons need to be provided for requesting access to official documents, council of europe 
convention on Access to official documents, cets no. 205 (not yet entered into force); see further the 
explanatory report to the coe convention on access to official documents, §17-19. 
105 see also Article 19, The Johannesburg Principles on national security, freedom of expression and 
Access to Information, (october 1, 1995), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4653fa1f2.html; 
Article 19, The Public’s right to know: Principles on freedom of Information legislation (June 1999) 
available at: https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/righttoknow.pdf. These principles were 
endorsed and referred to by various special rapporteurs on freedom of expression: organization of 
American states, Inter-American commission on Human rights, 1999 report of the rapporteur for 
freedom of expression, oeA/ser.l/v/II.106, doc. 3 rev. (April 13, 2000); lima Principles (principle 1) 
un doc e/cn.4/2001/63, Annex II; lagos declaration on the right of Access to Information, organized 
by Media rights Agenda, open society Justice Initiative (30 nGo from 16 African countries), available 
at http://tinyurl.com/osl823m , §1.
106 Hrcee, GC 34, §19 “easy, prompt effective and practical access”; article 4(1)(b) Aarhus convention; 
2006 Joint declaration by the un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, osce 
representative on freedom of the Media and oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression; 
report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression, Inter-American commission on 
Human rights 2009, oeA doc ser.l/v/II doc 51, chapter Iv, The right of Access to Information, 
§26-28; article 5 coe convention on Access to official documents (2009); Inter-American Juridical 
committee, Principles on the right to Access to Information, principle 5; coe, committee of Ministers, 
recommendation r (81) 19, Appendix 1, principle vI; coe committee of Ministers, Recommendation 
(2002) 2, principle vIII.
107 The interrelation between the degree of enjoyed discretion and the level of exercised scrutiny is a general 
theme within this research. In the context of the right to information, see particularly paragraphs 1.6 
and 2.6. for a broader discussion of discretionary norms and the level of exercised scrutiny exercised 
and its implication for the Inclusionary Governance Model chapter 6, section 2. 
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only some treaties further define the procedures. for instance, the Aarhus convention 
stipulates that, in principle, information has to be provided in the format sought, 
information has to be made available as soon as possible, latest within one month after 
submitting the request. further, authorities may only charge a reasonable fee for supplying 
information.
1.6. Limitations
This section will describe two ways in which the right to public interest information may be 
constrained: authorities may explicitly limit the right or they may impose conditions on the 
exercise of the right, which in practice may result in a limitation of the exercise of the right. 
each instrument stipulates what limitations to the right of public interest information are 
permitted. As argued in section 1.4, there is a presumption of disclosure when public interest 
information is requested. As a result, limitations are to be interpreted restrictively, and 
there is an exhaustive list of limitation grounds. As a minimum, a limitation may not render 
a right illusory. despite small differences in phrasing, each of the instrument requires that a 
tripartite test has to be fulfilled to limit the right to public interest information in accordance 
with the respective instrument. Generally speaking, the tripartite test comprises tests of 
legality, legitimacy, and necessity. even though the tripartite test originated in human 
rights law, similar language may be found in the context of the Aarhus convention.
firstly, the restriction has to comply with the criterion of legality. legality has been interpreted 
relatively similarly across the various treaty regimes: it requires more than merely a legal 
basis for the limitation in domestic law; instead, the instruments set quality criteria for such 
108 Article 4(1)(b) Aarhus convention; Accc, ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/8/Add. 1, 
(september 30, 2010), §70. 
109 Article 4(2) Aarhus convention: an extension up to two months is permitted when the volume and the 
complexity of the information justifies such an extension. 
110 Article 4(8) Aarhus convention, see for a further explanation of what constitutes a reasonable amount, 
for example, Accc, ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), §77-79; see similarly General Comment 34 (§19) of the 
Hrcee in which the committee stated that “[f]ees for requests for information should not be such as 
to constitute an unreasonable impediment to access to information”.
111 see e.g., article 4(4) Aarhus convention; Accc, ACCC/C/2007/21 (European Community), ece/
MP.PP/c.1/2009/2/Add.1 (december 11, 2009), §30; Hrcee, GC 34, §19; IActHr, Claude Reyes v. 
Chile, §85-87. 
112 see, e.g., Hrcee, GC 34, §21. The African commission for Human rights, Media Rights Agenda and 
others v. Nigeria (2000) AHrlr 200 (october 1998), §70. 
113 see, e.g., Hrcee, GC 34, §22; see Hrcee, Velichkin v. Belarus communication no. 1022/2001 (october 
20, 2005); ectHr, Kenedi v. Hungary, §43.
114 Article 10 (2) ecHr; article 13 (2) IAcHr; article 19(3) IccPr; article 9 AcHr, African commission, 
resolution on the Adoption of declaration of Principles on freedom of expression in Africa, AcHPr/
res. 62 (XXXII) (october 2002), principle II.
115 Article 4(4) Aarhus convention.
116 ectHr, delfi As v. estonia [Gc], no. 64569/09, ecHr 2015; article 4(3)(c) Aarhus convention; 
IActHr, The Word “Laws” in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights. Advisory Opinion, 
OC-6/86 (May 9, 1986) series A no. 6, §26-29; Hrcee GC 34, §25.
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laws. These criteria intend, inter alia, to prevent arbitrary withholding of information. 
for instance:
- legislation has to clearly define the conditions under which information may be withheld 
and define the (administrative) discretion of authorities. 
- At a minimum, legislation stipulating the limitation has to be compatible with the 
obligations of states under the convention in question. 
secondly, any restriction needs to be legitimate, which implies that the (partial) withholding 
of the information by authorities has to pursue one of the legitimate aims recognized by 
the respective treaty. when comparing the recognized legitimate aims, the majority of the 
provisions includes the following grounds: protection of the rights or reputation of others, 
national security or public order, and public health or morals. The ecHr and the Aarhus 
convention list further grounds for limiting access to the information. 
Thirdly, the restriction has to be necessary (in a democratic society). This criterion contains 
two elements: necessity and proportionality. even though different terminology is used 
across the various treaty regimes, the meaning of the requirement of necessity is fairly 
similar. for instance, the ectHr requires a pressing social need, the Inter-American court 
117 regarding the position of the ectHr, see, for example, Sunday Times v. UK (1979-1980) 2 eHrr 245, 
§49 and ectHr Hasan v. Bulgaria (2000) 24 eHrr 55. 
118 see, e.g., Accc, ACCC/C/2010/51 (Romania), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2014/12, (July 14, 2014), §89-90; in 
Kenedi v. Hungary, the ectHr came to the conclusion that the government’s refusal to comply with a 
domestic court decision that ordered the disclosure of information resulted into defiance of domestic 
law and arbitrary exercise of power (§ 44-45).
119 for example, in regards to the African charter, see the African commission on Human rights and 
Peoples rights, Interight and others v. Mauritania (2004) AHrlr 87 (AcHPr 2004), §77. Hrcee, GC 
34, §26 and Hrcee, Toonen v. Australia communication No. 488/1992 (March 30, 1994). 
120 The IccPr, the ecHr and the IAcHr mention these as legitimate aims. Aarhus speaks of national 
defence or public security. The African charter phrases it slightly differently in article 27(2) “the rights 
of others, collective security, morality and common interest.”
121 ecHr 10(2) further includes territorial integrity, prevention of the disclosure of information received 
in confidentiality, and maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. The Aarhus 
convention has quite a wide list of limitations, article 4(4) provides the following: the confidentiality 
of the proceedings of public authorities, international relation, the course of justice, the confidentiality 
of commercial and industrial information, intellectual property rights, the confidentiality of personal 
data and/or files relating to a natural person where that person has not consented to the disclosure of 
the information to the public, the interests of a third party which has supplied the information, and the 
environment to which the information relates, such as breeding sites of rare species.
122 not all treaty regimes distinguish clearly between the requirement of the necessity of the imposed 
restriction and the question whether the chosen restriction is proportional to achieve the legitimate 
aim; however, this research identified a similarity in the type of reasoning across the instruments, 
which is set out in this section; in Rafael rodríguez castañeda v. Mexico ((2013), §7.7), for example, 
the Hrcee assessed the refusal of authorities to disclose the physical ballot papers used in a popular 
election and concluded that there was no violation in this case by listing various factors, including those 
hinting at the proportionality and necessity of the restriction.
123 see, e.g., ectHr, Delfi AS v. Estonia [GC], no. 64569/09, ecHr 2015 §131. The ectHr’s approach to the 
principle of proportionality is closely connected to their margin-of-appreciation doctrine. This approach 
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of Human rights a compelling public interest, and the African commission on Human 
and Peoples’ rights a legitimate state interest to justify a refusal to disclose the information. 
In the case law, it often ends in a balancing act of competing interests: the public interest 
in disclosing information is balanced against the state interest (that is, the legitimate aim) 
protected by the restriction. The parameters for such a balancing act are decided through 
a case-by-case analysis. overall, authorities have a certain discretion in determining what 
constitutes a proper balancing of the interests. Accordingly, treaty monitoring bodies engage 
in a form of deferential review when they assess the limitations adopted by authorities. 
such deferential review is based on the presumption that administrative authorities are best 
suited to decide on the basis of the available facts. The discretion enjoyed by authorities 
and the exercised level of deferential review (or extent of scrutiny) are related to each other. 
for instance, the legal survey charts that whenever the right to public interest information 
was limited for national security reasons, treaty bodies were more explicit in defining the 
extent of administrative discretion that authorities enjoy, and the level of scrutiny that 
treaty monitoring bodies exercised was higher than when limitations were reviewed on 
other grounds. As stated by various treaty monitoring bodies, it is even more pertinent 
to clearly define the authorities’ discretionary power to prevent arbitrary use thereof when 
information is withheld for national security reasons. The oAs, for instance, limits the 
discretionary powers of authorities by imposing a higher necessity standard: the right to 
access public interest information may only be limited in situations of “real and imminent 
danger that threatens national security in democratic society”. 
The proportionality principle refers to the need to choose the least restrictive means to 
achieve the legitimate aim whenever the right is limited. It should be noted that not one 
has been criticised for being neither coherent nor transparent. see, e.g., M. Ambrus, ‘comparative law 
Method in the Jurisprudence of the european court of Human rights in the light of the rule of law’ 
(2009) 2(3) Erasmus Law Review 353-371. Benvenisti criticized the usage of the approach particularly 
when dealing with minority rights, e. Benvenisti ‘Margin of Appreciation, consensus and universal 
standards (1999) 31 International law and politics 843.
124 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §91.
125 The African commission for Human rights, Media Rights Agenda and others v. Nigeria (2000) §69; the 
African commission on Human rights and Peoples, Interight and others v. Mauritania (2004), §78. 
126 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, 88-90; Hrcee, Rafael Rodriquez Castañeda v. Mexico §7.5-7.7. 
127 Claude Reyes v. Chile, §58; see also IAcHr, Annual report of the office of the special rapporteur for 
freedom of expression. chapter III (The right to Access to Public Information in the Americas). oeA/
ser.l/v/II. doc. 69 (december 30, 2011), §343. 2004 Joint declaration by the un special rapporteur 
on freedom of opinion and expression, osce representative on freedom of the Media and oAs 
special rapporteur on freedom of expression.
128 Claude Reyes v. Chile, §98; Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the right to access to 
information, principle 4; 2004 Joint declaration by the un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion 
and expression, osce representative on freedom of the Media and oAs special rapporteur on 
freedom of expression. 
129 Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the right to Access to Information, principle 4; 
Claude Reyes v. Chile, §98.
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uniform methodology has been used across the international instruments to assess the 
proportionality of a given interference. The need to choose the least restrictive means 
implies that whenever authorities decide to refuse a full or a partial disclosure, authorities 
have to justify why. when partial disclosure of the information may just as well achieve 
the legitimate aim by editing some information, authorities are expected to choose this less 
restrictive means. further, several treaty monitoring bodies stipulate that authorities may 
only classify information for a particular period. Authorities are expected to set a reasonable 
timeframe after which the information will become available to the public.
In addition, the instruments stipulate that whenever the right to public interest information 
is limited by authorities, certain conditions have to be met. whether it concerns a refusal 
to partially or fully disclose of information, any refusal to disclose information needs to 
be provided in a written response in which authorities set out the reasons underlying the 
refusal. furthermore, whenever the information is refused or partly refused, applicants 
have to have an opportunity to appeal the decision and be informed about this option.
1.7. Conclusions: The Building Block of a Right to Public Interest Information 
The conceptual Model includes a right to access information for those affected by 
decisions of international institutions. This section examined whether, and to what extent, 
the international law applicable at a domestic level recognizes a right to public interest 
information and what the scope is of this right. 
130 see in general on the proportionality principle, for example, J. rivers ‘Proportionality and variable 
Intensity of review (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174 at 195-206. 
131 Another option may be the use of a document’s anonymized version to protect national security or to 
uphold the confidentiality of certain personal data. see, e.g., ectHr, OVESSG v. Austria, 45-47. 
132 Idem, §45-47; see also article 5(6) coe convention on Access to official documents. 
133 see, e.g., 2009 report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression, §54. 
134 for the duty to provide reasons, for example, see Hrcee, GC 34, §19; coe, committee of Ministers 
recommendation no. r. (81) 19, Appendix 1, principle vII; 2009 report of the oAs special rapporteur 
for freedom of expression, §26; Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the right to Access 
to Information, principle 5; an individual participation right (oecd recommendation of the council 
concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and trans-Border flows of Personal 
data (2013) c(80)58/fInAl, as amended on July 11, 2013 by c (2013)79, Annex paragraph 13(b)(c). 
IActHr, claude reyes v. chile, §55; the court further reasoned (§120) that if public authorities fail to 
provide access to information without explaining the rules or reasons on which it based its decision, 
it will lead to a violation of due process rights; see also the explanatory report to coe convention on 
Access to official documents, §53.
135 The possibility of appeal and its procedural requirements will be discussed in detail in chapter 5. for 
the right to appeal a (partial) refusal to provide information, see, for example, council of europe, 
committee of Ministers recommendation no. r. (81) 19, Appendix 1, principle vIII; Inter-American 
Juridical committee, Principles on the right to access to information, principle 8; 2004 Joint declaration 
by the un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, osce representative on 
freedom of the Media and oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression; 2009 report of the oAs 
special rapporteur for freedom of expression, §26. Also, article 4(7) Aarhus convention addresses the 
obligation to inform parties of the possibility of appeal. 
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The legal survey charted that the right to public interest information has a relatively firm 
legal basis in international law. Although there is strong support for a right to public interest 
information at a regional level, at un level, only the IccPr recognizes a right to public 
interest information. This section discussed the benchmarks of the right to public interest 
information, summarized in the schematic overview below. Although not all instruments 
recognize a right to public interest information, those that have recognized it, hold a rather 
uniform interpretation of its content and scope. 
2. Right to Personal Information 
The conceptual Model includes a duty to provide access to information and a duty to protect 
the confidentiality of information in the possession of international institutions without 
further specifying the contours of these duties. Through the legal survey, this section will 
examine whether, and to what extent, international law recognizes a right to personal 
information. said right refers in its most basic form to a right to access information held by 
public authorities and that relates to an individual. This section will explore the legal basis of 
the right (2.1), who is entitled to what information (2.2-2.3), the scope of the right and the 
136 note that the IccPr has a near-universal ratification record, 172 countries are party to the convention. 
see further, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=_en&mtdsg_no=Iv-
4&src=Ind.
137 Although human rights literature uses different terms (personal data, habeas data, personal information), 
this research will use the term personal information throughout the research. 
RIGHT TO PUBLIC INTEREST INFORMATION
Legal basis 
Who is the duty bearer 
Which information 
Holder of the right
Scope of obligations 
Procedure 
Limitations 
Broad support in IccPr, Aarhus, ecHr, AfcPHr, IAcHr
no basis in cMw, cedAw, crc, crPd, ced
Public authorities: all branches of state government, all actors who 
exercise public (administrative) authority
Information of public interest
relevant factors: subject of the information and who holds the 
information / to whom it relates 
General standard: general public, no interest needs to be stated
deviating standard: only social watchdogs and similar parties 
Presumption of disclosure of the information 
fair, timely and low-cost 
exhaustive list of limitations
Three-part test: legality, legitimacy, and necessity
legitimate aims are protection of the rights or reputation of others, 
national security, public order, or public health or morals
when limiting: avoid arbitrariness and appropriately balance interests 
Table 3: Building block - right to public interest information
  3
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
procedure that is to be followed to obtain such information (2.4-2.5), and the limitations to 
the right (2.6). The section will conclude with a schematic overview of the building block of 
the right to personal information (2.7). 
2.1. The Right’s Legal Bases 
The right to personal information finds its basis primarily in human rights law. This research 
distinguishes between an explicit right to personal information and an implicit right. The 
former refers to legal provisions that explicitly recognize a right to personal information 
(2.1.1), the latter refers to the recognition of such a right through the treaty monitoring 
bodies’ authoritative interpretation (2.1.2). This section will discuss the different ways in 
which the right has crystallized in international law.
2.1.1. Explicit Legal Bases
As this section will demonstrate, the right to personal information is rather similar across 
the various instruments. The 1981 coe data Protection convention is dedicated solely 
to the protection of the right to personal information. Before going into the content of this 
convention, two preliminary remarks are necessary regarding its normative relevance. 
firstly, the convention only applies to the automatic processing of personal information 
and thereby does not deal with all cases of personal information held by authorities. 
secondly, 45 of the 46 member states that ratified the coe data Protection convention are 
member states of the council of europe, which demonstrates a strong european focus. As 
to the substance, the convention stipulates a right to access personal information. Article 
8 provides four related guarantees: individuals have to (1) be enabled to know about the 
existence of an automated data file, (2) know the content of the information kept, (3) get a 
rectification of erroneous or inappropriate information, and (4) have access to a remedy if any 
of the previous elements is not respected. The convention is not self-executing; individuals 
cannot directly derive rights from it. Instead, state parties are required to implement the 
obligations in their domestic legislation. However, the convention is relevant for the scope 
and content of the recognized procedural safeguards. 
138 coe convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
data, etc no. 108, (strasbourg, January 28, 1981, entry into force on october 1, 1985). 
139 The following sections will further explain the extent to which the convention is considered to be of 
normative relevance. 
140 At the moment of writing, the convention has 46 state parties: all the council of europe members with 
the exception of san Marino and turkey, and non-coe member uruguay. The convention is open to 
parties outside the council of europe region upon approval of the committee of Ministers, article 23 of 
the coe data Protection convention.
141 Article 8 (a-d) coe data protection convention; explanatory report to the coe data Protection 
convention, §50-54.
142 Article 4 coe data Protection convention; explanatory report to the coe data Protection convention, 
§38.
Access to InforMAtIon
various non-binding yet authoritative guidelines recognize a right to personal information as 
well. for instance, the oecd Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and transborder flows 
of Personal data acknowledges the right to access, see and verify personal information and 
stipulate procedural safeguards against the risk of “loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of [personal] data.” similar considerations are included in 
the guidelines of the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation’s (APec) privacy framework 
and the un Guidelines for the regulation of computerized Personal data files. Also, 
the economic community of west African states (ecowAs) recognizes a right to access, 
modify, rectify personal information and stipulates clear rules for the processing, collecting 
and disclosing personal information. 
Besides international instruments that address the need for data protection, the right to 
personal information also finds an explicit legal basis in the convention for the Protection of 
All Persons from enforced disappearances (ced). In article 18, the ced recognizes a right 
to access personal information for persons deprived of liberty and others related to them 
143 council of the oecd, oecd council recommendation: oecd Guidelines on the Protection of 
Privacy and transborder flows of Personal data, (adopted and became applicable on september 23, 
1980 (updated 2013), Principle 11.
144 Idem, Principle 13 (individual participation principle).
145 The oecd recommendations are qualified as oecd Acts together with the oecd decisions (article 
5 oecd), they are however not binding on the members, article 8 oecd. nevertheless, they are 
normatively relevant as the recommendations are considered to be a “great moral force as representing 
the political will of Member countries.” https://www.oecd.org/legal/legal-instruments.htm. currently, 
35 states are member of the oecd, see further http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/.
146 The Asia-Pacific economic cooperation (APec) is a regional economic forum, which has as its aim 
to “create greater prosperity for the people of the region by promoting balanced, inclusive, sustainable, 
innovative and secure growth and by accelerating regional economic integration.” established in 1989, 
APec currently has 21 members, see further https://www.apec.org/About-us/About-APec/Member-
economies.aspx. APec has adopted a privacy framework that has as its starting point “recognizing the 
importance of the development of effective privacy protections that avoid barriers to information flows, 
ensure continued trade, and economic growth in the APec region.” for the purpose of this research, 
see in particular principles 15-26. normative overlap exists between principle 13 of the oecd, article 
8 of the coe convention and principle 23 of the APec. The APec privacy framework (2004) can 
be accessed via http://www.apec.org/Groups/committee-on-trade-and-Investment/~/media/files/
Groups/ecsG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx. 
147 see similarly the un Guidelines for the regulation of computerized Personal data files of the un 
commission on Human rights, adopted by un GA, un doc, e/cn.4/1990/72, (february 20 1990), 
un doc A/res/45/94 (december 14, 1990), principle 4.
148 ecowAs is a regional organization comprising – currently – 15 west-African states and aimed at 
economic integration within this region. see for more details economic community of west African 
states (ecowAs), revised treaty of the economic community of west African states (ecowAs), 
(July 24, 1993). see further, http://www.ecowas.int. 
149 Articles 23-28 for the obligations of authorities, articles 38-41 for the rights of the individuals, ecowAs, 
supplementary Act A/sA.1/01/10 on Personal data Protection within ecowAs (february 16, 2010). 
The supplementary acts are binding upon all member states to the ecowAs.
150 united nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2716, at 3, (new york, december 20, 2006, entry into force on 
december 23, 2010), the ced has 53 parties and 96 signatories. see for a current list of ratifications, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=Ind&mtdsg_no=Iv-16&chapter=4&clang=_en. 
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(such as their relatives, representatives or counsel). despite this provision’s limited scope 
of applicability, it is nevertheless evidence of the substantive terminology more generally 
adopted across the relevant instruments, as will be illustrated in the following section.
to conclude, there are a few explicit legal bases for the right to personal information. The 
ced recognizes a right to personal information, however it is applicable in a very limited 
set of situations which are less relevant for this research. Instruments that grant a right to 
personal information of a general nature have a rather more regional scope of applicability. 
nevertheless, the language used is rather similar across the instruments. The next section 
will explain how the right to personal information has further developed through the work 
of treaty monitoring bodies. 
2.1.2. Authoritative Interpretation
Although most instruments do not contain an explicit provision stipulating a right to 
personal information, several treaty monitoring bodies have read such a right into the right 
to privacy and/or the right of freedom of expression. As this section will show, the right 
to personal information has been shaped differently, depending on the instrument and the 
treaty monitoring body. 
The Human rights committee is the only un treaty monitoring body that has explicitly 
recognized a right to personal information. In General Comment 16 (article 17 IccPr) the 
Hrcee states that: 
…every individual should have the right to ascertain in an intelligible form, whether, and if so, 
what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what purposes. every individual 
should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals or bodies 
control or may control their files. If such files contain incorrect personal data or have been 
collected or processed contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the 
right to request rectification or elimination. 
In General Comment 34 (regarding Article 19), the Hrcee reaffirmed the importance of 
the protection of personal information, whether in automated data files or other files. The 
right to personal information is also recognized in the committee’s case law, albeit only in a 
151 Article 18 ced. The holders of the right as laid down in article 18 have to have access to the information 
on the authority that ordered the deprivation of liberty; the date, time and place where the person was 
deprived of liberty and admitted to the place of deprivation of liberty; elements relating to the state 
of health of the person deprived of liberty; in the event of death during the deprivation of liberty, the 
circumstances and cause of death and the destination of the remains. 
152 Hrcee, GC 16 (Article 17 ICCPR), §10.
153 Hrcee, GC 34 (Article 19), §18. 
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few cases. The Hrcee identified a right to personal information in the context of the right 
to privacy (article 17 IccPr) and in context of article 10 IccPr (humane treatment of 
persons deprived of their liberty). several un organs have adopted a similar approach; they 
recognize a right to access personal information for all those who offer proof of identity. 
treaty monitoring bodies of the other un human rights conventions do not currently 
recognize a right for individuals to access personal information held by authorities. 
nevertheless, as will be shown in section 2.4 in particular, several of these treaty monitoring 
bodies do emphasize the role of authorities in the prevention of personal information misuse 
as a result of unauthorized access to the information. 
At a regional level, the right to personal information has been mainly recognized in the 
european and Inter-American region. The european court of Human rights acknowledges 
said right in the context of article 8 ecHr (the right to private and family life) and developed 
extensive case law on the scope and content of this right to personal information. The 
court has established that the right to personal information, under the protection of article 
154 Hrcee, Van Hulst v. The Netherlands (903/2000), (november 1, 2004) 29, §7.9: the Hrcee decided 
that the separate storage of the recordings of the author’s taped conversations with someone else in 
the context of a criminal investigation was reasonable, proportionate and necessary to achieve the 
legitimate purpose of combating crime. Thus, in this case, there was no violation of article 17 IccPr. 
155 The committee held that the right of the detainee was violated as, amongst other things, he did not 
receive access to his medical records while in prison. Hrcee, Zheludkova (on behalf of Zheludkov) 
v. Ukraine, communication no. 726/1996, (december 6, 2002), §8.4 and 9; three members of the 
committee attached an individual opinion to the case in which they disagreed with the majority of the 
committee, which majority held that the denial of access to the medical records constituted a violation 
of article 10 IccPr. The three dissenting members argued that the article should not be stretched that 
far; Hrcee, Zheludkova (on behalf of Zheludkov) v. Ukraine, at 10-11, 13-14.
156 un commission on Human rights, Guidelines for the regulation of computerized Personal data 
files, (1990), principle 4; un General Assembly, Resolution 69/166 the right to privacy in the digital 
age (february 10, 2015) un doc. A/res/69/166; un Human rights council, report of the special 
rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression 
(frank de la rue), un doc. A/Hrc/17/27 (May 16, 2011), §58; see also the various joint declarations 
of the un special rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression, the osce representative on 
freedom of the Media, the oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression and the AcHPr special 
rapporteur on freedom of expression and Access to Information: for example, the 2004 declaration 
on access to information, the 2006 declaration on openness of national and International Public 
Bodies, 2015 declaration on freedom of expression and responses to conflict situations, and the 2016 
declaration on freedom of expression and countering violent extremism. All available via http://
www.osce.org/fom/66176. 
157 The right to privacy is recognized though in article 14 cedAw, article 16 crc, and article 22 crPd. 
currently however, no case law or other documents exists that interpret the content and scope of the 
right to privacy.
158 It focuses particularly on the right to have one’s personal data, for instance health information, treated 
with confidentiality. see, e.g., cescr GC 14 §12(B)(iv). The issue of confidentiality will be further 
discussed in section 2.3. 
159 It should be noted that, at a european level, the coe data Protection convention contains an explicit 
legal basis for a right to personal information, as addressed in section 2.1.1. 
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8 ecHr, encompasses, inter alia, the storage and collection of personal information, the 
disclosure of personal information to authorities or third parties, the erasure or destruction 
of personal information, and the right to access personal information.
In the Inter-American region, the right to personal information has mainly developed 
through the recognition of the right in non-binding documents of various organs of the 
oAs. so far, neither the IActHr nor the Inter-American commission on Human rights 
has addressed the issue of personal information in the cases submitted to them. The Inter-
American commission on Human rights, however, has extensively dealt with this issue in 
light of their “promotion and monitoring” task. At various occasions, the commission 
affirmed the right of individuals to access personal information and to request a rectification 
or removal of erroneous information. Moreover, the oAs special rapporteur on freedom 
of expression has adopted numerous declarations recognizing the right to personal 
information. 
160 regarding the storing by the secret service, see, for example, ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, Merits, App. 
no. 9248/81, A/116, (1987); regarding health data, see, for example, ectHr, L.H. v. Slovakia App. no. 
32881/04 (2009).
161 see, e.g., M.S. v. Sweden (August 27, 1997). The case concerned a swedish national, M.s., who requested 
access to her file held by the social Insurance office after she had applied for social security benefits, 
which application had subsequently been denied. she found out that the file contained her personal 
medical records to which release she had not consented. The medical records in question contained 
highly personal and sensitive data about the applicant, including information relating to an abortion. 
M.s. complained that the disclosure of her personal medical information to another public authority 
constituted a violation of article 8 ecHr. The court concluded that the interference was in accordance 
with the law and the measure was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. § 35-44; ectHr, 
Z v. Finland (Application no. 22009/93) judgment, (february 25, 1997), §95.
162 ectHr [Gc], Rotaru v. Romania, Preliminary objection, merits, just satisfaction, App. no. 28341/95, 
(May 4, 2000) §46.
163 ectHr [Gc], Amann v. Switzerland, Merits, App. no. 27798/95, (february 16, 2000); ectHr [Gc], 
Odièvre v. France, judgment on merits, App. no. 42326/98, (february 13, 2003); ectHr, Gaskin v. 
United Kingdom, merits and just satisfaction, App. no. 10454/83, (July 7, 1989). 
164 Inter-American commission on Human rights, declaration of Principles on freedom of expression; 
Principle 9 and 10 of the Preliminary Principles and recommendations on data Protection (The 
Protection of Personal data) (committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, oeA/ser.G, cP/cAJP-
2921/10 rev. 1 corr. 1, october 17, 2011); Inter-American commission report on terrorism and 
Human rights, oAs doc oeA/ser.l/v/II.116 doc 5, rev. 1 (october 22, 2002) §289; IA comm. report 
of the situation of Human rights defenders in the Americas, oAs doc oeA/ser.l/v/II.124, doc. 5, 
rev. 1, (March 7, 2006), §77; report of oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2001), 
§12, 36, 38; 1999 Annual report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2000); 
2000 Annual report of Inter-American commission on Human rights, report of the oAs special 
rapporteur for freedom of expression (2001), §13-14.
165 see, e.g., Inter-American commission on Human rights, declaration of Principles on freedom of 
expression, principle 3. 
166 see, e.g., principle 9 and 10 of the Preliminary Principles and recommendations on data Protection 
(committee on Juridical and Political Affairs, 2011), principle 10 reads: “The individual has the right 
to request that the data controller correct or delete personal data retained by the controller that may be 
incomplete, inaccurate, unnecessary, or excessive.”
167 report of oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2001), §12, 36, 38; 1999 Annual report 
Access to InforMAtIon
The African charter does not contain a right to privacy. so far, not the African commission 
nor the African court have addressed a right to personal information in the context of 
freedom of expression. However, the Principles on freedom of expression in Africa do 
acknowledge the right to access, update, and correct personal information. 
In conclusion, the right to personal information has a firm basis in international law. The 
following sections will discuss the content and scope of this right and the extent to which 
general normative patterns can be identified across the various treaty regimes. 
2.2. Personal Information Defined
All the instruments define personal information rather similarly, and all uphold a broad 
definition that includes “any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual 
(‘data subject’).” some instruments elaborate what constitutes an identifiable individual, 
but overall, authorities are accorded discretion to set criteria. so far, only the Hrcee and 
the ectHr have relevant case law that helps in identifying what information is included. 
for instance, the Hrcee considered medical records and taped conversations of a 
person in the context of criminal proceedings to be regarded as personal information. 
The ectHr held in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary that even though there is no 
of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2000); 2000 Annual report of IA comm. 
Hr, report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression (2001), §13-14; see also the joint 
declarations by the special rapporteurs to the un, coe and African union, above n. 154.
168 African commission resolution on the Adopting of the declaration of Principles on freedom of 
expression in Africa AcHPr/res.62 (XXXII) (october 2002), principle Iv. (3). It should be noted 
though that ecowAs explicitly recognizes a right to personal information, as discussed in 2.1.1. 
169 Article 2(a) of the coe convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal data; the ectHr with reference to Article 2 coe convention used the same 
definition in Amann v. Switzerland [Gc], §65; see similarly oecd recommendation of the council 
concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and trans-border flows of Personal data 
(2013) Annex paragraph 1 (b); the un comm. Hr Guidelines for the regulation of computerized 
Personal data files of the un commission on Human rights, principle 4; Inter-American commission 
on Human rights, declaration of Principles on freedom of expression, principle 3; African commission 
resolution on the Adopting of the declaration of Principles on freedom of expression in Africa, 
AcHPr/res.62 (XXXII) (october 2002), principle Iv. on the definition of personal data, see also, for 
example, Hrcee, General Comment 16 (April 8, 1988) §10; Hrcee, Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, §7.6; 
see also coe committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (91) 10 on the Communication to Third 
Parties of Personal Data Held by Public Bodies (september 9, 1991), appendix §1.3. see also the oAs 
special rapporteur reports that also include the right of information about one’s property in the ambit 
of the right to personal information, 2000 special rapporteur report of the oAs, §12; 2001 oAs 
special rapporteur report, at 26; 2001 oAs special rapporteur report on Paraguay, oAs doc oeA/
ser.l/v/II.110, doc 53, §21. see also §28-29 of the explanatory report to the coe convention on data 
Protection.
170 coe committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (91) 10, appendix, paragraph 1.3; see also §28-29 
of the explanatory report to the coe convention on data Protection. oecd Guidelines, explanatory 
Memorandum, §41. Hrcee, Zheludkova (on behalf of Zheludkov) v. Ukraine, (2002), §8.4; Hrcee, Van 
Hulst v. The Netherlands, §7.6; Hrcee, GC 16, §10.
171 Hrcee, Zheludkova (on behalf of Zheludkov) v. Ukraine, (2002), §8.4.
172 Hrcee, Van Hulst v. The Netherlands, §7.6.
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definition of what constitutes personal information under the right to privacy, the court 
had in the past:
identified examples of personal data relating to the most intimate and personal aspects of 
an individual… such categories of data constituted particular elements of private life falling 
within the scope of the protection of Article 8 of the convention. 
The court has concluded that, amongst other things, birth mother records, foster care 
records, social service records, and (personal) intelligence agencies records constitute 
personal information.
In other words, each of the instruments upholds a broad definition of what constitutes 
personal information, which includes any information relating to an identifiable individual. 
As the next section will demonstrate, this broad definition affects who is the holder of the 
right. 
2.3. The Scope of the Right
The obligations stemming from the right to personal information can be divided into three 
broad categories. 
collection/storage of personal information by public authorities: 
i. right to challenge legality of storage/collection of the personal information 
once the personal information is in an authority’s possession:
ii. individuals have a right to access this personal information, challenge its accuracy and 
request its removal 
iii. authorities have a duty to prevent unauthorized access to or disclosure of the information 
each set of obligations is discussed separately. However, as this and the next section will 
demonstrate, the scope of any obligations and the permissibility of any limitations to the right 
of personal information are closely related. furthermore, although the scope of personal 
information is broad, this section will demonstrate that the obligations concerned may vary 
to a certain extent depending on the type of personal information. 
173 ectHr [Gc], Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, §192.
174 ectHr [Gc], Odièvre v. France, (2003).
175 ectHr, Gaskin v. United Kingdom, Merits and Just satisfaction, App no 10454/83, (July 7, 1989). 
176 ectHr, M.G v. United Kingdom, judgment, application no. 39393/98 (september 24, 2002). 
177 ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, Merits; ectHr, Segerstedt-Wiberg and ors v. Sweden, (2006); ectHr [Gc], 
Rotaru v. Romania, (2000); ectHr, Turek and Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights (intervening) v. 
Slovakia, (2006); ectHr [Gc], Amann v. Switzerland (2000).
Access to InforMAtIon
The right to challenge the legality of the storing of personal information by authorities refers 
to an authority’s obligation to only store personal information in accordance with the law. In 
other words, there is a presumption that the storing of personal information interferes with 
an individual’s private life and that authorities are only allowed to do so when it is justified 
according to the respective treaty instrument. Authorities are accorded wide discretion in 
determining the conditions for its storage as long as it meets the tests of legality, necessity 
and legitimacy. At a minimum, an individual whose personal information has been stored 
has to have the possibility to challenge the legality of the storage by public authorities. some 
instruments stipulate an extra criterion for the legality of storing information, namely that 
the purpose for collecting or storing personal information has to be specified. for instance, 
the oecd Guidelines on data protection requires that the law which regulates the storage of 
the information has to stipulate for which purpose personal information may be stored and 
subsequently used.
Most case law focuses on the right of individuals to access their personal information held 
by authorities, which concerns the second category of the above-mentioned obligations. The 
survey has established that the right of access to personal information may be subdivided 
into two broad categories: (1) cases that deal with access to information on one’s birth, 
childhood or social service records; and (2) cases that deal with access to personal files 
created and/or held by national security agencies. with regard to both categories, authorities 
have an obligation to provide access to such personal information unless the right thereto 
is limited in accordance with provisions of the respective instrument. The rationale of the 
access right is that the mere existence of personal information in public (and also classified) 
records triggers the right to access these files. regarding the first category of the above-
mentioned two categories, the request to access is often aimed at learning more about one’s 
early development. for instance, adopted children may request access to adoption files or 
178 see, for example, Hrcee, Van Hulst v. The Netherlands (november 1, 2004, § 7.9), in which the Hrcee 
recalled that the right to challenge the correctness of the data stored is a separate issue from the question 
as to the legality of the storage of any data. 
179 The discussion of what limitations are allowed under what circumstances will be discussed in more 
detail in section 2.6. It should be noted that quite recently the court of Justice of the european union 
also acknowledged a right to be forgotten in relation to information that was stored by Google in their 
search engine. This is the latest development in the right to personal data. cJeu, case c-131/12 Google 
Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González (2014).
180 see below in section 2.6, in which this tripartite test will be discussed further. 
181 oecd Guidelines on data Protection, principle 9. see similarly article 5 (Quality of data) of the coe 
data Protection convention; principle 3 of the un comm. Hr, Guidelines for the regulation of 
computerized Personal data files, adopted by un GA, (1990), and article 19(1) ced.
182 The scope and type of limitations will be addressed further in section 2.6.
183 see, e.g., Inter-American special rapporteur, 2001 Annual report of the rapporteur on freedom of 
expression. (April 16, 2001), §38. 
184 for instance, the importance of knowing one’s origin is emphasized by the committee on the rights of 
the child; for example, crc, GC 14 (2013) on the right of a child to have his or her best interests taken 
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birth certificates to find out the identity of their birth parents. As to the second category, 
access to personal files created by intelligence agencies, an individual often requests access 
to see the nature of the information collected and verify its content. As recognized across 
the instruments, individuals do not only have a right of access to the personal information 
but they also have a right to have their personal information modified, corrected or 
removed if inaccurate. Accordingly, authorities are required to establish procedures that 
allow individuals to assert their rights. The existence of such a procedure is a key factor 
in determining whether an interference with the right to personal information was in 
accordance with the law. It should be noted that the request to access this information is 
often hindered by an individual being unaware that the information is in the authorities’ 
possession. 
The third set of obligations relates to the duty to protect personal information in the possession 
of authorities from unauthorized access by third parties. The positive obligations are therefore 
more well-defined; as a result, authorities enjoy less discretion in this respect. Authorities 
have a duty to protect individuals against unauthorized access of their personal files by 
others. In principle, personal information may only be used or disclosed with the data 
subject’s consent unless the right is limited in conformity with a provision of the respective 
instrument. Across all instruments the criterion for such legislation is that, at minimum, 
the law has to stipulate who may access the information and under which circumstances. 
The other criteria for limiting the right are discussed in section 2.6. The obligation to take 
as a primary consideration, (May 29, 2013), section v(A)(1)(b). 
185 see ectHr, Odievre v. France and ectHr, Godelli v. Italy. similarly, other cases before the ectHr dealt 
with a request to access foster care files to verify, for example, whether the individual requesting the 
information had suffered abuse when in foster care. see, for example, Gaskin v.UK, which concerned a 
partial refusal to disclose such information. The court concluded that due to the lack of a mechanism to 
provide procedural safeguards (and thus test whether the refusal to disclose information was legitimate) 
to Mr. Gaskin, the uk had violated article 8 ecHr, §44-49. see similarly M.G. v. UK.
186 see, e.g., ectHr, Leander v. Sweden; ectHr [Gc], rotaru v. romania, (violation of article 8 ecHr 
considering that the holding and use of the intelligence information was not in accordance with the law 
as no procedural safeguards had been instituted); ectHr, Turek v. Slovakia, article 8 had been violated 
as there was no procedure via which the applicant could seek protection of his rights. ectHr, Segerstedt 
and others v. Sweden (refusal to grant full access did not result in violation of Article 8).
187 In relation to the ecHr, see, e.g., ectHr, Turek v. Slovakia; COE Convention on Data Protection Article 
8(c-d); Hrcee, GC 16, §10, see also Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Korea, un doc A/55/40 vol. 
1 §149 (2000); oecd Guidelines on data Protection, principle 13(d); oAs report on Human rights 
defenders, §89; Inter-American commission on Human rights, declaration of Principles on freedom 
of expression, principle 3; African commission resolution on the Adopting of the declaration of 
Principles on freedom of expression in Africa AcHPr/res.62 (XXXII) (october 2002), principle Iv(3).
188 This is the overlap with the first set of obligations, those related to the legality of information storage. 
189 ectHr, L.L v. France, app. no. 7508/02 (october 10, 2006); ectHr, I. v. Finland app. no. 20511/03 
(April 3, 2007); cescr, GC 14: article 12: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 
e/2001/22 (2000) 128 at §23; Hrcee, GC 16, §10.
190 see further section 2.6, in which the limitations to the right to personal information will be discussed. 
191 see, e.g., the oecd use limitation Principle (principle 10).
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measures to protect an individual’s personal files is closely connected to the protection of the 
right to confidentiality, which is particularly noticeable in the context of health (care) data. 
2.4. Rightsholders 
All instruments recognize a right to personal information for those individuals who can offer 
proof of identity, in other words, that they are the subject of the personal information in 
question. In some treaty regimes, however, a wider definition is used for the holder of the 
right, stipulating a right of access for others than those to whom the information refers too. 
In that case, the relation of such other person to the individual the information belongs to 
is determinative for deciding whether said person is also a holder of the right. for the right 
to personal information, the purpose for seeking access to the information is not considered 
relevant. In other words, no interest needs to be stated. 
2.5. Procedure 
The procedural requirements relate mainly to the procedure of requesting access to 
personal information, and they are similar to those stipulated for access to public interest 
information: the procedures have to be low-cost, simple, and expeditious. Authorities are 
accorded wide discretion in realizing these procedures. 
regarding the other procedures concerning personal information (that is, the procedure 
to challenge the legality of the storage and to request removal or modification of the 
information), the various instruments stress the obligations of authorities to ensure proper 
192 for instance, the cescr reasoned that “accessibility of information should not impair the right to have 
personal health data treated with confidentiality,” cescr, General Comment 14: Article 12: The Right to 
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, e/2001/22 (2000) 128 at §12(b) (iv).
193 see, e.g., un comm. Hr, Guidelines for the regulation of computerized Personal data files, adopted 
by un GA, (1990), principle 4; see further in n. 154 above. 
194 The ectHr recognized that an individual may also have a right to information that is of direct concern 
to you but does not relate to you personally. for instance, in the case of Tsourlakis v. Greece (app. no. 
50796/07, october 15, 2009), a father sought access to his son’s medical and welfare file. The ectHr 
agreed that the refusal to disclose the file to the father constituted a violation of article 8 ecHr. The 
convention against enforced disappearances also embraces a wider category of persons who have a 
right to personal information; namely, not only the persons deprived of liberty have such a right but 
also others related to them including their relatives, their representatives or counsel, see Article 18 ced.
195 see, e.g., ectHr, Amann v. Switzerland, §70, ectHr, Segerstedt-Wiberg and ors v. Sweden, §71. 
196 It should be noted that although the ectHr does not impose a proof of interest requirement for the 
right to access personal information, in the context of the right to public interest information, it does 
however consider the purpose for which it is sought relevant. 
197 see above, in section 1.6 of this chapter in which the three principles for limitations were further 
explained.
198 Hrcee, GC 34 at §19 “easy, prompt effective and practical access”; 2004 Joint declaration by the un 
special rapporteur, osce representative and oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression; 2009 
report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression, §26-28; Inter-American Juridical 
committee, Principles on the right to access to information; article 5 coe convention on Access to 
official documents. see also principle 20 of the APec Privacy framework. 
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handling of personal information and that authorities need to establish such procedures. 
These procedural requirements or procedural safeguards are further discussed below in the 
context of limitations to the right to personal information.
2.6. Limitations
similar to what was discussed in the context of the right to public interest information 
(section 1.6), limitations are permitted to the right to personal information provided that 
the aforementioned tripartite test is fulfilled. In short, said tripartite test requires that a 
restriction, and thus each interference with the right in question, complies with the criteria 
of legality, legitimacy, and necessity. This section discusses the criteria for limiting the right 
to personal information and the extent to which they differ from those discussed in the 
context of the right to public interest information. The right to personal information may be 
interfered with by public authorities in the following ways: 
- The information is stored or collected by public authorities, which at a minimum, implies 
a right to challenge the legality of the storage and/or collection of the information
- The personal information is held by public authorities, which at a minimum, implies 
a right to access this information as well as a right to challenge the accuracy of the 
information and/or to request its removal;
- whenever personal information is held by public authorities, public authorities have a 
duty to protect this information from third-party access. A failure to do so or actively 
sharing it with third parties without the consent of the individual constitutes an 
interference which needs to be justified.
The limitations to the right to personal information are less explicit than those recognized for 
the right to public interest information. only the ecHr, coe data Protection convention, 
the un Guidelines and the oecd Guidelines explicitly address what limitations to the 
right to personal information are permissible. The IAcHr stated no restrictions to the right 
to privacy (the substantive right into which a right to personal information is read), and 
neither the IActHr nor the IAcommHr has addressed the issue of limitations to the right 
to privacy in the cases submitted to them; the African Principles on freedom of expression 
similarly do not address any possible limitations. Article 17 of the IccPr merely states that 
“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with their private life” and 
does not further qualify the limitations allowed. Accordingly, the following discussion of the 
tripartite test of legality, necessity and legitimacy, is based on the limited legal provisions and 
the relevant case law available. 
The criterion of legality is interpreted rather similarly as to how it is interpreted in the context 
of the right to public interest information. legality requires that any limitations to the right 
199 see above section 1.6. 
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personal information have to be in accordance with the law. This implies a certain quality 
of the law; in other words, some form of procedural guarantee that prevents an arbitrary 
exercise of powers. Moreover, it requires authorities to provide for a review procedure: 
individuals whose personal information has been collected, stored and/or shared have to 
have a right to request access, modification and/or removal of their personal information. 
when access to the personal information is refused, those affected have a right to appeal this 
decision.
The ectHr is the only treaty monitoring body with extensive case law on the criterion of 
legality in the context of the right to personal information. In general, the law needs to 
be compatible with the rule of law and accessible to the individuals concerned. The 
consequences of the law have to be foreseeable, and thus, the law has to indicate the scope 
of and manner in which the discretion conferred on the competent authorities is to be 
exercised. In other words, the law has to regulate what individuals or authorities may under 
what circumstances access, collect, store, or disclose personal information. 
The second criterion is that the interference has to pursue a legitimate aim. The ecHr, coe, 
un Guidelines and the oecd guidelines overlap in the recognized legitimate aims. All of 
200 The coe data Protection convention was modelled after article 8(2) ecHr (see §55 explanatory 
report to the coe data Protection convention) and has been referred to by the ectHr as an important 
instrument when interpreting the ecHr. In regards to the IActHr, see, for example. Claude Reyes v. 
Chile, §88-89. The oecd Guidelines, for example, allow only the collection of data obtained via legal 
and fair means, principle 7 oecd Guidelines governing the Protection of Privacy and transborder 
flows of Personal data; for instance, the Hrcee has stipulated that article 17 IccPr’s concept of legality 
encompasses more than procedural arbitrariness and, instead, requires that the interference also has 
to be in conformity with the provisions of the convention and that it has to be reasonable. Hrcee, 
GC 16, §4. The position was later confirmed in Hrcee, Rojas Garcia v. Colombia, communication no. 
687/1996, §10.3; Hrcee, Canepa v. Canada, 558/1993, §11.4.
201 ectHr, Gaskin v. UK (1989), §49; ectHr, M.G v. United Kingdom judgment, (september 24, 2002) 
application no. 39393/98, §30: “Procedure to appeal denials of information must be in place in order 
to be ‘in accordance with the law’ ”; COE Convention on Data protection Article 8(c-d); Hrcee, GC 
16, §10, see also Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Korea, un doc A/55/40 vol. 1 §149 (2000); 
oecd Guidelines on data Protection, principle 13(d); oAs report on Human rights defenders, §89; 
Inter-American commission on Human rights, declaration of Principles on freedom of expression, 
principle 3; African commission resolution on the Adopting of the declaration of Principles on 
freedom of expression in Africa AcHPr/res.62 (XXXII) (october 2002), principle Iv(3).
202 see, e.g., ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, §50. see also ectHr, segerstedt-wiberg and ors v. sweden, §76; 
ectHr, Gaskin v. UK (1989), §49; ectHr, M.G v. United Kingdom, judgment, (september 24, 2002) 
application no. 39393/98, §30.
203 ectHr, Segerstedt-Wiberg and ors v. Sweden.
204 ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, §50; see similarly ectHr, Malone (August 2, 1984), series A, no. 82, §66. 
205 Idem, §50-57, see also Rotaru v. Romania, §61. 
206 ectHr, Segerstedt-Wiberg and ors v. Sweden, §76.
207 It should be noted that the ecHr and un Guidelines also list the protection of health or morals: 
article 8 ecHr and principle 6 un Guidelines; the coe also lists the protection of the data subject as 
a legitimate aim, article 9 coe convention on data Protection. The coe convention and the ecHr 
both also list the economic well-being of a country as a legitimate aim, oecd guidelines principle 
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those instruments recognize national security, public safety, the prevention of disorder or 
crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others as legitimate aims. Although 
instruments exist that do not contain any explicit limitations to the right, the relevant 
monitoring bodies, however, have nevertheless read implicit limitations into the right in 
those instances. The treaty monitoring bodies use similar language in their interpretations 
of the treaty obligations in the context of the right to personal information to that used in 
the context of the right to public interest information when defining the principles of legality 
and necessity. 
The criterion of necessity is interpreted similarly across the instruments. Including those 
without an explicit requirement of necessity, the emphasis throughout is on the necessity 
of the interference in a given case. similarly, the principle of necessity often results in a 
balancing act of competing interests just as it does in the context of the right to public interest 
information. said balancing act consist of weighing an individual’s interest in protecting 
their personal information and respecting their privacy against a state’s interest (that is, 
the legitimate aim) protected by the restriction in question. In general, authorities do have 
quite some discretion to determine how to precisely balance the interests in the context of 
the principle of necessity. At a minimum, however, the treaty monitoring bodies examine 
whether, and to what extent, procedural safeguards are in place to prevent an arbitrary 
exercise of public power. for instance, discretionary powers accorded to administrative 
authorities to decide on the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information has to 
be restricted.  At the very minimum, there has to be an appeals procedure in place via 
4(1-2). The cescr only stipulates positive obligations for authorities to respect the confidentiality of 
certain personal data and has not addressed as such the issue of limitations.
208 It should be noted that the oecd guidelines do not mention this last ground; however, they also do not 
provide an exhaustive list of limitations. Principle 4 of the oecd Guidelines states “exceptions to the 
Principles contained in Parts two and Three of these Guidelines, including those relating to national 
sovereignty, national security and public policy (“ordre public”), should be a) as few as possible, and b) 
made known to the public; the ced uses a broader term and stipulates that the collection, processing, 
storage and use of personal information “shall not infringe or have the effect of infringing the human 
rights, fundamental freedoms or human dignity of an individual”, article 19(2) ced. 
209 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile case, §88-93.
210 The ecHr, the coe, the IAcHr, and the ced stipulate a requirement of necessity: article 8(2) 
ecHr; article 9(2) coe data Protection convention; article 19(2) ced. In relation to the IActHr 
approach, see the case Claude Reyes v. Chile §88-93. It should be noted though that the right to personal 
information is construed in the context of the right to freedom of expression. It thus coincides with the 
analysis of the right to public interest information, see above section 1.6. The oecd, un guidelines 
and the IccPr do not contain an explicit limitation clause; see the principles 7-11, 13(d), 14 of the 
oecd guidelines; principles 14, 22, 23(c) and 25 APec Privacy framework; principles 1, 4, 6 of the 
un Guidelines concerning computerized personal data files.
211 It should be noted though that the ectHr, for example, has determined that when authorities have no 
discretion in balancing the interests at stake and are thus unable to take the circumstances of the case 
into account this can lead to a violation of the respective substantive right (i.e., the principle of necessity 
had not been complied with and the interference was therefore not justified) 
212 see, for example, ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, in which the issue of procedural safeguards was examined 
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which affected individuals may challenge a (partial) refusal to disclose information and/or 
an improper collection/storage, usage or sharing of personal information.
2.7. Conclusions: The Building Block of a Right to Personal Information 
The conceptual Model includes a duty to ensure access to information as well as one to 
protect the confidentiality of information in possession of international institutions. This 
section examined the extent to which the right to personal information is recognized in 
international law. said right developed from a positive obligation to prevent misuse of 
personal data to a right for individuals to access, modify and remove personal information 
in possession of public authorities. The right is primarily recognized in the regional 
conventions, both specific and general instruments, and in addition, in the near-universally 
ratified IccPr. The legal terminology and language used in the various binding and non-
binding instruments are remarkably similar and attest of a broad normative consensus on 
the scope and content of the right to personal information. 
in the context of the requirement of necessity whereas in Godelli v. Italy, the court examined it in the 
context of the legality principle. see also, e.g., ectHr, I. v. Finland, app. (2007).
213 see, e.g., Hrcee, GC 16 (Article 17 ICCPR), §10; ectHr, Gaskin v. UK (1989), §49; ectHr, M.G v. 
United Kingdom, judgment, (september 24, 2002) application no. 39393/98, §30: “Procedure to appeal 
denials of information must be in place in order to be ‘in accordance with the law’ ”, article 8(d) coe 
data protection convention; explanatory report to the coe data Protection convention, §50-54; article 
9(1) Aarhus convention; Principle 13 (Individual Participation Principle) of the oecd Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and transborder flows of Personal data; APec principle 23; articles 23-28 for 
the obligations of authorities, articles 38-41 for the rights of the individuals, ecowAs, heads of states 
and governments, supplementary act A/sA.1/01/10 on Personal data Protection within ecowAs 
(february 16, 2010).
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The building block of the right to personal information can be summarized as followed: 
The legal survey shows that one of the rationales for the development of the right to 
personal information is the proper exercise of public power. The obligations identified 
for public authorities in the context of the right reflect this, in particular in the way treaty 
monitoring bodies discuss limitations to the right to personal information. regarding the 
latter, monitoring bodies place a strong emphasis on the need to prevent a misuse of the 
powers accorded to public authorities and on the need to have procedural safeguards to 
prevent such misuse – that is, to prevent an arbitrary exercise of public power and to ensure 
that everyone has a right to access, modify and remove personal information in possession 
of public authorities. Although the conceptual Model encompasses only a general, not 
further defined, right to access information and a general duty to protect the confidentiality 
of information in the possession of international organizations, it also includes constraints 
on the exercise of public power. At a minimum, these constraints include a prohibition of 
an arbitrary use of power and the need to ensure a certain level of quality in the decision-
making procedure as was also discussed in the context of the right to personal information. 
The following chapters will examine whether these type of constraints on the exercise of 
public power form a general trend across the rights identified and discussed in this research. 
RIGHT TO PERSONAL INFORMATION
Legal basis 
Who is the duty bearer 
Which information 
Holder of the right
Scope of obligations 
Procedure 
Limitations 
Broad support: IccPr, un organs, coe, ecHr, oecd, APec, IAcHr, 
ced
Partial basis in cescr, cedAw, crc, AcPHr
no basis in cMw, crPd, cAt
Public authorities: all branches of state, all actors that exercise public 
(administrative) authority
Information relating to an identified or identifiable person
everyone with proof of identity that they are the data subject: no interest 
to be stated. under circumstances, family members of the data subject 
may be a holder of the right as well.
right to access, modify and remove personal information
challenge the legality of the storage of personal information
Prevent unauthorized access to and disclosure of personal information
fair, timely, low-cost procedure to request information.
exhaustive list of limitations
Three-part test: legality, legitimacy, and necessity
legitimate aims: national security, public safety, the prevention of 
disorder or crime, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others
limited discretionary powers for authorities, procedural safeguards 
required, prevention of arbitrary exercise of powers
Table 4: Building block - right to personal information
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3. Overall Conclusions
The conceptual Model recognizes that international institutions that exercise a form of 
public power that directly affects individuals have to provide access to information to the 
general public. Besides, they have a duty to protect the confidentiality of any information in 
their possession. The legal survey of the international standards applied at a national level, 
which was conducted in this chapter, established that international law recognizes the right 
to (access) information to be exercised by individuals against domestic authorities exercising 
public power that affects said individuals.
This chapter identified two distinctive informational rights: the right to public interest 
information and the right to personal information. There are quite some similarities in their 
content and scope. Both rights (and their concomitant duties) exist whenever authorities 
hold (or collect, store or share) personal or public interest information. At a minimum, there 
is a right to request access to the information, which has to be realized via a timely, low-cost 
and fair procedure. Both rights may only be limited if the tripartite test mentioned is met. In 
this context, the relevant treaty monitoring bodies use similar language when interpreting 
the conditions under which a limitation is permitted. In the assessment of both the criterion 
of legality and the criterion of necessity, it was evaluated whether, and to what extent, 
decision-making bodies had adopted procedural safeguards to prevent an arbitrary use of 
public power. for instance, it revealed that when discretionary powers have been accorded 
to public authorities, this discretion may not be unfettered – that is, there have to be certain 
conditions to and constraints on the exercise of such a discretion. Moreover, at a minimum, 
individuals have to have access to a review procedure to challenge an adopted decision. As 
the following chapters will demonstrate, these considerations form part of a larger claim 
for a certain quality of decision-making and review procedures that is closely related to a 
demand to prevent an arbitrary exercise of public power. Quite some overlap thus exists with 
the constraints on the exercise of public power as recognized for international institutions, 
which was discussed in chapter 2. The conceptual Model states that public power has to 
be exercised in accordance with the law, may not be arbitrary nor may it violate ius cogens 
norms, and that a certain quality of the decision-making procedure is expected. 
Moreover, it is expected for the remainder of the legal survey that the informational rights 
will inform and strengthen the content and scope of the rights of the two other dimensions 
(that is, the right to participation in the decision-making procedure and the right to an 
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rIGHt to MeAnInGful PArtIcIPAtIon In decIsIon-MAkInG Procedures
This chapter will outline the building block of the second pillar of the Inclusionary Governance 
Model: the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedures. The 
conceptual Model recognizes a duty to enable an individual to participate in the decision-
making procedures of international institutions, but existing international standards do not 
give further guidance as to the content and scope of this duty. This chapter will examine 
through the legal survey whether, and to what extent, international law recognizes a person’s 
right to participation in the decision-making procedure carried out by domestic public 
authorities. The right to participation refers to the possibility of affected individuals to have 
their views and opinions heard and considered before a decision is made.
This chapter will explore the legal bases of the right (section 1), the holders of the right 
(section 2), the scope of the right to meaningful participation (section 3), and the limitations 
to the right (section 4). The chapter will conclude with a schematic overview of the building 
block of the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure (section 5). 
1. The Legal Bases of the Right
In international law, the right to participation in the decision-making procedure has 
developed in a relatively fragmented manner. However, the legal survey establishes that 
normative patterns can be identified, revealing a general right to meaningful participation in 
administrative decision-making. This section will discuss the few explicit provisions (section 
1.1), and how the right to participation has mainly developed through the work of treaty 
monitoring bodies (section 1.2). 
1 The conceptual Model addresses the duties owed by international institutions whereas, in this Part II, 
the legal survey primarily charts the rights enjoyed by individuals (and groups) with the concomitant 
duties for public authorities. The emphasis is in this chapter is on the rights enjoyed by individuals as 
the majority of the instruments that are surveyed are rights-based instruments. It is the survey’s main 
aim to recognize the rights that individuals (and groups) enjoy vis-à-vis the parties to the respective 
instruments. chapter 6 will address whether this ‘switch’ influences the language used in the draft 
Inclusionary Governance Model. see similarly the introduction to Part II, fn. 5 to chapter 3, fn. 1 to 
chapter 5, and the discussion in chapter 6. 
2 l. Boisson de chazournes, ‘changing roles of International organizations: Global Administrative law 
and the Interplay of legitimacies’ (2009) 6 International Organizations Law Review 655 at 661. The right 
to be heard after a decision is taken (that is, in a review or reconsideration procedure) forms part of the 
right to an effective remedy. The right to an effective remedy will be discussed in chapter 5. 
3 It should be noted that this chapter only explores the obligations for public authorities as the (principal) 
duty bearer to enable its people to participate meaningfully in the decision-making procedure, and 
it does not address a private authority’s (potential) obligations to ensure this right; see however 
temperman (J.d. temperman, ‘Public Participation in times of Privatization’ (2011) 4(2) Erasmus Law 
Review 43) who does discuss the role of public and private authorities in relation to the right to public 
participation.
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1.1.  Explicit Legal Bases 
The right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure has been recognized 
in various explicit provisions; however, all these provisions recognize a right to participation 
in a particular context only. remarkably, those human rights provisions that contain a 
general explicit right to public participation (the right to participate in public affairs) do not 
encompass an explicit right to participation in administrative decision-making procedures. 
for instance, article 25 IccPr stipulates an individual’s right to participate in the conduct 
of public affairs through the right to vote and to be elected, and thus focuses on general 
suffrage and the right to participate indirectly in legislative procedures. The content of the 
right to participate in public affairs has a relatively similar content in regional human rights 
treaties; they all focus on the right to participate directly or indirectly in political affairs and 
normative development and not on the right to participation in administrative decision-
making procedures that may affect individuals. 
Those instruments that do explicitly recognize a right to participation in administrative 
decision-making procedures recognize the right in a particular context only – that is, for 
a particular type of decision-making procedure or for a particular (group of) affected 
4 Article 21 udHr; article 25 IccPr; article 7 cedAw; article 5(c) International convention on the 
elimination of All forms of racial discrimination (cerd); article 29 convention on the rights of 
Persons with disabilities. 
5 Hrcee, General Comment 25 (1996), reprinted in HrI/Gen/1/rev.7, at 167-172; so far there is no 
support in the work of the Hrcee that article 25 IccPr should be interpreted as including participation 
in administrative decision-making procedures. see Hrcee, Marshall v. Canada, communication 205/
l986 (1991).
6 The emphasis thus lies on the right to public participation in relation to procedures concerning the 
exercise of political power. for example, temperman signalled a strong nexus between these two 
concepts under the IccPr; J.d. temperman, ‘Public Participation in times of Privatization’ (2011), 
at 48-49. see further for article 25 IccPr, (the right to vote and the right to stand for elections) 
Hrcee, General Comment 25, §7-15 and 19-22. see also, e.g., Hrcee, Guido Jacobs v. Belgium, Comm. 
no. 943/2000, (2004); Hrcee, Gillot v. France (932/2000), (July 15, 2002); Hrcee, Mátyus v. Slovakia 
(923/2000) (July 22, 2002); Hrcee, Svetik v. Belarus (927/2000) (July, 8 2004); Hrcee, Gorji-Dinka 
v. Cameroon (1134/2002), (March 17, 2005); Hrcee, Concluding Observations on United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, un doc. A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 36 at §75(10), 75(13) and 75(15); 
cescr, Concluding Observations on Kuwait, un doc. e/2005/22 (2004) 29 at §187 and 206; cedAw, 
Concluding Observations on Yemen, un doc. A/57/38 part III (2002) 200 §402 and 403; cedAw, 
Concluding observations on Kuwait, un doc. A/59/38 part I (2004) 15 at §60, 61, 75; Hrcee, Concluding 
Observations on Colombia, un doc. A/59/40 vol. I (2004) 35 at §67(6), 67(11) and 67(19).
7 temperman, at 54; article 23 American convention on Human rights; article 13 African charter on 
People’s rights. see also article 3(1) of the first protocol to the european convention on Human rights, 
which stipulated merely a right to free elections. see in this regard also ectHr, Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v. Belgium, (1987) app. no. 9267/81 at 46-51. ectHr, Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(application nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) ecHr (2009), at 50. 
8 temperman, at 44; see, e.g., the cescr (un doc e/c.12/2001/10 (May, 10 2001) statement of the 
cescr on poverty and the Icescr, §12) stating that: 
 Although free and fair elections are a crucial component of the right to participate, they are not 
enough to ensure that those living in poverty enjoy the right to participate in key decisions affecting 
their lives.
rIGHt to MeAnInGful PArtIcIPAtIon In decIsIon-MAkInG Procedures
individuals. for example, article 6 of the Ilo convention no 169 on Indigenous and tribal 
Peoples stipulates a right to consultation for the people concerned whenever “consideration is 
being given to… administrative measures which may affect them directly.” similarly, article 
19 of the un declaration on the rights of Indigenous People stipulates an obligation for 
authorities to consult with the aim of obtaining prior informed consent before they can adopt 
any decision that may affect the indigenous people concerned. Thus, indigenous and tribal 
people are accorded participatory rights in regard to any kind of decision affecting them. As 
the next section will demonstrate, this extensive right to participation for indigenous peoples 
is well-recognized in the works of various human rights treaty monitoring bodies. 
Article 12 of the convention on the rights of the child stipulates that every child has the 
right to express their views on decisions that affect them. The committee on the rights of 
the child (crc) has further strengthened this right in its General Comments and Concluding 
Observations on the compliance of member states. Participatory rights are accorded to 
children who are capable of forming their own views in regards to all matters that affect the 
child, including any administrative and judicial decision-making procedures. 
9 International labour organization (Ilo), Indigenous and tribal Peoples convention, c169 (June 27, 
1989, entry into force september 5, 1991). currently, the convention has 22 member states. despite 
the low number of ratifications, the convention is seen as authoritative as can be deduced from the 
numerous references to it in other instruments and in the documents of un IHrl bodies. see, e.g., 
Inter-American commission on Human rights, report on indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights over 
their ancestral lands and natural resources: norms and jurisprudence of the Inter‐American human 
rights system, oeA/ser.l/v/ii doc 56/09 (december 30, 2009).
10 un General Assembly resolution 61/295, 107th plenary meeting, (september 13, 2007). for the 
normative value of the declaration, see also k. Göcke ‘The case of Angela Poma Poma v. Peru before 
the Human rights committee’ (2010) 14 MAX Planck UNYB 337 at 350-357; M. Barelli, ‘The role of 
soft law in the International legal system: The case of the united nations declaration on the rights 
of indigenous Peoples’ (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 958. see also the report 
of the un special rapporteur Anaya in which he discusses the normative relevance of the declaration 
and the normative background of the duty to consult in international law; special rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental rights of indigenous people, J. Anaya, report ‘Promotion 
and Protection of All Human rights, civil, Political economic, social and cultural rights’ (July 25, 
2009) un doc, A/Hrc/12/34, p. 12, at 38-42.
11 (emphasis added) article 12 crc; crc, General Comment No. 14 (2013) on the right of the child to have 
his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration (art. 3(1)) crc/c/Gc/14 (May 29, 2013), §53.
12 see, e.g., crc, Concluding Observations on Portugal, crc/c/111 (2001) 48 at §226. 
13 see, e.g., crc, Concluding Observations on Cameroon, crc/c/111 (2001) 71 at 355; crc, Concluding 
Observations on Gabon, crc/c/114 (2002) 47 at 203-204. crc, Concluding Observations on 
Mozambique crc/c/114 (2002) 65 at 281. Article 12 should be read together with articles 2 (non-
discrimination), 3 (Best interests of the child), and 6 (the right to life, survival and development) of the 
convention on the rights of the child. together they form the general principles of the convention. 
see also the committee on the rights of the child, ‘treaty-specific guidelines regarding the form and 
content of periodic reports to be submitted by states parties under Article 44, paragraph 1(b), of the 
convention on the rights of the child’ (March 3, 2015) un doc crc/c/58/rev.3.
14 see for example, crc, Concluding Observations on Belgium, crc/c/18 (2002) 29, §19-20. similarly, 
participatory rights have been recognized in the context of serious disciplinary procedures (Article 
40 crc), decisions related to children’s health, care and custody procedures (articles 5, 9, 10, 20, 21 
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The Migrant workers convention also provides a right to participation in the decision-
making procedures. It requires authorities to facilitate “the consultation or participation 
of migrant workers and members of their families in decisions concerning the life and 
administration of local communities.” Thus far, the Concluding Observations and General 
Comments of the committee on Migrant workers have not shed much light on how this 
provision should be interpreted. However, the committee did adopt a joint General 
Comment with the committee on the rights of the child in which the two committees 
reaffirmed the obligations of authorities to realize and respect participatory rights for 
children, particularly in a migrant context. 
The Aarhus convention accords members of the public concerned a right to participate 
in administrative decision-making procedures concerning environmental matters. The 
Aarhus convention lists minimum criteria for meaningful participatory processes in 
(administrative) decision-making. for instance, the right to participation in the decision-
25 crc), refugee application procedures (article 22 crc, and see crc, Concluding Observations on 
Poland, crc/c/121 (2002) 120 at 523-524). further see for example, regarding adolescents’ rights to 
participate in decision-making affecting their health, crc, GC 4:Adolescent Health and Development in 
the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2003) reprinted in HrI/Gen/1/rev.7 at 322 and 
ff., §4, 8, 13, 18, 28, 38. see similarly with regard to HIv/AIds and the participatory rights of the child, 
crc General Comment No 3, crc/Gc/2003/3 (March 17, 2003) §10. with regard to divorce/custody 
procedures see for example, crc, Concluding Observations on Greece, crc/c/114 (2002) 25 at 130. 
15 Article 42 (2) International convention on the Protection of the rights of All Migrant workers and 
Members of their families. 
16 The Concluding Observations thus far focus on the participation in the “implementation of the 
convention and design and evaluation of public policies,” see, for instance, committee on the Protection 
of the rights of All Migrant workers and Members of Their families, Concluding Observations on the 
Third Periodic Report of Mexico (september 27, 2017) cMw/c/MeX/co/3, §19.
17 committee on the Protection of the rights of All Migrant workers and Members of their families and 
the committee on the rights of the child, Joint General Comment No. 3 (2017) of the Committee on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families and No. 22 (2017) of the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child on the General Principles regarding the Human Rights of Children in 
the Context of International Migration (november 16, 2007), §32(2), 34-39. 
18 In principle, article 6 stipulates the right to participate for members of the public. In paragraph 7, 
however, the public is mentioned instead of the public concerned, which is used throughout article 6 of 
the Aarhus convention. It is assumed that those members of the public that participate in the decision-
making procedure on the basis of article 6(7) of the Aarhus convention acquire the status of the public 
concerned in relation to article 9(2) of the Aarhus convention (the possibility of access to justice); see 
also, Accc, ACCC/C/2006/16 (Lithuania), ece/MP.PP/2008/5/Add.6, (April 4, 2008), §80. 
19 In the context of article 6(1)(a) of the Aarhus convention, authorities have to facilitate participatory 
procedures for decisions either permitting one of the proposed activities as listed in Annex I to the 
convention or for other decisions that may have a significant impact on the environment; the listed 
activities are presumed to have a potential significant effect on the environment. said activities include, 
for example, decisions on spatial planning, development consents, construction and operating permits, 
permits for the use of water or other natural resources. Article 7 stipulates the obligation to realize 
participatory procedures during the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the environment. 
see also J. ebbesson and others, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (united nations 
Publications 2014) at 92, 126. In addition to articles 6 and 7, the Aarhus convention stipulates the right 
to public participation in the preparation by public authorities of laws and regulations in article 8.
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making has to take place when all options are open, participation has to include at least a 
possibility for members of the public concerned to submit comments, information, analyses 
or opinions that they consider to be relevant to the proposed activity and public authorities 
have a duty to duly take into account those interests expressed. 
lastly, there is a right to participation in decision-making procedures for those persons 
who are facing expulsion. Both universal and regional instruments have recognized limited 
participatory rights in this context. These individuals have the right to submit reasons or 
evidence against a (possible) expulsion unless compelling reasons of national security 
require otherwise. 
In sum, the explicit provisions recognizing a right to participation in the decision-making 
procedure all accord participatory rights applicable in a particular context: for a particular 
type of decision-making procedure or for a particular group of affected individuals. 
1.2. Authoritative Interpretation 
Increasingly, bodies responsible for the interpretation of treaties have read procedural 
guarantees into substantive provisions, including the right to participation in the decision-
making procedures concerned. This section will demonstrate how a procedural right to 
meaningful participation has crystallized through the works of the treaty monitoring bodies.
The body that has done so most extensively is the committee on economic, social and 
cultural rights (cescr). The cescr recognizes a right to participation for the poor, 
the homeless, and the elderly whenever they are affected by an administrative decision. 
20 Article 6(4) Aarhus convention; Accc, ACCC/C/2008/26 (Austria), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/6/Add.1 
(february 8, 2011), §66; ACCC, ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), §117(a)(iii).
21 Article 6(7) Aarhus convention.
22 Article 6(8) Aarhus convention; this is also reflected in the duty to provide reasons for adopting a 
decision, including the considerations leading to said decision, as discussed below in 4.3. 
23 Article 13 IccPr; article 1 Additional Prot. 7 to the ecHr; article 32 of the 1951 refugee convention; 
article 22(5) and (6) American convention on Human rights; article 12(4) African charter on Human 
and Peoples’ rights. 
24 The explanatory report to article 1 Prot. 7 to the ecHr explains that individuals have to have such 
an opportunity before the case is reviewed by a court – that is, before the decision is adopted by the 
authorities concerned. explanatory report to Protocol no. 7 to the convention for the Protection of 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms (ets no. 117), §12. 
25 see also Hrcee, General Comment 15 (1986): The Position of Aliens under the covenant, A/41/40 
(1986) 117 §9-10; see, for instance, Karker v. France (833/1998), IccPr, A/56/40 vol. II (october 26, 
2000) 144 at §9.3.
26 J.d. temperman, ‘Public Participation in times of Privatization’ (2011) 4(2) ELR 43 at 59-60. 
27 cescr, Statement of the CESCR on Poverty and the ICESCR, (May 10, 2001) §12.
28 cescr, General Comment 7: the Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, §16.
29 cescr, General Comment 6: The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons (december 8, 
1995), §5, 34, 38.
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In addition, the cescr recognizes a right to particpation for whomever is affected by 
forced evictions, by decisions on adequate housing, by decisions on water, by decisions 
interfering with the right to cultural life, and lastly, by decisions related to one’s health. 
for instance, the committee acknowledges an obligation for authorities to realize extensive 
genuine consultation with, and participation of, everyone affected by decisions on matters 
of housing. In the various General comments, the committee further defines when 
authorities have an obligation to ensure the right to participation in the decision-making of 
those affected by decisions.
Also, other un human rights bodies recognized a right to participation for those affected. 
The Human rights committee (Hrcee) recognizes a right to participation in the decision-
making for minorities and indigenous people affected by decisions, for those affected 
by forced evictions and for those subjected to expulsion. similarly, the committee on 
the elimination of racial discrimination (cerd) has identified an obligation to provide 
for participatory procedures in the context of decision-making that affects descent-based 
communities, indigenous peoples, and minorities. Also, the cerd has explained 
extensively in its General comments the scope of the obligations for authorities to ensure 
participatory rights under the cerd. The committee on the elimination of discrimination 
against women (cedAw) has also recognized a right to participate in the administrative 
decision-making, albeit in fewer cases. for instance, in its Concluding Observations 
30 cescr, General Comment 7: the right to adequate housing: forced evictions, §16.
31 cescr, General Comment 4, §9. 
32 cescr, General Comment 15, §56.
33 cescr, General Comment 21.
34 cescr, General Comment 14; crc, General Comment 4, §4; crc, General Comment 3, §10. 
35 committee on economic, social and cultural rights, General Comment 4: Right to Adequate Housing 
(article 11(1) of the Covenant), (1991), un doc e/1992/23, §9; regarding link access to information and 
right to health, see cescr, General Comment 14: Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 
(2000), § 3, 11, 12(b).
36 see, e.g., General Comments 7, 15, 18, 19, 21, 22 of the cescr. 
37 Hrcee, General Comment 23: Article 27 (Rights of Minorities), (April 8, 1994) ccPr/c/21/rev.1/Add.5, 
§7; Hrcee, Lansman et al v. Finland, communication 511/1992 (1994), §9.5-9.6; Hrcee, Apirana 
Mahuika et al v. New Zealand communication no 543/1993 (2000), §9.5; Hrcee, Angela Poma Poma v. 
Peru, §7.6.
38 Hrcee, CO on Kenya, A/60/40 (2005) 44, §86(22). 
39 Hrcee, General Comment 15: the Position of Aliens under the Covenant A/41/40 (1986) 117, §9-10; 
Hrcee, Karker v. France, (833/1998) (2000), §9.3.
40 cerd, General Comment XXIX on Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention, §6 (aa).
41 cerd, General Comment XXIII on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, un doc A/52/19, Annex v, §4(d).
42 see, e.g., committee on elimination of racial discrimination, General Comment XXVII on 
Discrimination Against Roma, adopted at 57th session (2000) UN Doc. A/55/18, annex V, 154, at §41-
44. In this General comment, the cerd stipulates the need of the inclusion of the roma communities 
in decision-making procedures that affect them.
43 see, for instance, cerd, General Comment XXIII, §4(d).
44 Instead, most of the treaty interpreting documents focus on the right to public participation as part of 
the right to participate in public affairs; cedAw, Concluding Observations on Yemen, un doc. A/57/38 
rIGHt to MeAnInGful PArtIcIPAtIon In decIsIon-MAkInG Procedures
on Argentina, the committee emphasized the obligations of authorities to ensure that 
indigenous women can participate meaningfully in decision-making processes regarding 
the use of traditional lands.
At a regional level, the right to participation in decision-making procedures is firmly 
established as well. The european court of Human rights (ectHr), in the context of the 
right to family life (article 8 ecHr), recognized already in 1987 the need for participatory 
rights in decision-making procedures. These rights include, according to the court, the 
right to present one’s views and the duty of authorities to duly take into account the views 
expressed by affected individuals. The ectHr has taken this approach concerning cases 
on the right to family life, deprivation of legal capacity, data registration, registration of 
ethnic identity, issues of planning and environment, and access to abortion. similarly, 
the Inter-American court of Human rights has strengthened the right to participation in 
various cases dealing particularly with the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples. The 
court relied, amongst other things, on the principle of participation as stipulated in the 
Inter-American democratic charter. The African court on Human and People’s rights 
part III (2002) 200 at §402 and 403; cedAw, Concluding Observations on Kuwait, un doc. A/59/38 
part I (2004) 15 at §60, 61, 75.
45 cedAw, Concluding Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Argentina, (november 18, 2016), 
cedAw/c/ArG/co/ §40(a) (d), 41(b) (e).
46 ectHr, W v. United Kingdom, app 9749/82 (1987) §62.
47 ectHr, McMichael v. United Kingdom, App. no. 16424/90 (1995) §87; see also ectHr, Buckley v. United 
Kingdom, App. no. 20348/92 (1996) §76; ectHr, Görgülü v. Germany, app no 74969/01 (february 26, 
2004) §52; see also e. Brems and l. lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human rights Adjudication: The 
european court of Human rights’ (2013) 35(1) Human Rights Quarterly 176 at 191-193.
48 see similarly the committee on the rights of the child, General Comment 4: Adolescent Health and 
Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, crc/Gc/2003/4 (2003) §4, 8, 
13, 18, 28, 38. regarding HIv/AIds and the rights of the child, see similarly crc General Comment 
No. 3, crc/Gc/2003/3 (March 17, 2003) §10.
49 e.g. ectHr, Drobnjak v. Serbia, app 36500/05 (2010) §143-144; ectHr, shtukaturov. v. Russia, App. no. 
44009/05, (March 27, 2008).
50 see, e.g., ectHr, Turek v. Slovakia, app. 57986/00 (2006) §111.
51 e.g. in ectHr, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, App. no. 27138/04 (2010) §51.
52 ectHr, Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. no. 36022/97 (2003) §99, 128-129; ectHr, Buckley v. United 
Kingdom, App. no. 20348/92 (1996); ectHr, Taşkin v. Turkey, app no 46117/99 (2005), §119; ectHr, 
Giacomelli v. Italy, app. no. 59909/00 (2007) §82-83; see also o. de schutter, International Human Rights 
Law (cambridge cuP, 2010), 316-322.
53 ectHr, R.R. v. Poland, app. no. 27617/04 (2011) §191.
54 The Inter-American democratic charter stipulates in article 6 that citizens have the right to participate 
in decisions relating to their own development. The charter was adopted by the General Assembly 
of the organization of American states. The Inter-American court of Human rights referred to the 
charter to indicate the procedural standards recognized within the oAs in Claude Reyes v. Chile, §86; 
in the case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, the court extensively discussed the scope and content of 
the participatory rights of those affected by the decision-making regarding investment or development 
plans within traditional indigenous and tribal territories; public authorities have, for instance, a duty 
to actively consult with the communities according their custom and traditions (§113), IActHr, the 
Saramaka People v. Suriname (november 28, 2007).
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recognizes an obligation for authorities to provide “meaningful opportunities for individuals 
to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.” 
The case law focuses particularly on the rights of groups or communities to participate in 
decision-making procedures that directly affect them.
In conclusion, the right of affected persons to participate in the decision-making procedures 
has a firm legal basis in international law which has two elements. first, there is a strong 
procedural right to participation in the decision-making procedure as read into substantive 
rights. whenever public authorities adopt decisions that affect individuals, these individuals 
should have a right to participate meaningfully in the decision-making procedure. second, 
in particular contexts, when there is an explicit legal basis, there is a judiciable right to 
meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. The following sections will 
discuss the scope and content of the right to meaningful participation in decision-making 
procedures. 
2. The Scope of the Right
The general standard across various instruments is that participation in the decision-making 
procedure should be meaningful. However, authorities are accorded wide discretion in 
fulfilling this obligation. This section will address the elements of the right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure. 
In general, the participatory process contains four different phases; per phase, several criteria 
have been identified that set limits to the discretion of authorities and define the positive 
obligations of authorities. These criteria together ensure that the participation in the decision-
making procedure is meaningful: the duty to inform affected individuals before and during 
a decision-making procedure (section 2.1), the design of the participatory process (section 
2.2), the duty to duly consider the interests presented during the deliberation phase (section 
2.3.) and the duty to provide a reasoned decision (section 2.4).
55 AfcommHPr, social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v. Nigeria (2001) AHrlr 60 
(AcHPr 2001). communication 155/96, §52 concludes by stating that government compliance in the 
spirit of article 16 and article 24 of the African charter also has to include (…) “providing meaningful 
opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities”.
56 see, e.g., African commission for Human and Peoples rights, Case 276 /2003 Endorois Welfare Council 
v. Kenya (2009) §291. 
57 The exceptions to the rule are the procedural guarantees recognized for individuals facing expulsion. In 
these instances, the right is restricted to only the right to be heard, which may be limited for national 
security reasons; article 1 Prot. 7 to the ecHr, ectHr, B.H, T.H R.H and R.H v. Switzerland, (May 11, 
1994).
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2.1. The Duty to Inform Individuals Potentially Affected by Decisions 
The duty to inform serves as a pre-condition to meaningful participation of those potentially 
affected by the outcome of the decision-making procedure. without information on the 
procedure, on the decision to be adopted and on the possibility to participate, the right to 
participation becomes a meaningless pro forma exercise. This duty to inform has a strong 
legal basis in international law as a condition for meaningful participation in decision-
making. 
The most explicit basis, and most extensive duty, is found in article 6 of the Aarhus convention 
in which an obligation is laid down for authorities to duly inform the public concerned. The 
information to be provided includes information about the proposed activity, the timeframe 
of the decision-making procedure and the participatory procedure, information about the 
participatory procedure and how members of the public concerned may participate. similar 
obligations – although not always as extensive as in the context of the Aarhus convention – 
are provided by other international instruments. The cescr has recognized a duty to inform 
those potentially affected by decisions in those situations in which it similarly recognized a 
right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedures. In the same way, other 
un treaty monitoring bodies recognize a duty for authorities to inform potentially affected 
individuals in four different situations: to inform indigenous communities and minorities 
potentially affected by decisions; to inform those potentially affected by decisions that 
58 As stated in a communication concerning Kazakhstan: “if a key group of members of the public most 
directly affected by the activity was not informed of the process and not invited to participate in it,” it 
follows from it that they had not been informed in a timely fashion, they had not had opportunities 
to early and effective participation in the procedure nor had they been able to provide input. Accc, 
ACCC/C/2004/2 (Kazakhstan), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2005/2/add.2 (March 14, 2005), §24. see also J. 
ebbesson, ‘Public Participation’ in: The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2012) at 
686.
59 Article 6 Aarhus convention. The obligation laid down in article 6 is closely connected to the duty 
to actively collect and disseminate information (article 5 of the Aarhus convention) and the right to 
request public interest information (article 4 of the Aarhus convention). 
60 Article 6(2), (6) of the Aarhus convention; see also, for instance, Accc, ACCC/C/2004/2 (Kazakhstan), 
§23-25; Accc, ACCC/C/2006/16 (Lithuania), §66-68, 78; Accc, ACCC/C/2006/17 (European 
Community) ece/MP.PP/c.1/2008/5/Add.10 (May 2, 2008), §47-50, 59.
61 The obligation to inform is recognized for those affected by decisions relating to the right to water (GC 
15: the Right to Water at 48, 56), the right to adequate housing (GC 7: the Right to Adequate Housing - 
Forced Evictions at 16), the right to social security benefits (GC 19: the Right to Social Security at §26, 35, 
78), the right to health (cescr GC 22: the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, §18-19, 49; GC 14: 
the right to the highest attainable standard of health at §37), the right to work (GC 18: the right to work, 
§12 (b), 42), and the right to take part in cultural life (GC 21: the Right Everyone to Take Part in Cultural 
Life, §36, 49(e), 55).
62 regarding indigenous communities, see, for example, Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Suriname, 
A/59/40 vol. 1 (2004) 43, §69(21). cerd, Concluding Observations on Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
A/60/18 (2005) 35 at 170; cescr, concluding Observations on Brazil (2003) un doc e/2004/22 28, 
§142-143, 165-166; cedAw, Concluding Observations on the Combined Seventh and Eighth Periodic 
Reports of Honduras CEDAW/C/HND/CO/7-8, (november 18, 2016), §43; CEDAW, Concluding 
Observations on Argentina CEDAW/c/ArG/co/7, (november 18, 2016), §40-41. regarding minorities, 
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have a strong impact on the lives of individuals, such as in the case of forced eviction; 
to inform those potentially affected by decisions on environmental matters; and lastly, 
various un treaty bodies have recognized an obligation to inform those affected in the very 
specific situations of invasive health treatments, in particular, regarding practices of forced 
sterilization or abortion. 
each regional instrument recognizes a duty to inform; however, the context in which the duty 
is recognized differs. within the organization of American states (oAs), a duty to inform 
those affected by decisions on environmental matters is recognized and a duty to inform is 
recognized for whenever indigenous communities and minorities are affected by decisions. 
The european court of Human rights identified a duty to inform those affected by decisions 
in the context of the right to family life and of the right to life (articles 2 and 8 ecHr); this 
includes, for instance, decisions on environmental matters and decisions on invasive heath 
see, for example, cerd, General Recommendation XXVII on Discrimination against Roma (2000), §41-
44; cedAw, Concluding Observations on Argentina CEDAW/c/ArG/co/7, (november 18, 2016), §38-
39.
63 Hrcee, Concluding Observations concerning Kenya, (2005) at §86(22).
64 It should be noted though that the obligation in this context – in comparison to the other contexts in 
which it has been acknowledged – is mainly recognized by un special rapporteurs and less by the treaty 
monitoring bodies concerned. Human rights and the environment un special rapporteur, 2008, §204, 
draft declaration of principles on human rights and the environment un doc, e/cn.4/sub.2/1994/9, 
Annex 1 (July 6, 1994); 2004 Joint declaration by the un special rapporteur, osce representative 
and oAs special rapporteur on freedom of expression; report of the special rapporteur on the 
Adverse effects of the Illicit Movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous Products and wastes on 
enjoyment of Human rights, un Human rights council, un doc. A/Hrc/7/21 (february 18, 2008), 
§64-67.
65 crPd, Concluding Observations on Spain, un doc. crPd/c/esP/co/1 (october 19, 2011); 
crPd; Concluding Observations on Peru, un doc. no: crPd/c/Per/co/1 (May 9, 2012); crPd, 
Concluding observations on China, un doc: crPd/c/cHn/co/1 (september 27, 2012); crPd; 
Concluding Observations on Hungary, un doc.: crPd/c/Hun/co/1 (september 27, 2012); cedAw, 
Concluding Observations on the Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports of Chile, un doc. cedAw/c/cHl/
co/5-6 (november 12, 2012); cedAw, Concluding Observations on Australia, cedAw/c/Aus/co/7; 
cedAw; Concluding Observations on Czech Republic, un doc. cedAw/c/cZe/co/5 (november 
10, 2010); cedAw, Ms. Andrea Szijjarto v. Hungary, communication no. 4/2004, un doc. cedAw/
c/36/d/4/2004 (August 29, 2006); cescr (1994) General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, 
(december 9, 1994); cescr, Concluding Observations on Brazil. un doc. e/c.12/1/Add.87 (May 23, 
2003); CRC, Concluding Observations: Australia, un doc. crc/c/Aus/co/4 (August 28, 2012).
66 Inter-American Juridical committee, Principles on the right to Access to Information, principle 4; 
2009 report of the oAs special rapporteur for freedom of expression, Inter-American commission 
on Human rights 2009, §32-34; Inter-American commission on Human rights, 1997 Study on HR 
Protection in Ecuador oeA/ser.l/v/II.96 doc. 10, rev. 16-18, §50); IAcHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile.
67 for instance, in the case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, the IActHr held that those affected have 
to be informed of “possible risks, including environmental and health risks” of proposed development 
or investment plans. The duty to inform involves an obligation to “accept and disseminate information” 
and has to include a “constant communication between the parties”. IActHr, the Saramaka People 
v. Suriname, (november 28, 2007), series c no. 172, §133; IAcHr, report no. 75/02, Case 11.140, 
Mary and Carrie Dann (United States), (december 27, 2002), §140; IAcommHr, Case 12.053, Maya 
Indigenous Community of the Toledo District (october 12, 2004), report 40/04, §132-135, 140-144. 
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treatments. The African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights has identified an 
obligation to inform those affected by decisions on environmental matters in the context of 
the substantive right to a healthy environment as stipulated in the African charter. further, 
the African charter on values and Principles of Public service and Administration stipulates 
in article 6 a right to access information, which includes a duty for authorities to inform 
individuals of the decisions adopted that affect them, the reasons behind the decisions, and 
the possibility to appeal these decisions. 
overall, the decisive factor across each of the instruments and each of the categories is the 
(potential) impact of a decision on the life of an individual. Below the scope of the duty to 
inform is addressed: who should be informed, about what, when, and how?
Who 
Public authorities have a duty to inform those affected by decisions. section 3 will discuss 
further who is considered to be the holder of the right to meaningful participation in 
the decision-making procedure. However, if those affected are not properly identified 
as rightsholders, they will not be properly informed of the upcoming decision and the 
participatory processes, which will have a detrimental effect on the participation in the 
procedure. 
68 see, e.g., ectHr, V.C. v. Slovakia 18968/07 (november 8, 2011) §146. In regard to decisions 
on environmental matters, there is a normative overlap between the ectHr’s case law and the 
communications dealt with by the Aarhus convention compliance committee. see, e.g., M. schaap, 
‘Access to environmental Justice for nGos: Interplay between the Aarhus convention, the eu lisbon 
treaty and the european convention on Human rights’ in: A. Jakubowski and k. wierczynska, 
Fragmentation vs the Constitutionalization of International law (routledge 2016) 244-264; e. Hey, ‘The 
Interaction between Human rights and the environment in the european “Aarhus space” in: A. Grear 
and l.J. kotz (eds.) Research Handbook on Human Rights and the Environment (edward elgar 2015), p. 
353-362. 
69 African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) 
and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) / Nigeria, communication 155/96 (october 27, 2001), 
§71, see also §1-9, 54-55.
70 African charter on values and Principles of Public service and Administration (January 31, 2011) 
adopted at the 16th ordinary session of the assembly of the African union, Addis Ababa (entry into 
force on July 23, 2016). so far, the charter has 16 member states and 37 signatories. Article 6(1)(2) 
reads:
1. Public service and Administration shall make available to users information on procedures and 
formalities pertaining to public service delivery. 
2. Public service and Administration shall inform users of all decisions made concerning them, the 
reasons behind those decisions, as well as the mechanisms available for appeal. 
71 see, e.g., ACCC/C/2004/2 (Kazakhstan) in which the Aarhus convention compliance committee 
explained this detrimental effect in §24: 
 If a key group of members of the public most directly affected by the activity was not informed of the 
process and not invited to participate in it, it follows that they did not receive notice in “sufficient time” 
as required under Article 6, paragraph 3, and that in practice they did not have the opportunities for 
early and effective participation that should have been available in accordance with paragraph 4 or to 
provide input in accordance with paragraph 7. similarly, if no public notice of the planned hearings 
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Inform about what
The information to be provided by authorities concerns the information about the procedure 
and the procedure to be followed, and the (more substantive) information required for 
individuals to participate in a meaningful way in the decision-making procedure. At a 
minimum, individuals should receive a sufficient amount of information to enable them to 
meaningfully participate in the decision-making procedure; however, some treaties specify 
further what information should be provided to those affected. for instance, the cescr, in 
relation to forced evictions, stipulates that authorities have to (at a minimum) adequately 
and reasonably inform all those affected, prior to the impending decision of a scheduled 
eviction, of the opportunities for genuine consultation with the authorities in charge, and the 
procedure to be followed. Ilo convention no 169 stipulates that indigenous communities 
affected by investment or development plans in their traditional territories have to be fully 
briefed on the content and purpose of these plans, as well as of possible negative and positive 
impacts of such plans. 
The duty to inform may trigger further positive obligations: Authorities may have a duty to 
actively collect or produce information in certain situations and to disseminate it widely. 
This duty exists particularly in the context of decision-making on environmental matters, 
in the context of decisions affecting indigenous communities and in the context of decisions 
affecting children. 
or other participation opportunities was given, and if affected local residents were not invited to the 
hearing, whatever views they might have had to offer could not have been taken into account as 
required by Article 6, paragraph 8.
72 cescr, General Comment 7, §15; similarly, in the context of the right to water, the cescr reminded 
parties that “individuals and groups should be given full and equal access to information concerning 
water, water services, and the environment, held by public authorities or third parties.” cescr, GC 15: 
The Right to Water (2002), 120 at 48. The information required includes, amongst others, timely and 
full disclosure of information on the proposed measures and reasonable notice about the plans to the 
persons concerned (at 56).
73 Article 7.1 of the convention concerning Indigenous and tribal Peoples in Independent countries 
(Ilo no 169) 72 Ilo official Bull. 59; 28 IlM 1382 (1989) (entry into force on september 5, 1991); 
see similarly report of the un special rapporteur on the situation of Human rights and fundamental 
rights of Indigenous People, J. Anaya, report ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human rights, civil, 
Political, economic, social and cultural rights, (July 25, 2009) un doc., A/Hrc/12/34, §53. for an 
extensive obligation to inform, see similarly article 6(2) of the Aarhus convention. 
74 ectHr, Giacomelli v. Italy, (application no. 59909/00) (november 2, 2006), §93-96; article 5 of the 
Aarhus convention. 
75 un Human rights council, report of the special rapporteur on the situation of Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of Indigenous People, James Anaya un doc. A/Hrc/12/34, (2009), §53; Inter-
American commission on Human rights, ‘1997 study on Hr Protection in ecuador’ oeA/ser.l/v/
II.96 doc. 10, rev. 16-18, §30.
76 crc, General Comment 14 (article 3), §99. 
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When to inform 
All instruments stipulate that authorities have to inform those affected in an early stage of 
the decision-making procedure, when participation in the procedure is still meaningful. 
for instance, the Aarhus convention speaks of informing those affected in a timely manner 
when all options are still open, the ectHr refers to the need of timely access to relevant 
information, and the cescr refers to a reasonable timeframe and a timely disclosure of 
information. 
How to inform 
The general standard across instruments is that authorities have to provide an “adequate and 
reasonable notice” and that authorities have wide discretion in determining how to inform 
those affected. only in the context of decisions on environmental matters, one finds further 
specification. for instance, the Aarhus convention compliance committee has dealt in 
several communications with the question of how the public concerned can be informed 
in an adequate and effective manner, which can be achieved by two methods of informing 
the public: by public notice and by individual notice. The committee examines in a given 
77 Article 6(2) and (3) of the Aarhus convention. 
78 ectHr, R.R v. Poland, §197; the case R.R. v. Poland concerned the right of a pregnant woman to receive 
information on her health in order to decide whether or not to perform an abortion. The court reminded 
the authorities of the significance of timely access to this information, that the stipulation applies “with 
particular force to situations where rapid developments in the individual’s condition occur,” and that 
therefore her ability to take relevant decisions was reduced; see similarly Lupsa v. Romania where the 
court held that those facing expulsion have to know the grounds for expulsion in time so that they have 
sufficient time to prepare themselves for providing reasons against their expulsion. ectHr, Lupsa v. 
Romania, 10337/04 (June 8, 2006). 
79 cescr, GC 7, §15 reads “adequate reasonable notice …. Prior to the scheduled date of eviction…
information [has to] be made available in reasonable time to all those affected”.
80 cescr, GC 15, §56; see similarly cescr, GC 19, §78 both general comments prescribe timely and full 
disclosure of information on the proposed measures and reasonable notice of the proposed action. 
81 In the context of forced evictions, cescr stipulates, for instance “[a]dequate and reasonable notice for 
all affected persons prior to the scheduled date of eviction” cescr, GC 7: the Right to Adequate Housing 
(Forced Evictions), §15. see also Hrcee, CO on Kenya (2005).
82 The public concerned is defined by the Aarhus convention as the public affected or likely to be affected 
by environmental decision-making procedures or having an interest in those: article 2(5) Aarhus 
convention; the interest to be stated seems comprise both legal interests as well as factual interests; the 
Aarhus convention compliance committee defined public concerned as follows: 
 while narrowed than the definition of the public, the definition of the public concerned under the 
convention is still very broad. whether a member of the public is affected by a project depends on 
the nature and size of the activity. (…) also, whether members of the public have an interest in the 
decision-making depends on whether their property and other related rights (..), social rights or other 
rights or interests relating to the environment may be impaired by the proposed activity. (…) Article 3, 
paragraph 5, deems nGos promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements under 
national law to have such an interest; ACCC/C/2010/50 (Czech Republic), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2012/11, 
§66.
83 see, e.g., Accc, ACCC/C/2009/37 (Belarus), ece/MP.PP/2011/11/add.2, (May 12, 2011), §86; for 
instance, in one case the authorities complied with their obligations by informing the public by a public 
inquiry notice in two daily newspapers and by publishing the information on the Internet site of local 
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case whether all those who “could potentially be concerned have [had] a reasonable chance 
to learn about proposed activities and their possibility to participate,” which can imply a 
combination of individual and public notice.
In conclusion, the duty to inform is one of the four elements to ensure a meaningful 
participation of those affected in the decision-making procedure. In short, individuals 
have to be informed in a timely, adequate and effective manner about the decision-making 
procedure and the participatory processes, and that those affected have to receive all relevant 
(background) information necessary to be able to participate in a meaningful way in the 
decision-making procedure. If an individual is not sufficiently informed of the participatory 
process, and accordingly will not participate in the procedure, the individual has to have an 
opportunity to request a review of the decision as a way to enforce their right to participation. 
The content and scope of the right to a review will be further discussed in chapter 5. The 
next sections will discuss the other three elements required for a meaningful participatory 
procedure.
2.2. The Procedure 
The instruments accord wide discretion to public authorities to design the participatory 
processes; however, there are certain parameters. The participation needs to be, at a 
minimum, meaningful, which implies that the participation has to take place early in the 
procedure and that those affected have to have a possibility to have their views heard. 
Although the right to participation in the decision-making procedure has been recognized 
in all treaty regimes, the scope of the participation and thus the influence that those 
affected have in a decision-making procedure varies. overall, the legal survey charts two 
different degrees of participation: the right to meaningful involvement and the right to prior 
informed consent. The former is the general standard across treaty instruments; only in 
limited circumstances, meaningful involvement is not sufficient and instead prior informed 
consent is required. The difference between these two degrees of participation will be further 
explained below.
In general, the right to meaningful involvement implies that affected individuals have a right 
to present their point of view or interest in the decision-making procedure and authorities 
authorities, Accc, ACCC/C/2007/22 (France), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/4/add.1 (february 8, 2011), §41. 
84 Accc, ACCC/2006/16 (Lithuania), §67; see also Accc, ACCC/C/2007/22 (France), §42.
85 see similarly the ectHr’s case law. see, e.g., ectHr, Hatton v. United Kingdom, app. no. 36022/97 
(2003) §128- 129. see also Taskin v. Turkey, where the authorities complied with the duty to inform as 
laid down in the ecHr and duly informed those affected properly (§119-120), but they failed to comply 
with national judicial proceedings ordering to the government to foreclose the goldmine. ectHr, 
Taskin v. Turkey, app no 46117/99 (2005) §121-126.
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have the obligation to duly take this into account. The right is widely recognized across 
various international instruments. However, slightly different terminology is used in every 
treaty regime: some treaties refer to the right to be heard, whereas others refer to the right to 
consultation. for instance, the convention on the rights of the child accords children the 
right to be heard in relation to decisions that affect them. similarly, the ecHr recognizes 
a right to be heard for those affected by decisions, including decisions related to the right to 
family life, and in particular, in relation to the deprivation of legal capacity decisions, data 
registration, registration of ethnic identity and access to abortion cases. for example, 
regarding an eviction notice, the court concluded that affected individuals have to have: 
a full and fair opportunity to put before the planning inspectors any material which they regard 
as relevant to their case and in particular their personal, financial and other circumstances, 
their views as to the suitability of alternative sites and the length of time needed to find a 
suitable alternative site. 
other instruments refer to a right to consultation in the decision-making procedure. This 
right is recognized for minorities, indigenous peoples, in the context of environmental 
decision-making, decisions affecting the right to development, and decisions interfering 
with an individual’s right to water. 
86 It should be noted that the obligation to duly take into account the interests presented will be discussed 
in section 2.3. 
87 Articles 12, 22 and 40 of the convention on the rights of the child; crc, General Comment 4, §4; crc, 
General Comment 14, §53.
88 see similarly the committee on the rights of the child, General Comment 4: Adolescent health and 
development in the context of the convention on the rights of the child, (2003) §4, 8, 13, 18, 28, 38. with 
regard to HIv/AIds and the rights of the child, see similarly CRC, General Comment no. 3, (March 17, 
2003) §10.
89 e.g., ectHr, Drobnjak v. Serbia, app. 36500/05 (2010) §143-144; ectHr, shtukaturov. v. Russia, App. 
no. 44009/05, (March 27, 2008).
90 e.g., ectHr, Turek v. Slovakia, app. 57986/00 (2006) §111.
91 e.g., ectHr, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, App. no. 27138/04 (2010) §51.
92 ectHr, R.R. v. Poland, app. no. 27617/04 (2011) §191.
93 ectHr, Chapman v. UK, §106; on forced evictions, see similarly the Hrcee and cescr who speak 
however of genuine consultation: Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Kenya (2004) A/60/40 44, 
§86(22) and cescr, General Comment 7, §15. 
94 see, e.g., Hrcee, Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, §7.6; Hrcee, General Comment 23 (1994) §7; cescr, 
General Comment 21 (2009); cerd, General Comment 23 (2000) §41-44. 
95 Article 6 Ilo convention no 169; Hrcee, Lansmann et al v. Finland §9.5-9.6; cerd, General Comment 
23, §4(d); cedAw, CO on 7th periodic report of Argentina (2016), §40 (a)(d), 41(b). cerd, Concluding 
Observations on Saint Lucia, cerd, A/59/18 (2004) 86 at §446, 447; for instance, the Hrcee speaks 
of giving greater influence to the indigenous people affected by particular decisions, Concluding 
Observations on Sweden, A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 57 at §79(15).
96 Article 6 Aarhus convention; IActHr, the Saramaka People v. Suriname. 
97 AfcPHr, SERAC v. Nigeria.
98 (emphasis added), cescr, General Comment 15: the Right to Water (2002) 120, at §56. see also Hrcee 
in relation to article 27 IccPr (rights of minorities):
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In some instances, when the rights of individuals are adversely affected, a more extensive 
form of participation is required: the right to prior informed consent. In general, the 
obligation to prior informed consent has been recognized for indigenous communities 
and minorities whenever measures are taken by public authorities that adversely affect their 
lives or livelihood. for instance, the cerd stipulates a right to prior informed consent for 
indigenous or minority communities whenever decisions are adopted that directly relate 
to their rights or interests; similarly, the IActHr recognized the obligation in relation 
to decisions to extract natural resources that are necessary for the survival of indigenous 
communities and in the case of large scale investment or development projects with a 
major impact within the territory of the indigenous people. Additionally, the obligation 
to obtain prior informed consent has been recognized across international human rights 
instruments for the specific situation of invasive health treatments. The reasoning is that 
 …the admissibility of measures which substantially compromise or interfere with the culturally 
significant economic activities of a monitory or indigenous community depends on whether the 
members of the community in question have had the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
process in relation to these measures.
 Hrcee, Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, §7.6; see also cescr, General Comment 21: Right of everyone to 
take part in cultural life, un doc e/c.12/Gc/21 (december 21, 2009).
99 see for an overview of the right to prior informed consent within international law, for example, t. 
ward, ‘The right to free, Prior, and Informed consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation rights within 
International law’ (2011) 10(2) Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 54-84. 
100 Article 19 un declaration; see also the report by un special rapporteur Anaya in which he discussed 
the normative relevance of the declaration and the normative background of the duty to consult in 
international law; special rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental rights of 
indigenous people, J. Anaya, report ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human rights, civil, Political, 
economic, social and cultural rights’ (July 25, 2009) un doc., A/Hrc/12/34, p 12, at 38-42; cescr, 
Brazil, e/2004/22 (2003) 28 §165; similarly, cescr, china, e/2006/22 (2005) 25 §190; in observations 
of ecuador, the cerd recommends that the “prior informed consent of these communities be sought” 
(emphasis added) regarding the exploitation of subsoil resources of the traditional lands of indigenous 
communities; cerd, ecuador, A/58/18 (2003) 22 §62; cerd, ecuador, e/2005/22 (2004) 39, §301; 
cescr, colombia, e/2002/22 (2001) 110, §782; cerd, Bolivia cerd/c/Bol/co/17-20 (April 8, 2011) 
§20; cerd, Concluding Observations on Mexico, (August 3, 2012) un doc. cerd/c/MeX/Q/16-17.
101 see, e.g., Hrcee, Ángela Poma Poma v. Peru §7.6, see also §7.2, 7.4, 7.7; for instance, un special 
rapporteur Anaya speaks of a right to prior informed consent in the context of major development 
projects that affect indigenous peoples (2009 report ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human rights, 
civil, Political economic, social and cultural rights, un doc., A/Hrc/12/34, §63).
102 cerd, General Comment 23 §4(d).
103 IActHr, the Saramaka People v. Suriname §134-135, and 145. see similarly the Hrcee, which stated 
in Lansmann et al v. Finland that implementing a consultation procedure was sufficient for complying 
with the convention’s obligations considering that the minorities had not been adversely affected (§9.6). 
The cescr, for example, recognizes a right to prior informed consent whenever a decision affects the 
preservation of the cultural resources of indigenous communities, minorities or other communities, 
and especially when those resources that are associated with their way of life and cultural expression are 
at risk (cescr, General Comment 21, §55 (e)).
104 see, e.g., ectHr, V.C. v. Slovakia 18968/07 §146; crPd, Concluding Observations on Spain, un doc.: 
crPd/c/esP/co/1 (october 19, 2011); crPd; Concluding Observations on Peru, un doc. no.: 
crPd/c/Per/co/1 (May 9, 2012); crPd, Concluding Observations on China, un doc: crPd/c/cHn/
co/1 (september 27, 2012); crPd; Concluding Observations on Hungary, un doc.: crPd/c/Hun/
co/1 (september 27, 2012; cedAw, Concluding Observations on the Fifth and Sixth Periodic Reports 
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those individuals and/or groups that are adversely affected in these situations are considered 
to be particularly vulnerable, and that therefore further procedural guarantees have to be 
realized by public authorities to ensure that their rights are guaranteed.
The difference between the right to meaningful involvement and the right to prior informed 
consent lies in the influence that affected individuals have in the decision-making procedure. 
whenever meaningful participation is required of those affected, authorities have an 
obligation to consult with stakeholders and to duly consider their interests, but they are not 
required to obtain the consent of those affected before adopting a decision. However, when 
indigenous communities or minorities are adversely affected by an adopted decision, public 
authorities are required to obtain their prior informed consent. for instance, the IActHr 
held in the Saramaka People v. Suriname case:
regarding large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within saramaka territory the state has a duty, not only to consult with the saramaka, but also 
to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.
In general, the instruments accord wide discretion to authorities in determining how to 
achieve the result of meaningful participation. Authorities have freedom to choose the way 
in which they want to organize the participatory processes, whether via public comments, 
of Chile, un doc. cedAw/c/cHl/co/5-6 (november 12, 2012); cedAw, Concluding Observations 
on Australia, cedAw/c/Aus/co/7; cedAw; Concluding Observations on Czech Republic, (november 
10, 2010); cedAw, Ms. Andrea Szijjarto v. Hungary, communication no. 4/2004, (August 29, 2006); 
cescr (1994) General Comment 5: Persons with Disabilities, (december 9, 1994); cescr, Concluding 
Observations on Brazil. un doc. e/c.12/1/Add.87 (May 23, 2003); CRC, Concluding Observations: 
Australia, un doc. crc/c/Aus/co/4 (August 28, 2012).
105 In some instances, however, authorities have a duty to obtain the consent of indigenous communities 
whereas in other situations authorities have a duty to consult to obtain the consent of indigenous 
communities. nevertheless, this distinction in the context of decision-making procedures that affect 
indigenous communities or minorities goes beyond the scope of the research. It should be noted that 
the difference between the duty to consult to obtain the consent and the duty to obtain the consent 
only applies to the decision-making procedures that affect indigenous communities and minorities. 
regarding invasive health treatments, there is only the right to prior informed consent. with respect 
to other situations in which the right to consultation exists, there is – currently – no duty to consult to 
obtain the consent.
106 see similarly above in the text in and around footnotes 99-102.
107 IActHr, Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, 
merits, reparations and costs, IAcHr series c no. 185, IHrl 3058 (IAcHr 2008), (August 12, 2008); 
see also General Comment 23 of the cerd, which reasons along similar lines. cerd GC 23, § 4(d); in 
its Concluding Observation on Ecuador, the cerd stated that in the case of the exploitation of subsoil 
resources of the indigenous communities’ traditional lands mere consultation is not sufficient; instead, 
prior informed consent has to be sought. cerd, A/58/18 (2003) 22 at §62; cescr, CO on Colombia, 
e/2002/22 (2001) 110 at 782; cescr, Concluding Observations on Ecuador , e/2005/22 (2004) 39 §278, 
301.
108 see also, e.g., ectHr, Chapman v. UK, §92, 106-116. 
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hearings, a written phase, one-on-one interaction, or another type of participation. However, 
at a minimum, the participation should take place early in the procedure in order to still 
be meaningful. for instance, the Aarhus convention compliance committee held in 
ACCC/C/2009/43 (Armenia) that since the public participation was organized only after 
a special mining license had been issued, it was in contravention with the requirement to 
provide participation at an early stage when all options are still open.
when decision-making procedures are more complex, different terms may be required for 
participatory processes. for instance, in regards to certain types of decisions, authorities 
may be required to conduct impact assessments to examine the impact that a certain project 
can have on the environment, on the society, or on children’s rights and whether, and to what 
extent, considering the outcome of this assessment, it should influence the design of the 
decision-making procedure and the guarantees that have to be offered by authorities to those 
affected. for instance, in SERAC v. Nigeria, the AcHPr stated:
government compliance … must also include ordering or at least permitting independent 
scientific monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicizing environmental 
and social impact studies prior to any major industrial development, undertaking appropriate 
monitoring and providing information to those communities exposed to hazardous materials 
and activities and providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to 
participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.
109 Article 6(4) of the Aarhus convention; the Aarhus convention compliance committee emphasized that:
 such participation does not only require formal participation. More importantly, participation is to 
include public debate and the opportunity for the public to participate in such debate at an early stage 
of the decision-making process, when all option are open and when due account can be taken of the 
outcome of the public participation. 
 Accc, ACCC/C/2008/26 (Austria), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/6/Add.1 (february 8, 2011), §66; Accc, 
ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), §117(a)(iii); e.g., the Accc argued in ACCC/C/2009/37 (Belarus), (§89): 
 The committee appreciates a flexible approach to setting the time frames aiming to allow the public 
to access the relevant documentation and to prepare itself, and considers that while a minimum of 30 
days between the public notice and the start of public consultations is a reasonable time frame, the 
flexible approach allows to extend this minimum period as may be necessary taking into account, 
inter alia, the nature, complexity and size of the proposed activity. 
110 Accc, ACCC/C/2009/43 (Armenia), ece/MP.PP/2011/11/add.1, (May 12, 2011), §76. As the Accc 
explained in §76: 
 In this case, a special mining licence was issued for the developer … in 2004, and the developer 
organized public participation in the framework of the [environmental Impact Assessment] 
procedure in 2006. Providing for public participation only after the licence has been issued reduced 
the public’s input to only commenting on how the environmental impact of the mining activity could 
be mitigated, but precluded the public from having input on the decision on whether the mining 
activity should be pursued in the first place, as that decision had already been taken. (emphasis added)
111 This automatically influences what has to be understood to be reasonable timeframes for participatory 
processes in a given context, see, for example, Accc, ACCC/C/2006/16 (Lithuania), §69-70.
112 AcHPr, SERAC v. Nigeria, §52-54; see further for the necessity to have access to information 
to participate meaningfully in the decision-making procedures of public authorities regarding 
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Although impact assessments constitute separate procedures – with their own participatory 
processes – it is interlinked with the duty to inform those affected and with the obligation 
to ensure meaningful participation in the decision-making procedures of those affected. 
2.3. The Duty to Duly Account for the Views Expressed
The duty for authorities to duly account for the views or interests presented by affected 
individuals is the third element to ensure that the participatory process is meaningful and 
not merely a formality. The duty is widely recognized within the various treaty regimes. 
Authorities ought to give an appropriate weight in their deliberation to the interests 
presented by those affected and weigh them against other competing interests. It can best 
environmental matters, for example, the Aarhus convention, and Principle 10 of the rIo declaration. 
113 see, e.g., General Comment 14 (§99) of the crc, in which the committee explained the need for an 
impact assessment in the context of the rights of children and the necessity for authorities to include 
such assessments in their decision-making procedures to ensure a proper regard of children’s rights 
in their procedures. see further, ACCC/C/2009/43 (Armenia) in which the Accc explains that the 
obligation to carry out impact assessments concerns a separate obligation from the obligation to provide 
for a meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure, at §76. 
114 In ACCC/C/2004/3 (Ukraine), however, the Accc reminded the authorities that the information to be 
provided may not be limited to a mere publication of the conducted environmental impact assessment, 
Accc ACCC/C/2004/3, ACCC/S/2004/1 (Ukraine), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2005/2/Add.3 (March 14, 2005), 
§32. 
115 report of the special rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous people, James Anaya, (2009) §53; crc, General Comment 14, §99. with respect to decisions 
on oil operations, see, for example, the Inter-American commission on Human rights, 1997 study on 
HR protection in Ecuador, oeA/ser.l/v/II.96 doc. 10, rev. 16-18, §30, 45-49; with regard to deforesting 
projects, see IAcHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile; with respect to the need to inform and duty to collect 
information concerning the design and construction of nuclear reactor, see e.g. ectHr, sdruženi 
Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic (2006).
116 Article 6(8) Aarhus convention.
117 only in the limited context of decisions on expulsion, a lower bar is set. Those facing expulsion have 
only a right to be heard without a corresponding obligation for authorities to duly take into account any 
of the views expressed. 
118 see, e.g., article 12 of the convention on the rights of the child; crc, General Comment 4, §4; crc, 
General Comment 3, §10; crc, GC 14, §53; Hrcee, Lansmann et al, v. Finland, communication no. 
511/1992 (1992), §9.5-9.6; Hrcee, Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, (2000), §9.5-9.6, 9.8; article 
6(8) Aarhus convention; Accc/c/2004/3 and Accc/s/200, ece/MP/PP/c.1/2005/2/add.3 (March 
14, 2005),§29; ectHr, McMichael v. United Kingdom, App. no. 16424/90 (1995) §87; see also ectHr, 
Buckley v. United Kingdom, App. no. 20348/92 (1996) §76; the cescr speaks of “genuine consultation,” 
see, e.g., cescr, General Comment 7, §15, crc, General Comment 15, §56; cescr, General Comment 
19, §42; IActHr, the Saramaka People v. Suriname, §131-133; article 32 of the un declaration on the 
rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
119 In relation to article 8, for instance, the ectHr has established that when a decision-making process 
leads to measures interfering with a right under the convention these processes “must be fair, and such 
as to afford due respect for the interests safeguarded to the individual by Article 8”. (emphasis added) 
ectHr, McMichael v. United Kingdom, App. no. 16424/90 (1995)§87; see also ectHr, Buckley v. United 
Kingdom, App. no. 20348/92 (1996) §76; ectHr in Hatton v. UK used similar language; see also A. 
Boyle, ‘Human rights and the environment: where next’ (2012) 23 EJIL 613 at 624; e. Brems and l. 
lavrysen, ‘Procedural Justice in Human rights Adjudication: The european court of Human rights’ 
(2013) 35Human Rights Quarterly 176 at 192.
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be described as an obligation of effort. This obligation does not imply that authorities should 
adopt the decision in conformity with the view of the affected individual; authorities have 
administrative discretion in the way they come to their decision, as long as they take the 
views into account when the decision is made. only the Aarhus convention compliance 
committee further defines what factors play a role in the determination of whether due 
account has been given of the interests presented by those affected. for instance, it is of 
relevance whether authorities have had a sufficient amount of time to take the outcome of 
the public participatory processes into account. 
If, in a given case, prior informed consent is required, it implies that authorities have 
less discretion to come to their decision, and individuals thus have more influence in the 
decision-making procedure. Hence, the duty to consider the views expressed is closely 
connected to the modality of participation required in a decision-making procedure. The 
more influence an individual has in the decision-making procedure – depending on the 
participation modality – the less discretion authorities have in weighing the interests and 
coming to their decision. 
2.4. Obligation to Provide Reasons for the Decision Reached
The duty for authorities to provide a written reason is widely recognized across the various 
instruments. In essence, the obligation requires authorities to provide the legal basis 
120 see, e.g., in the context of Aarhus, ACCC/C/2008/24 (Spain), §98. The committee further explained 
that all comments have to be seriously considered, but that it is impossible to accept all comments. 
However, routinely disregarding or not accepting comments on their merits without an explanation 
may constitute violation of the convention (§99-100). 
121 each treaty monitoring body defines administrative discretion differently. for instance, the ectHr 
and the cerd refer to it as the margin of appreciation. This discretion accorded to authorities will be 
further discussed in chapter 6.
122 Accc, ACCC/C/2004/3 and ACCC/S/2004.1 (Ukraine), ec/MP.PP/c.1/2005/2/add.3 (March 14, 
2005), §29.
123 In particular, see crc, General Comment 14 (concerning article 3 CRC), §97; see further cescr, General 
Comment 7, §15; ectHr, Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy app. no. 39128/05 (2010), §45-49; the ectHr held in 
several cases that the obligation to provide reasons applies to administrative and judicial proceedings. 
for instance, in Suominen v. Finland (July 1, 2003 app. 37801/97, §37), the court held with regard to 
judicial proceedings that: 
 The court emphasises that a further function of a reasoned decision is to demonstrate to the parties 
that they have been heard. Moreover, a reasoned decision affords a party the possibility to appeal 
against it, as well as the possibility of having the decision reviewed by an appellate body. It is only by 
giving a reasoned decision that there can be public scrutiny of the administration of justice. 
 similarly, decisions adopted by administrative authorities on the non-disclosure of requested 
information have to include the reasons underlying the decision. Hrcee, GC 34, §19; coe, committee 
of Ministers, recommendation no. (81) 19, Appendix 1, principle vII; Inter-American Juridical 
committee, Principles on the right to Access to Information, principle 5; Individual participation 
right (oecd recommendation of the council concerning Guidelines governing the protection of 
privacy and transborder flows of personal data (2013) c(80)58/fInAl, as amended on July 11, 2013 by 
c(2013)79, Annex, §13(b)(c); IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §55.
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for the decision and an explanation of the reasons underlying the decision. The Accc, 
the crc, and the ectHr gave further guidance as to how to interpret this obligation. for 
instance, the ectHr emphasizes in its case law the importance of allocating due weight 
to the interests of those affected, and that this has to be reflected in the reasons for the 
decision. The Aarhus convention compliance committee explained that authorities 
do not need to react to every view expressed. The crc is most explicit in addressing 
what the duty to give reasons entails for public authorities. In General Comment 14, the 
committee explains that, at a minimum, the decision has to be motivated, justified and 
explained, the explanation has to include the relevant factual circumstances and the 
elements taken into account in the context of the best interest assessment, the interests at 
stake, and the relative weight allotted to the interests. 
It should be noted that the duty to provide reasons for a decision reached is not only an 
essential condition of the right to meaningful participation, the provision of reasons by 
authorities also affects the right to an effective remedy. The effectiveness of the remedy 
depends, amongst other things, on the knowledge of the reasons for the decision that one 
would like to have reviewed. 
3. Rightsholders 
The right to participation in the decision-making procedure has a legal basis in the majority 
of the instruments; however, the type of decision-making procedure or to whom this right is 
accorded varies in each instrument. In this regard, this research signals two factors that are 
relevant in determining who has a right to participation in the decision-making procedure. 
124 It should be noted that the Aarhus convention is one of the few instruments that has an explicit provision 
stipulating the obligation to provide a written reasoned decision, article 6(9) Aarhus convention. The 
other treaty monitoring bodies have read this obligation into the substantive rights. 
125 ectHr, Kutzner v. Germany, Application no. 46544/99 (february 26, 2002) §56; ectHr, McMichael v. 
United Kingdom, (March 2, 1995), §87. 
126 However, as stated by the Aarhus convention compliance committee:
 the obligation to take due account of the outcome of the public participation should be interpreted as 
the obligation that the written reasoned decision includes a discussion of how the public participation 
was taken into account. 
 ACCC/2008/24 (Spain), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/8/add.1 (september 30, 2010), §100. 
127 crc, General Comment 14, §97.
128 Idem; it should be noted that if a decision is made that differs from the child’s point of view, public 
authorities have an extensive duty to explain why other interests outweighed the interests of the child in 
question. 
129 chapter 5 will further address this point. see, for instance, ectHr Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria (app. no. 
50963/99 (2002) §123): 
 …the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of law in a democratic society require that measures 
affecting fundamental human rights must be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before 
an independent body competent to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence.
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In practice, these two trigger factors for participatory rights often overlap.
firstly, the holders of the right can be determined by who is affected by the decision. overall, 
vulnerable groups or individuals are accorded participatory rights. The right to participation 
has been recognized for minorities, descent-based communities, indigenous people, 
children, women, migrant workers, the poor, the homeless, elderly, and for people 
with disabilities in regards to all decisions affecting them. 
secondly, the holders of the right can be determined by the kind of decisions affecting 
individuals. In these situations, anyone affected by these types of decisions has a right to 
participate in the decision-making procedure. The right to participate in the decision-making 
has been recognized for those subjected to expulsion, forced evictions, those affected by 
decisions on adequate housing, by decisions on water, by decisions interfering with the 
right to cultural life, by decisions relating to one’s health, by decisions relating to the right 
130 Hrcee, Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, §7.6; Hrcee, General Comment 23 (1994), §7; cescr, General 
Comment 21 (2009); cerd, General Comment 23 (2000), §41-44. 
131 cerd, General Comment XXIX, §6(aa).
132 Hrcee, Lansman et al v. Finland, §9.5-9.6; Hrcee, Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand, §9.5; cerd, 
General Comment 23, §4(d); cedAw, CO on Seventh Periodic Report of Argentina (2016), §40(a), (d), 
41(b) and (e). 
133 crc, article 12; crc General Comment 14 (2013) §53.
134 cedAw, CO on Seventh Periodic Report of Argentina (2016), §40(a), (d), 41(b) and (e). 
135 Article 42(2) International convention on the Protection of the rights of All Migrant workers and 
Members of Their families. 
136 cescr, statement of the cescr on Poverty and the Icescr, (May 10, 2001) §12.
137 cescr, GC 7, §16.
138 un committee on economic, social and cultural rights (cescr), General Comment No. 6: The 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Older Persons (december 8, 1995), §5, 34, 38. The cescr 
referred to the principles stipulated in the vienna International Plan of Action on Ageing adopted 
by the world Assembly (observations in the report of the world Assembly on Ageing, vienna, (un 
Publications 1982) available via http://www.un.org/en/events/elderabuse/pdf/vipaa.pdf) and to the 
united nations Principles for older Persons adopted by the un General Assembly (un GA resolution 
46/91 of december 16, 1991), ‘Implementation of the International Plan of Action on Ageing and 
related activities’, annex, principle 7.
139 for instance, article 3(c) of the un convention of Persons with disabilities that stipulates as a third (and 
final) general principle of the convention “full and effective participation and inclusion in society;” see 
also cescr, General Comment No. 5: Persons with Disabilities, (december 9, 1994), §26, 31, 36-37.
140 Article 13 IccPr, Hrcee, General Comment 15, §9-10; Hrcee, Karker v. France, §9.3; article 1 Add. 
Prot. 7 ecHr; article 32 of the 1951 refugee convention; article 22(5) and (6) American convention 
on Human rights; article 12(4) African charter on Human and Peoples’ rights. 
141 for example, individuals subjected to forced evictions from their homes have a right to genuine 
consultation within the decision-making procedure. see, e.g., cescr, GC 7, §16.
142 cescr, General Comment 4, §9. 
143 cescr, General Comment 15, §56.
144 cescr, General Comment 21; Hrcee, General Comment 23, §7. 
145 cescr, General Comment 14; crc, General Comment 4, §4; crc, General Comment 3, §10. 
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to development, by decisions relating to one’s right to family life,  and by decisions on 
environmental matters.
The common denominator across each instrument and each category is the (potential) impact 
of the decision on the lives of affected individuals. vulnerability is a key trigger factor for 
participatory rights. Those affected by the decisions are presumed to be vulnerable, which 
triggers an obligation for authorities to provide participatory rights to those affected. The 
vulnerability is materialized in two different ways: on the basis of characteristics related to 
the person or on the basis of characteristics related to the type of decision. The participatory 
rights focus on empowering vulnerable individuals, or groups affected by administrative 
decisions.
In conclusion, there is a right to participate meaningfully in the decision-making procedure 
for all those affected – and thus considered vulnerable – by decisions adopted by public 
authorities. It is a decisive moment for the right to meaningful participation in the decision-
making procedure and for the overall level of inclusionary governance when public 
authorities determine who they consider to be affected by the decision. After all, only those 
considered to be affected are duly informed of the upcoming decision and participatory 
146 AcfPHr, SERAC v. Nigeria.
147 regarding deprivation of legal capacity, see, e.g., ectHr, Drobnjak v. Serbia, app. 3650/05 (2010) §143-
144; ectHr, shtukaturov. v. Russia, App. no. 44009/05, (2008); as regards access to abortion, see, e.g., 
ectHr, R.R. v. Poland, app. no. 27617/04 (2011) §191; see further e. Brems and l. lavrysen, ‘Procedural 
Justice in Human rights Adjudication: The european court of Human rights’ (2013) 35(1) Human 
Rights Quarterly 176 at §192. see similarly the committee on the rights of the child, GC 4: Adolescent 
Health and Development in the Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2003) §4, 8, 13, 18, 
28, 38. with regard to HIv/AIds and the rights of the child, see similarly crc, General Comment No. 
3, (2003), §10.
148 Article 6 Aarhus convention; un special rapporteur on Human rights and the environment (2008); 
Inter-American commission on Human rights, Human Rights Protection in Ecuador (1997); ectHr, 
Hatton v. United Kingdom, App. no. 36022/97 (2003) §99, 128-129; ectHr, Buckley v. United Kingdom, 
App. no. 20348/92 (1996); ectHr Taşkin v. Turkey, app. no. 46117/99 (2005) §119; ectHr, Giacomelli v. 
Italy, app. no. 59909/00 (2007) §82-83; ectHr, Chapman v. United Kingdom, [Gc], app. no. 27238/95, 
(January 18, 2001).
149 The concept of vulnerability is used throughout this research to refer to the approach of treaty monitoring 
bodies to accord procedural guarantees to those who are particularly affected by a decision. see chapter 
6 in which this concept will be further discussed. It should be noted that the working definition upheld 
in this book is deduced from the work of the treaty monitoring bodies in which de iure and de facto 
factors of vulnerability seem to influence the norm setting and norm application in the context of 
inclusionary governance. The definition upheld in this research is broader than the concept of (group) 
vulnerability as used in scholarly work to refer to particular groups of individuals that, on the basis of 
characteristics of their identities, are considered to be extra vulnerable. for critical reflections on the 
usage of the concept of vulnerability by treaty monitoring bodies, see, for example, A.r. chapman and 
B. carbonetti ‘Human rights Protections for vulnerable and disadvantaged Groups: The contributions 
of the un committee on economic, social and cultural rights’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 682-
732. l. Peroni and A. timmer, ‘vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an emergent concept in european 
Human rights convention law’ (2013), 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056-1085.
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process and considered to have a right to participate in the procedure. Accordingly, when 
public authorities fail to recognize someone who may potentially be affected by the decision, 
this person will not be included in the decision-making procedure. It has a detrimental 
effect on the right to participation in the decision-making procedure and the overall level of 
inclusionary governance. 
4. Limitations
This section discusses different ways in which the right to participation may be limited. The 
discussion that follows is broader than a stipulation of explicit limitations to the right, and 
focuses instead on different ways in which the right may be restricted by public authorities 
that can derive from (1) explicit limitations stipulated in various legal provisions, (2) 
conditions imposed on the exercise of the right, or (3) the implicit legal basis of the right 
(that is, the way the treaty monitoring bodies have read the procedural right into various 
legal provisions of certain substantive rights that impose constraints on its enforceability).
first, regarding the explicit limitations, each instrument that recognizes a right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure limits access to the right of those that are 
(potentially) affected by decisions. when someone is not considered to be affected by the 
decision, this person does not have a right to participation in said decision-making procedure. 
In other words, unlike the right to public interest information, the right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure is not a right for the general public. Beyond 
this general limitation, only the right to participation in expulsion cases contains a further 
explicit limitation ground. for instance, article 13 IccPr (the right to submit reasons in the 
case of expulsion) may be limited when there are compelling reasons of national security. 
In Karker v. France, the Human rights committee held that although Mr. karker was not 
allowed to submit reasons due to national security reasons, there was no violation in the 
given case. Article 13 IccPr permitted the limitation, and considering that Mr. karker 
had the opportunity to have his case reviewed (at two instances) with counsel representation, 
it was in conformity with the provision. 
Although the Aarhus convention, the convention on the rights of the child and Ilo 
convention no 169 contain an explicit legal basis for the right to participation, they do 
not provide for explicit limitation grounds. nevertheless, these instruments permit public 
authorities to impose certain conditions on the exercise of the right, which may have a 
restricting effect on the exercise of the right to meaningful participation in the decision- 
 
150 Hrcee, Karker v. France, §9.3; see also Hrcee, GC 15: the Position of Aliens under the Covenant (1986), 
§10.
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making procedure. This is the second way in which the right may be limited. for instance, 
authorities may impose (reasonable) time frames during which the participation has to take 
place; this restricts those affected to be able to exercise their right to participation within 
the allocated timeframe only. similarly, public authorities may reasonably limit the format in 
which the participation takes places, as long as it remains meaningful. 
other treaty monitoring bodies construed a right to participation in the decision-making 
procedures in the context of a substantive right, which has implications for the scope and the 
justiciability of the right. In these instances, treaty monitoring bodies have read a procedural 
right to participation into various substantive rights of the respective instruments. In these 
cases, the extent to which participation of those affected in the decision-making procedure 
can be considered meaningful is to be assessed taking all procedural safeguards required 
for the decision-making procedure into account. for example in its case law on article 8 
ecHr, the ectHr uses as a formula to describe the level of procedural guarantees required 
that: “the decision-making process leading to measures of interference must be fair and 
such as to afford due respect to the interests of the individual as safeguarded by Article 8.” 
The court examined all relevant procedural aspects to assess whether authorities had used 
their administrative discretion properly, including whether those affected had a right to 
meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. In other words, in these cases, 
participation is not a right that may be limited; rather it is a procedural safeguard to ensure a 
certain quality of the decision-making procedure whenever the underlying substantive right 
is limited. 
In general, regardless of the way in which the right to participation is limited, all instruments 
stipulate that a lack of (meaningful) participation in the decision-making procedure 
151 for instance, the Accc examined in ACCC/C/2007/22 (France) whether the time frame for the 
participatory processes were reasonable and provided those affected with a right to meaningful 
participation: 
 The committee notes that the announcement of the public inquiry, made on 3 August, provided 
a period of approximately six weeks for the public to inspect the documents and prepare itself for 
the public inquiry. furthermore, the public inquiry held from 19 september to 3 november 2005 
provided 45 days for public participation and for the public to submit comments, information, 
analyses or opinions relevant to the proposed activity. The committee is convinced that the provision 
of approximately six weeks for the public concerned to exercise its rights under Article 6, paragraph 
6, of the convention and approximately the same time relating to the requirements of Article 6, 
paragraph 7, in this case meet the requirements of these provisions in connection with Article 6, 
paragraph 3, of the convention. 
 ece/MP.PP/c.1/2009/4/Add.1 (february 8, 2011), §44.
152 see, e.g., ectHr, Chapman v. UK, §92, 106-116.
153 ectHr, Taskin v. Turkey, at 118.
154 In the context of the ectHr, it is referred to as the margin of appreciation. In its case law, the court 
gives indicators to assess in which instances authorities have a wide or narrow margin of appreciation. 
for instance, in the context of environmental law cases authorities have in principle a wider margin of 
appreciation. 
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is subject to review. Although, the precise content and scope of such a review procedure 
will be discussed in chapter 5, it may be noted already that there is a difference depending 
on whether the request for review is triggered by the explicit legal basis of the right to 
meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure or by the procedural right read 
into a substantive provision. In short, the grounds for review might differ as well as the scope 
of the review.
As presented in this section, the limitations to the right to participation in the decision-
making procedure are of a different nature than the limitations to the right to public interest or 
personal information as discussed in chapter 3. whereas in the context of both informational 
rights there is a well-articulated set of limitations laid down in the instruments, in the context 
of the right to participation, the constraints on the right are rather of an indirect nature. 
These differences can be further explained by the more procedural nature of the right to 
participation in the decision-making procedure in comparison to the informational rights.
5. Conclusions: The Building Block of a Right to Meaningful 
Participation in the Decision-Making Procedure 
The conceptual Model includes a duty to provide for participation in the decision-making 
procedure of international institutions to those affected and a duty for decision-making 
bodies to provide reasons for the decisions reached. This chapter showed how the right to 
meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure has developed in international 
law. The legal survey charted that there are only a few conventions that contain an explicit 
legal basis for the right to participation, all of which are only applicable in a specific context. 
The right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure developed mainly 
through the work of treaty monitoring bodies. The majority of the treaty monitoring bodies 
have read a right to participation in the decision-making procedure into substantive rights 
of the respective instruments. As a result, a general procedural right to participation in the 
decision-making procedure can be identified, and only in certain situations does an explicit 
right to participation in the decision-making procedure exist. 
Although, the right to meaningful participation in decision-making procedures has a more 
fragmented origin than the two informational rights, general benchmarks of such a right can 
be identified across the instruments, as illustrated in the building block below. 
rIGHt to MeAnInGful PArtIcIPAtIon In decIsIon-MAkInG Procedures
In the interpretation of the treaty obligations, treaty monitoring bodies focus extensively 
on the need for procedural safeguards for groups and individuals and the duty of public 
authorities to prevent arbitrary decisions. The four benchmarks of the right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure (the duty to inform, the duty to ensure 
meaningful involvement, the duty to duly consider the interests presented, and the duty 
to provide reasons) are all a way to prevent an arbitrary use of public power by public 
authorities. Moreover, in the context of the permitted constraints on and limitations to the 
right to participation in the decision-making procedure, treaty monitoring bodies emphasize 
the need to ensure a certain quality of the decision-making procedure, which similarly aims 
to prevent an arbitrary use of power.
when comparing the content and scope of the right to meaningful participation in the 
decision-making procedure with the informational rights discussed in the previous chapter, 
certain commonalities come to the forefront. Particularly in the context of the right to 
personal information, and to a lesser extent in the context of the right to public interest 
information, treaty monitoring bodies emphasize that public authorities have the obligation 
RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE
Legal basis 
Who is the duty bearer? 
Rights holder 
Scope of obligations 
Limitations 
substantive right: crc, Ilo convention no 169, Migrant workers 
convention, Aarhus convention, 1951 refugee convention
recognition of a procedural (accessory) right: IccPr, cescr, cerd, 
cedAw, ecHr, IAcHr, AcPHr, albeit recognized in various context
Public authorities: all branches of state government, all actors who 
exercise public (administrative) authority
Those affected by decisions
factors: belonging to a recognized vulnerable group and/or concerns a 
decision that is known to impact individuals 
duty to inform 
spectrum of participation modalities: a right to meaningful involvement 
➔ a right to prior informed consent (for those adversely affected by a 
decision, applicable in limited situations only)
obligation to duly take into account views expressed 
obligation to provide a reasoned decision 
conditions may be imposed on the exercise of the explicit right to 
participation as long as it does not render the right to participation in the 
decision-making procedure meaningless 
The procedural right to participation as part of substantive rights is to be 
assessed as part of the overall assessment of the procedural aspects of the 
substantive right limited by authorities
Table 5: Building block - right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure
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to ensure a certain quality of the decision-making procedure and to realize the procedural 
safeguards against arbitrary uses of power. An important factor is whether, and to what 
extent, authorities are accorded discretion in the exercise of certain public powers, and if 
so, whether the use of this discretion is sufficiently regulated to prevent an abuse thereof. 
even more than in the contexts of the informational rights, authorities enjoy discretion to 
implement the obligations to realize a meaningful participatory process. Moreover, the same 
commonalities can be identified – although to a lesser extent – in relation to the conceptual 
Model. In the exercise of their public power, international institutions have to act in 
accordance with the law, may not act in an arbitrary manner, and, in addition, decision-
making procedures have to ensure a certain quality of the procedure. As the next chapter will 
further demonstrate, whereas there are various elements that contribute to a certain quality 
of the decision-making procedure, the lack of one of those elements in a given case, can have 
a detrimental effect on the rights enjoyed by those affected. chapter 5 will further discuss 
the interlinkages between the dimensions and the way in which the informational rights and 




chapter 5: right to an eff ective remedy 
5 right to an 
eff ective remedy

rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
This chapter will outline the building blocks of the third pillar of the Inclusionary Governance 
Model: the right to an effective remedy. The point of departure for the analysis is the 
conceptual Model that recognizes a right to an adequate and effective remedy whenever 
third parties are affected by decisions of international institutions. 
The legal survey takes this right as a point of departure and develops the building blocks 
of the right to an effective remedy. This research adopts a broad approach to this right 
and examines whether, and to what extent, the legal survey is able to identify standards 
for a review procedure (section 1) and for the outcome of a review procedure in relation to 
decisions that affect individuals (section 2). The review procedure refers to the processes 
by which “arguable claims” of violations of international law are heard and decided on by 
a review body at the domestic level, which is discussed in this chapter under the right to a 
review. The outcome of the review proceedings refers to the potential relief awarded to a 
successful litigant, which the research discusses in the context of the right to reparation. In 
the conclusions of this chapter, the building blocks of the right to an effective remedy will be 
summarized and discussed as charted by the legal survey. 
1. Right to a Review
This section will examine when and in which context a right to a review is recognized in 
the international instruments and the content and scope of the right to a review. firstly, the 
different legal bases will be discussed (section 1.1), followed by a discussion of the holders 
of the right (section 1.2), the scope of the right to a review (section 1.3), and, lastly, the 
1 Although the conceptual Model also incorporates the term right in relation to an effective remedy in 
contrast to the conceptual Model’s other elements that refer to duties, the usage of this term has no 
normative implications. It is used in the IlA report and in theoretical approaches to the accountability 
problem of international institutions seemingly without the normative connotation of referring to 
a right enjoyed by individuals (and groups) and owed by international institutions. rather, it seems 
to refer to an international institution’s duty to realize an effective remedy. As similarly raised in the 
previous chapters, there is therefore a difference in the language used in the conceptual Model and in 
that used in this chapter. In Part II, the legal survey primarily charts the rights enjoyed by individuals 
(and groups) with the concomitant duties for public authorities. In contrast with the language used 
in the conceptual Model, the emphasis in the language thus switches from duties to rights. chapter 
6 will address whether this switch influences the content of the elements of the draft Inclusionary 
Governance Model, see also the Introduction to Part II, n. 5 to chapter 3, n. 1 to chapter 4, and chapter 
6.
2 The terms review, remedies, and access to justice are used interchangeably by the various treaty 
monitoring bodies. In particular, the ectHr uses the term a right to a review and a right to an effective 
remedy interchangeably. Moreover, the right to a review and the right to reparation are complementary 
to each other and often share the same legal basis in a convention’s provision. Accordingly, this chapter 
will discuss the provisions of the right to an effective remedy both in section 1 in the context of the right 
to a review and in section 2 in the context of the right to reparation. 
3 see also the approach of the ectHr and Hrcee in this regard; they too refer to arguable claims as a 
yardstick for a remedy, see below section 1.1.1. 
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limitations to a right to a review (section 1.4). The section will conclude with a schematic 
overview of the building blocks of the right to a review as recognized in international law 
(section 1.5).
1.1. The Different Legal Bases Compared 
The right to a review is widely recognized in international law. two broad categories of a 
right to a review can be identified: 
- The decision affects substantive rights enjoyed under the respective instrument, which 
triggers a right to a review (section 1.1.1)
- The dispute qualifies as a suit at law or determination of certain rights and obligations, 
(i.e., fair trial provisions), which triggers a right to a review (section 1.1.2)
This section will therefore follow a different structure than the previous two chapters and will 
discuss the legal bases per category as identified above and will not discuss the legal bases 
on the basis of the distinction between whether there is an explicit legal basis or whether the 
right developed through the work of treaty monitoring bodies. In section 1.1.3, the different 
legal bases are summarized in a schematic overview. 
1.1.1 Decision of Respective Instruments in regards to Affected Substantive Rights 
This section will discuss the category of rights to review as recognized by the various treaty 
instruments that have the widest scope: whenever substantive rights are allegedly violated 
under a respective treaty instrument, the instruments accord a right to a review to those 
affected. 
This type of review is generally construed as part of the right to an effective remedy. The right 
to a review in this context is defined as a right for individuals to have an arguable claim of a 
violation of a convention right heard by a review body at the domestic level. for instance, the 
ectHr referred to the meaning of article 13 ecHr (the right to an effective remedy) as to:
4 for the sake of simplicity, reference is made here to individuals; section 1.2. will further explain that 
others may also have a right to a review, including groups and nGos. 
5 see, e.g., ectHr, Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, §444; ectHr, Leander v. Sweden (March 
26, 1987) series A no. 116, §77(a). 
6 It should be noted that the right to an effective remedy in the respective instruments encompasses both 
the right to a review and the right to reparation. In this section, only that first component is discussed: 
the right to a review. The right to reparation will be discussed in section 2. However, as the right’s 
two components are complementary to each other, the interactions between the two rights and the 
implications thereof for the overall interpretation of the right will be addressed where necessary. The 
other rights to review discussed in this section are similarly dependent on the right to reparation for the 
effectiveness of the remedy, as this chapter will demonstrate.
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…provide a means whereby individuals can obtain relief at the national level for violation 
of their convention rights before having to set in motion the international machinery of 
complaint before the court.
This right can be found in the majority of the instruments, although the language and the 
scope may vary. The necessity of an effective remedy, judicial or otherwise, to enforce the 
guaranteed protected rights is widely recognized in international law. As described by the 
Human rights committee in General Comment 31 regarding the IccPr, states are under 
obligation to: 
ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those rights... 
administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to 
7 ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, §152; the right to an effective remedy is closely related to the admissibility 
criterion of having exhausted all domestic remedies before an applicant may submit a complaint to 
the international human rights machinery. (e.g., article 35 – 13 ecHr, article 2(3) IccPr, article 2, 
5(2)(b) of the optional Protocol to the IccPr); see also Hrcee, C.F. v. Canada Comm no 113/1981, 
§6.2; Hrcee, Guillermo Ignacio Dermit Barbato et al. v. Uruguay, (1990) at 9.4. only those remedies 
that are effective have to be exhausted in order to meet the admissibility criterion; see, for instance, the 
Salah Sheekh case (Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, comm. no. 1948/04 (January 1, 2007)), in which 
the ectHr reasoned that a somalian asylum seeker had correctly not made use of the option of appeal 
to the council of state (Raad van State) of the netherlands as, in this particular case, it was clear in 
advance what the outcome of the proceedings would be. This was clear, amongst others things, due to 
the dual role of the council of state in the netherlands: it has an advisory role to the government as 
well as constitutes the highest judicial authority in administrative proceedings. Additionally, established 
case law of the council of state dealing with similar cases of asylum seekers from the same region 
hinted at a non-favorable outcome for the applicant. see also ectHr, Akdivar v. Turkey, (August 30, 
1996) § 67. see for other examples of remedies that were not considered effective, for instance, Hrcee, 
Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, Communication No. 16/1977 (1990), 76.
8 for instance, article 8 of the universal declaration of Human rights stipulates that:
 [e]veryone has the right to effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by the law.
 article 13 ecHr; article 2(3) IccPr, article 25 AcHr; article 8 udHr; article 7 AcHPr; article 9(1),(2) 
of the Aarhus convention; article 83(a)(b) Migrant workers convention, article 6 cerd; article 2 
cedAw; article 9(1) crc (no child should be separated from his parents unless such is decided by 
competent authorities and subject to judicial review); Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right 
to a remedy and reparation for victims of Gross violations of International Human rights law and 
serious violations of International Humanitarian law, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly 
resolution 60/147 (december 16, 2005). In addition, although article 13 crPd does not provide for a 
right to an effective remedy, or other type of review procedure, it does stipulate wide ranging positive 
obligations for a state in order to ensure effective access to justice for those falling within the scope of 
the convention; in essence, it concerns the right to equality of arms, fairness of the procedure and a 
right of access to the procedure.
9 Article 2(3) IccPr; article 13 ecHr; article 25 AcHr; article 83(a)(b) Migrant workers convention; 
Hrcee, General Comment 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation imposed on state parties to 
the Covenant, (2004), §15; see further, e.g., cerd, General Comment XXVII on discrimination against 
Roma, (2000) §7; crc, General Comment 14, §98; cescr, General Comment 4: Right to adequate 
housing (1991), §14-19; cescr, General Comment 7: Right to adequate housing – forced evictions (1997), 
§ 11-13; cescr, General Comment 12: Right to adequate food (1999), §32; cescr, General Comment 
14: Right to the highest attainable standard of health (2000), §59; cescr, General Comment 15: Right to 
Water (2002), § 55.
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investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through independent 
and impartial bodies.
The requirement across all instruments is that the remedy has to be effective both in practice 
and in law, it has to be adequate, and it has to be accessible. It may be noted that the provisions 
within the IccPr, AcHr and the AcHPr do not constitute autonomous provisions; they 
may only be relied upon jointly with a substantive provision of the respective convention. 
The right to an effective remedy as recognized in article 13 ecHr does constitute an 
autonomous provision that may be relied upon without an alleged violation of another 
article. The ectHr reasoned that: 
[t]he existence of an actual breach of another provision is not a prerequisite for the application 
of (…) Article [13] (…) it guarantees the availability at the national level of a remedy to 
enforce – and hence to allege non-compliance with – the substance of the convention rights 
and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be secured.
Besides the right to an effective remedy of a general nature, various instruments also stipulate 
a right to an effective remedy for a particular situation. In other words, whereas the general 
provisions regarding the right to an effective remedy are applicable to all situations of alleged 
violations of rights within the scope of the respective instrument, the right to an effective 
remedy of a specific nature implies that in specific situations the instruments recognize a 
right to a review. The different contexts in which a right to a review exists when substantive 
rights are affected will be discussed below. 
10 Hrcee, General Comment 31 (2004) §15, 19, 20. 
11 ectHr, Ilhan v. Turkey, comm. no. 22277/93 (June 27, 2000) §97; ectHr, Gladkiy v. Russia, (Application 
no. 3242/03), (december 21, 2010), §119; ectHr, Samayev and others v. Georgia and Russia app. no. 
36378/02 (April 12, 2005), §447. In Shamayev v. Georgia and Russia, the ectHr stated that this implies 
that, for instance, the exercise of a remedy may not be unjustifiably hindered by acts or omission of state 
authorities.
12 see, for instance, the Hrcee that confirmed in R.E. v. Russian Federation communication that:
 [t]he committee recalls its jurisprudence, which indicates that the provisions of article 2 of the 
covenant lay down general obligations for states parties and cannot give rise, when invoked separately, 
to a claim in a communication under the optional Protocol... The committee thus considers that 
the author’s claims under article 2 of the covenant are inadmissible under article 3 of the optional 
Protocol. 
 Hrcee, R.E. v. Russian Federation communication No. 2249/2013 (August 14, 2018) at 11.4; see also 
Hrcee, Kuvvatali Mudorov v. Tajikistan communication 2826/2016 (october 25, 2018), in which the 
complaint of an alleged violation of article 14(1) in conjunction with 2(3) IccPr was considered 
admissible. for the IAcHr, see, e.g., IActHr, Constitutional Court v. Peru, §68-71. 
13 ectHr, Klass and others, §63.
14 ectHr Samayev and others v. Georgia and Russia app. no. 36378/02 (April 12, 2005), § 444.
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There is a right to a review for those whose right to information has been fully/partially 
denied. first, the instruments that stipulate a right to public interest information (as 
discussed in chapter 3), similarly recognize a right to a review for those whose request to 
public interest information has been (partially) denied. for instance, article 9(1) of the 
Aarhus convention and article 6 of the African charter on values and Principles of Public 
service and Administration, contain a right to a review for those whose request to access 
public interest information has been (partially) denied by public authorities. whereas the 
African charter on values and Principles of Public service and Administration does not 
provide further definition of the content and scope of this review procedure, the Aarhus 
convention and its Aarhus convention compliance committee do offer further details on 
the content and scope of article 9(1). Article 9(1) describes that such a procedure has to take 
place before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law. 
The content and scope of this right is comparable to that of the provisions of the general 
right to an effective remedy as described above. In the context of the other instruments, the 
criteria for the review procedure for recognizing a right to a review whenever the access to 
public interest information has been (partially) denied are less defined. second, there is a 
right to a review for those whose request to access, rectify or remove personal information 
has been denied, for those whose personal information has been shared with third parties 
without their consent, and for those who wish to challenge the collection and storage of their 
personal information by authorities. 
furthermore, there is a right to a review for those whose right to meaningful participation 
in the decision-making procedure has been limited, as discussed in chapter 4. The grounds 
15 Article 8 coe convention on Access to official documents (June 19, 2009) cets 205 has not yet entered 
into force; see also the individual participation right as stipulated in the oecd recommendation of the 
council concerning Guidelines governing the protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal 
data (2013) c(80)58/fInAl, as amended on July 11, 2013 by c(2013)79, Annex section 13(c); for 
example, some national systems have an obligatory internal review procedure proceeding or a court of 
appeal and/or independent complaint procedure in place for reviewing complaints related to the right 
to information. explanatory report to coe convention on Access to official documents (June 19, 
2009) cets 205, has not yet entered into force, §66. see further chapter 3, section 1. IActHr, Claude 
Reyes v. Chile, §86.
16 Article 6 of the African charter on values and Principles of Public service and Administration. It 
should be noted that the charter only recently entered into force (July 23, 2016); so far 17 states have 
ratified the charter and 37 have signed it, see also https://au.int/en/treaties/african-charter-values-and-
principles-public-service-and-administration. to the author’s knowledge, neither the commission nor 
the court has given so far a (further) interpretation of the obligations ensuing from this Article.
17 see above, n. 15.
18 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §86.
19 see, e.g., Hrcee, GC 16, §10; Hrcee, GC 34, §18; ectHr, Gaskin v. UK (1989), §49; ectHr, M.G v. 
United Kingdom, judgment, (september 24, 2002) application no. 39393/98, §30: “Procedure to appeal 
denials of information must be in place in order to be ‘in accordance with the law’” Article 8(a-d) coe 
data Protection convention; Principle 13 of the oecd Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
transborder flows of Personal data.
20 The most explicit basis can be found in Article 9(2) Aarhus convention. treaty monitoring bodies have 
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for review on which someone can rely, and accordingly, what the scope of the review has to 
be, depend on the instrument, and on the legal basis. The most explicit legal basis can be 
found in article 9(2) of the Aarhus convention, which stipulates a right for those affected by 
decisions to access a review procedure to challenge the substantive and/or procedural legality 
of the decision adopted. similarly, as required under article 9(1) of the Aarhus convention 
(right to information), the review procedure required by article 9(2) has to involve a court 
of law or another independent and impartial body established by law; however, a two-tier 
procedure is permitted. This implies that a decision has to be challenged first by a higher 
authority within the same administrative decision-making body that had adopted the 
decision before a review may be requested by an independent and impartial review body. 
At the international level, similarly a right to a review is recognized in those instances in 
which a right to meaningful participation is identified. The Hrcee recognizes the right to a 
review for those affected by forced evictions. The cescr recognized a right to a review for 
those affected by forced evictions, by decisions affecting the right to water, by decisions 
related to social security, and by actions related to the right to take part in cultural life. The 
crc recognizes a right to a review whenever a decision is made that is not in the best interest 
of the child, and/or lacks a proper procedure to come to such a decision. 
similarly, at the regional level, treaty monitoring bodies have recognized a right to a review 
when certain substantive rights were affected. The African court on Human and People’s 
recognized this right to a review in the context of those decisions affecting individuals. for example, the 
cerd has recognized a right to a review for indigenous peoples affected by decisions that have a right 
to participate in the decision-making procedure (e.g., cerd, CO on Suriname (2004), §193). Another 
example is the Suominen v. Finland case in which the ectHr reminded authorities of their obligation to 
provide reasons for a decision reached (in the context of participatory procedural guarantees) ectHr, 
Suominen v. Finland (July 1, 2003), §37.
21 see chapter 4 section1.2.
22 see, e.g., Accc, ACCC/C/2011/57 (Denmark); ece/MP.PP/c.1/2012/7 (July 16, 2012), §44.
23 Administrative review and the two-tier review procedure will be further discussed in section 1.3.2 
below as to their content and the implications for the requirements of a right to a review.
24 Hrcee, CO on Kenya, A/60/40 (2005) 44 86(22).
25 cescr, General Comment 7: the Right to Adequate Housing (Forced Evictions) (1997), §15 (g)(h): legal 
remedies have to be provided to those affected by forced evictions, and legal aid has to be provided to 
those who need it in order to seek redress in court. 
26 cescr, General Comment 15: The Right to Water (2003) §56(d) (e): legal recourse and remedies for 
those affected and legal assistance in obtaining legal remedies. 
27 cescr, General Comment 19: Right to Social Security (2008), §42(f): retrogressive measures are subject 
to independent review at the national level, §78(d): legal recourse and remedies for those affected and 
legal assistance. 
28 cescr, General Comment 21: The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life (2009), §54: states have an 
obligation to develop and create legislation and mechanisms required to allow individuals or groups 
to demand protection of their rights, and claim and receive compensation whenever these rights have 
been violated. 
29 crc, General Comment 14 (2013), §98. 
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rights recognizes a right to a review for communities whenever development decisions are 
adopted that affect their communities. furthermore, the American court of Human rights 
has read the procedural guarantees laid down in articles 8 and 25 of the AcHr into other 
substantive rights of the convention including the right to a review, particularly in the context 
of environmental decision-making. The ectHr has recognized a right to a review whenever 
decisions adopted by public authorities affect the right to life (article 2 ecHr), whenever 
extradition would (allegedly) violate the prohibition of refoulement (article 3 ecHr) and 
whenever decisions affect the right to property (article 1 Protocol 1 to the ecHr). In the 
context of article 8 ecHr, the ectHr has recognized a right to a review concerning cases 
on the right to family life, deprivation of legal capacity, data registration, registration of 
ethnic identity, issues of planning and environment, and access to abortion. for instance 
in regard to deportation decisions, article 13 ecHr in conjunction with article 8 ecHr 
requires:
…that states must make available to the individual concerned the effective possibility of 
challenging the deportation or refusal-of-residence order and of having the relevant issues 
examined with sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic 
forum offering adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality.
30 AfcommHPr, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v. Nigeria (2001) AHrlr 60 
(AcHPr 2001), communication 155/96, §52; AfcommHPr, Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya case 
276 /2003 (2009) §291.
31 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §86.
32 ectHr, Jabari v. Turkey §39; it requires independent scrutiny of the claim to assess whether substantial 
grounds exist for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to article 3. said scrutiny has to be carried out 
without regard to what the person concerned may have done to warrant expulsion or to any perceived 
threat to the expelling state’s national security. (ectHr, Chahal v. United Kingdom (november 11, 1996) 
§151. 
33 ectHr, AGOSI v. UK, §55.
34 see similarly the committee on the rights of the child, General Comment 4 (2003) §4, 8, 13, 18, 28, 38. 
see similarly with regard to HIv/AIds and the rights of the child, CRC, General Comment 3, (March 
17, 2003), §10.
35 e.g., ectHr, Drobnjak v. Serbia, app. 36500/05 (2010) §143-144; ectHr, shtukaturov. v. Russia, app. no. 
44009/05, (March 27, 2008).
36 see, e.g., ectHr, Turek v. Slovakia, app. 57986/00 (2006) §111.
37 e.g., ectHr, Ciubotaru v. Moldova, app. no. 27138/04 (2010) §51.
38 e.g., ectHr, Taşkin v. Turkey (app. no. 46117/99 (2005), §119; see also ectHr, Hatton v. United 
Kingdom, app. no. 36022/97 (2003) §99, 128-129; ectHr, Buckley v. United Kingdom, app. no. 
20348/92 (1996); ectHr, Giacomelli v. Italy, app. no. 59909/00 (2007) §82-83; see also p. 316-322, of 
o. de schutter, International Human Rights Law (cambridge: cambridge university Press, 2010). J. 
ebbesson, ‘transparency in environmental Matters’ in A. Bianchi and A. Peters (eds.) Transparency in 
International Law (ouP 2013), at 65.
39 ectHr, R.R. v. Poland, app. no. 27617/04 (2011) §191.
40 ectHr, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria; this judgment shows that although expulsion or deportation cases are 
excluded from the scope of applicability of article 6, similar procedural guarantees are still required 
albeit less stringent via article 8 in conjunction with article 13.
  5
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
furthermore, various treaty regimes -- whether explicitly or through authoritative 
interpretation by treaty monitoring bodies -- have recognized a right to a review for 
a particular subset of situations. The right to a review has been recognized for those 
(particularly) affected by decisions (i.e., those who are considered to be vulnerable) due to 
contextual factors related to the individual or group that renders them vulnerable. 
The Hrcee recognizes a right to a review for minorities and indigenous people allegedly 
negatively affected by decisions. The crc recognizes a right to a review whenever a decision 
was allegedly not taken in the best interest of the child, and/or lacked a proper procedure 
to come to such a decision. The cerd, for example, recommends that state parties adopt 
measures to ensure effective remedies for members of the roma communities allegedly 
affected by decisions. In all these instances, the right to an effective remedy was interpreted 
to encompass the right to a review and the right to reparation. The content and scope of the 
latter will be discussed in section 2. 
A similar pattern can be identified at a regional level. The Inter-American court of Human 
rights has recognized a right to a review for minorities and indigenous people affected by 
decisions. The African court on Human and Peoples’ rights recognizes an obligation for 
authorities to provide individuals with a right to a review of development decisions that 
allegedly affect their communities. 
lastly, several treaties stipulate a (limited) right to a review for those subjected to expulsion. 
The IccPr, the 1951 refugee convention, Migrant workers convention, and the 
41 In chapter 4, section 2, the basis of the concept of vulnerability is explained. chapter 6 will reflect 
further on this concept and its relevance for the Inclusionary Governance Model.
42 Hrcee, General Comment 23: article 27 (Rights of Minorities), (1994) §7; Hrcee, Lansman et al v. 
Finland, communication 511/1992 (1994), §9.5-9.6; Hrcee, Apirana Mahuika et al v. New Zealand 
communication no 543/1993 (2000), §9.5; Hrcee, Angela Poma Poma v. Peru, §7.6.
43 crc, General Comment 14 (2013), §98. 
44 cerd, General Comment 27, §7; CO on Iceland (2005) §270.
45 IActHr, Saramaka v. Suriname (november 28, 2007).
46 AfcommHPr, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) v. Nigeria (2001) AHrlr 60 
(AcHPr 2001). communication 155/96, §52 concludes by stating that government compliance in the 
spirit of Article 16 and Article 24 of the African charter also has to include “(…) providing meaningful 
opportunities for individuals to be heard and to participate in the development decisions affecting their 
communities.” see, e.g., AfcommHPr, Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya case 276 /2003 (2009) §291.
47 Article 13 IccPr; Hrcee, General Comment 15 (1986): The Position of Aliens under the covenant, §9-
11; Hrcee, Hammel v. Madagascar (155/1983) (April 3, 1987), §19.1-19.3. In this particular case, there 
were no compelling reasons of national security to deny the applicant the right to submit reasons to his 
expulsion nor to justify the inability to have his expulsion reviewed by a competent authority within 
reasonable time (§20). Hrcee, Karker v. France, §9.3; Hrcee, Garcia v. Ecuador, §2.4, 5.2, 6.1; Hrcee, 
Ronald Everett v. Spain, §6.11; Hrcee, Giry v. Dominican Republic, §5.5. Hrcee, Alzery v. Sweden, 
§11.10-11.11; Hrcee, Maroufidou v. Sweden (1981) §8, 9.2-9.3, 10.1 10.2, 11. 
48 Article 32 1951 refugee convention.
49 Article 22(4) Migrant workers convention. 
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ecHr recognize a right for those facing expulsion to have one’s expulsion decision 
reviewed, which, at a minimum, implies a right to submit evidence against one’s expulsion. 
However, the procedural guarantees recognized for this type of review are more limited than 
the procedural guarantees granted in the context of the right to an effective remedy or the 
right to a fair trial (which will be discussed in section 1.1.2). The right to submit evidence 
against an upcoming expulsion to a competent authority may be limited for national 
security reasons.
This section outlined that whenever substantive rights are allegedly violated under a respective 
treaty instrument, there is a right to a review in international law for those affected. 
1.1.2.  Right to Fair Trial 
The right to fair trial recognizes a right to a review with extensive procedural guarantees for 
certain types of review proceedings. The various instruments define for which type of review 
proceedings authorities have to provide the extensive procedural guarantees of a right to 
fair trial. The IccPr and the Migrant workers convention accord extensive procedural 
50 Article 1 Additional Protocol 7 to the ecHr; explanatory report to Protocol no. 7 to the convention 
for the Protection of Human rights and fundamental freedoms (ets no. 117), §12. ectHr, Al-Nashif 
v. Bulgaria (2002), §123-128.
51 It should be noted that the treaty monitoring bodies of various instruments have also recognized a right 
to a review for those subjected to expulsion. see, e.g., cerd, General Recommendation XXX (2004), at 
preamble and §25-28. 
52 see also cerd, Concluding observations on Iceland, A/60/18 (2005) 51 at §270: 
 The committee notes with concern that applicants whose asylum applications have been rejected 
or who are being expelled by the directorate of Immigration can only appeal that decision to the 
Minister of Justice as the supervisory authority, whose decision is subject only to a limited court 
review on procedure rather than substance (art. 6). The committee recommends that the state party 
consider introducing a full review by an independent judicial body of decisions of the directorate 
of Immigration and/or the Minister of Justice concerning the rejection of asylum applications or 
expulsion of asylum seekers.
53 Article 13 IccPr; IccPr General Comment 15 (1986), 117; Hrcee, Giry v. Dominican Republic 
(193/1985) at §5.5; Hrcee, García v. Ecuador (319/1988), (november 5, 1991), §2.4, 5.2, 6.1. ectHr, 
Vikulov. and others v. Latvia, decision 16870/03 (March 25, 2004); ectHr, Lupsa v. Romania, 10337/04 
(June 8, 2006), §60: “Individual must be genuinely able to have his case examined in the light of the 
reasons militating against his deportation.”
54 The right to fair trial entails that individuals should have a right of access to a court (or tribunal), 
that there should be a fair hearing and that the review should be exercised by an independent and 
impartial tribunal or court, to name but a few. It should be noted, though, that the African charter is 
less articulate about what fair trial guarantees individuals enjoy. The right to fair trial is laid down in 
article 14 IccPr, article 18 Migrant workers convention, article 7 of the African charter on Human 
and Peoples’ rights, article 8 AcHr, and article 6 ecHr.
55 This section only addresses the right to review decisions of a more administrative nature or civil nature, 
excluding review procedures concerning criminal matters, for which an extensive right to fair trial has 
been recognized.
56 Article 14 IccPr.
57 In Article 18(1), the Migrant workers convention recognizes a right to a fair public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law in the context of a determination 
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guarantees to review procedures that qualify as suits at law, the ecHr to determinations of 
civil rights and obligations, the AcHr to determinations of the rights and obligations of an 
individual whether it is of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature, and the AfcHPr recognizes 
a broader right for every individual to have his cause heard. each treaty monitoring body has 
interpreted the scope of applicability further in its case law. The differences and similarities 
in the scope of applicability between these treaty provisions stipulating a right to fair trial are 
summarized below. 
Article 6 of the european convention on Human rights (ecHr) stipulates a right to a fair 
public hearing within a reasonable timeframe by an independent and impartial court or 
tribunal established by law, and a right of access to a court for determinations of civil rights 
and obligations. Article 6(1) ecHr is the fair trial provision that generated the most case 
law. The court has stipulated three threshold criteria for the applicability of article 6 ecHr 
in a given case: (1) the existence of a dispute, (2) the dispute has to relate to rights/obligations 
that have some basis in domestic law, and lastly, (3) the rights/obligations have to be of a 
civil nature. In general, the threshold for qualifying as a dispute is not considered to be high. 
of rights and obligation in a suit at law. However, considering the individual complaint mechanism of 
the Migrant workers convention has not yet entered into force and the limited amount of concluding 
observations and General Comments, time will tell how this article will be further interpreted. 
58 It should be noted that article 7 AcHPr falls both within the scope of a general right to a review (right 
to an effective remedy) as discussed in the previous section and of the right to fair trial as discussed in 
this section. due to the phrasing used, it can fall under both categories of review. The legal basis will be 
discussed further in this section.
59 for the sake of comparability, this research refers to the general term case law when discussing the 
treaty monitoring bodies’ output as part of their mandate to interpret the provisions of each respective 
instrument and when monitoring the compliance of states with their obligations under said instruments. 
It therefore includes general comments by un treaty bodies, concluding observations on state 
compliance, and views of treaty monitoring bodies regarding alleged violations of treaty obligations 
originating from submitted individual petitions. All these different outputs are authoritative; however, 
most of these documents are not binding on a state. only the ectHr’s judgments and the IActHr’s 
judgments are officially – and explicitly – binding, the others are, at minimum, (very) authoritative in 
the interpretation of the treaty obligations of member states. 
60 The concept of determination of civil rights and obligations has an autonomous meaning under the 
convention. The domestic classification of a proceeding is considered irrelevant; ectHr, Konig v. 
Germany (1978), §88; see also Jacobs, white and ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (5th 
edition, ouP 2010), 247-253, see the similarity in reasoning by the Hrcee in General Comment 32, 
§16. 
61 via the database of the european court of Human rights (Hudoc system), more than 17,000 results 
appear when searching for judgments addressing article 6(1) in english or french, http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int. 
62 ectHr, Roche v. UK, §116-12.
63 In short, a dispute can both concern questions of facts and of law (ectHr Le Compte, van Leuven 
and de Meyere v. Belgium, (1981), §45-51). It may relate to the existence of a right, its scope or the 
exercise thereof. The trigger is whether the outcome of the proceedings is decisive for private rights 
or obligations (see, e.g., ectHr, Balmer-Schafroth and Others v. Switzerland, (August 26, 1997), §40 
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-Iv; ectHr, Sdružení Jihočeské Matky v. the Czech Republic 
(december)). In addition, a dispute should be of genuine and serious nature (see, e.g., ectHr, Sporrong 
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More complicated is the question of which types of disputes are covered by article 6. Although 
the provision speaks of civil rights and obligations, the court has included procedures of an 
administrative nature to be covered by article 6 ecHr. for instance, disputes concerning 
social matters, and disputes concerning public servants fall within the scope of article 6 
ecHr. However, extradition or deportation procedures, and minor disciplinary measures 
that are not punitive in nature, are explicitly excluded from the applicability of Article 6(1). 
whenever an administrative measure is considered to be punitive, it will be considered 
a criminal charge and accordingly, the ectHr will apply the higher review standard of 
criminal charges of Article 6(2) ecHr. to determine whether an administrative measure 
should be deemed to be punitive, the court does not only look at the label of the decision but 
takes into account the nature of the decision adopted and the impact thereof. It should be 
noted that whenever a review procedure does not meet the threshold criteria of article 6(1) 
ecHr, it most likely does meet the threshold criteria of one of the other rights to review 
v. Sweden (1982), §81). see also, e.g., Jacobs, white and ovey, The European Convention on Human 
Rights (5th edition, ouP 2010), at 253-254.
64 ectHr, Werner v. Austria §38. 
65 ectHr, Feldbrugge v. the Netherlands, §27-29 and Salesi v. Italy, (1993) §19.
66 It should be noted however that these proceedings are covered by art. 1 prot. 7 ecHr (and similarly 
covered by article 13 IccPr); further, article 3 and 13 ecHr offer procedural guarantees in asylum 
procedures. see, e.g., ectHr Maaouia v. France (2000) §38-39; ectHr, Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands 
(2007) 1948/04, §136-141. 
67 ectHr reasoned that preventative or deterrent objectives “may be seen as constituent elements in the 
very notion of punishment” Welch v. United Kingdom (1995) 20 eHrr 247, §30. 
68 The ectHr has adopted an autonomous meaning of criminal charge (ectHr, Adolf v. Austria (March 
26, 1982) app. no. 8269/78 §30) and has recognized three criteria in the classification (ectHr, Engel and 
others v. the Netherlands, (June 8, 1976) app. no. 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/73, §82 – 
83): (1) domestic classification (point of departure); (2) nature of the offence – that is, does it, in general, 
apply to anyone or specific group of individuals (key criterion), (ectHr, Jussila v. Finland [Gc], no. 
73053/01, ecHr 2006-XIv, §38); and (3) severity of the charge/sanction. It should be noted that in 
general at least two out of three steps should be met. If one of them is not satisfied, the offence can still 
be considered to have a criminal character. ectHr, Öztürk v. Germany (Application no. 8544/79). The 
Hrcee has adopted a similar approach reasoning in General Comment 32 (§15) that:
 criminal charges relate in principle to acts declared to be punishable under domestic criminal law. 
The notion may also extend to acts that are criminal in nature with sanctions that, regardless of their 
qualification in domestic law, must be regarded as penal because of their purpose, character or severity.
 see also Hrcee, Perterer v. Austria communication no. 1015/2001, §9.2; The reasoning that a label should 
not be leading and that one needs to look at other factors too has also been applied in different contexts 
by different bodies when qualifying or classifying decisions/actions. for instance, when interpreting the 
notion of ‘suit at law’ in art. 14 IccPr, the Hrcee explained in its General Comment that:
 concepts of a suit at law…. [are] based on the nature of the right in question rather on the status of 
one of the parties, or else on the particular forum in which individual legal system may provide that 
the right in question is to be adjudicated upon, especially in common law systems where there is no 
inherent difference between public law and private law
 In the context of the Aarhus convention, the Aarhus convention compliance committee does consider 
the label given to a decision in domestic law to determine whether an activity should be regarded as an 
article 6 or 7 type decision, but states that one should determine this on a “contextual basis, taking into 
account the legal effects of each decision” ACCC/C/2008/26 (Austria), (february 8, 2011) §50; Accc, 
ACCC/C/2005/11 (Belgium) ece/MP.PP/c.1/2006/4/Add.2, §29. 
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as recognized by the ecHr and/or as interpreted by the ectHr. The legal basis for the 
right to a review influences the scope of a right to a review, and accordingly, the scope of the 
required guarantees, as the following sections will demonstrate. 
Article 14(1) IccPr recognizes a right to access a court or a tribunal for suits at law, a right to a 
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial court or tribunal established 
by law and a right to equality before the courts and tribunals. The Hrcee interprets the 
term suit at law broadly and stipulates two criteria to determine whether a given procedure 
qualifies as a suit at law: (1) “the nature of the right in question” and (2) “the particular forum 
provided by domestic legal systems for the determination of particular rights.” The Hrcee 
considers “judicial procedures aimed at determining rights and obligations,” and “equivalent 
notions in the area of administrative law” such as disciplinary dismissals imposed by a judicial 
body, dismissals from employment, pension rights of soldiers, the determination of social 
security benefits, or the taking of private property to be a suit at law. The committee thus 
explicitly includes certain administrative procedures in the scope of applicability. However, 
some other administrative procedures do not constitute suits at law under article 14 IccPr, 
like procedures related to the appointment of judges, and dismissals from public office. Based 
on the current case law of the committee, all other review procedures of an administrative 
nature seem to fall within the scope of applicability of article 14 IccPr. The Migrant workers 
convention similarly recognizes a right to fair trial for suits at law: article 18 stipulates a right 
to a fair public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law for determinations of rights and obligation in a suit at law. However, considering that the 
individual complaint mechanism of the Migrant workers convention has not entered into 
force, and in the limited amount of Concluding Observations and General Comments currently 
published, there is no further guidance on how to interpret this provision. 
69 for example, extradition or deportation procedures are covered by art. 1 Prot. 7 ecHr; further, articles 
3 and 13 ecHr offer procedural guarantees in asylum procedures. see, e.g., ectHr Maaouia v. France 
(2000) §38-39; ectHr, Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands (2007) 1948/04, §136-141. 
70 Hrcee, GC 32, §9. 
71 similarly, as discussed in the context of the ecHr, the classification of the proceedings at a domestic 
level is considered irrelevant for the Hrcee’s assessment. Hrcee, GC 32, §16.
72 Hrcee, Perterer v. Austria, Comm. no. 1015/2001, (2004), §9.2.
73 Hrcee, Casanovas v. France Comm. no. 441/90, (1990).
74 Hrcee, General Comment 32 (2007), under III; see also Hrcee, Y.L. v. Canada, Comm. no. 112/1981, 
§9.2; Hrcee, Perterer v. Austria, Comm. no. 1015/2001, (2004), § 9.2; Hrcee, Casanovas v. France, 
Comm. no. 441/90 (1990), §5.2. 
75 Hrcee Garcia Pons v. Spain, Comm. no. 454/91. 
76 Hrcee, General comment 32 (2007), under III.
77 Hrcee, Kazantis v. Cyprus at §2.1-2.6, 3.1 and 6.3-6.5; for a further discussion of the legal basis for the 
right to fair trial and its applicability to administrative procedures, see, for example, J. Joseph, J. schultz, 
M. castan, The International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights (oxford university Press 2004), 
388-426; M. nowak, CCPR Commentary (nP engel 2005).
78 for more details, see https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cmw/pages/cmwindex.aspx.
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The right to fair trial laid down in the American convention on Human rights seems to 
have a broader scope than the previously discussed fair trial provisions. Article 8 AcHr 
guarantees a right to fair trial for determinations of rights and obligations of an individual, 
whether it is of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature. The court has repeatedly affirmed 
the applicability of article 8 AcHr to administrative procedures. further, article 8 AcHr 
is not limited to judicial remedies; the requirements also apply to the procedural stages 
to enable “all persons (…) to defend their rights adequately vis-à-vis any state action that 
could affect them.” However, when it does not concern judicial proceedings, the procedural 
guarantees are of a different nature, with the main requirement being that the procedure 
may not be arbitrary. This implies that, at a minimum, the decision has to be well-reasoned 
and parties have to have the opportunity to participate in the proceedings. Hence, a wide 
range of review proceedings are covered by the procedural safeguards of Article 8 AcHr, 
albeit the scope of guarantees differs depending on the type of proceedings. 
The African charter on Human and Peoples’ rights recognizes a right to fair trial for those 
whose rights are allegedly violated. Although the procedural guarantees are less explicitly 
articulated in the charter, the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights has laid 
down detailed principles of the right to fair trial in various resolutions: a right to a review 
79 see, for instance, IActHr, Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua at §77:
 Article 8 of the American convention … establishes the main lines of what is known as “due process 
of law” or “the right to legal defense,” which consist of the right of every person to a hearing, with 
due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, 
previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made against 
him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other measure; 
Article XvII American declaration of the rights and duties of Man: every person may resort to the 
courts to ensure respect for his legal rights. There should likewise be available to him a simple, brief 
procedure whereby the courts will protect him from acts of authority that, to his prejudice, violate any 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
 see also IActHr, Constitutional Court v. Peru (January 31, 2001), Merits, reparation, and costs, §68-71. 
80 for instance, in Baena Ricardo et al v. Panama the court stated: 
 The right to obtain all the guarantees through which it may be possible to arrive at fair decisions is 
a human right, and the administration is not exempt from its duty to comply with it. The minimum 
guarantees must be observed in the administrative process and in any other procedure whose decisions 
may affect the rights of persons. (emphasis added). 
 IActHr, Baena Ricardo et al. Case (february 2, 2001), series c no. 72, §127-129; the same quote can 
also be found in Advisory opinion oc-18/03, cit., §125; the Inter-American court cites the following 
precedents in the european system of human rights: “cf., inter alia, ectHr, Campbell and Fell, (June 28, 
1984, series A no. 80, §68; ectHr, Deweer, (1980), series A no. 35, §49; and ectHr, Engel and others, 
(1976), series A no. 22, §82.” 
81 IActHr, Baena Ricardo et al. case, Judgment (february 2, 2001) series c no. 72, §124-125. 
82 see, e.g., IActHr, Claude Reyes v. Chile, §119-144, in which the scope of article 8 (in conjunction with 
article 25 AcHr) was discussed for administrative proceedings. Below in paragraph 1.3, the difference 
in scope of guarantees will be further discussed.
83 see, for instance, IActHr, Constitutional Court v. Peru, §68-71. 
84 see, e.g., the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, resolution on the right to recourse 
and fair trial (1992); the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, resolution on the right 
to fair trial and legal Aid in Africa (1999) the African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, 
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includes the right to a fair and public hearing by a legally constituted competent, independent 
and impartial judicial body, the right to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority, 
and the right to legal aid. The African commission has held that the fair hearing guarantees 
of article 7 AcHPr apply to all rights recognized under the charter. Accordingly, all review 
procedures fall within the ambit of Article 7. Although the precise guarantees may vary per 
procedure, at a minimum, the criterion of non-arbitrariness applies to all review proceedings, 
whether they are of an administrative nature or otherwise. 
Hence, in the context of the right to fair trial, there are two different approaches. The ecHr, 
the IccPr and the Migrant workers convention clearly define which review procedures are 
included within the ambit of the right to fair trial and which are excluded from the scope 
of applicability. As a result, said scope in these conventions is rather limited. The right to 
fair trial operates as one of the rights to review as recognized in the respective conventions, 
where the other provisions provide for a right to a review in other contexts, which were 
discussed in the previous section. The rights to fair trial as laid down in the American 
convention on Human rights and African charter on Human and Peoples’ rights have a 
wider scope of applicability and the respective treaty monitoring bodies interpret the right 
to fair trial to be applicable to all types of review procedures within the scope of the treaties. 
Thus, the American convention on Human rights and the African charter on Human and 
Peoples’ rights recognize a general right to a review and reason that the level of procedural 
guarantees that authorities have to ensure varies depending on the context. 
1.1.3. Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a firm legal basis for the right to a review in both explicit legal 
provisions and through the works of treaty monitoring bodies. However, as illustrated in 
this section, the right is in essence more varied than the informational rights and the right 
to meaningful participation as discussed in the previous chapters. to summarize, a right to a 
review exists in the following instances:
Principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal Assistance in Africa (2003), doc/os 
(xxx) 247.
85 Principle 1 of the 2003 Principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal Assistance in 
Africa. 
86 Article 7(1)(a) of the AfPHr.
87 Principle H(a)-(k) of the 2003 Principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal Assistance 
in Africa.
88 African commission on Human and Peoples rights, Civil Liberties Organization and others v. Nigeria, 
(2001), §12.
89 The importance of the criterion of non-arbitrariness will be further discussed in chapter 6; it is considered 
to be one of the minimum norms across the decision-making procedures and review proceedings.




qualifies as a suit 
at law or as a 
determination of 









triggers a right to 
a review
Legal basis
Art. 14 IccPr, art. 18 Migrants 
workers convention 
Art. 6 ecHr (determination of 
civil rights and obligations), art. 8 
AcHr (determination of rights and 
obligations, whether civil, labor, fiscal 
or of other nature)
Art. 7 AfcHPr
Art. 13 ecHr, art. 2(3) IccPr, art. 25 
AcHr, art. 7 AfcHPr, art. 8 udHr
Art. 6 of the African charter on 
values and Principles of Public 
service and Administration; art. 9(1) 
Aarhus convention; IActHr (Claude 
Reyes v. Chile); ectHr (Gaskin v. uk)
Art. 32 1951 refugee convention; art. 
22(4) Migrant workers convention; 
art. 1 Add. Prot. 7 to the ecHr; 
Hrcee (GC 16)
Art. 9(1) crc (decision is not taken 
in best interest of the child; proper 
procedure is not followed); art. 2 
(right to life) ecHr; art. 3 (non-
refoulement ecHr; art. 8. (right to 
family life) ecHr; art. 1 Prot. 1 to the 
ecHr (right to property); cescr, 
right to water (GC 15), social security 
(GC 19), right to take part in cultural 
life (GC 21), IActHr (environmental 
decision-making), art. 8, 25 AcHr; 
AfcHPr (development decision-
making, SERAC v. Nigeria); art. 
9(2) Aarhus convention (challenge 
procedural and substantive legality of 
decision); Hrcee (forced eviction); 
cescr (GC 7) (forced evictions)
Art. 83 (a)(b) Migrant workers 
convention; art. 6 cerd; art. 
2 cedAw; IActHr (Saramaka 
v. Suriname); Hrcee (GC 23) 
minorities and indigenous peoples); 
cerd (roma); art. 9(1) crc
Trigger for review 
“suits at law”
“determination of certain rights 
and obligations”
“whenever rights have allegedly 
been violated”
“Arguable claim of a violation of a 
convention right, heard by a review 




Particular substantive rights 
women, migrant workers, roma, 
minorities, indigenous peoples, 
children 
Table 6: Summary of legal bases of the right to a review
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Although the different (types of review) procedures recognized may have a different scope 
of procedural guarantees, they demonstrate the broad legal basis for the right to a review. 
regarding the difference in scope of the recognized procedural guarantees, this is expected 
to be dependent on the various rights to review recognized within a given instrument and on 
the various categories of rights to review across the instruments. to illustrate, the AfcHPr 
and the AcHr apply the guarantees of the right to fair trial and the right to an effective 
remedy to all substantive provisions and identify a graduation in the extent of guarantees 
recognized depending on the context, while the Hrcee and the ecHr distinguish between 
different rights to review with distinctive legal bases per right to a review within the relevant 
convention. to give an example, the ectHr addressed the interrelation and differences 
between the various rights to review recognized in the context of the ecHr. to illustrate 
this point, article 13 grants individuals a right to an effective remedy before a national 
authority for an alleged violation of a criterion stipulated in, for instance, article 3 ecHr, 
article 8 ecHr and article 6(1) ecHr. further, the ectHr determined that whenever the 
procedural safeguards of article 6 (right to fair trial) apply in a given case, which are “stricter 
than, and absorb, those of article 13,” article 6 ecHr has to be seen as the lex specialis and 
article 13 (right to an effective remedy) as the lex generalis. 
Although the particulars may differ per treaty monitoring body and per instrument, the 
rationale and effect is rather similar. As the next section will show, there is a minimum set 
of procedural guarantees identified across the instruments for all review procedures, and in 
addition, certain types of review procedures require a higher set of procedural guarantees. 
1.2. The Scope of the Right to a Review 
The legal survey leads to three main elements of the right to a review, which will be further 
discussed in this section:
90 see similarly ectHr, McMichael v. United Kingdom, no. 16424/90 (1995), in which the court explained 
in §91 that the examination of the same set of facts may be warranted under both articles due to the 
different purposes of the procedural safeguards as laid down in article 6(1) and 8 ecHr. Thus, the 
articles both cover review procedures, but the purpose for which the articles covers these procedures 
differs. 
91 see e.g. ecHr, Peck v. UK (2003); ectHr, Lyonova and Aliyeva v. Russia §134; ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, 
§157; ectHr [Gc] Olhan v. Turkey, 22277/93, §97.
92 Article 13 in conjunction with article 8 ecHr requires, for instance, of public authorities in regard to 
deportation decisions:
 …that states must make available to the individual concerned the effective possibility of challenging 
the deportation or refusal-of-residence order and of having the relevant issues examined with 
sufficient procedural safeguards and thoroughness by an appropriate domestic forum offering 
adequate guarantees of independence and impartiality. ectHr, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, §136.
93 for instance, when a trial does not take place within a reasonable time, it constitutes a violation of 
article 6(1) ecHr, ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, §147-149, 156, and 157-160.
94 ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, 30210/96 (october 26, 2000), §146.
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
1. The right to access a review body 
2. A competent, independent and impartial review body 
3. A fair review procedure 
In general, public authorities are accorded wide discretion in implementing their obligations 
to realize the right to a review. The various instruments set minimum standards for a review 
procedure and treaty monitoring bodies exercise a form of deferential review when they 
review the compliance of a party to the convention. treaty monitoring bodies do not act as 
a fourth instance to those who initiated proceedings at a domestic level for non-compliance 
with the rights stipulated in the respective instrument. for instance, the Human rights 
committee recalled:
…it is generally for the courts of [s]tates’ parties to the covenant to review facts and evidence 
in a particular case, unless it can be shown that the evaluation of evidence was clearly arbitrary 
or amounted to a denial of justice, or that the court otherwise violated its obligations of 
independence and impartiality.
In other words, treaty monitoring bodies acknowledge the discretion of authorities to 
set procedures for a review request and that the burden and standard of proof and the 
evaluation of facts and evidence fall within the domain of those authorities. In general, 
95 This is further reflected in the admissibility criterion of exhaustion of domestic remedies, which is an 
admissibility criterion for each treaty regime that has an individual complaint procedure. Article 35 
of the ecHr; ectHr, Akdivar and others v. Turkey 1996-Iv. reports 23 eHrr 365, 65-76; IActHr, 
Velasquez-Rodriguez case (preliminary objections) (1987) series c no. 1; IActHr Advisory Opinion on 
Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Local Remedies (1990) series c no 11; AfcHPr, Amnesty International 
v. Sudan, §39; Aarhus convention MoP decision I/7 §21: “The committee should at all relevant stages 
take into account any available domestic remedy unless the application of the remedy is unreasonably 
prolonged or obviously does not provide an effective and sufficient means of redress.” Article 5(2)(b) 
of optional Protocol 1 to the IccPr see, e.g., Hrcee, Karttunen v. Finland, comm. no. 387/89, §7.3; 
Hrcee, Chira Vargas v. Peru (906/2000) (July 22, 2002) at §7.3; article 4(1) of the optional Protocol to 
the cedAw; Article 7(5) of the oP-crc-Ic; article 77(b) of the IcMw.
96 Hrcee, Bondarenko v. Belarus, 886/1999, (April 3, 2003) §9.3. This argument also ties in closely with 
the fact that the Hrcee is not a fourth instance court. In r.M. v. Finland (301/1988, (March 23, 1989) 
300 at §6.4, the committee reasoned:
  it is not an appellate court and that allegations that a domestic court has committed errors of fact or 
law do not in themselves raise questions under the covenant unless it also appears that some of the 
requirements of Article 14 may not have been complied with. 
 see also Hrcee, J. H. v. Finland (300/1988), (March 23, 1989), §6.4; Hrcee, Van Meurs v. The Netherlands 
(215/1986), (July 13, 1990), §7.1; Z. P. v. Canada (341/1988), (April 11, 1991) 297 at §5.2 and 5.5; Bullock 
v. Trinidad and Tobago (553/1993), (July 19, 1995) §7.4; Blaine v. Jamaica (696/1996), (July 17, 1997) 
§6.6; Hrcee, Perel v. Latvia (650/1995), (March 30, 1998) §12.2; Hrcee, Chadee et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago (813/1998), (July 29, 1998), §8.3; Hrcee, Bailey v. Jamaica (709/1996) (July 21, 1999) §6.3. 
Lyashkevich v. Belarus (887/1999) (April 3, 2003) at §2.1-2.3 and 8.3; a similar reasoning can be seen at 
the cAt, P. E. v. France (193/2001), cAt, A/58/44 (november 21, 2002) 135 (cAt/c/29/d/193/2001) 
at § 6.2-6.7.
97 see, for example, Hrcee, J.K v. Canada, communication 174/84, §7.2: 
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treaty monitoring bodies do not review these elements of a given domestic review procedure, 
and thus leave it to public authorities to develop and set benchmarks for the burden of proof, 
standard of proof and rules of evidence in their domestic review procedures. 
The survey shows that the precise content and scope of the right to a review is variable to an 
extent, dependent on the context and the nature of a complaint. This section will start with a 
discussion of the content and scope of the right to access a review body (section 1.2.1), followed 
by a discussion of the various standards that a review body has to meet (section 1.2.2) and will 
conclude with a discussion of the standards for a fair review procedure (section 1.2.3).
1.2.1. Access to the Review Body 
The right to access a review body is the first essential step for an effective right to a review. 
each treaty monitoring body has read a right to access a review body into the right to a 
review. As mentioned in section 1.2, authorities have an obligation to ensure that those 
affected have a right to a review before a review body, which may require authorities to 
develop review procedures or create legal standing for those affected by decisions. Public 
authorities are accorded discretion regarding how they develop review procedures and to 
set rules guiding these procedures. This section will discuss the most common conditions 
imposed by authorities to access review procedures as signalled by the legal survey. 
 The committee … observes that it is beyond its competence to review findings of fact made by national 
tribunals or to determine whether national tribunals properly evaluated new evidence submitted on 
appeal.
98 see, for instance, the ectHr’s case law in this regard; the court held in Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, that “the 
scope of the obligation under article 13 [right to an effective remedy] varies according to the nature of 
the applicant’s complaint under the convention.” ectHr, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, §136; ectHr, Kudła 
v. Poland, §157. The court has extensive case law on the relation and differences between the right to 
a review as recognized in article 6 ecHr and with said right set out in the articles 3, 8 and 13 ecHr. 
see, e.g., ecHr, Peck v. UK (2003); ectHr, Lyonova and Aliyeva v. Russia § 134; ectHr [Gc] Olhan v. 
Turkey, 22277/93, §97.
99 for instance, the ectHr read a right of access to a court into the right to a fair trial in the landmark case 
Golder v. United Kingdom (february 21, 1975), §38, series A no. 18, §34-35: 
 The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to judge ranks as one of the 
universally recognized fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of international 
law which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6(1) must be read in light of these principles (….) It 
would be inconceivable, in the opinion of the court, that Article [6(1)] should describe in detail 
the procedural guarantees afforded to parties in a pending lawsuit and should not first protect that 
which alone makes it in fact possible to benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. The 
fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are of no value at all if there are no 
judicial proceedings.
 Access to a court is also strongly protected under Article 14(1) IccPr; Hrcee, GC 32, §12; Hrcee, IP 
v. Finland Comm 450/991, 6.2. Hrcee, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, §9.4; Hrcee, Avellanal v. Peru 
Communication 202/86.
100 see, e.g., Migrant workers committee, CO on the Second Periodic Report of Sri Lanka (october 11, 
2016), cMw/c/lkA/co/2, §29 (a).
101 The ultimate decision whether a review procedure is in accordance with the instrument in question 
rests with the treaty monitoring body. see, e.g., ectHr, Kruez v. Poland, §53.
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
Across the various instruments, authorities are permitted to impose further conditions (beyond 
the legal standing criteria) that may limit the right to access a court, as long as these conditions 
do not impair the very essence of the right and that it does not result in the discrimination 
of certain individuals or groups. for instance, the Hrcee held in Avellanal v. Peru that the 
Peruvian law prohibiting women from representing matrimonial property before a court 
violated the non-discrimination requirement. As a result, there was a violation of the right to 
access a court and of the equality of arms. overall, the permitted conditions can be divided 
into three categories: set timeframes to initiate proceedings, costs or fees to initiate proceedings 
and the requirement of legal representation. Below, each category will be further explained 
and references to case law of various treaty monitoring bodies will serve to illustrate how the 
treaty monitoring bodies interpret the right to access a review body within a given context. In 
general, each condition may constitute a limitation to the right to a review, which implies that 
the condition needs to meet the tripartite test of legality, necessity and legitimacy. 
first, stricter time frames for submitting a claim may be in accordance with the tripartite 
test. However, particular circumstances may warrant a more lenient approach. for instance, 
in Jabari v. Turkey, the ectHr concluded that a strict five-day registration requirement of 
the Asylum regulation of 1994 denied the applicant in question any evaluation of her fears of 
facing maltreatment or torture if she were to be deported. In light of the circumstances, this 
strict timeframe for registration resulted in a violation of Article 3 ecHr. 
second, most instruments stipulate that the review procedure may not be too costly, but 
that the fair administration of justice may justify the imposition of a fee on the individual’s 
102 see, for instance, ectHr, Z and others v. United Kingdom (2001), §93:
 where the individual’s access is limited either by operation of law or in fact, the court will examine 
whether the limitation imposed impaired the essence of the right and, in particular, whether it 
pursued a legitimate aim and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim sought to be achieved.
 see similarly ectHr, Golder v. UK; ectHr, Ashingdane v. UK (1985), §57; Hrcee, Casanovas v. France 
communication 1514/2006, §11.3.
103 Hrcee, GC 32, §9; article 3(9) of the Aarhus convention; Principle A.2(b)(c) of principles and 
guidelines on the right to a fair trial and legal assistance in Africa, 2003, doc/os(XXX)247; Migrant 
workers committee, CO on the second periodic report of Sri Lanka (october 11, 2016), cMw/c/lkA/
co/2, §33 (d).
104 Hrcee, Graciela Ato del Avellanal v. Peru communication 202/1986 (october 28, 1988), 10.1-10.3.
105 see, e.g., ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, (october 9, 1979), series A no 32, §24-26; ectHr, Kruez v. Poland, 
28249/05 (June 19, 2001), §60; Hrcee, Äärelä Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland communication 779/1997, §7.2; 
Accc, ACCC/C/2011/57 (Denmark), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2012/7 (July 16, 2012), §45.
106 It should be noted that an expeditious review process and accordingly the length of the proceedings will 
be discussed in the context of the fairness of the proceeding, see below in section 1.3.4. for a general 
discussion of the scope of the tripartite test, see chapter 3, section 1.6.
107 ectHr, Jabari v. Turkey, §39 and ff. 
108 Aarhus convention article 9(4); Accc, ACCC/C/2008/33 (United Kingdom) ece/MP.PP/2008/5/add.4 
(August 24, 2011) §128-136; Accc ACCC/C/2011/57 (Denmark), §45. 
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access to a court. The determinative factor is whether the legal fees required result in 
effectively barring those affected from accessing the review procedure. for example, 
a rigid duty under domestic law to award costs to a winning party may have a deterrent 
effect on the ability of persons to pursue a remedy before the courts. This would be the 
case particularly whenever courts are not given the discretion to take circumstances into 
account and to mitigate the effect of the award. various treaty monitoring bodies identified 
factors that are of relevance in the determination of whether legal fees restrict access to 
courts in a given case: the amount of the fees, the financial situation of the applicant, and the 
phase of the proceeding in which the fee is required. In general, it concerns a contextual 
assessment, and treaty monitoring bodies assess – taking the review procedure as a whole – 
whether the interests of states to collect court fees was properly balanced against the interests 
of the applicant in vindicating its claim in court. when in a given case the conclusion is 
that the procedure is prohibitively expensive, or too costly for those affected, the question 
arises whether those affected should have access to legal aid. As stated by the Hrcee, the 
“availability or absence of legal assistance often determines whether or not a person can 
109 The ectHr, for instance, has held that excessive costs and fees preventing individuals from pursuing 
litigation may constitute a violation of article 6(1); ECtHR Airey v. Ireland, (october 9, 1979), series A 
no. 32, §24-26, and further ff; see particularly Kreuz v. Poland where the court dealt in detail with the 
interests of a state to collect court fees versus the interest of an applicant in substantiating his claim 
in court, ectHr, Kreuz v. Poland, app. no. 28249/05, (June 19, 2001), §58-67; ECtHR, Jedamski and 
Jedamska v. Poland, no. 73547/01, §66, (July 26, 2005); ectHr, Weissman and Others v. Romania, 
no. 63945/00, §§38-40, ecHr 2006-vII (extracts), §40, 42; ectHr Ferenc Rózsa and István Rósza v. 
Hungary, no. 30789/05, §§12, 20-24, (May 28, 2009); ectHr, Handölsdalen Sami Village and others 
v. Sweden no. 39013/04 (March 30, 2010), §§51-55, in which the court concluded considering the 
proceedings as a whole that:
 the court finds that the applicants were afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their case 
effectively before the national courts and that there was not such an inequality of arms vis-à-vis the 
landowners as to involve a violation of article 6(1) of the convention. 
 see also in relation to IccPr, M. nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary 
(2005) at 312. see also Hrcee, Lindon v. Australia, app. no. 646/1995 §6.4. ectHr, Steel Morris v. UK, 
§72.
110 for instance, the Hrcee held in one case that this situation led to a violation of article 14(1) in 
conjunction with article 2(3) IccPr, Hrcee, Äärelä Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland communication 779/1997, 
§7.2.
111 ectHr, Kruez v. Poland, above n. 110, §60; However, occasionally treaty monitoring bodies do not 
only examine whether the procedure was prohibitively expensive in a given, specific case but they 
also examine whether the procedure was prohibitively expensive considering the system as a whole 
and in any systemic manner. see, for instance, Accc, ACCC/C/2008/33 (United Kingdom) ece/
MP.PP/2008/5/add.4 (August 24, 2011) §128-136.
112 ectHr, Kruez v. Poland, above n. 110, §58-67; see also, ectHr, Jedamski and Jedemska v. Poland app. 
no. 73547/01 (July 26, 2005), §66; ectHr, Weissman and others v. Romania app no 63945/00§38-40; 
ectHr, Ferenc Rozsa and Istvan Rosza v. Hungary app. no. 30789/05 (May 28, 2009), §12, 20-24. for 
more details, see M. nowak, UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (2005), 312; 
Hrcee, Lindon v. Australia 646/1995, §6.4.
113 see, for instance, ectHr, Steel Morris v. UK, §72, in which case the denial of legal aid to the applicants 
deprived them of an opportunity to present their case effectively before the court and contributed to an 
unacceptable inequality of arms. Accordingly, the court held that there was a violation of article 6(1).
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
access the relevant proceedings or participate in them in a meaningful way.” In order to 
decide whether legal aid services should be provided by authorities, it has to be determined 
on the basis of the circumstances and particular facts of each case. overall, the trigger 
factor is whether individuals are considered to be particularly vulnerable; if so, authorities 
may have an obligation to provide legal aid. This does not imply that in each instance the 
state has to provide legal aid. for instance, if access can also be achieved by assisting in 
other ways, for instance by simplifying procedures, the obligation is complied with. In 
conclusion, whether or not a procedure is prohibitively expensive is determined by treaty 
monitoring bodies on the basis of a contextual assessment that requires a proper balancing 
of the interests involved and an assessment of whether legal aid should have been provided. 
lastly, in certain judicial procedures, one may be required by the state to have legal 
representation, which may be perceived as an obstacle for some to initiate proceedings. In 
these instances, if those affected cannot afford legal representation, public authorities may be 
required to provide legal aid or other legal assistance. In a given case, the denial of such aid or 
assistance may result in effectively barring access to the review procedure to those affected. 
As a related point, in the context of some review procedures, international law stipulates 
a right to legal representation for those affected. The procedures for which such right is 
stipulated are review procedures that have a high impact on those affected; considering 
that those affected are particularly vulnerable in these cases, it could negatively impact the 
effectiveness of their right to a review if they were not represented by counsel. As examples, 
114 Hrcee, GC 32, §10.
115 see, for example, ectHr, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, §61:
 the importance of what is at stake for the applicant in the proceedings, the complexity of the relevant 
law and procedure and the applicant’s capacity to represent him or herself effectively.
 In the Airey case, the ectHr deemed legal assistance necessary to guarantee a fair trial as the proceedings 
were determinative of important family rights and relationships, ectHr, Airey v. Ireland, (october 9, 
1979), series A no. 32, §26; see also ectHr, Munro v. United Kingdom, no. 10594/83, (commission 
decision of July 14, 1987) decisions and reports 52 at 158.
116 see for a first discussion of the concept of vulnerability, for instance, chapter 4 section 2. for a more 
detailed discussion of the concept of vulnerability, see chapter 6, section 2. 
117 cerd, CO on Bahamas, A/59/18 (2004), 10 at §35. In relation to various substantive rights, the cescr 
held that authorities have to provide where possible legal aid to persons who need it in order for them 
to seek redress from the courts, see for instance GC 7, §15(h); cescr, GC 15 (2002), § 56(e); cescr, 
GC 19, §78 (d); see also council of europe committee of Ministers, recommendation no. 93(1) of the 
committee of Ministers to Member states on effective Access to the law and to Justice for the very 
Poor (adopted by the committee of Ministers on January 8, 1993). 
118 ectHr, Airey v. Ireland, §2.6.
119 Hrcee, GC 32, § 16; ectHr, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom (2005), §60.
120 see, for instance, Principle 1 of the African Principles and Guidelines on the right to a fair trial And 
legal Assistance in Africa, 2003, doc/os(XXX)247.
121 This research identifies the concept of vulnerability as a trigger for further protection of certain 
individuals and/or groups of individuals particularly affected by decisions. when there are factors 
of vulnerability, public authorities have to do more to ensure the inclusion in the review procedure 
of those considered to be vulnerable. In chapter 6, section 2, the concept will be further analyzed in 
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the right to legal counsel is recognized by various treaty monitoring bodies in the context of 
expulsion decisions, refugee status determination procedures and in review procedures 
affecting children. 
In conclusion, although public authorities have discretion in developing the review 
procedures and in the imposition of conditions to access these procedures, there are certain 
constraints on this discretion. The conditions may not result in effectively impairing or 
making it impossible for those affected to access their right to a review. whether a given 
condition or limitation to the right to access a review body is permissible is to be assessed 
by taking the circumstances of the case into account, taking the nature of the complaint into 
account, considering whether there are certain vulnerability factors, and lastly, considering 
whether and to what extent authorities have mitigated the effects of these conditions by, for 
instance, providing legal aid or legal assistance to those particularly affected. 
1.2.2. Competent, Independent and Impartial Review Body 
The general standard across the various instruments is that the review body has to be 
competent, independent and impartial. what varies is the degree to which treaty 
monitoring bodies have provided benchmarks for these requirements. 
regards to its role within the draft IGM. 
122 Article 13 of the IccPr; Hrcee, General Comment 15, §10; Hrcee, Hammel v. Madagascar (April 3, 
1987), 19.2; Hrcee, Karker v. France, §9.3; ectHr, Conka v. Belgium app. no. 51564/99 (May 5, 2002). 
123 Article 32(2) of the refugee convention, see also commentary on the refugee convention 1951, 
Articles 2-11 (1997), division of international protection of the unHcr, available at http://www.unhcr.
org/3d4ab5fb9.pdf, §9.
124 crc, GC 14, §98.
125 Article 2(3)(b) IccPr; article 25 AcHr; article 7(2) AfcHPr; article 8 udHr; article 6 cerd; 
article 2 cedAw; articles 18, 22(4) 83(a)(b) of the Migrant workers convention; article 9(2) Aarhus 
convention; ectHr, Shamayev. v. Georgia and Russia, §446; AfcommHPr, Principles and Guidelines 
on the right to a fair trial and legal Assistance in Africa, 2003, doc/os(XXX)247, Principle 1.
126 AfcHPr, Civil Liberties organizations and others v. Nigeria, (2001) AHrlr 75, § 27 and 44; ectHr, 
Findlay v. UK, §281; ectHr, Cirklar v. Turkey (october 28, 1998) §120.
127 ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, §157; ectHr, Micallef v. Malta [Gc], no. 17056/06, ecHr 2009 § 93; Hrcee, 
General Comment 13, §3; see also Hrcee, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea (468/91), §9.4; Hrcee, 
Concluding Observations on Algeria, (1998) un doc ccPr/c/79/add. 95, §14; Hrcee, Concluding 
Observations on Armenia, (1998) un doc ccPr/c/79/add. 100, §8; Hrcee, Concluding Observations 
on Peru (1996) un doc. ccPr/c/79/ add. 67, §14; see on impartiality also Hrcee, Karttunen v. 
Finland, (387/89), §7.1-7.3; In Karttunen §7.2., the Hrcee stated that impartiality implies:
 that judges must not harbor preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that the must not 
act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties. where the grounds for disqualification of 
a judge are laid down by law, it is incumbent upon the court to consider ex officio these grounds and 
to replace members of the court falling under the disqualification criteria.
 see also Hrcee, Rogerson v. Australia (802/1998), (2002), §7.4; Principles and Guidelines on the right 
to a fair trial and legal Assistance in Africa, 2003, doc/os(XXX)247; Principle 1: legally constituted 
competent, independent and impartial judicial body. 
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
Competence 
The criterion of competence refers to whether the review authority has jurisdiction to hear 
a complaint in a given case and has the mandate to provide an appropriate relief. Thus, 
the requirement of competence is not only relevant in the context of the right to a review 
but also in the context of the right to reparation. whether, for example, an ombudsperson 
procedure meets the conditions of competence depends on whether they are able to adopt 
a final decision and to provide the appropriate relief. The appropriate relief that has to be 
provided in a given case depends on the type of review and the nature of a complaint. 
Independence 
The criterion of independence refers to the independence of the review body from the 
executive and legislative powers and vis-à-vis the parties involved. The factors to determine 
the independence of the review body are, for example, the appointment procedure of the 
members of a review body, whether there are procedural guarantees against outside pressure 
and whether there is an appearance of independence. If, for instance, an executive has an 
ultimate say within a review procedure and has the power to overrule a decision, it poses 
a threat to the independence of the review body. similarly, if an executive has the power to 
remove judges, it poses a comparable threat. 
128 ectHr, Shamayev. v. Georgia and Russia, § 446: 
 competent national authority should be able to deal with substance of relevant convention complaint 
and grant appropriate relief. However, it does not go so far as to require any particular form of remedy, 
contracting states being afforded a margin of discretion in confirming to their obligations under 
this provision. nor does the effectiveness of a remedy for the purpose of Article 13 depend on the 
certainty of a favourable outcome.
129 for instance, the ectHr held in Silver v. UK (1983) that considering the ombudsperson lacked the 
power to issue binding decisions, it resulted in a violation of article 13 ecHr (the right to an effective 
remedy). see similarly Chahal v. UK, §154. In this case, however, more problems existed in regard to the 
available review procedure: neither the panel nor the courts had jurisdiction to review the decision to 
deport Mr. chahal, the applicant was not entitled to legal presentation, he only received an outline of the 
grounds underlying the decision to deport, and the advice of the advisory panel to the Home secretary 
was not disclosed to Mr. chahal. The court concluded that the remedies available to Mr. chahal did not 
satisfy the requirements of article 13 ecHr; ectHr, Chahal v. UK, (november 15, 1996). The Aarhus 
convention stipulates in article 9(1) that the review body is able to provide a binding decision, and 
Article 9(4) requires that the review body can provide injunctive relief. see also J. ebbesson and others 
(eds.) The Aarhus Convention: an Implementation Guide (2nd ed., 2014), at 192-193, 199-201. 
130 Hrcee, General Comment 32, §19; Hrcee, Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea (october 20, 1993) ccPr/
c/49/d/468/1991; Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Vietnam, IccPr, A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 67, §82(9) 
and 82(10); Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Romania, (1999) un doc. ccPr/c/79/add. 111, §10; 
Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Azerbaijan, IccPr, A/57/40 vol. I (2002) 47 at §77(14); Hrcee, 
Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka, IccPr, A/59/40 vol. I (2003) 30 at §66(16); Hrcee, Concluding 
Observations on Finland, IccPr, A/60/40 vol. I (2004) 22 at §81(13); Hrcee, Concluding Observations 
on Tajikistan, IccPr, A/60/40 vol. I (2005) 70, §92(17); see also cAt, Concluding Observations on 
Ukraine, cAt, A/57/44 (2002) 31 at §57 and 58. IActHr, Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela (July 1, 2011) 
series c no. 227; AfcommHPr, Lawyers for Human Rights v. Swaziland (2005) communication 251/02, 
18th activity report of the AfcommHPr. 
131 see, e.g., Hrcee, Concluding observations on Zambia, (1996) un doc. ccPr/c/79/add. 62, §16; 
see similarly Hrcee, Adrien Mundyo Buyso, Thomas Osthudi Wongodi, René Sibu Matubuka et al. v. 
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Impartiality 
The principle of independence is often discussed in the same breath as the principle of 
impartiality. The Aarhus convention compliance committee defines the principle of 
impartiality to include that “the process, including the final ruling of the decision-making 
body, must be impartial and free from prejudice, [favoritism] or self-interest.” other 
instruments define impartiality in a similar manner. for example, when a member of the 
review body has previously been involved in a different phase of the procedure, it has a 
negative effect on the appearance of impartiality.
The criteria for a review body discussed above are to be applied slightly differently whenever 
there is a two-tier review procedure required. A two-tier review procedure implies that those 
affected are obliged to first request an administrative review by a higher authority within the 
same decision-making body before they may appeal this decision and request a review by 
an independent and impartial review body. The IccPr, ecHr, and the Aarhus convention 
explicitly recognize the discretion of authorities to establish a two-tier procedure for 
administrative decisions. other instruments do not explicitly address the possibility but 
also do not seem to exclude this option. reasons to choose a two-tier procedure are, for 
example, that these procedures are regarded as more flexible, cost-efficient and expeditious 
than other administrative or judicial procedures. when assessing the compliance of 
authorities with these standards in a given case, treaty monitoring bodies assess whether a 
two-tier procedure provides due procedural safeguards as required by the right to a review. 
The procedural guarantees may be provided by an accumulation of the review procedures 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, (933/2000), IccPr, A/58/40 vol. II (July 31, 2003) at §5.2, 6.1, 6.2; 
Hrcee, Pastukhov. v. Belarus (814/1998), IccPr, A/58/40 vol. II (August 5, 2003) §2.1-2.5, 7.2, 7.3, 
9; see also cerd, Concluding observation on Kazakhstan in which the cerd noted with concern that 
“with the exception of the judges of the supreme court, all the judges are appointed by the President, 
who also determines the organization of the work of the courts” cerd, A/59/18 (2004) 54 at §295.
132 Accc, ACCC/C/2011/57 (Denmark), §44.
133 In Karttunen v. Finland, (comm. no. 387/89, §7.2.), the Hrcee stated that impartiality implies:
 that judges must not harbor preconceptions about the matter put before them, and that they must not 
act in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties. where the grounds for disqualification of 
a judge are laid down by law, it is incumbent upon the court to consider ex officio these grounds and 
to replace members of the court falling under the disqualification criteria.
 see also Hrcee, Rogerson v. Australia (802/1998) (April 3, 2002) at §7.4; ectHr, Wettstein v. Switzerland, 
§43.
134 see, for instance, ectHr, Piersack v. Belgium (1983) 5 eHrr 169, in which the presiding judge in the 
given case had served as the head of the public prosecutor’s department during the investigation in the 
given case. 
135 see, e.g., ectHr, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, §51; Article 9 (2) Aarhus 
convention. 
136 see, e.g., ectHr, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, §51; Aarhus convention, Article 
9(1) and (2) Aarhus convention. 
137 ectHr, Ortenberg v. Austria (october 25, 1994), § 31, where the court held that the Administrative 
court that reviewed the complaint satisfied all the requirements of article 6(1) of the ecHr and 
accordingly that there was no violation of article 6(1) ecHr.
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
available to the holders of the right to a review. At a minimum, an administrative review 
has to be exercised by an authority that is competent to conduct the review. for example, in 
Bryan v. United Kingdom, the ectHr had to assess whether the two-tier review procedure 
open to Mr. Bryan provided due procedural safeguards as required by article 6 ecHr. 
The decision in question concerned an environmental planning decision that required 
Mr. Bryan to demolish two buildings on his property. In this case, the court reasoned that 
although the administrative review by the inspector was quasi-judicial and was exercised 
in an independent, impartial and fair manner, the fact that the secretary of state had the 
discretion to revoke the power of an inspector had a negative effect on the appearance of 
independence. Accordingly, the ectHr held that the review by “the inspector does not of 
itself satisfy the requirements of article 6 [ecHr].” The court explained that: 
even where an adjudicatory body determining disputes over “civil right and obligations” does 
not comply with Article 6 para[graph] 1 in some respect, no violation of the convention can 
be found if the proceedings before that body are “subject to subsequent control by a judicial 
body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 para[graph] 1”.
Thus, in all instances where authorities prescribe a two-tier procedure, as described by the 
ectHr there are two options: 
either the jurisdictional organs themselves, [i.e. the administrative review authority] comply 
with the requirements of Article 6 para[graph] 1 (art. 6-1), or they do not so comply but are 
subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the 
guarantees of Article 6 para[graph] 1.
often in a two-tier procedure, the first tier does not meet the independence criterion as the 
administrative review is exercised by a higher authority within the same decision-making 
body, which, at a minimum, affects the requirement of independence. 
Non-judicial nature of the review body
The instruments do not stipulate a general requirement for a review body to be judicial. It 
138 sections 1.3.2-1.3.4 discuss the content and scope of the procedural safeguards required. 
139 ectHr, Bryan v. United Kingdom 19178/91 (november 22, 1995).
140 Idem, at §37.
141 emphasis added; ectHr, Bryan v. United Kingdom, §38.
142 Idem, emphasis added, §40, referencing to ectHr Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium (february 10, 1983, 
series A, no. 58, p. 16 §29).
143 Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium at §29. 
144 for instance, the ectHr states that if the review body is not of a judicial nature “powers and guarantees 
which it affords are relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is effective;” ectHr, Silver 
v. UK (1983), §113; ectHr, Khan v. UK, § 43-47; ectHr, Hatton v. UK, §140; ectHr Al-Nashif v. 
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is only required in specific situations that a review body is judicial. In these instances, the 
requirements for independence and impartiality are more spelled out. for instance, in the 
African human rights system, very elaborative principled guidelines were adopted for 
review by judicial bodies, whether courts or tribunals, describing each element required for 
a judicial review body in order for it to be independent and impartial. one can find these 
requirements particularly in the context of the review procedures described in section 1.1.2., 
specifically those disputes that qualify as a suit at law or determination of certain rights 
and obligations (fair trial). for instance, the ectHr in its extensive case law on the right to 
fair trial explained that the standard of independence and impartiality has both subjective 
and objective elements. The subjective elements focus on the personal conviction of a 
judge, and the objective element concerns a determination of whether, in terms of structure 
or appearance, a party’s doubts about a tribunal’s independence or impartiality may be 
legitimate. The Hrcee clarified that the criteria for independence and impartiality of 
Article 14 IccPr apply to all courts and tribunals, whether specialized or ordinary. 
Bulgaria, §137; ectHr, Kamasinka v. Austria, §110. The right to an effective remedy under the ecHr 
does not require a judicial review body, see, for example, Kudla v. Poland, §157. 
145 Article 2(3)(b) IccPr stipulates a priority of judicial remedies: 
 to ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent 
judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by 
the legal system of the state, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
 see also nowak, at 34; similar phrasing can be found in Article 25 IAcHr.
146 for example, the African court for Human and People’s rights determined that the competence of the 
organ is also dependent on the expertise of the judges and the inherent justice of laws under which they 
operate; AfcHPr, Amnesty International v. Sudan (2000) AHrlr 297, §69.
147 The African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, Principles and Guidelines on the right to a 
fair trial and legal Assistance in Africa (2003), doc/os(Xxx) 247. 
148 The African commission on Human and Peoples’ rights, Principles and Guidelines on the right to a 
fair trial and legal Assistance in Africa (2003), doc./os (Xxx) 247, Principle 4, point a to v.
149 Idem, Principle 5 a-e.
150 r.c.A. white and c. ovey, The European Convention on Human Rights (oxford university Press 2010) 
at 266.
151 Idem, at 266; see also ECtHR Piersack v. Belgium, App. 8692/79, (1983) series A no. 53 5 eHrr 169.
152 Hrcee, General Comment 32, §22. However, scricter scrutiny seems to be exercised by treaty monitoring 
bodies of specialized courts, such as anti-terrorism courts. for instance, courts using faceless judges 
cannot be deemed to be independent or impartial as their independence and impartiality cannot be 
verified (Hrcee, Gutierrez Vivanco v. Peru, 678/1996 (March 26, 2002), §7.1; the concept of faceless 
judges is used in Peru, for example for terrorist related offences. see also Hrcee, Polay Campos v. Peru 
(577/1994) (november 6, 1997); Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Egypt, A/58/40 vol. I (2002) 31 
at §77(16) and 77(17); Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Peru, A/51/40 vol. I (1996) 48 at §350, 
352 and 364; cAt, Concluding Observations on Peru, cAt, A/50/44 (1995) 11 at §73. often, these 
courts do not meet the standard of independence and impartiality. Hrcee, General Comment 13, §4; 
Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Chile, (1999) un doc. ccPr/c/79/add. 104; Hrcee, Concluding 
Observations on Slovakia, (2003) un doc. ccPr/co/78/svk, §14; Hrcee, Concluding Observations 
on Lebanon, (1997) un doc. ccPr/c/79/add. 78; Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Cameroon, 
(1999) un doc. ccPr/c/79/add. 116, §21; however, see also Hrcee, Fals Borda et al v. Colombia 
comm. no. 46/79, §1.5, 9.2, 13.3.
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In conclusion, all instruments stipulate that review bodies, whether judicial or not, need to 
be competent, independent and impartial. 
1.2.3. Fair Review Procedure 
A general standard across the various instruments is that, at a minimum, a review procedure 
has to be fair. This is an obligation of result; authorities are accorded wide discretion to 
design the proceedings to achieve a fair review procedure. However, most instruments do 
not further define the elements required for a fair review procedure; instead, it has to be 
deduced from the case law of the treaty monitoring bodies when a review procedure is 
deemed to be fair or unfair. The elements of a fair review procedure are more explicitly 
and completely defined only in the context of certain review procedures. for instance, the 
Aarhus convention stipulates that review procedures as recognized by the convention: 
shall provide adequate and effective remedies … and be fair, equitable, timely and not 
prohibitively expensive. decisions under this Article shall be … in writing. decisions of 
courts, and whenever possible of other bodies, shall be publicly accessible. 
In general, across the various instruments similar elements can be identified that are 
considered essential for a fair review procedure: a duty to inform, a duty to provide reasons 
for a decision reached, equality of arms, and a timely procedure that is not prohibitively 
expensive. considering that the elements are derived from a small set of review cases, the 
case law serves primarily as an illustration of how the concept of fairness is interpreted by 
these treaty monitoring bodies and to understand the complexity of all factors influencing 
the fairness of a review proceeding. whenever this research can identify a general benchmark 
across the instruments, it is mentioned accordingly. 
153 Article 14(1) IccPr; article 6(1) ecHr; African commission on Human rights and Peoples rights, 
Civil liberties organization and others v. Nigeria (2001) AHrlr 75, §12, 27, 44; Accc, ACCC/C/2011/57 
(Denmark), ece/MP.PP/c.1/2012/7 (July 16, 2012) at §44; Accc, ACCC/C/2004/6 (Kazakhstan), 
ece/MP.PP/c.1/2006/4/Add.1 (July 28, 2006) at §28-29; ectHr, Ciubotaru v. Moldova (2010),§51; 
Hrcee, Everett v. Spain, 961/2000 (July 9, 2004), §6.4; IActHr, Constitutional Court v. Peru; crc, 
General Comment 14, §98.
154 see, e.g., ectHr, Gorgulu v. Germany (february 26, 2004), §53 (regarding compliance with article 8 
ecHr). for the ectHr, a decisive element is the quality of the decision-making procedure. If there 
are any structural or fundamental flaws in this procedure, the court scrutinizes the procedure and the 
review process more strictly. see also ectHr, Drobnjak v. Serbia, 36500/05, (october 13, 2009), §143. 
155 In the context of administrative dismissals or administrative sanctioning, for instance, a higher level of 
review is required, similar to the fair trial guarantees expected in criminal proceedings. The IActHr 
has held that in such cases article 8(1)(2) AcHr is applicable (Baena and Ricardo, §129).
156 Article 6(4) of the Aarhus convention.
157 It should be noted that the latter (the element of the procedure not being prohibitively expensive) was 
discussed in the context of the right to access the review body in section 1.2.1 of this chapter.
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overall, the assessment of the fairness of a procedure is a contextual one, where all factors 
have to be taken into account. This implies that the lack of one of the elements does not have 
to result in an unfair review procedure. The concept of vulnerability seems to play a role in 
determining the fairness of the procedure, and accordingly, of the content and scope of the 
obligations of the authorities vis-à-vis those affected. 
Duty to inform 
firstly, there is a duty to inform the holders of their right to a review. The content and 
scope of this obligation is similar to the duty to inform recognized in the context of the right 
to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. Those affected have to be 
duly informed of the decision adopted, the possibilities for review, and the procedure to be 
followed. If persons are particularly vulnerable, more effort may be required of authorities 
to duly inform those affected. In Čonka v. Belgium, the Belgian authorities had made the 
information available only in tiny characters, not in the language of the asylum seekers, and 
there was only one interpreter available for all asylum seekers. Accordingly, the asylum 
158 for instance, the crc imposes a duty to inform a child of the review procedure and ensure accessibility 
to the procedure, crc, GC 14, §98. If trials are held in public, courts are required to make information 
on the time and venue of the oral hearing available to the public and to have adequate facilities for 
those attending, all within reasonable limits. Hrcee, Van Meurs v. The Netherlands, 215/1986 (July 13, 
1990) §6.1; cescr, General Comment 7 (1997), §15 (g)(h); cescr, General Comment 15: The Right to 
Water (2003) §56(d) (e); cescr, General Comment 21: The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life (2009), 
§54; cerd, General Comment 27, §7; CO on Iceland (2005) §270; ectHr, AGOSI v. UK, §55; see, e.g., 
ectHr, Gaskin v. UK (1989), §49; ectHr, M.G v. United Kingdom, judgment, (september 24, 2002) 
application no. 39393/98, §30: “Procedure to appeal denials of information must be in place in order to 
be in accordance with the law”; IActHr, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru (January 31, 2001),§83; 
Migrant workers committee, CO on the Second Periodic Report of El Salvador (May 2, 2014), cMw/c/
slv/co/2, §25; Migrant workers committee, CO on the Second Periodic Report of Sri Lanka (october 
11, 2016), cMw/c/lkA/co/2, §29 (b). 
159 for instance, the Aarhus convention compliance committee held that a procedure that allowed for a 
court hearing to start without properly notifying the parties involved could not be considered to be a 
fair proceeding in the meaning of article 9(4) of the convention. Accc, ACCC/C/2004/6 (Kazakhstan), 
§28-29. on the basis of article 9(5), parties to the convention are required to facilitate effective access 
to justice by providing information on access to administrative and judicial review procedures. for 
instance, see in comparison section 3.1.2. of chapter 4 above in which the content of the obligation 
to duly inform those affected was discussed in the context of the right to meaningful participation in 
decision-making procedures. 
160 This is particularly the case in the context of asylum seekers, ectHr, Čonka v. Belgium, (May 5, 2002), 
§44.
161 The court concluded:
 The convention is intended to guarantee rights that are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and 
effective (…). As regards the accessibility of a remedy within the meaning of Article 35 §1 of the 
convention, this implies, inter alia, that the circumstances voluntarily created by the authorities must 
be such as to afford applicants a realistic possibility of using the remedy. That did not happen in the 
present case.
 ectHr, Čonka v. Belgium, (May 5, 2002), §44; similarly, the committee against torture has argued that 
states have the obligation to duly inform asylum seekers about all domestic remedies available to them, 
in particular the possibility of judicial review and whether domestic legal aid is available. cAt, S.H. v. 
Norway no 121/1998, (november 19, 1999), §7.4; cAt, Z.T. v. Norway, no. 127/1999 (november 19, 
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seekers were not duly informed, the court concluded that they did not have access to a fair 
review procedure, and as a result the asylum seekers did not have an effective legal remedy. 
Equality of arms 
The equality of arms refers to a certain balance between the parties in a review procedure 
that ensures, as described by the ectHr, that “each party must be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present their case – including their evidence – under conditions that do not 
place them at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent”. The criterion is explicitly 
spelled out in the context of the right to fair trial, the Aarhus convention, and article 13 
IccPr. However, in the context of other instruments, one can find similar references to 
the balance between the parties and the extent to which a claimant receives a fair procedure 
taking into account the extent to which both parties had access to witnesses, evidence and 
the use of experts in a given proceedings. 
In general, three factors can be identified across the various instruments that may contribute 
to a violation of the criterion of equality of arms. firstly, those affected may be at a 
disadvantaged position, which has a negative impact on the equality of arms. for instance, 
those affected may not be able to afford to hire expert witnesses, which may have a negative 
effect on the equality of arms. As a result, in certain situations, legal assistance or financial 
aid may be required, not only to ensure access to a review body but also to ensure a certain 
equality of arms between the parties involved. secondly, a lack of access to information 
1999), §7.4; see also M. reneman, ‘Access to an effective remedy in Asylum Procedures’ (2008) 1(1) 
Amsterdam law Forum 65 at 87-88.
162 ectHr, Suominen v. Finland application no. 37801/97 (July 1, 2003) §33-34; Hrcee, Dugin v. Russian 
Federation, 815/1998, (July 4, 2004) §9.3; Article 14 IccPr.
163 ectHr, Neumeister v. Austria, (app. 1936/63) (June 27, 1969) series A no. 8 (1979-1980) 1 eHrr 91. 
Access to the courts is closely related to the requirement of equality of arms. The Hrcee argued in 
Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea no. 468/1991 §9.4 that: 
 The notion of equality before the courts and tribunals encompasses the very access to the courts, 
and that a situation in which an individual’s attempts to seize the competent jurisdictions of his/her 
grievances are systematically frustrated runs counter to the guarantees of Article 14, section 1; 
 Hrcee, GC 32 (2007) §9; see similarly, ectHr, Case of Bulut v. Austria, judgment (february 22, 1996) 
§47.
164 Article 9(4) of the Aarhus convention stipulates that review procedures in the context of the Aarhus 
convention should be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. see for instance, Accc, 
ACCC/C/2008/33 (uk) ece/MP.PP/c.1/2010/6/Add.3, december 2010, §132. 
165 Hrcee, Everett v. Spain, 961/2000 (July 9, 2004), §6.4.
166 see, for example, IActHr, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru (January 31, 2001), §83; principle 
2.A(a): (a) equality of arms between the parties to a proceeding, whether they be administrative, civil, 
criminal, or military; ectHr, De Haes and Gijssels v. Belgium (february 24, 1997), §53, 58-59. 
167 section 1.2.1. of this chapter discussed the effects of court fees on the accessibility of a review procedure.
168 see, for instance, ectHr, Steel Morris v. UK, §72, the denial of legal aid to the applicants deprived them 
of an opportunity to present their case effectively before the court and contributed to an unacceptable 
inequality of arms. Accordingly, the court held that there was a violation of article 6(1). As stated by the 
ectHr, the rationale is to provide each side with “a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case 
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places an individual in a disadvantaged position, which has a negative impact on the 
equality of arms. The information required has to be interpreted in broad terms, including 
informing individuals of the evidence used in review proceedings, but also allowing equal 
access to (use) evidence, witnesses and experts to substantiate their case before a review 
body. without this information the right to a review becomes futile for these individuals. 
In De Haes and Gijssels v. Belgium, the ectHr held that the outright rejection of a higher 
court to include evidence requested by the applicants constituted a violation of the principle 
of the equality of arms, as it placed the applicants in a disadvantaged position. lastly, if 
both parties to the review procedure do not have a similar opportunity to make certain 
procedural choices, it has a negative impact on the equality of arms. for instance, in Weiss v. 
Austria, the Hrcee determined that there was a violation of the principle of equality of arms 
as only the prosecutor in the case had an opportunity to appeal the decision; the applicant 
could not appeal the decision to extradite. 
These three ways in which the equality of arms may be negatively impacted have to be 
placed in the context of the type of procedures that are of most interest to this research; that 
is, the administrative decision-making by public authorities that affect individuals. In these 
procedures, there are some inherent inequalities, considering that one party concerned is the 
public authority that may be presumed to have the financial and logistical support and the 
expertise and experience of state authorities, and the other party is, for example, the private 
individual, a group of individuals or companies whose support structure is very different or 
under conditions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the adversary,” Steel 
and Morris v. UK, §62; see also ectHr, De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium 19983/92 (february 24, 1997), 
§53; ectHr, McVicar v. United Kingdom, 46311/99 (May 7, 2002), §51, 62. It should be noted that the 
obligation to provide legal aid does not imply that authorities have to realize complete equality of arms, 
using public funds, between the assisted and the opposing party, ectHr, Steel and Morris v. United 
Kingdom (2005), §62; see also ectHr De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium, §53; ectHr, McVicar v. United 
Kingdom, §51, 62. 
169 for example, ectHr, McGinley and Egan v. UK, case no.10/1997/794/995-996, (June 9, 1998) §86, 91 
cited in §19 of the revision of the judgment: 
 The court considers that, if it were the case that the respondent state had, without good cause, 
prevented the applicants from gaining access to, or falsely denied the existence of, documents in its 
possession which would have assisted them in establishing before the PAt that they had been exposed 
to dangerous levels of radiation, this would have been to deny them a fair hearing in violation of 
Article 6 §1.
 In the given case however, a procedure was available for the disclosure of documents that the applicants 
failed to use; accordingly, there was no violation of the principle of a fair review procedure. 
170 see, e.g., ectHr, McMichael v. United Kingdom, (february 24, 1995), §80. 
171 ectHr, De Haes and Gijssels v. Belgium (february 24, 1997), §58-59; see also ectHr, Hentrich v. France 
(13616/88, (september 24, 1994) §56, in which the court held that it was quite difficult for the applicant 
to challenge this decision on the ground that the administrative body provided shallow reasons for the 
decision reached (a property’s sales price was too low), but combined with the fact that the tribunals 
of fact did not allow the applicant to prove that the price agreed was in line with market conditions 
resulted in a violation of article 6(1) ecHr. 
172 Hrcee, Weiss v. Austria communication 1086/2002 (April 3, 2003), §9.6. 
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perhaps lacking. In this context, more may be required of public authorities to ensure that the 
private party finds himself/herself not at an unfavorable disadvantage in the review procedure. 
Reasonable timeframes 
various instruments require the review procedure to have reasonable timeframes, which 
concerns two elements. firstly, authorities are required to realize expeditious proceedings. 
for instance, in Gonzalez del Rio v. Peru, the individual had been waiting for a decision in the 
first instance since 1985, and in the autumn of 1992, there was still no decision when the case 
was decided by the Hrcee. The committee concluded that this delay in the proceedings 
constituted a violation of the principle of fairness. secondly, it requires that individuals have 
a sufficient amount of time to participate properly in the review proceedings. for example, 
several treaty monitoring bodies have warned authorities of the risk of using accelerated 
proceedings when it concerns irreversible actions. overall, the definition of a reasonable 
timeframe depends on the case at hand, taking the circumstances, the complexity, the type 
of complaint, and other elements of a fair procedure into account. 
Duty to provide reasons 
review bodies are required to provide reasons for a decision reached and to communicate 
the decision to those affected. The review body’s duty to provide reasons is quite similar to 
the one identified in the context of the right to meaningful participation in the decision-
173 The support for expeditious proceedings can be found in most instruments. see, e.g., Accc, 
ACCC/C/2008/33 (UK), ece/MP.PP/2008/5/Add. 4, (August 24, 2011), §30; Hrcee, Munoz v. Peru 
“justice is rendered without undue delay” (203/86); Hrcee, Fei v. Colombia, 514/1992 (April 4, 1995), 
§8.4.
174 Hrcee, Gonzalez del Rio v. Peru 263/87 (october 28, 1992), §5.2; see similarly, Hrcee, Rubén Toribio 
Muñoz Hermoza v. Peru 203/1986 (1988), §11.3.
175 see, e.g., IActHr, Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, (January 31, 2001) §83
176 see, for example, cerd (Concluding Observations on Finland, (2003) A/58/18, 69 at §408:
 …such narrow time limits may not allow for the proper utilization of the appeal procedure available 
and may result in an irreversible situation even if the decision of the administrative authorities were 
overturned on appeal.
 see similarly cAt, concerning Finland A/60/44 (2005) 32, §73(b).
177 The IActHr (Genie Lacayo v. Nicaragua, §77) follows, for instance, the line of case law of the ectHr 
(e.g., Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain (June 23, 1993), §30) and uses three criteria to determine what constitutes 
a reasonable timeframe for conducting a review procedure: the complexity of the matter, the judicial 
activity of the interested party, and the behavior of the judicial authorities concerned; in Deisl v. Austria, 
the Hrcee determined that several criteria were of relevance to coming to the conclusion that this 
case’s protracted proceedings did not result in a violation under the convention: (a) the length of each 
individual stage of the proceedings, (b) the fact that the suspensive effect of the proceedings vis-à-vis 
the demolition orders was to the benefit of the applicant, (c) the applicants did not try to accelerate 
proceedings, (d) complexity of the matter at hand, Hrcee, Deisl v. Austria 1060/2002 (July 27, 2004) 
§11.6. 
178 ectHr, Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy, app. no. 39128/05, (october 20, 2009); ectHr, Suominen v. Finland 
(July, 20 2403), §34; ectHr, Geleri v. Romania, app. no. 33118/05, (september 15, 2011); Article 9(4) 
Aarhus convention.
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making procedure. The duty does not imply that a review body is required to give a detailed 
answer to every argument. Instead, at a minimum, provision of the legal basis and main 
considerations for the decision is required; whether or not the criterion is complied with in 
a given case is to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. for example, in Suominen v. Finland, 
the ectHr held that there was a violation of article 6(1) ecHr, as: 
the applicant did not have the benefit of fair proceedings in so far as the [domestic] court’s 
refusal to admit the evidence proposed by her was concerned. The lack of a reasoned decision 
also hindered the applicant from appealing in an effective way against that refusal. 
In this case, the finnish court refused to admit certain evidence and did not provide reasons 
for the refusal. As explained by the ectHr, the duty to provide reasons plays a role at various 
levels: to demonstrate that the parties have been heard and to provide an opportunity to 
appeal the decision, as only through “giving a reasoned decision that there can be public 
scrutiny of the administration of justice.” 
Factors for further scrutiny of the fairness of a procedure
In certain contexts, a higher scrutiny is exercised by treaty monitoring bodies of the level of 
fairness realized by a public authority. for instance, in Mansour Ahani v. Canada, the Human 
rights committee held that due to what was at stake – whether the affected individual 
was at risk of substantial harm if he would be expelled – “the closest scrutiny should be 
applied to the fairness of the procedure applied to determine whether an individual is at a 
substantial risk of torture.” In addition, although the rules on evidence, the burden of proof 
and the standard of proof generally fall outside the scope of review by treaty monitoring 
bodies, sometimes matters of proof and evidence are taken into account in the assessment 
of fairness by a treaty monitoring body. whenever review procedures appear to have 
arbitrary features, and/or a review proceeding is tantamount to a denial of justice, and/or 
when there is a manifest violation of the obligations of impartiality and independence of the 
179 see above, chapter 4, section 2.4. crc, General Comment 14 (concerning article 3 CRC), §97; see also 
cescr, General Comment 7, §15; ectHr, Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy app no 39128/05 (2010), §45-49. 
180 ectHr, Perez v. France, §81-84. In this case, the domestic court had duly considered all of the applicant’s 
grounds for appeal and addressed all these grounds effectively; therefore, there was no violation of 
article 6(1) ecHr; see also, ectHr, Ruiz Torija v. Spain, (december 9, 1994), series A no. 303-A, 12, 
§29.
181 for instance, the IActHr ruled in Yatama v. Nicaragua that the failure of the review body to provide 
reasons constituted a violation of article 8 AcHr: (June 23, 2005), IActHr series c no. 127. 
182 see, e.g., ectHr, Ruiz Torija v. Spain (december 9, 1994), §29; ectHr, Suominen v. Finland application 
no. 37801/97 (July 1, 2003) §34.
183 ectHr, Suominen v. Finland (July 1, 2003) §38. 
184 Idem, §37.
185 Hrcee, Mansour Ahani v. Canada communication 1051/2002 (April 2, 2004), §10.6; see similarly, 
ectHr, Chahal v. United Kingdom, (november 11, 1996) §151-152.
186 Hrcee, Everett v. Spain, 961/2000 (July 9, 2004), §6.4.
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review body, treaty monitoring bodies exercise a higher degree of scrutiny, which includes 
an evaluation of the burden and standard of proof. 
In conclusion, the fairness of a review procedure is a contextual assessment where, amongst 
others, four elements identified are evaluated: the duty to inform, the reasonableness of set 
timeframes, the equality of arms, and the duty to give reasons for the decision reached. If 
there were already certain procedural flaws in the decision-making procedure, this may have 
a negative effect on the fairness of the review procedure. 
1.3. Rightsholders 
The general standard across the various instruments is that those allegedly affected by a 
decision have a right to a review. The various treaty monitoring bodies give guidance as 
to when someone is considered to be affected and, thus, entitled to a right to a review. In 
general, addressees of a decision are ipso facto deemed to be affected by the decision, and 
accordingly they have a right to a review. 
The majority of the instruments define per right to a review (i.e., per legal basis per 
instrument) when someone, who is not the addressee of the decision, can be regarded as 
affected. This concerns a contextual assessment. for instance, the IActHr establishes that 
authorities have to remedy the harm caused to those who suffer the “immediate effects” 
of its breaches of human rights guarantees, when those effects are sufficiently direct and 
proximate. further, various review bodies have accepted that parents may initiate a review 
procedure on behalf of their children, and in exceptional situations, children can initiate a 
procedure on behalf of their parents. 
In general, authorities have an obligation to ensure that there are review procedures in place 
for those affected. Public authorities are permitted to impose procedural bars – like legal 
standing criteria – to access these review procedures in accordance with the requirements 
of the respective instrument if it does not result in an impairment of the very essence of the 
187 see, e.g., Hrcee, Z.P v. Canada (341/1988) (April 11, 1991), §5.2; Hrcee, Blaine v. Jamaica (969/1996) 
(July 17, 1997), §6.6. 
188 examples are forced eviction notices; decisions to expel a person; (partial) denial of a request for public 
interest information or a request to see, rectify, or remove personal data held by authorities. see also 
above in chapter 3, section 2. 
189 d. shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (oxford university Press 2015), at 240; 
IActHr, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname (1994) series c no. 15 §49. 
190 IActHr, Blake v. Guatemala (1996) series c no 27; IActHr, Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (reparations) 
(1998) series c no 42; see similarly, Hrcee, Quinterros v. Uruguay 107/1981 (1983) §3; Bleier v. Uruguay 
30/1978, §7). see for the ectHr, for instance, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [Gc], §§ 47; ectHr, 
Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [Gc], §101; ectHr, Klass and 
others v. Germany; ectHr, Soering v. United Kingdom. 
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right of access. Although constraints on the exercise of the right to a review – such as legal 
standing criteria – do not limit who is the holder of a right to a review per se, it results in 
practice in limiting who may request for a review in a given case. The discretion accorded to 
authorities to impose such conditions depends on the type of review procedure. In general, 
authorities may impose legal standing criteria to bring claims to court at a domestic level or 
requests for a proof of interest of the claimants. legal standing criteria may make it difficult 
for groups or nGos to initiate proceedings. It is the obligation of public authorities 
to ensure that these nGos have legal standing to initiate a review procedure. Thus, when 
a treaty instrument stipulates a substantive right to, for example, minority protection, 
authorities are required to implement the treaty obligations, which may imply – if the 
procedure is not in place – that authorities have to develop review procedures and/or adapt 
the legal standing criteria so that the holders of the right are able to request a review of a 
decision that affects them. The Aarhus convention makes this obligation for authorities 
191 see ectHr, Z and others v. United Kingdom (2001), §93: ectHr, Golder v. UK; ectHr, Ashingdane v. 
UK (1985), §57; Hrcee, Casanovas v. France communication 1514/2006, §11.3; see also section 1.3.2 of 
this chapter. 
192 It should be noted that it is a separate issue whether, and to what extent, remedies at the level of treaty 
monitoring bodies are accessible. each rights-based instrument adopts its own criteria for accessing 
review mechanisms and legal standing. for instance, the IccPr upholds a strict victim requirement, 
which makes it challenging for nGos or groups to bring a claim before the Hrcee. see however 
the case law on article 27 IccPr, which forms an exception in this respect as it is directed towards 
minorities. nevertheless, the claim can only be successful if the claimant formulates it as an individual 
right (Hrcee, Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada 167/1984 (March 26, 1990), §27. The 
IActHr is more lenient in this respect and has accepted group claims (IActHr, Aloeboetoe v. Suriname 
(1994), §19 49-54; Awas Tingri Mayagna Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua; Ioayza Tamayo v. Peru). 
It has also accepted claims filed by persons who are not a victim (case 11.625 Maria Eugenia Morales 
de Sierra v. Guatemala (1998) oeA/ser.l/v/II.98 doc 6, rev), but a victim has to be identified. The 
AfcPHr has accepted actio popularis claims, SERAC v. Nigeria Comm 300/05, 25th Annual Activities 
report (2008). on the issue of legal standing in front of international human rights bodies, see also M. 
scheinin, ‘Access to Justice before International Human rights Bodies: reflections from the Practise 
of the un Human rights committee and the european court of Human rights’ in f. francioni (ed.) 
Access to Justice as a Human Rights (ouP 2007) 135 at 142-147, and d. shelton, Remedies in International 
Human Rights Law (oxford university Press 2015), at 241-256. 
193 Although most instruments recognize that groups can be affected by certain decisions and have to be 
accorded a right to a review before an independent and impartial body, it is for domestic authorities to 
implement this right at the domestic level. see, e.g., cerd, CO on Suriname A/59/18 (2004) 36, §193
194 see on the issue of an nGo’s right to a review in the context of environmental decision-making, for instance, 
M. schaap-rubio Imbers ‘Access to environmental Justice for nGos: Interplay between the Aarhus 
convention, eu treaty of lisbon and the european convention on Human rights’ in: Fragmentation vs. 
the Constitutionalization of International Law - A Practical Inquiry (routledge 2016) 244-264; for instance, 
the Aarhus convention imposes an obligation on authorities to enable nGos to pursue public interest 
litigation in the enforcement of Aarhus convention obligations. see article 2(5) of the Aarhus convention. 
see also Accc, ACCC/C/2006/18 (Denmark), ece/MP.PP/2008/5/Add. 4 (April 29, 2008), §28.
195 for example, in its concluding observations on suriname, the cerd recommended suriname to grant 
those affected a right to “appeal to the courts, or any independent body specially created for that purpose; 
in order to uphold their traditional rights and their right to be consulted before concessions are granted 
and to be fairly compensated for any damage.” In this case, indigenous and tribal people were not able to 
initiate proceedings to enforce their traditional rights as they were not recognized as legal entities, and 
thus they did not have legal standing, cerd, CO on Suriname A/59/18 (2004) 36, §193. 
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more explicit by including a right to a review of the procedural or substantive legality of 
a decision for the public concerned with a sufficient interest. At a minimum, nGos that 
promote environmental protection and meet any requirements under national law shall be 
deemed to have sufficient interest to challenge the procedural and/or substantive legality of 
a decision under Article 9(2) Aarhus convention. 
Procedural bars, besides legal standing criteria, may be fees to initiate legal procedure and/
or an obligation to be represented by legal counsel. These other conditions that may have a 
limiting effect on who is able to request a review will be discussed below in the context of 
permitted limitations to the right to a review. 
1.4. Limitations
This section will discuss the different ways in which the right can be restricted by public 
authorities that can derive from (1) explicit limitations stipulated in the various legal provisions, 
(2) conditions imposed to the exercise of the right, or (3) from the implicit legal basis of the 
right; that is, the way in which treaty monitoring bodies have read a procedural right into the 
legal provisions of certain substantive rights that imposes constraints on its enforceability. 
only in the context of the right to a review in cases of expulsion decisions explicit limitation 
grounds are recognized: the right to submit reasons and to have the case reviewed by a competent 
authority may be limited based on national security reasons, if the tripartite test is met.
In the context of other review procedures, public authorities are permitted to impose certain 
conditions on the exercise of the right to a review if they do not result in an impairment of the 
very essence of the right and if it meets the tripartite test of legality, legitimacy and necessity. As 
demonstrated in the preceding sections (1.2.1 and 1.3), these conditions may have a limiting 
effect on who may exercise the right, and on who has access to the review procedure. The 
recognition of the discretion to impose these conditions can be found most explicitly in fair 
trial provisions, and the Aarhus convention review procedures under article 9(1) and 9(2). 
196 see further c. redgwell ‘Access to environmental Justice’ in f. francioni (ed.), Access to Justice as a 
Human Right (2007), 153 at 168-169. 
197 Article 1 of Protocol 7 to the ecHr. 
198 The tripartite test implies that restrictions have to be in accordance with the law, pursue a legitimate 
aim, be proportional and should not be so broad that they destroy the very essence of the right to 
a review. see, e.g., article 13 IccPr; Hrcee, General Comment 15: the Position of Aliens under the 
Covenant (1986), §9-11; Hrcee, Hammel v. Madagascar communication no. 155/1983 (April 3, 1987), 
§19.1-19.3; Article 32 of the 1951 refugee convention.
199 Article 14(1) IccPr, article 6(1) ecHr; e.g., ectHr, Ashingdane v. United Kingdom, app. no. 8225/78 
(May 28, 1985) series A no 93 (1985) 7 eHrr 528; ectHr, Z and others v. United Kingdom, Application 
no. 29392/95, (May 10, 2001) (2001), §93; ectHr, Markovic and others v. Italy, app. no. 1398/03, [Gc] 
(2007) 44 eHrr 1045 ecHr 2006-XIv; H. v. United Kingdom, app. 11559/85 (december 2, 1985) 
45 dr 281; Stubbings and others v. United Kingdom, app. nos. 22083/93 and 22095/93, (october 22, 
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They can also be identified in the works of treaty monitoring bodies interpreting a right to an 
effective remedy for those affected. The different conditions can be summarized as follows: 
1996) (1997) 23 eHrr 213, ecHr 1996-Iv; ectHr, Stagno v. Belgium, app. no. 1062/07 (July 7, 2009); 
ectHr, Steel and Morris v. United Kingdom, §62; ectHr, Acimovic v. Croatia, 61237/00, (october 9, 
2003), §29. 
200 see, e.g., Hrcee, Graciela Ato del Avellanal v. Peru communication 202/1986 (october 28, 1988), 10.1-
10.3; ectHr, Kreuz v. Poland, app. no. 28249/05, (June 19, 2001), §58-67. see also above in section 1.3.1. 
Element of the 
right to a review
Holder of the right 
Access to the 
review body 
Access to review 
body, fairness of 
the procedure 




Imposition of legal 
standing criteria 










In general, only 
for those decisions 
with high impact 
All instruments 
Table 7: Possible conditions to a right to a review
Criteria 
- It may not result in 
impairment of the very 
essence of the right 
- no discrimination 
- when there are factors 
of vulnerability, positive 
measures may be required 
to ensure the access of these 
individuals or groups
- not prohibitively expensive
- Assessed in the context of the 
case at hand, and the system 
as a whole 
- It may not de facto block 
access to the review body for 
the individual 
- vulnerability is a trigger 
factor for the provision of 
legal aid and assistance to 
mitigate negative effects 
- discretion for authorities 
to impose the requirement, 
however might result in an 
obligation to provide legal 
aid and/or legal assistance to 
those (particularly) vulnerable
- strict timeframes are 
permitted, but particular 
circumstances, such as the 
vulnerability of the claimants 
or applicants, may warrant a 
more lenient approach 
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In the context of national security threats, treaty monitoring bodies appear to be more 
lenient, and allow for certain limitations. for instance, the ectHr explained that in the case 
of national security considerations, remedies have to be as effective as possible. In other 
words, it is accepted that in situations of national security, access to certain information 
may be limited, for instance, by denying (partial) access to the underlying evidence or by 
only providing a summary of reasons. However, even more than in the context of other 
limitations, there have to be procedural guarantees in place to prevent arbitrary use. 
The ectHr addressed this question in Kaushal and others v. Bulgaria: 
However, even where national security is at stake, the concepts of lawfulness and the rule of 
law in a democratic society require that measures affecting fundamental human rights must 
be subject to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent 
to review the reasons for the decision and relevant evidence, if need be with appropriate 
procedural limitations on the use of classified information. The individual must be able to 
challenge the executive’s assertion that national security is at stake. while the executive’s 
assessment of what poses a threat to national security will naturally be of significant weight, 
the independent authority must be able to react in cases where invoking that concept has 
no reasonable basis in the facts or reveals an interpretation of “national security” that is 
unlawful or contrary to common sense and arbitrary. failing such safeguards, the police 
or other state authorities would be able to encroach arbitrarily on rights protected by the 
convention.
This case illustrates that authorities have to provide certain minimum guarantees, even when 
there is a situation of national security warranting a restriction of the rights of those affected. 
whenever the legal basis for the right to a review is not explicit, and instead, the treaty 
monitoring bodies have read the right into substantive provisions of the respective treaty 
instrument, the assessment of possible limitations or conditions to the right is slightly 
different. In these cases, the extent to which the right to a review is realized is to be assessed 
taking all procedural safeguards required into account. whenever the substantive right is 
limited by authorities, the instruments require that public authorities – in light of the legality 
201 ectHr, al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 136.
202 Article 13 requires a remedy to be “as effective as it can be,” having regard to the fact that it is inherent 
in any system of secret surveillance or secret checks that there is a restricted scope for recourse (see the 
Klass and Others v. Germany judgment (september 6, 1978), series A no. 28, § 69).
203 ectHr, Kaushal and others v. Bulgaria, 1537/08, judgment, (september 2, 2010), §29; see similarly 
ectHr, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, §129-130, 137.
204 see, e.g., cescr, General Comment 7: Right to adequate housing – forced evictions (1997), §11-13; 
cerd, CO on Suriname (2004), §193; ectHr, Leander v. Sweden, §77(a).
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and/or necessity principle – provide a right to a review for those affected. Thus when 
no, or only a limited, right to a review is provided, treaty monitoring bodies assess this in 
consideration with the overall level of procedural guarantees offered in light of the limitation 
to the substantive right.
overall, there is little room to impose limitations on the right to a review, beyond the 
conditions discussed in the context of the right to access the review body. These conditions, 
if they meet the tripartite test of legality, legitimacy and necessity, are permitted if it does not 
result in an impairment of the very essence of the right to a review. 
1.5. Conclusions: The Building Blocks of a Right to a Review 
The conceptual Model recognizes a right to an effective remedy, which includes a right to a 
review and to reparation. However, it does not further define the content and scope of these 
rights required to realize an effective remedy. This section will show that the right to a review 
within international law applicable to the domestic level has a strong legal basis. 
The right to a review has very diverse substantive legal bases, which recognize different forms 
of review. nevertheless, despite the different legal bases, this research identified general 
standards across the instruments for the content and scope of the right to a review; what 
differs, is the level of detail of the requirements for the review procedures and the extent to 
which further positive obligations are recognized for authorities to comply with. 
205 see, e.g., cescr, General Comment 7, §15; cescr, General Comment 15: the Right to Water, (2002), 
§48; cescr, General Comment 19: the right to social security, §8; crc, General Comment 14 (Article 3), 
§98: ectHr, Hatton and others v. United Kingdom, §127; ectHr, Taşkin v. Turkey, §119.
206 see similarly the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure (section 4 
(limitations) of chapter 4). for the type of substantive rights into which a right to a review has been 
read see section 1.1.2. of this chapter.
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The right to a review can be summarized as follows:
The next section will discuss whether, and to what extent, a right to reparation can be 
identified in the international instruments for those affected by decisions. 
2. The Right to Reparation 
The right to an effective remedy has two components: the right to a review and the right to 
reparation. The previous section discussed the content and scope of the right to a review; this 
section will address the right to reparation. However, the right to reparation is a peculiar one in 
comparison to the other rights recognized in the context of the draft Inclusionary Governance 
Model. Although the right to reparation has a firm legal basis in international law, its content 
and scope are relatively undefined. This section will set out the extent to which benchmarks 
can be identified for the right to reparation across the various treaty instruments. 
each international instrument contains one or more references to the right to reparation. 
However, the nature of the right varies; whereas some instruments have a general treaty 
provision stipulating a need for remedies and reparation whenever there is a violation of 
207 In general, see the un General Assembly resolution 60/147, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
right to a remedy and reparations for victims of Gross violations of International Human rights law 
and serious violations of International Humanitarian law G.A. res. 60/147, un doc. A/res/60/147 
(March 21, 2006).
RIGHT TO A REVIEW
Legal basis 
Duty bearer 
Holder of the right 
Type of obligations 
Limitations 
All instruments recognize a form of a right to a review. overall, there are two 
broad categories of legal bases: 
- The decision affects substantive rights enjoyed under the respective instrument 
- The dispute qualifies as a suit at law or determination of certain rights and 
obligations 
Public authorities: all branches of state, all actors who exercise public authority
Those affected by (administrative) decisions 
legal standing requirements may be posed 
A right to access a review body
competent, independent and impartial review body 
fair review procedure which includes a duty to inform, a duty to provide  
reasons, equality of arms, and a reasonable timeframe 
right to limit access to the review body 
constraints may not lead to the impairment of the essence of the right 
The right to a review forms part of the procedural guarantees recognized in the 
context of substantive rights 
Table 8: Building block - right to a review
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a right of the respective instrument, in other instances, the right is mentioned in the same 
breath as the recognition of a right to a review in that particular case. overall, across the 
instruments, a right to reparation is recognized in all those instances where a right to a review 
was recognized. This is not surprising, considering that the right to a review and the right 
to reparation are both required to ensure a right to an effective remedy. The reasoning of the 
various treaty monitoring bodies is similar, a review cannot constitute an effective remedy 
without reparation, and reparation is vital in the context of the enforcement of human 
rights. The IActHr, for instance, in the case of Montero Aranguren et al. aptly described 
the fundamental role of the right to reparation in international law when explaining the 
meaning of Article 63 AcHr: 
Article 63(1) of the American convention reflects a customary norm that constitutes one of 
the basic principles of contemporary international law on state responsibility. Thus, when 
an unlawful act occurs, which can be attributed to a state, this gives rise immediately to its 
international responsibility, with the consequent obligation to cause the consequences of the 
violation to cease and to repair the damage caused.
The question of who is the holder of a right to reparation is therefore intrinsically linked 
to the question who may initiate a complaint of an alleged violation of a convention right. 
In other words, in general, the holders of the right are those who may initiate the legal 
proceedings as discussed in section 1.1 above. However, as highlighted in the previous 
section, this includes not only the addressees of decisions but also others that are affected 
by a decision. for instance, parents may claim remedies on behalf of their children, and in 
very limited situations children may do so on behalf of their parents or siblings. 
208 The recognition of the right can derive from an explicit legal basis for the right and/or it can be read into 
a substantive provision by a treaty monitoring body.
209 cescr, GC 21, §54a: claim and receive compensation; cescr GC 19, §78: remedies; cescr 15, §56(d) 
legal remedies; ectHr, Taskin v. Turkey, §124-125; African commission on Human and Peoples’ 
rights, Amnesty International and Others v. Sudan, comm. no. 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93 (1999), §37; 
article 9(4) of the Aarhus convention reads: 
 The procedures (…) shall provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as 
appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. Injunctive relief refers to a 
remedy designed to prevent or remedy injury. This is particularly relevant in environmental matters 
as many of the disputes concern future proposed activities or deal with ongoing activities which poses 
an imminent threat to the human health and the environment.
 see also ebbesson, and others, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation Guide (2014), at 200.
210 IActHr, Case of Montero Aranguren et al. (Detention Center of Catia) (July 5, 2006) series c no. 150, 
§116; IActHr, Case of Ximenes Lopes, §208; IActHr, Case of the Ituango Massacres, §346.
211 IActHr, Blake v. Guatemala (1996) series c no. 27; IActHr, Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru (reparation) 
(1998) series c no. 42; see similarly Hrcee, Quinterros v. Uruguay 107/1981 (1983) § 3; Bleier v. 
Uruguay 30/1978, §7). see for the ectHr, for instance, Vallianatos and Others v. Greece [Gc], §§ 47; 
ectHr, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v. Romania [Gc], § 101; ectHr, 
Klass and others v. Germany; ectHr, Soering v. United Kingdom. 
212 In the situation of enforced disappearances, for instance, children may file these claims under Article 24 
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
The general standard is that authorities have wide discretion in choosing the reparation, as 
long as the reparation contain a “determination of the claim, and some form of redress.” 
In general, an effective remedy has to be effective, accessible and adequate to repair the harm 
suffered. compliance with this standard is reviewed by assessing both the review procedure 
available to those affected and the reparation provided. The accessibility requirement was 
discussed in the context of the right to a review in section 1 (section 1.3.1) and requires 
that the holders of the right have access to a review body to request a review and claim for 
reparation. The effectiveness of the remedy refers to the competence of the review body to 
provide suitable reparation required in a given case to remedy the harm suffered by those 
affected. Accordingly, the principle is to be assessed both under the right to a review and the 
right to reparation. for a remedy to be effective, it has to be heard by a competent authority, 
which implies that the review body has to have the power to remedy the harm. depending 
on the (substantive) right at stake, a different remedy may be effective and adequate. At a 
minimum, the authority has to be able to adopt a final decision on the alleged violation and 
offer some form of redress for the harm suffered. The content of reparation required may 
vary depending on, for instance, the nature of an allegedly violated right and on the gravity 
of the violation suffered, and damage resulting from this violation. In general, the various 
instruments recognize a wide discretion for public authorities to determine which reparation 
are suitable in a given case. The reparation may entail restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, 
satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. for instance, in Wilson v. the Philippines: 
…the committee observes that the compensation provided by the state party under its 
domestic law was not directed at these violations, and that compensation due to the author 
should take due account both of the seriousness of the violations and the damage to the author 
caused.
of the convention against enforced disappearances. 
213 ectHr, Silver v. UK, (1983), §113. 
214 for example, the ectHr explained that effectiveness refers to “[e]ffective in the sense either of 
preventing the alleged violation or its continuation, or of providing adequate redress for any violation 
that had already occurred,” ectHr, Kudla v. Poland, §159.
215 see above in section 1.2.2 of this chapter. for example, the ectHr held in Chahal v. UK that the remedy 
provided was not effective as the advisory panel that acted as the review body was not able to make a 
binding decision. ectHr, Chahal v. UK (november 15, 1996). It should be noted that in order to comply 
with this criterion, it is not sufficient to merely adopt a binding decision. As stated particularly by the 
ectHr, the execution of a judgment is an integral part of the right to a review and thus of the right to 
an effective remedy, article 35(1) ecHr, ectHr, Zehentner v. Austria, §43 (october 16, 2009); ectHr, 
Burdov. v. Russia (2002), §34-35; ectHr, Jasiūnienė v. Lithuania (2003), §27; ectHr, Sirbu v. Moldova, 
§25-27). As stated in Burdov. v. Russia, §34-35, the right to an effective remedy becomes illusory if “a 
member state court system would allow a final binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the 
detriment of one party”.
216 Hrcee, Wilson v. The Philippines (868/1999), (october 30, 2003), at §9; see also §2.3, 2.6-2.10, 8. 
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The requirement of adequacy of the remedy is closely related to the requirement of effectiveness, 
it requires that the reparation provided are capable in addressing the harm suffered. for 
instance, the Aarhus convention refers to the obligation to fully compensate past damage 
and prevent future damage. further, in a given case it may require restoration, or injunctive 
relief to remedy the harm done. overall, what reparation are required in a given case is a 
contextual assessment. Public authorities enjoy wide discretion in determining what type of 
reparation are effective, adequate and accessible to ensure an effective remedy. However, the 
legal survey charted a few situations in which further instructions are given as to the type 
of reparation required. for instance, in the case of expropriation, public authorities have to 
fairly compensate those affected for the harm suffered and damage caused. In the context 
of decisions that adversely affect the lives of indigenous peoples, public authorities have to 
provide a remedy that is not only effective in remedying the harm but in particular, they 
have to offer compensation or restitution when prior informed consent was not given by 
those adversely affected. lastly, in the particular situation of alleged gross human rights 
violations, there is an obligation for authorities to conduct a full and impartial investigation 
of the such violations and an obligation to institute proceedings against the perpetrators. 
none of the instruments recognizes a discretion for public authorities to limit the right to 
reparation. 
217 Article 9(4) Aarhus convention; see also footnote 207; injunctive relief refers to a remedy designed to 
prevent or remedy injury. This is particularly relevant in environmental matters as many of the disputes 
concern proposed future activities or deal with ongoing activities that pose an imminent threat to the 
human health and environment; ebbesson and others, The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation 
Guide (2014), at 200. 
218 for example, article 15 Migrant workers convention contains an explicit legal basis for the right to 
reparation, namely the right to fair and adequate compensation for those affected by expropriation.
219 for instance, the cerd states in its General Comment 23 that when decisions are taken without the 
prior informed consent of those who have been adversely affected, restitution has to be offered to the 
indigenous peoples affected. cerd, General Comment 23, (1997) §5; cerd, CO on Ecuador, §16, un 
doc. cerd/c/ecu/co/19 (september 22, 2008); cerd, Concluding Observations on Namibia, §18, 
un. doc. cerd/c/nAM/co/12 (september 22, 2008); cerd, CO on USA, §29, un doc. cerd/c/
usA/co/6 (May 8, 2008). 
220 cerd, CO on Nigeria, A/60/18 (2005) 54, §294.
rIGHt to An effectIve reMedy
In conclusion, the right to reparation has a firm legal basis in international law. The limited 
benchmarks of the building blocks of the right to reparation are summarized below:
3. Conclusions 
chapter 2 (the conceptual Model) recognized an obligation for international institutions to 
provide an effective remedy. The legal survey conducted in this chapter of the international 
standards for the national level established that the right to an effective remedy has a firm 
legal basis in international law, and that the contours of the right can be further defined. 
The remedy provided has to be effective, adequate and accessible. The remedy has to be 
available to those affected by decisions and to direct family members or next of kin. The 
right to a review implies a duty for public authorities to provide a fair review procedure 
by a competent, independent and impartial review body. However, a two-tier procedure is 
permitted, and public authorities may impose conditions to constrain access to the review 
body under circumstances if the requirements of the tripartite test are met. The right to 
reparation implies a duty for public authorities to provide effective and adequate reparation 
to those affected, their direct family members or next of kin. The right to a review and the 
right to reparation are complementary to each other and the lack of one of the two cannot 
be compensated by the other. Thus, even if there was a fair review procedure conducted by 
an independent, impartial and competent review body, if actual reparation is prevented by 
actions of state authorities, it results in a violation of the right to an effective remedy. This 
exact situation was reviewed by the ectHr in Taskin v. Turkey, and the court held that:
221 As explained in section 1.1 of this chapter, the right to a review is recognized in the context of two broad 
categories of legal bases: (1) the decision affects substantive rights enjoyed under the instrument in 
question, and (2) the dispute qualifies as a suit at law or determination of certain rights and obligations. 




Holder of the right 
Type of obligations 
Limitations 
Broad legal basis: all conventions recognize a form of a right to reparation
Public authorities: all branches of state, all actors who exercise public 
(administrative) authority
Those affected by (administrative) decisions, family members, next of kin 
The remedy provided has to be effective, accessible and adequate in 
addressing the harm 
no explicit or implicit limitations recognized 
Table 9: Building block - right to reparation
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where administrative authorities refuse to fail to comply, or even delay doing so, the guarantees 
enjoyed by a litigant during the judicial phase of the proceedings are rendered devoid of 
purpose (…) this finding appears all the more necessary in that the circumstances of the 
case clearly demonstrate that, notwithstanding the procedural guarantees offered by turkish 
legislation and the implementation of those guarantees by judicial decisions, the council of 
ministers, [in not a public decision] authorized continuation of production at the gold mine, 
which had already begun to operate in April 2001. In so doing, the authorities deprived the 
procedural guarantees available of any useful effect.
Although the two rights are two sides of the same coin, the extent to which international law 
regulates the content and scope of the rights is quite different. The right to a review is a more 
robust right, where international law gives more guidance as to what is required from public 
authorities. In contrast, with respect to the right to reparation, there is normative agreement 
in international law on the necessity of the norm and that the reparation has to be adequate 
and effective in remedying the harm, while public authorities are accorded wide discretion 
on how to achieve this. 
even more than in regard to the other two dimensions, in the context of the right to an 
effective remedy, the interaction between the norms within the dimension come to the fore. 
first, the two rights of an effective remedy are complementary to each other; both rights have 
to be provided in order for the remedy to be effective. Moreover, the right to information 
and the right to participation inform the right to an effective remedy, and the right to an 
effective remedy strengthens the other two dimensions. By now, recurring themes can 
be identified in the analyses of chapters 3, 4, and 5. Therefore, chapter 6 will discuss the 
draft Inclusionary Governance Model as a whole and it will demonstrate the interaction 
between the dimensions and between the different legal norms. It will also explain how the 
draft Model serves to analyze and address the accountability of public authorities adopting 
decisions affecting individuals.
222 The court came to this conclusion in the context of Article 8 ecHr, Taskin v. Turkey, §124-125. 
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A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
This chapter serves as the concluding chapter of Part II. The main aim of this chapter is to 
present a draft Inclusionary Governance Model (‘draft IGM’ or ‘draft Model’) that serves 
as a yardstick for the analysis of the accountability of public authorities vis-à-vis those 
affected by their decisions. This chapter summarizes and demonstrates how the legal survey 
informed the conceptual Model developed in Part I and how the various elements of the 
draft Inclusionary Governance Model are further developed. As a recap, the conceptual 
Model can be summarized as follows: 
section 1 summarizes and illustrates the building blocks of the draft IGM and its benchmarks. 
The focus in this section is on understanding how different elements of the draft Model 
play a role in ensuring accountability for public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their 
decisions and how the norms relate to each other. section 2 will discuss how the concepts 
of non-arbitrariness and vulnerability influence the content and scope of inclusionary 
governance norms, contributing to a dynamic model. section 3 will present a schematic 
overview of the draft Model to analyze the accountability of public authorities exercising 
public power directly affecting individuals and explains the main elements of the draft IGM. 
section 4 will provide the conclusions of this chapter. 
1. Building the Draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
section 1.1 will summarize the building blocks of the three dimensions of the draft 
Inclusionary Governance Model, the informational rights, the right to participation in the 
decision-making procedure and the right to an effective remedy. section 1.2 will discuss the 
interaction identified between the dimensions and will further explain the commonalities 
and differences between the various building blocks.
1 The conceptual Model was developed in chapter 2, the schematic overview and its main characteristics 
were discussed in the concluding paragraph of that chapter. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR INCLUSIONARY GOVERNANCE
International institutions exercising public power directly affecting individuals:
- have to provide access to information; 
- have to duly inform those affected;
- have to provide participation in the decision-making procedure;
- have to ensure an effective and adequate remedy; and 
- have to provide reasons for the decision reached. 
In addition, any public power has to be exercised: 
- in accordance with the law; 
- not in an arbitrary manner; 
- may not result into a violation of ius cogens norms. 
- In addition, decision-making procedures have to ensure a certain quality of the procedure. 
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1.1. The Building Blocks of the Three Dimensions
This section will discuss the main characteristics, similarities, and differences within and 
between the three dimensions (1.1.1-1.1.3). considering that previous chapters identified, 
demonstrated, and justified the various benchmarks of each building block as charted by 
the legal survey, this chapter only summarizes and demonstrates the function and content 
of these building blocks. Those interested in the background and details of the various 
benchmarks per building block of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model are referred to 
the distinct sections in the preceding chapters. 
1.1.1. Two Informational Rights 
The draft Inclusionary Governance Model contains two informational rights: the right to 
public interest information and the right to personal information. The building blocks of 












no interest to be stated
right to access information of public 
interest (corresponding duty to 
disclose information upon request)
duty to provide reasons for a refusal to 
disclose information 
fair, timely, low-cost procedure
duty to provide information on the 
procedure to request information
exhaustive list of limitations
tripartite test: legality, legitimacy, 
necessity
Provide procedural safeguards 
(including right to a review) and limit 
the discretion of authorities 
Personal information
Public authorities
Those with proof of identity (no interest to 
be stated), family members with genuine 
link to information (and subject) 
right to access, modify and remove 
personal information 
duty to provide an opportunity to challenge 
the legality of the information stored 
duty to protect information in possession 
of the authorities from unauthorized access 
and usage by third parties 
fair, timely, low-cost procedure
duty to duly inform of personal information 
held and how to access this information 
exhaustive list of limitations
tripartite test: legality, legitimacy, necessity
Avoid arbitrariness: provide procedural 
safeguards (including right to a review) and 
limit the discretion of authorities
Table 10: Building blocks of the informational rights (summary)
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
As the table shows, both informational rights encompass a strong access right with no 
requirement to state an interest in order to gain access to the information. Public authorities 
have to disclose the information upon request, unless the right is limited in accordance 
with the requirements of legality, necessity and legitimacy (i.e., the tripartite test). overall, 
authorities have to ensure a fair, low-cost and timely procedure to request information and 
a possibility to challenge a denial of (partial) access to information. Moreover, any decision 
made has to be duly reasoned and communicated to those initiating the procedure. 
The right to personal information, however, differs from the right to public interest 
information not only in the nature of the information held but also in the scope of the right. 
The duties for public authorities are far more encompassing, the potential interferences 
with the substantive rights of those affected are also more extensive when public authorities 
collect, store and/or share personal information. Accordingly, those individuals whose 
personal information is held by public authorities have a right to challenge the legality of the 
collection and storage and/or sharing of their information. furthermore, authorities have 
a duty to protect personal information in their possession from unauthorized access and/
usage by third parties.
1.1.2. The Right to Meaningful Participation in the Decision-Making Procedure
The right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure provides a right 
for those affected by (administrative) decisions to participate in the procedure. The building 
block can be summarized as follows: 
2 It should be noted that in the context of personal information, an individual may not be aware of 
the information held by public authorities and accordingly will most likely not ask for access to the 
information held. see further chapter 3, section 2.
RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCEDURE
Duty bearer
Holders of the right





Those affected by decisions 
duty to duly inform (substance & procedure) 
duty to ensure meaningful involvement in the procedure ➔ if individuals 
are adversely affected, prior informed consent is required 
duty to duly account for views expressed 
duty to provide a reasoned decision 
fair, timely, low-cost procedure 
no explicit limitations, but a general obligation to avoid arbitrariness 
Table 11: Building block of the right to meaningful participation (summary)
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Those affected by decisions have a right to participate in a meaningful manner in the 
decision-making procedure. Authorities are required to duly inform those affected, ensure a 
meaningful involvement of those affected, duly consider the views expressed by those affected 
and justify the decision reached by providing reasons for the decision. In general, authorities 
enjoy wide discretion in determining how to organize these participatory processes – the 
format, duration, and the timeframe – as long as the participation of those affected in the 
decision-making procedure remains meaningful. 
The benchmarks of the building block incorporate a differentiation in the minimum 
standards to be provided; under particular circumstances, a higher substantive standard has 
to be met by public authorities. A right to prior informed consent exists whenever authorities 
make decisions that adversely affect the lives or livelihood of indigenous communities or 
minorities. In these situations, it is not enough for authorities to arrange for meaningful 
involvement of those affected, but instead, they are required to realize the prior informed 
consent of those adversely affected by the upcoming decision. Thus, the views of those affected 
are accorded more weight (veto right) in the decision-making procedure that diminishes the 
discretion of authorities in this regard.
There is a duty to inform those affected of the participatory processes in the decision-making 
procedure and to provide them with enough information to enable them to participate in the 
procedure in a meaningful manner. This duty to inform is distinct from the informational 
rights as summarized in the previous section. However, the informational rights can 
strengthen the right to participation in the decision-making procedure, as those interested 
can file for a request to access public interest information to receive further (background) 
information related to the decision that affects them. 
similarly, as identified in the context of the informational rights, the various instruments 
recognize procedural guarantees that have to be provided by public authorities in the context 
of the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. In general, there 
is an obligation to prevent arbitrary decision-making processes. The participatory procedure 
has to be fair and timely to ensure that the involvement is meaningful and those affected have 
to have a right to challenge the decision reached. Moreover, in contrast to the informational 
rights, no explicit limitations have been recognized to the right to participation in the 
decision-making procedure. 
3 It should be noted that sections 3, 4 and 5 will address how the authorities’ discretion should be 
understood in terms of the general yardstick for accountability. 
4 This right also exists for the particular situation of invasive health treatments. see further chapter 4, 
sections 3.2-3.3.
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
1.1.3. The Right to an Effective Remedy
The right to an effective remedy contains two components: the right to a review and the 
right to reparation. The two rights are complementary to each other, and thus authorities 
need to provide both in order to comply with the requirements of the right to an effective 
remedy. Accordingly, even when a review body was impartial, independent and/or when 
they provided a fair hearing to those affected, if the review body did not provide for adequate 
and effective reparation, it will result in a violation of the right to an effective remedy. The 
building blocks of the right to an effective remedy can be summarized as follows: 
The right to a review contains several elements: a right to access a review body, a right to a fair 
review by a competent, impartial and independent review body, a duty to notify those affected of 
the review possibilities and the procedural requirements, and a duty to provide a reasoned written 
decision. Authorities may require those affected to follow a two-tier review procedure, which 
includes a first obligatory step of administrative review. At a minimum, an administrative review 
has to be conducted by competent authorities, those affected have to be notified of the procedure, 
they have to have a right to be heard in the review procedure, and there has to be a possibility to 
request a review of the decision by an independent, impartial and competent review body. 
with respect to the right to reparation, the guidance of international law is more limited. 
reparation provided has to be effective and adequate in addressing the harm impaired; how 
this is achieved – that is, with what reparation – falls within the discretion of authorities. 







Right to a review 
Public authorities
Those affected by (administrative) 
decisions, family members, next of kin
right of access to the review body 
competent, independent, impartial 
review body 
fair review procedure: duty to inform, 
duty to provide a reasoned decision, 
equality of arms, timely and not 
prohibitively expensive procedure 
conditions permitted to the access to a 
review body 
constraints may not lead to an 
impairment of the very essence of the 
right  
Right to reparation 
Public authorities 
Those whose rights have allegedly been 
violated, family members, next of kin 
The remedy provided has to be effective and 
adequate in addressing the harm 
no explicit or implicit limitations 
recognized 
Table 12: Building block of the right to an effective remedy (summary)
  6
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
If those affected are considered to be particularly vulnerable, authorities may however be 
required to do more to ensure the effectiveness of a remedy. for example, public authorities 
may be required to provide legal aid or render other forms of assistance to empower those 
who wish to access a review procedure to ensure that they are able to successfully access 
the review procedure. In addition, in the context of certain violations of international law 
affecting particular individuals or groups of individuals, the type of reparation required is 
more spelled out. 
As noted in the previous two sections, informational rights and the right to participation 
in the decision-making procedure inform the right to an effective remedy. The table below 
provides insight into what type of claims for review may derive from the rights previously 
discussed but also into what is expected from the reparation for the remedy to effectively 
repair the harm suffered.
5 This is the case, for example, in regards to expropriation decisions affecting indigenous peoples, see 
above chapter 5 section 2. 
6 The overview given in the table is not exhaustive but instead serves as an illustration of how the 
dimensions influence and inform each other. 
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
It should be noted that these grounds for review are in addition to the other legal bases 
recognized for the right to a review.
overall, this section showed that the norms interact with each other: they do not operate in a 
vacuum; instead, they act to some extent as communicating vessels. Therefore, the realization 
of the recognized inclusionary governance norms should not be assessed per dimension, or 
per norm, but instead, it is necessary to look at the decision-making and review procedure 
as a whole. 
7 The following two main categories of right to a review were identified in chapter 5: (1) the decision 
affects substantive rights enjoyed under the respective instrument, and (2) the dispute qualifies as a suit 
at law or determination of certain rights and obligations.
POTENTIAL GROUNDS FOR REVIEW TRIGGERED BY THE OTHER TWO DIMENSIONS
Right to information
Those whose request for public 
interest information has been 
fully or partially denied
Those whose personal 
information is stored and 
collected
Those whose personal 
information is published
Those whose personal 
information is accessed by 
third parties without consent 
of the data subject and without 
authorization by the public 
authority in possession of the 
information
Right to participation in the 
decision-making procedure 
Those who were not able to 
participate in a meaningful 
manner in the decision-making 
procedure 
Right to an effective remedy 
right to challenge the decision 
made
right to challenge the legality 
of storage or collection of the 
information (i.e., legality/accuracy 
evidence) 
right to rectification and removal 
if the information is not accurate 
and a right to challenge the 
legality of the publication of the 
information
right to question authorities’ 
compliance with the duty to 
protect personal information 
right to challenge a lack of 
participation, right to challenge 
substance of the decision 
Table 13: Informational and participatory rights that trigger a right to a review 
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The next section will demonstrate that a contextual assessment is warranted when analyzing 
the accountability of public authorities making decisions directly affecting individuals. when 
conducting a contextual assessment, certain dynamics between and within the dimensions 
come to the forefront. In short, the next section will address the interaction and normative 
overlap between the dimensions within the draft Inclusionary Governance Model.
1.2. Mapping Interactions within and between the Dimensions: Contextual Assessment 
is Warranted
The previous section showed that the three dimensions, the two informational rights – the 
right to meaningful participation in decision-making procedures and the right to an effective 
remedy – influence each other. This section will further map the different ways in which the 
identified norms interact with each other and the implications thereof for the draft Model. 
first, the rights influence each other and aim to strengthen each other. for instance, the two 
informational rights strengthen the right to participation and the right to an effective remedy. 
These informational rights enable one to be (further) informed; the possibility to request 
public interest information and/or personal information of public authorities can strengthen 
participatory processes and review procedures. The informational rights are distinctive from, 
but complementary to, the duty to inform that exists in the context of the right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure and the right to an effective remedy. Those 
individuals (or groups) whose informational rights and/or participatory rights have been 
partially or fully denied have a right to an effective remedy. Thus, said right enables those 
affected to enforce their informational rights and their right to meaningful participation in 
the decision-making procedure.
second, commonalities across the dimensions are identified in the recognition of procedural 
requirements that play a role in the realization of inclusionary governance protected for those 
affected. The legal survey established that similar procedural requirements can be identified 
across the various decision-making and review procedures: a common core of guarantees. 
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All these criteria aim to ensure a certain quality of the procedures: 
Authorities are required to ensure these common core guarantees in all their decision-making 
procedures that affect individuals and in the respective review procedures in place. Thus, 
the guarantees are required for procedures to request access, modification or removal of 
personal information and for the decisions to challenge the legality to store or share personal 
information. similarly, public authorities have to realize these guarantees for procedures to 
request access to public interest information and for the related review procedure, as well as 
for each participatory and review procedure.
certain dynamics were detected during the legal survey in relation to these common core 
guarantees. In short, when all common core guarantees are realized in a given decision-
making or review procedure, the argument is that it leads to better decisions, decisions that 
are fair and in which the interest of those affected are duly taken into account. realizing the 
common core guarantees does not imply per se that those affected are sufficiently included in 
the decision-making procedure of public authorities; a lack of one of the other benchmarks of 
the draft Model may still lead to a violation of (one of) the identified rights and obligations. 
However, not meeting one of the common core guarantees is expected to have a detrimental 
effect on the overall level of realized inclusionary governance. for example, there is extensive 
case law that shows that whenever decision-making authorities fail to provide reasons for the 
decision reached (e.g., in the participatory phase), it has a negative effect on the effectiveness 
of a legal remedy in the review procedure.
8 The notion of quality of a procedure is also discussed in section 2.2 when the concept of non-arbitrariness 
will be discussed. In short, when the procedure is of a certain quality the majority of the common core 
procedural guarantees are realized and as a result the chance of an arbitrary procedure is mitigated. 
9 see, e.g., crc, General Comment 14 (concerning article 3 CRC), §97; see further cescr, General 
Comment 7, §15; ectHr, Suominen v. Finland application no. 37801/97 (July 1, 2003) §38. ectHr, 
Lombardi Vallauri v. Italy application no. (*) 39128/05 (2010), §45-49. 
COMMON CORE PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
Decision-making procedure 
duty to inform 
right to be heard in the participatory process of 
the decision-making procedure 
duty to duly consider input 
duty to provide a written reasoned decision
duty to publish or notify of decision reached 
Review procedure 
duty to inform 
right to be heard by a competent, independent, 
impartial review body
duty to duly consider views presented 
duty to provide a written reasoned decision
duty to publish the decision reached 
Table 14: Common core procedural guarantees
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further, the common core guarantees serve as a way to prevent arbitrary decisions. section 
2 will address how the concept of arbitrariness influences the draft Model. In short, an 
arbitrary decision is a decision that is not (sufficiently) guided by rules or laws but is rather 
decided within the full discretion of public authorities without procedural guarantees in 
place to prevent a misuse of public powers. 
In conclusion, the normative interaction identified in this section further shows the merits 
and the necessity of a contextual assessment of the accountability of authorities exercising 
public power affecting individuals. The common core guarantees provide insights into the 
functioning of the draft Model and its dynamics. The following section will address how 
contextual factors influence the content and scope of the benchmarks of the draft Model.
2. Minimum Standards and Discretionary Powers: Understanding the 
Dynamics of the Draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
This section will discuss the dynamic aspect of the draft Model and will illustrate how 
the concepts of non-arbitrariness and vulnerability influence the content and scope of the 
benchmarks of the draft IGM. The legal survey charted how these notions influence the 
amount of discretion enjoyed by authorities. In short, discretion refers to the administrative 
leeway authorities enjoy in implementing their legal obligations and decisions in a case at 
hand. section 2.1 will discuss the different discretionary norms recognized within this 
research. 
As a result of the discretion conferred upon public authorities, treaty monitoring bodies 
exercise a form of deferential review. said deferential review is reflected in the various 
concepts and notions used in international (human rights) law: the level of scrutiny exercised 
by monitoring bodies, exhaustion of local/domestic remedies, margin of appreciation for 
member states, and/or deference. The legal survey shows that the amount of discretion in 
a given case and the deferential review exercised by treaty monitoring bodies relate to each 
other. 
10 y. shany, ‘towards a General Margin of Appreciation doctrine in International law’ (2005) 16 European 
Journal of International Law at 910.
11 deference, as defined in the online Merriam-webster dictionary, refers to “respect and esteem due a 
superior or an elder”, deferential review in this regard refers, according to the dictionary, to “showing 
or expressing respect and high regard due a superior or an elder : showing or expressing deference”. In 
the context of review by treaty monitoring bodies of the review conducted by domestic courts, it means 
that such monitoring bodies exercise a form of restraint, and do not conduct a de novo review. Instead, 
they evaluate the compliance of the member state, including the domestic court’s judgements, with the 
treaty obligations laid down in the respective treaty and exercise a form of judicial constraint in their 
evaluation.
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There is a presumption that public authorities are in the best position to decide in individual 
cases as they have the facts at hand. Therefore, public authorities enjoy discretion to evaluate 
the evidence and facts in a given case; in principle, international law does not regulate 
the evaluation of evidence and facts in a domestic review procedure. Accordingly, treaty 
monitoring bodies exercise a form of deferential review in their assessment of individual 
complaints submitted to them. They do not re-evaluate facts and evidence presented in 
domestic court cases, nor do they act as a fourth instance court; instead, treaty monitoring 
bodies seem to exercise a form of judicial constraint when reviewing compliance of a state 
party with the treaty obligations. only the european court of Human rights has defined 
its approach to deferential review explicitly, by developing the doctrine of the margin of 
appreciation in its case law. In the context of other treaty monitoring bodies, the approach is 
deduced from the case law examined in the legal survey. 
The following sections aim to further define and map this interaction. section 2.1 will define 
how the notion of discretion is understood. sections 2.2 and 2.3 will discuss how the concepts 
of non-arbitrariness and vulnerability influence the discretion enjoyed by authorities and, 
consequently, the scope of review exercised by treaty monitoring bodies. 
2.1. Discretionary Norms
Authorities enjoy administrative discretion in the implementation of their obligations to 
realize inclusionary governance of those affected by their decisions. In order to understand 
the role of this discretion of public authorities in the draft Model, further distinction is 
required between two types of discretionary norms: ‘standard type norms’ and ‘result norms’. 
standard type norms refer to norms that have an inherent uncertainty in the norm: either they 
are inevitably dependent on circumstances or purposefully non-uniform, which implies a 
level of discretion for authorities when they apply these norms. shany defined them as norms 
that “mediate between law and reality and inject considerable flexibility into the law.” for 
12 see, e.g., Hrcee, R.M. v. Finland (301/1988, (March 23, 1989) 300 at §6.4; Hrcee, J. H. v. Finland 
(300/1988), (March 23, 1989), §6.4.
13 It should be noted that, in this research, the focus lies on the role of public authorities and the extent 
to which international law imposes constraints on the exercise of public power, and thus also whether 
certain discretion is recognized for public authorities in the exercise of their powers. The discussion of 
the recognized discretion and the exercised deferential review that follows is based on the results of the 
legal survey. 
14 for a broader discussion of the different discretionary norms, see shany at 910 and further. In this book, 
a slightly different categorization is used for the research’s scope and angle. officially, there are three 
categories with the third consisting of discretionary norms, which imply that authorities are accorded 
a discretion within the legal instrument, (for example, “a state may consider…”), but this research only 
uses the two categories mentioned in the text. The result-based norms referred to in this research are a 
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instance, limitations to various rights as recognized in the draft Inclusionary Governance 
Model are permitted when these restrictions meet the tripartite test of legality, necessity and 
legitimacy. The principle of necessity is an example of a standard type norm. Although the 
principle has been interpreted as requiring the installation of certain procedural safeguards 
into the procedure, the principle is meant to allocate freedom to authorities to balance the 
interests in a given case, which is inherently dependent on the facts of the case at hand. even 
though different treaty monitoring bodies may accord authorities less or more discretion 
in this regard, the final decision and the balancing of the interests at stake fall within the 
discretion of authorities. 
result norms are norms that are indifferent to how a result is attained. Accordingly, 
authorities enjoy broad discretion in the choice of means and manner in which, for example, 
meaningful participation or an effective remedy is achieved. similarly, authorities have a 
duty to duly inform those affected and prevent arbitrary procedures, while the instruments 
currently do not dictate how to achieve this. The discretion accorded to authorities in 
these result norms may change over time. Instruments and/or treaty monitoring bodies 
may limit the accorded discretion by stipulating benchmarks – that is, elements that, at a 
minimum, should be provided by authorities when realizing the particular norm – but at the 
end, authorities retain the freedom to choose the means and manner in which the result is 
achieved within set parameters. 
Both types of norms allow for a form of norm flexibility, and accord public authorities a degree 
of discretion. It should be noted however that the fact that authorities have discretion does 
not preclude review of their conduct; it only limits its scope of operation. treaty monitoring 
bodies will not re-do a decision; instead they will assess whether, in the given context, public 
authorities stayed within the given discretion and whether the result is achieved and/or 
whether the standard is properly applied in light of the parameters set by the respective 
instrument. In the following sections, two factors that influence the discretion enjoyed by 
public authorities, and accordingly the deferential review exercised by treaty monitoring 
bodies, will be discussed: the concept of non-arbitrariness and the concept of vulnerability.
2.2. Non-Arbitrariness as a Substantive Limitation to the Exercise of Public Power 
This section will discuss the concept of non-arbitrariness and how it serves as a substantive 
limitation to the exercise of public power by public authorities. The legal survey charts how 
both within the instruments and in the works of the treaty monitoring bodies the concept of 
non-arbitrariness plays a pivotal role. Although there are some differences in the way various 
treaty monitoring bodies refer to the concept, two ways can in general be identified in which 
the concept of non-arbitrariness informs the recognized inclusionary governance standards. 
17 Idem. 
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first, the concept of non-arbitrariness is used in the interpretation of the criterion of 
legality, one of the three criteria of the tripartite test. overall, treaty monitoring bodies 
have interpreted the term rather similarly and require a certain quality of the law that, at a 
minimum, constitutes a way to prevent an arbitrary use of powers. This implies, for instance, 
that a law has to define who may exercise discretionary powers under what circumstances. 
for example, whenever public authorities store personal information for national security 
reasons, there should be a law regulating who may store personal information and under 
what circumstances, who may access this information and under what circumstances, 
and what rights are held by those who may be affected; in other words, there should be 
a law protecting the rights of those affected to access, modify or rectify information, and 
ensuring a possibility to challenge the storage of the personal information. If authorities 
enjoy unfettered discretion and/or there are no procedural guarantees in place, it paves the 
way for an arbitrary use of powers. As a result, treaty monitoring bodies assess whether the 
discretion enjoyed by public authorities is properly regulated to prevent an arbitrary use of 
powers. 
secondly, the various instruments stipulate that all decision-making and review procedures 
have to be of a certain quality, which is a way to prevent an arbitrary use of powers. for 
instance, in the context of the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making 
procedure, public authorities are obliged to duly inform those affected, to realize meaningful 
involvement of those affected, to duly account for the interests presented and to duly reason 
the decision made. All these steps may prove that a decision was not taken arbitrarily, and 
that it was made through a fair decision-making procedure. similar reasoning can be found 
in the context of the right to a review; for instance, those affected should have a fair review 
procedure, which implies that at the very minimum the procedures cannot be arbitrary. 
Public authorities enjoy wide discretion in meeting these quality criteria, they are free to 
choose the means and methods to meet the criteria. As a result, treaty monitoring bodies 
exercise a form of deferential review when they assess the compliance of public authorities 
with these discretionary norms. only when there is an arguable claim that a decision has 
arbitrary features are the procedures and the realized guarantees scrutinized in greater 
detail. whenever a decision appears to be taken arbitrarily, the whole decision-making and 
review procedure is further scrutinized, including issues of evidence, standard and burden of 
proof, which normally fall outside the scope for review of treaty monitoring bodies. 
18 see, e.g., section 2.6 of chapter 3 in which the limitations to the right to personal information were 
discussed.
19 see further below, section 2.3, where other factors will be discussed that require strict scrutiny of any 
case at hand.
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In conclusion, the concept of non-arbitrariness serves as a substantive limitation to the 
exercise of public power by authorities to ensure a certain quality of the procedure. Public 
authorities enjoy, in general, wide discretion in realizing this quality of the procedure. 
2.3. Vulnerability as a Trigger Factor for Further Positive Obligations 
vulnerability is broadly defined in this research and refers to both the personal factors 
that qualify someone to be considered vulnerable and/or to the circumstances surrounding 
the decision that renders someone vulnerable. In the work of various treaty monitoring 
bodies, one finds explicit and implicit references (disadvantaged, marginalized, adversely 
affected, empowering individuals) to the concept of vulnerability. overall, the concept of 
vulnerability plays a role at two different levels: in the context of the recognition of a norm 
and in the interpretation of a norm. The former was addressed in the context of the various 
legal bases of the right to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure and 
the right to an effective remedy in chapters 4 and 5. for instance, treaty monitoring bodies 
have recognized a right to participation and/or an effective remedy for those considered to 
be vulnerable. The latter is considered to be most relevant for the purpose of this section. 
20 This broad definition is deduced from the work of the treaty monitoring bodies and refers to situations 
in which individuals or groups of individuals de iure or de facto are considered to be (particularly) 
vulnerable, and accordingly, further procedural guarantees are warranted as explained in this section. 
see further the text in and around note 149 of chapter 4.
21 It should be noted that the concept is increasingly addressed in the literature, with some trying to map 
how the concept is used, see, for instance, Icelandic Human rights centre, the Human Rights Protection 
of Vulnerable Groups (2009) available at http://www.humanrights.is/en/human-rights-education-
project/human-rights-concepts-ideas-and-fora/the-human-rights-protection-of-vulnerable-groups; 
others aim to review more critically the use and usefulness of the concept of vulnerability as it is applied 
by the various treaty monitoring bodies, see, e.g., A.r. chapman and B. carbonetti ‘Human rights 
Protections for vulnerable and disadvantaged Groups: the contributions of the un committee on 
economic, social and cultural rights’ (2011) 33 Human Rights Quarterly 682-732. l. Peroni and 
A. timmer, ‘vulnerable Groups: the Promise of an emergent concept in european Human rights 
convention law’ (2013), 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1056-1085.
22 This is particularly visible with the (fragmented) development of the right to meaningful participation 
in decision-making procedures. As discussed in chapter 4, treaty monitoring bodies increasingly 
read a right to participation in the decision-making procedure for those considered to be (particular) 
vulnerable into various substantive rights; similarly, the un’s specialized human rights treaties often 
start from the premise that those individuals who are the subject of the instruments are considered to be 
vulnerable and therefore warrant further protection. for instance, the preamble of the Migrant workers 
convention states: 
 considering the situation of vulnerability in which migrant workers and members of their family 
members frequently find themselves, owing, amongst other things, to their absence from their 
state of origin and to the difficulties they may encounter arising from their presence in the state of 
employment (…) convinced therefore of the need to bring about the international protection of the 
rights of migrant workers and members of their families. 
23 for instance, chapter 4, section 1.2, discussed how the various treaty monitoring bodies have recognized 
a right to participation for minorities, descent-based communities, indigenous people, children, 
women, migrant workers, the poor, the homeless, the elderly, and people with disabilities in regard to 
any decisions affecting them. 
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when there are factors of vulnerability in a given case, it diminishes the amount of discretion 
enjoyed by public authorities. In other words, the concept of vulnerability functions as a trigger 
factor: it influences the scope and content of obligations of public authorities, and it limits the 
discretion of public authorities in implementing these obligations. Broadly speaking, there are 
three different ways in which the concept of vulnerability influences the draft Model: 
a) factors of vulnerability affect the result-based discretionary norms 
b) factors of vulnerability affect the standard-type discretionary norms
c) discretion is diminished by the imposition of a higher substantive norm due to factors 
of vulnerability 
Ad a) result-based norms imply a discretion for authorities to choose the means to achieve 
the result. one finds result-based norms within each of the dimensions; for instance, the 
duty to duly inform those affected provides authorities with the freedom to choose the 
means by which those affected are duly informed. If persons are deemed particularly 
vulnerable, more efforts are required of public authorities. for example, authorities have an 
obligation to ensure that asylum seekers, who are generally considered to be in a particularly 
vulnerable situation, are properly informed of the remedies available to them. This may 
require making an interpreter available, publishing information in the native language(s) of 
the asylum seekers, and to further assist them in understanding the process or procedures. 
similarly, in the context of the right of access to a review body, authorities may be required 
to adopt measures to empower those considered to be vulnerable and to remove factual, 
monetary, or physical barriers to access the review body. This may include the necessity to 
provide legal aid or to provide interpreters in a given case. In other words, in a given case, 
treaty monitoring bodies assess whether there were factors of vulnerability, and if so, whether 
authorities are required to adopt further measures to ensure that the result is achieved. 
Thus, in these instances, authorities enjoy less discretion.
Ad b) standard-based discretionary norms are those norms that are inherently circumstantial, 
dependent on the facts of the case. for instance, the requirement of expeditious or inexpensive 
review procedures is a standard-based discretionary norm. Public authorities enjoy 
discretion to impose legal fees to initiate court proceedings – and thus impose conditions 
24 It should be noted that any duty or obligation needs to be assessed in the context of the whole decision-
making procedure and the rights it aims to realize. for instance, in the context of the right to meaningful 
participation in decision-making procedures, the duty to duly inform those affected has to be assessed 
in combination with the other duties relevant to such procedures: the duty to ensure meaningful 
involvement and the duty to ensure timely and accessible participatory processes.
25 see, e.g., ectHr, Čonka v. Belgium, (May 5, 2002), §44; cAt, S.H. v. Norway no. 121/1998, (november 
19, 1999), §7.4; cAt, Z.T. v. Norway, no. 127/1999 (november 19, 1999), §7.4; see further the text in and 
around footnote 163 of chapter 5 (right to an effective remedy).
26 for instance, see above in section 1.2.1. of chapter 5, in which the obligation of public authorities to 
prevent a legal procedure becoming too expensive for those affected was discussed. 
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on the right to access a review body – if it does not result in an impairment of the right. 
treaty monitoring bodies assess in a given case whether the fees imposed were necessary and 
proportionate to the legitimate aim to be achieved. This assessment considers the inherent 
norm flexibility and the related discretion enjoyed by authorities. whenever there are factors 
of vulnerability, authorities have further positive obligations to ensure that the conditions 
imposed do not effectively bar access to a review procedure for vulnerable individuals. Thus, 
treaty monitoring bodies review whether the procedure became prohibitively expensive for 
those affected in a given case, and if so, whether there was (free) legal aid/assistance available 
to those affected. Hence, factors of vulnerability diminish the discretion of authorities to 
determine how to achieve inclusionary governance. Amongst other things, authorities may 
be required to further explain how the measures adopted ensure that those considered to be 
vulnerable are included in the decision-making procedure and review procedure. 
Ad c) There is a third way in which the concept of vulnerability plays a role. In some 
exceptional situations, the impact of an upcoming decision is considered to be so significant 
for those affected that it renders them particularly vulnerable and therefore warrants (even) 
further protection. In these cases, public authorities have to guarantee a higher substantive 
norm that diminishes the level of discretion enjoyed by authorities. This is visible both in 
the context of the right to meaningful participation in decision-making procedures and in 
the context of the right to an effective remedy. regarding the former, in certain situations, 
meaningful involvement in decision-making procedures is not sufficient, and instead, public 
authorities are required to obtain the informed consent of those affected. This right to prior 
informed consent has been recognized for indigenous communities and minorities whenever 
measures are taken by public authorities that adversely affect their lives or livelihood. In this 
instance, the vulnerability of those affected – created both by the fact that they are indigenous 
peoples or minorities and that it concerns a decision with a significant impact on the daily 
lives of those affected – triggers a demand for further protection. Accordingly, authorities 
have less discretion to determine how to achieve the participation of those adversely affected 
and treaty monitoring bodies exercise closer scrutiny in determining whether, and to what 
extent, prior informed consent is achieved. regarding the latter, in the context of the right 
27 It should be noted that the argument is not that there is a general right to legal aid, but instead, whether 
legal aid should be or should have been provided by public authorities in a given context, which is a 
contextual assessment. An important factor is whether individuals are particularly vulnerable, and if 
so, what authorities have done to ensure a right to access for those affected. see further section 1.2.1. of 
chapter 5. 
28 Article 19 un declaration; cescr, CO on Brazil, (2003) 28 §165; cerd, GC 23, 4(d); Hrcee, Ángela 
Poma Poma v. Peru. 
29 for instance, the IActHr held in the Saramaka v. Suriname case: 
 regarding large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact within 
saramaka territory the state has a duty, not only to consult with the saramaka, but also to obtain their 
free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and traditions.
 see further the text in and around footnotes 99-104 of chapter 4. 
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to an effective remedy, treaty monitoring bodies hold that when decisions have a significant 
impact on those affected and render those affected particularly vulnerable, their further 
protection is warranted. International law provides further guidance as to the standard of 
review and procedural guarantees required to comply with the respective right in question. 
As a result, public authorities enjoy less discretion in realizing the right to an effective 
remedy. Accordingly, treaty monitoring bodies exercise closer scrutiny of the compliance 
by authorities with the international norms. for instance, all treaty monitoring bodies hold 
that whenever public authorities are to review an alleged refoulement claim, authorities are 
obliged to exercise rigorous scrutiny of the claims presented by those facing expulsion and are 
at the risk of being tortured when they are sent back to their country of nationality. treaty 
monitoring bodies provide guidance as to the appropriate standard of review to be exercised 
by domestic authorities in this context. normally, the burden and standard of proof applied by 
public authorities do not fall within the scope of review by treaty monitoring bodies; however, 
when there are arbitrary features or factors of vulnerability, treaty monitoring bodies may 
review these issues and give further guidance to parties and how to comply with their treaty 
obligations. for example, whenever public authorities adopt administrative sanctions that 
have a punitive character – which renders an individual particularly vulnerable, authorities 
are required to offer further protection to those affected and the domestic review bodies have 
to exercise a higher form of scrutiny of the decision-making procedure in its review procedure. 
In conclusion, the concept of non-arbitrariness and the concept of vulnerability influence the 
content and scope of the inclusionary governance norms. This section provided insight into 
the dynamics of the draft Model. It showed the relevance of a contextual assessment, not only 
to identify whether public authorities provided informational rights, a right to meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure and a right to an effective remedy to those 
affected, but also to assess the overall level of inclusionary governance realized. The next 
section will address how – taking these identified dynamics into account – the draft Model 
functions as a yardstick. 
3. The Draft Inclusionary Governance Model: A Yardstick to Analyze 
the Accountability of Public Authorities vis-à-vis those Affected 
This section will provide a schematic overview of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. 
In addition, it provides a step-by-step explanation of how the draft Model can be applied to 
public authorities exercising public power directly affecting individuals; in other words, how 
the draft Model serves as a yardstick to analyze the accountability of public authorities vis-
à-vis those affected by their decisions. 
30 see, e.g., ectHr, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria (2002), §123-128.
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However, before discussing the different elements of the draft Model, a general remark is 
in order. In the conceptual Model the focus lies on the duties that international institutions 
have whenever they exercise public power that directly affects individuals. As the previous 
three chapters of Part II have shown, the legal survey primarily charted the rights enjoyed by 
individuals (and groups) with the concomitant duties for public authorities in this context. 
Therefore, in contrast with the language used in the conceptual Model, the emphasis in the 
language of the building blocks developed in chapters 3-5 switched from duties to rights. 
This is a logical consequence considering that the survey focused on those international 
instruments that constrain the exercise of public power by public authorities; these 
primarily concern rights-oriented instruments. These instruments aim to confer rights upon 
individuals and establish the responsibility of the state to comply with these international 
obligations laid down in the treaties. However, the overall objective of this research is to 
develop a framework to address the accountability deficit of international institutions vis-
à-vis those affected by their decisions. Accordingly, the yardstick will have as a view point 
the duties owed by public authorities regardless of the question of whether those affected 
enjoy rights in the relevant context. Therefore, the building blocks of the draft Model as 
described in section 1 are amended so that the draft Model can better serve as a yardstick 
to analyze the accountability of public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. 
This adjustment is more than merely a tweaking of the language used, and instead concerns a 
more fundamental adjustment necessary to take the context for which the Model is developed 
into account. A legal framework to analyze the accountability of public authorities vis-à-vis 
those affected by their decisions has to address with sufficient clarity the duties owed by 
those exercising public power. The draft Inclusionary Governance Model contains several 
elements: 
- The building blocks (information entitlements, duty to realize meaningful participation 
in the decision-making procedure, duty to realize an effective remedy) constitute the core 
elements of the draft Model, and correspond with the initial three identified dimensions 
of inclusionary governance. 
- The benchmarks are the minimum standards identified for each building block, against 
which the exercise of public powers by international institutions is to be evaluated. 
- The constraints are those limitations identified for the exercise of public powers by public 
authorities, regardless of what type of public power they exercise.
The draft IGM can be summarized as follows: 
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DRAFT INCLUSIONARY GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
Public authorities shall exercise their public powers:
in accordance with the law;
not in an arbitrary manner; and
it may not constitute a violation of an ius cogens norm.
limitations are only permitted if the tripartite test of legality, necessity and 
legitimacy are met; and
the decision-making procedures followed have to be low-cost, timely and fair.
Dynamic aspects of the Draft Model:  
factors of vulnerability result in more positive obligations for public authorities,  
less discretion and more scrutiny
when arbitrary features are present, higher scrutiny should be exercised of the inclusionary 
governance realized
INFORMATION ENTITLEMENTS: INFORMATION OF A PUBLIC INTEREST NATURE 





Duty to ensure 
meaningful parti­







duty to provide access to information 
duty to provide reasons for a refusal to disclose information
duty to provide information on a procedure to request information and 
to review the refusal 
duty to realize a review procedure to challenge a refusal to disclose 
information
duty to realize a procedure through which individuals can request access 
to, or modification or removal of personal information held by public 
authorities
duty to duly inform those affected of the information held and how to 
access it
duty to protect information held by public authorities from unauthorized 
access or usage by third parties 
duty to realize a review procedure to challenge the legality of information 
stored
duty to duly inform those affected
duty to ensure meaningful involvement in the decision-making 
procedure 
duty to duly take into account the views expressed
duty to provide a reasoned decision 
duty to ensure access to the review procedure 
duty to establish a competent, independent and impartial review body 
duty to realize a fair review procedure 
reparation provided has to be adequate and effective in addressing the 
harm suffered
DUTY TO REALIZE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCEDURE 
Table 15: Draft Inclusionary Governance Model
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The draft Model suggests that the decision-making and review procedure have to be assessed 
as a whole and that the context should be taken into account in order to evaluate the level of 
aaccountability realized. The draft Model is dynamic in nature: 
- The inclusionary governance norms influence each other: there is interaction within and 
between the dimensions. 
- There is a common core of guarantees required across the building blocks to ensure 
a certain quality of the decision-making and/or review procedure. when certain 
inclusionary governance norms are not provided for, it can have a crippling effect on the 
overall level of inclusionary governance realized.
In the draft Model, it is acknowledged that authorities enjoy discretion in fulfilling and 
realizing their obligations. However, a number of factors determine the extent of this 
discretion, and accordingly, influence the scope of the inclusionary governance norms to be 
realized:
- There is a substantive limitation to the exercise of public power by public authorities 
that also limits the discretion enjoyed: public power may not be exercised in an arbitrary 
manner. In general, public authorities have to show that they exercised their public 
powers in a fair and not in an arbitrary manner. The common core guarantees identified 
serve as the main benchmarks to prevent an arbitrary exercise of public power. whenever 
the exercise of discretionary powers is not sufficiently regulated, there is a higher risk 
of arbitrary decisions being made. If there are arbitrary features present in a decision-
making or review procedure, the Model suggests that the exercise of public power by 
public authorities should be further scrutinized by whoever applies the draft Model. 
Accordingly, the rules of evidence, standard and burden of proof upheld by authorities 
are also taken into account to assess whether there is a fair decision-making procedure. 
It should be noted that it normally falls within the discretion of public authorities to set 
the rules of evidence, standard and burden of proof. 
- vulnerability: whenever a person affected by a decision (to be) made is considered to 
be vulnerable on the basis of characteristics related to the person or on the basis of 
characteristics related to the type of decision, authorities enjoy less discretion in fulfilling 
their obligations under the draft Model, and, in certain situations, a higher substantive 
inclusionary governance norm may be required.
In order to apply the draft Model in practice, further guidance is required. Therefore, several 
steps are identified below that have to be taken to properly analyze the level of inclusionary 
governance realized by public authorities in a given case:
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
Steps in applying the Draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
1. In what context does the public authority operate? what does the decision-making 
procedure and review procedure look like?
2. can factors of vulnerability of those affected by the decisions be identified? If factors of 
vulnerability exist, it influences the draft Model for steps 4-6.
3. does the initial screening of the quality of the procedure reveal arbitrary features in the 
procedure? If there are arbitrary features, it influences the draft Model for steps 4-6. 
4. does the public authority hold information of a public interest and/or personal nature, 
and if so, to what extent?
i. If the authority holds information of a public interest nature, are individuals entitled 
to have access to this information? 
ii. If the authority holds information of a personal nature, are individuals entitled to 
have access to, or to request modification or removal of the personal information in 
its possession? 
5. does the public authority provide for meaningful participation in the decision-making 
procedure, and if so, to what extent? 
6. does the public authority provide for one or more effective legal remedies, and if so, to 
what extent? 
i. Is there an entitlement to review, and if so, to what extent?
ii. Is there entitlement to reparation, and if so, to what extent? 
7. what conclusions can be drawn from the assessment of the level of inclusionary 
governance realized vis-à-vis those affected? to what extent is the public authority 
accountable towards those affected by its decisions? 
8. what recommendations for improvement can be identified? 
each step will be further explained below, taking into account the ways the draft Model can 
be used. In general, there are two different uses for the draft Model: (1) to analyze and assess 
the inclusionary governance standards adopted to ensure the accountability of a public 
authority vis-à-vis those affected by its decisions (2) to analyze these inclusionary governance 
standards and the application thereof in practice by the public authority in question.  
In the first step of the application of the draft Model, the context is set in which a public 
authority operates (the type of public power exercised, who exercises it, and the institutional 
setting in which it is exercised) and descriptions of its decision-making procedure(s) and 
review procedure(s) are given. This descriptive overview forms the basis for the analysis in 
the following steps. 
The second step is to examine whether there are factors of vulnerability present in a 
given case, which would warrant further scrutiny. vulnerability is broadly defined, and it 
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materializes in two ways: on the basis of characteristics related to the individual (or group of 
individuals) concerned and/or on the basis of circumstances surrounding the decision that 
renders an individual (or group of individuals) (particularly) vulnerable. In order to examine 
the potential vulnerability of those affected, an assessment is required of who is affected and 
whether the type of decision and the impact of the decision points to certain vulnerabilities. 
As a result, a variety of vulnerability factors can be identified in this step. whenever factors 
of vulnerability are identified, it influences the assessment to be conducted in steps 4-6. In 
this assessment, it is examined whether the authorities have criteria to identify vulnerability 
factors, and if so, whether these are formulated too narrowly. In addition, it is assessed 
whether they are applied correctly in practice. If one identifies factors of vulnerability, one 
should verify whether the public authority has adopted all necessary measures to ensure that 
those considered vulnerable are included in the procedure. for instance, when decisions 
are made that affect migrant children, public authorities may have to adopt further positive 
measures to ensure that these migrant children – a group of individuals considered to be 
vulnerable – have access to a review body. In other words, were they duly informed of the 
procedure and their rights? were they in need of legal assistance, and if so, did they receive 
legal assistance to ensure equality of arms? 
If authorities make decisions that have a significant impact on the livelihood of minorities or 
indigenous peoples, those adversely affected are considered to be particularly vulnerable. In 
these instances, the draft Model suggests that there is less discretion for public authorities 
and that public authorities have to acquire prior informed consent of those particularly 
affected instead of meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. In other 
words, there is a higher substantive norm to be complied with by authorities, and thus to be 
evaluated when applying the draft Model. 
In step 3, one conducts an initial screening of the decision-making and review procedure 
of the public authority in question to assess whether there are certain inherent features 
in the procedure that increase the chance of arbitrary decisions being made. whenever 
public authorities enjoy discretion in the exercise of their public power, there has to be 
a framework regulating this exercise of discretion. Accordingly, one evaluates whether 
this framework exists, and whether it addresses who may exercise what discretion and 
under which circumstances, and whether there is a procedure in place to challenge this 
exercise of public power. This initial screening implies an evaluation of the realization of 
common core guarantees in the decision-making and review procedure. The common core 
guarantees reflect a general requirement that procedures have to have a certain quality; the 
guarantees that have been identified are the duty to duly inform, the opportunity to present 
one’s views, to have these views duly taken into account, and that those affected enjoy an 
entitlement to review. If the conclusion is that there are certain inherent arbitrary features, 
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
it has an impact on the assessment to be conducted in steps 4-6. Accordingly, one has to 
further scrutinize the level of inclusionary governance realized. In this assessment, one 
has to assess the rules of evidence and burden/standard of proof used by public authorities 
and the extent to which these contribute to a fair procedure. further, sufficient procedural 
safeguards should be offered in the procedure to ‘compensate’ for the arbitrary features in 
the procedure to ensure that inclusionary governance is still realized for those affected. If 
there are no apparent arbitrary features, steps 4-6 are conducted without exercising higher 
scrutiny. In this situation, the rules of evidence, burden and standard of proof applied by 
the public authorities are, in principle, not reviewed as part of the inclusionary governance 
assessment. 
In steps 4-6, one examines whether, and to what extent, public authorities ensured the 
entitlement to information, to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure 
and to an effective remedy. The identified benchmarks of the building blocks of the draft 
Model are applied to evaluate on the basis of the facts of the case whether, and to what extent, 
public authorities realized inclusionary governance. for example, do the authorities hold, 
collect and/or use personal information? If so, how is this realized, what type of information 
does it concern, and what is the legal framework in place to handle this personal information 
held by public authorities? In addition, the examination should address whether, and to 
what extent, the public authority exercised its public power in accordance with the identified 
constraints to the exercise of public power as stipulated in the draft Model. Moreover, 
if in steps 2 and/or 3 the answer was that there were arbitrary features and/or factors of 
vulnerability, it influences the draft IGM as explained above. Accordingly, public authorities 
will enjoy less discretion, and thus, closer scrutiny should be conducted of the extent to 
which public authorities provide inclusionary governance to those affected. In each step, the 
dynamic aspects of the draft Model are constantly re-evaluated: can interactions between 
the norms be identified? what is the (potential) effect of a lack of a certain benchmark in 
one of the building blocks for the overall analysis of the accountability of the public authority 
vis-à-vis those affected by its decisions? In the evaluation, one should examine whether, and 
to what extent, the accountability framework in place sufficiently includes individuals in the 
decision-making procedure. If factors of vulnerability are identified, the policy should set 
out the type of measures taken to ensure that those considered to be vulnerable are included 
in the decision-making procedure. for each step, the discretion enjoyed by public authorities 
is scrutinized in light of the above. 
In step 7, considering the decision-making and review procedure as a whole, the overall 
level of inclusionary governance realized by the public authorities in question is evaluated. 
This contextual assessment allows for a proper understanding of how certain procedural 
guarantees may strengthen other norms and how the lack of certain procedural guarantees 
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or non-recognition of those affected can have a crippling effect on the overall level of 
inclusionary governance realized. In other words, besides the conclusion of whether or not 
inclusionary governance was realized by public authorities, the assessment in this step will 
allow for an identification of potential strengths and weaknesses in the given design of the 
decision-making and review procedure. considering that the draft Model’s aim is to address 
and analyze the accountability of public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions 
in a systematic manner, identifying weaknesses and strengths in the design of the procedures 
allows for the draft IGM to be forward-looking. Accordingly, in step 8, recommendations 
are formulated for how to improve and strengthen the accountability of the public authority 
vis-à-vis those affected. 
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, Part II of this book developed a draft Inclusionary Governance Model to 
analyze the accountability of public authorities vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions 
based on an extensive legal survey of the international standards constraining the exercise 
of public powers of domestic authorities. The instruments, and their respective treaty 
monitoring bodies, regulate this exercise of public power, define the responsibility of states 
vis-à-vis individuals and identify the duties for public authorities. This dynamic yardstick 
that has been developed thus far enables one to examine in a systematic manner whether 
public authorities are accountable towards those affected by their decisions. The identified 
minimum norms – the building blocks with their benchmarks – seek to attain that a 
minimum level of inclusion is realized by public authorities, while the dynamic component 
of the draft Model ensures that the contexts in which public authorities operate are taken 
into account. As a result, the accountability analysis conducted through the draft IGM is 
nuanced and is capable of identifying the strengths and weaknesses in the design of the 
inclusionary governance processes realized by public authorities for those affected by their 
decisions. Thus, the draft Model as it stands offers an answer to the criticism voiced in the 
introduction of this book to other existing accountability frameworks. The draft yardstick 
explicates its benchmarks and building blocks, and at the same time, incorporates a form 
of norm flexibility that enables one to take into account the context in which public 
authorities exercise public power. The draft yardstick allows one to thoroughly examine 
whether, and to what extent, public authorities are accountable towards those affected by 
their decisions. 
However, the draft yardstick was developed on the basis of a legal survey of international 
standards applicable to the national level, whereas the main aim of this research is to develop 
a yardstick that will be able to analyze and address the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. Therefore, in Part III, the suitability 
A drAft InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model 
of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model to analyze and address the accountability of 
international institutions will be tested. The hypothesis is that some adjustments need to be 
made to take into account the context in which international institutions operate.  
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The evolution of international law has led to more and more rights being divested directly 
in the individual. yet the organization has not evolved at the same pace. time has come to 
align the applicable law to the united nations with the developments in international human 
rights law.
In Part II, the draft Inclusionary Governance Model (draft IGM or draft Model) was 
developed based on a legal survey of international standards that regulate the public power 
exercised by domestic public authorities. for a summary of Part II, see chapter 6. 
In Part III, the functionality of the draft IGM will be tested in relation to the decision-
making procedure of the un sanctions committee to designate individuals and/or entities. 
chapter 7 will accordingly serve two purposes. The first purpose is to demonstrate how the 
draft yardstick functions in practice by applying the draft Model to the decision-making 
and review procedure of an international institution. The second purpose is to test the 
draft IGM to examine whether the draft yardstick can analyze in a systematic manner the 
accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions, or if 
it requires adaptations to be able to do so. The following questions guide the testing of the 
functioning draft IGM in chapter 7: 
1. Is the formulation of the benchmarks of the different building blocks of the draft Model 
sufficiently clear to be applied to international institutions?
2. does the draft IGM and its identified dynamics sufficiently capture the context in which 
an international institution operates?
3. Is the draft Model complete and sophisticated enough to deal with the everyday reality 
of international institutions, or are there other issues that the draft Model does not yet 
sufficiently capture? 
1 report of the un secretary General, ‘strengthening and coordinating united nations rule of law 
Activities’, un doc. A/65/318, (August 20, 2010), §94.
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lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
The un security council is one of the principal organs of the united nations and its 
primary responsibility is to maintain international peace and security. The security council 
has the power to adopt binding decisions to “maintain or restore international peace and 
security under chapter vII of the united nations charter.” In this context, the un security 
council adopts sanctions measures under article 41 un charter that focus, amongst others, 
on supporting the political settlement of conflicts, on nuclear non-proliferation, and/or 
counter-terrorism. The un security council currently has over 15 sanctions committees, 
each designed for one particular situation or country. This research focuses on the designation 
by the un security council sanctions committees as a means of countering terrorism. The 
sanctions imposed by the sanctions committees may entail arms embargos, asset freezing, 
travel bans or a combination of the three. Individuals may be targeted personally, or their 
company may be listed. In practical terms, the sanctions result in: 
a denial of access by listed individuals to their own property, a refusal of social security benefits, 
limitations on their ability to work and restrictions on their ability to travel domestically and 
internationally.
This chapter will examine only the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee as 
established by un security council resolution 1267; this sanctions committee has the 
 
1 The united nations has 193 member states, its constituent document is the un charter in which the 
institutional structure, the organs of the un and the main powers of these organs are laid down. 
2 Article 7 un charter. 
3 The authority to adopt binding decisions under chapter vII of the un charter derives from article 25 
in conjunction with article 39 un charter; article 104 un charter stipulates that member states are 
obliged to follow these decisions. 
4 other sanctions regimes focus, for instance, on supporting political settlement of conflicts and/or 
nuclear non-proliferation. see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information  
5 see for an overview of the different sanctions committees, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
sanctions/information.
6 It differs per sanctions committee what sanctions may be imposed and their conditions. see further 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/index.shtml.
7 This chapter chooses to focus primarily on the listing of individuals, but the majority of the analysis is 
equally applicable to any listed entities. where there is a difference in the procedural guarantees offered 
to individuals and to entities, the distinction will be made, otherwise, the term (listing of) individuals 
should be read as to include the listing of entities by sanctions committees (i.e. those designated). 
8 see §13 of the un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights (emmerson) report, 
second annual report (september 26, 2012), un doc. A/67/396. 
9 The un security council established the sanctions committee in accordance with article 29 
un charter, and the sanctions committee is a subsidiary organ of the un sc council. sanctions 
committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018) are available at https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/committee-guidelines, para 1(a)-(b). It should be noted that the 
sanctions committee’s official name is the ‘security council committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 
(1999) 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida and associated individuals 
groups undertakings and entities’. IsIl and other related terrorist organizations, such as Al nusra, are 
all considered to be associated with Al-Qaida by the sanctions committee. 
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most advanced procedural guarantees available to target perpetrators of terrorism in 
comparison to the guarantees offered by other sanctions committees. Most importantly, 
since 2009 the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee has had an office of 
the ombudsperson that handles requests to delist those who have been targeted by its 
sanctions. The ombudsperson procedure gives those designated direct access to a review 
body. In contrast, other sanctions committees work with an inter-state review procedure 
facilitated by the focal Point; designated individuals have to ask a state to file a delisting 
request on their behalf, they play no role within the inter-state procedure. 
This chapter will apply the draft Inclusionary Governance Model to the designation 
procedure of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee (‘IsIl (da’esh) and Al-
Qaida sanctions committee’ or ‘sanctions committee’) to demonstrate how the draft Model 
functions in practice and to test whether the formulation of its building blocks is sufficiently 
clear to be applied to analyze the accountability of an international institution (i.e., in casu 
the sanctions committee) vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. Accordingly, the draft 
Model will be applied to the sanctions committee decision-making procedure and its review 
procedure following the steps identified in chapter 6 (section 3): 
1. In what context does the public authority operate? what does the decision-making 
procedure and review procedure look like?
2. can factors of vulnerability of those affected by the decisions be identified? If factors of 
vulnerability exist, it influences steps 4-6 of the application of the draft Model.
3. does the initial screening of the quality of the procedure reveal arbitrary features in the 
procedure? If arbitrary features exist, it influences steps 4-6 of the application of the draft 
Model. 
4. does the public authority hold information of a public interest and/or personal nature? 
And if so, to what extent?
i. If the authority holds information that is of a public interest nature, are individuals 
entitled to request access to this information? 
10 un security council resolution 1904 (2009). The mandate of the ombudsperson was extended by un 
sc res. 1989 (2011), un sc res. 2083 (2012), un sc res. 2161 (2014), un sc res. 2253 (2015) and 
un sc res. 2368 (2017).
11 see further, the website of the office of the ombudsperson for the criteria to submit a request, https://
www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/application. 
12 The focal Point for delisting was established in 2006 (un sc res. 1730); the focal Point is used, 
for instance, for the sanctions committees pursuant to un sc res. 1718 (2006), concerning the 
democratic People’s republic korea, for the one pursuant to un sc res 1636 (2005) concerning 
lebanon, and for the one pursuant to un sc res. 1518 (2003), concerning Iraq/kuwait. The focal Point 
is merely an administrative secretariat registering the request, but the actual review is undertaken by the 
reviewing states – that is, any designated state(s) and the state of citizenship and residence. Individuals 
are dependent on the willingness of reviewing states to submit their delisting request on their behalf. 
see also l. van den Herik, ‘The security council’s targeted sanctions regimes’ (2007) 20 Leiden Journal 
of International Law at 799. 
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ii. If the authority holds information that is of a personal nature, are individuals 
entitled to request access to, modification or removal of the personal information 
in their possession? 
5. to what extent does the public authority provide for meaningful participation in the 
decision-making procedure? 
6. to what extent does the public authority provide for one or more effective legal remedies? 
i. to what extent is there entitlement to a review?
ii. to what extent is there entitlement to reparation? 
7. what conclusions can be drawn from the assessment of the level of inclusionary 
governance realized vis-à-vis those affected? to what extent is the public authority 
accountable to those affected by its decisions? 
8. what recommendations for improvement can be identified? 
The discussion in the subsequent eight sections correspond with the eight identified steps of 
the application of the draft Model. each step will be discussed in a separate section; there 
is, however, one adjustment for the purpose of this chapter. step 8 is adjusted, as the aim of 
this chapter is to reflect on the functionality of the draft Model as a yardstick to analyze the 
accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions, and not 
only to assess the process of the international institution in question. Thus, the purpose is to 
demonstrate how the draft Model functions: what does the draft IGM show and tell about 
the accountability framework? what are its potential strengths and weaknesses? Is the Model 
in its current form capable of systematically analyzing the accountability of an international 
institution vis-à-vis those affected by its decisions, and to what extent? And are there certain 
nuances or controversies that were not captured in the development of the draft Model that 
prove to be relevant in the context of international institutions? Accordingly, section 8 will 
have two parts. first, section 8.1 will discuss the conclusions of the demonstration of the 
draft IGM functioning in practice, or in other words, the level of inclusionary governance 
realized vis-à-vis those affected and what it means for the draft Model. second, section 8.2 
will discuss the conclusions of the testing phase, or in other words, the recommendations for 
improving the draft Model. 
The discussion in the subsequent eight sections correspond with the eight identified steps of 
the application of the draft Model. 
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1. Setting the Context: The Designation of Individuals and Entities by 
the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee
This section will describe the context in which the international institution, the IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, makes its decisions. The sanctions committee is 
composed of diplomats representing all 15 un security council members; amongst them, a 
chair and two vice chairs are appointed. The designation procedure (or listing procedure) 
can be divided into three phases: the suggestion of designation by a state or group of states, 
the decision to designate, and the procedure to notify those designated. The review process 
concerns a separate procedure, which will be discussed in section 6 in the context of the right 
to an effective remedy. 
1.1. The Suggestion for Designation
each un member state may propose names of individuals or entities to be designated and 
put on the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. The state suggesting a name or entity 
for listing has to submit a detailed statement of case accompanied by a cover sheet to the 
sanctions committee. The statement of case should contain as much detail as possible 
regarding the individual or entity to ensure an accurate identification of the individual and/
or entity to be designated. furthermore, it should contain all evidence relied upon by a 
designating state to demonstrate that the individual or entity meets the listing criteria. An 
individual or entity may be listed if they are associated with IsIl and Al-Qaida or related 
organizations. 
This includes the following activities: 
(a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or 
activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
(b) supplying, selling or transferring arms and related material to; 
(c) recruiting for, or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, IsIl, or any cell, 
affiliate, splinter group or derivative thereof.
13 sanctions committee Guidelines, (amended version of september 5, 2018) available at https://
www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/committee-guidelines, para 1(b)-(d), all the sanctions 
committees have a similar composition. 
14 committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018) at §6(a) and (d).
15 see, e.g., un sc res 1735 (december 22, 2006) Annex 1.
16 committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018), at §6(e), (h). see, for instance, the list 
of individuals designated by the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries. not every entry of every individual has 
been filled in. 
17 committee Guidelines, (amended version of september 5, 2018) §6(d).
18 un sc res. 2368 (2017). 
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The sanctions committee notes that those individuals, groups or entities that are owned, 
controlled, or otherwise supporting “any individual, group, undertaking or entity associated 
with IsIl or Al-Qaida” can also be listed. In other words, individuals that are associated 
with someone or a group that is listed on the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list 
are subject to designation. The sanctions committee uses a wide definition of the type of 
funds, financial assets and economic resources that are considered to be in support of Al-
Qaida, related groups and/or listed individuals, including “those used for the provision of 
Internet hosting and related services,” travel-related funds, and “financial transactions 
involving any funds, economic resources or income-generating activities” including trade 
in petroleum products, and a variety of crimes, including kidnapping for ransom. one 
may also be listed when paying ransom to “individuals, groups, undertakings or entities on 
the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list, regardless of how or by whom the ransom is 
paid.” Hence, there is a low substantive threshold for designations. 
states have to specify the nature of evidence (intelligence, law enforcement, judicial open 
source information, or testimonies by subject) supporting the listing. However, the 
designating state has unfettered discretion to determine what evidence is of a confidential 
nature, and accordingly, what information will be withheld from the sanctions committee. 
whenever evidence is declared to be confidential, the designating state has to include its 
conclusions drawn from the evidence in the statements, but it does not have to include the 
actual evidence. designating states are not required to include any exculpatory evidence in 
a statement of case.
1.2. Decision-Making by the Sanctions Committee 
The sanctions committee discusses the statement of case submitted by the designating 
state(s); however, it does not provide an in-depth examination of the evidence provided to 
them by which to justify the designation, nor is there a standard of proof that should be 
19 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §4. 
20 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §5.
21 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §6. An exception exists however if an explicit exemption has been made for 
accessing funds for travel purposes, which follows from a successful request to the focal Point. 
22 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §7.
23 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §8 .
24 §6(h) committee Guidelines, (amended version of April 15, 2013). 
25 see, e.g., un sc res. 1989 (2011) §13 in the context of the proceedings for the Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee. It should be noted that in un sc resolution 2253 (2015), the un security council 
determined to expand the listing criteria to include individuals and entities supporting the Islamic state 
in Iraq and the levant (IsIl). As a result, the Al-Qaida sanctions committee was renamed to be called 
the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee. 
26 un special rapporteur report (scheinin 2010), A/65/258, §54; see also un special rapporteur on 
counter-terrorism and Human rights (emmerson) report, second annual report (2012), un doc. 
A/67/396, §26.
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met. The sanctions committee considers “proposed listings on the basis of the ‘associated 
with’ standard” and decides by consensus whether the individual or entity should indeed 
be listed. If consensus cannot be reached – even after consultations – it may be submitted 
to the un security council by the designating state.
1.3. Notification
notification of the sanction adopted takes place in three different steps. firstly, all un 
member states are notified. un member states are obliged based on article 25 of the un 
charter to execute a sanction imposed, and thus, implement the sanction measures as 
stipulated in the un sc resolution, including the freezing of assets, the implementation of 
a travel ban and/or a weapons embargo. 
Immediately thereafter, a narrative summary of reasons is published on the sanctions 
committee website; this website is publicly accessible. The last step of notification concerns 
a notification of the designated individual targeted by the adopted sanction. This notification 
takes place in two separate steps. firstly, the secretariat informs, within three working days 
after publishing the narrative, the Permanent Mission of the state or states of residence and/
or nationality of the designated individual. These states have an obligation to:
take all possible measures, in accordance with their domestic laws and practices, to notify or 
inform in a timely manner the listed individual or entity of the designation and to include 
with this notification the narrative summary of reasons for listing, a description of the effects 
of designation, (...) the committee’s procedures for considering delisting requests, including 
the possibility of submitting such a request to the ombudsperson,(…) and the provisions of 
resolution 1452 (2002) regarding available exemptions.
27 see further sections 4.1, 4.2 and 6.2.6 below, where the (lack of) disclosure of evidence to the sanctions 
committee, ombudsperson and affected individual will be discussed. 
28 un sc res. 2368 (2017), §6(e).
29 A designating state is encouraged to seek information/guidance from other states, including the state of 
nationality/residence. This practice should contribute to consensus on the issue; if doubt arises whether 
to designate, extra time should be reserved to gather further information instead of proceeding with the 
decision regardless. sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of february 12, 2007). 
30 sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of february 12, 2007), § 4(a).
31 for an example of a narrative summary and the information to be included, see https://www.un.org/
securitycouncil/content/mohammed-masood-azhar-alvi, see for all the narrative summaries adopted, 
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries.
32 un sc res. 2083 (2012), §17; sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of April 15, 2013), 
§6(q).
33 Paragraph 6(v) sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of february 12, 2007); un sc res. 
2083 (2012) §17. 
34 un sc res. 2083 (2012), §18.
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secondly, the ombudsperson has an obligation to inform directly – when the address is 
known – the listed individual/entity of the sanctions imposed and of the possibility to petition 
for delisting. However, when the address is not known or when the Permanent Mission has 
not been able to reach those affected for other reasons, a designated individual will find out 
about the designation when he or she is confronted with the day-to-day consequences of the 
imposed sanction. In other words, when they are unable to engage in bank transactions, 
unable to withdraw money, and/or unable to leave the country, they find out that they are 
designated. At each step of the notification, a summary of reasons is provided. once an 
individual is listed, he/she can only be removed from the list after a decision of the sanctions 
committee to delist; this can be achieved through the sanctions committee’s periodic review 
or after a successful delisting request to the ombudsperson. otherwise, an individual is listed 
indefinitely. The next sections will take this descriptive overview as the point of departure for 
the analysis of the accountability of the sanctions committee vis-à-vis those affected. 
2. Identifying Factors of Vulnerability: The Qualification of the 
Decision 
As explained in chapter 6, the concept of vulnerability influences the amount of discretion 
enjoyed by authorities and, as a result, the scope of the norms of the draft IGM. The draft 
Model suggests that vulnerability can be determined on the basis of the impact of the adopted 
decision (in other words, anyone affected by such a decision is considered vulnerable) and/
or characteristics related to the person who is affected by the decision (in other words, these 
individuals or groups are considered vulnerable in relation to whatever decision affects 
them). This section will examine whether one or more of such vulnerabilities can be 
identified in the context of the sanctions committee, and if so, how it influences the analysis 
in the remainder of the chapter.
The designation of individuals constitutes an administrative action. It has been argued 
however that these administrative sanctions should be deemed to have a punitive 
character. such characterization of the decision would automatically deem those affected 
35 un sc res. 1989 (2011), annex II, §16(b); un sc res. 2083 (2012) Annex II, §18(b); 6th report of the 
office of the ombudsperson pursuant to security council resolution 2083 (2012), un doc. s/2013/452, 
§24-25; 7th report of the office of the ombudsperson pursuant to security council resolution 2083 
(2012), un doc. s/2014/73 (2014), §24-25.
36 This also refers to automatic transfers, for instance, to pay a mortgage or other outstanding debt. In 
the context of entities, examples are money transfers being cancelled, as well as the inability to pay for 
goods, pay salaries and production costs, and large transactions with suppliers being cancelled. 
37 see above in and around n. 146 of chapter 4 and section 2.3 of chapter 6 for a further discussion of how 
the concept of vulnerability plays a role in the draft Model. 
38 e.g., §6(d) of the Al-Qaida sanctions committee Guidelines, (2013). 
39 The High commissioner for Human rights has qualified these sanctions as “clearly punitive,” although 
they may also be of a preventive nature (High commissioner for Human rights un doc. A/Hrc/16/50, 
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by the decision to be particularly vulnerable. The IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee’s position is that the designation is preventive in nature, and it does therefore not 
have a punitive character. 
However, the sanction imposed can arguably be considered to have a punitive nature 
due to the severity of the sanction, as these sanctions limit the freedoms enjoyed by 
those designated, and it has an adverse effect on the lives of those designated. As noted 
in chapter 5, the label given by the decision-making body is indicative but not decisive; 
what is conclusive is the effect of the adopted decision. The designations have a significant 
impact on the daily lives of the individuals. The individuals listed are often unable to access 
their property, pay their mortgage, or receive social security benefits. They may also face 
problems getting a job and are restricted in their ability to travel. The sanctions do not 
only affect those designated but also their direct relatives, who are similarly affected by 
the sanctions. The sanctions have no limitations in space or in time. A sanction can only 
be ended with a successful delisting request to the ombudsperson or when the internal 
review by the sanctions committee of the designation results in delisting; otherwise, the 
designation is indefinite. considering that all un member states are obliged to implement 
the sanctions, the assets of the person or entity listed shall be frozen wherever they are 
located and the imposed travel ban results in the individual being unable to leave the 
country in which he/she resides. There is no discretion accorded to member states to only 
partially implement the sanctions, or to mitigate the consequences due to, for instance, 
particularly harsh circumstances in a given case. 
The consequences can only be mitigated via a successful plea for an exemption of the travel 
and/or assets ban, and this has to be submitted to the sanctions committee by a state on 
behalf of an individual or entity. In other words, individuals need to find a state (for instance, 
the designating state, state of nationality or state of residence) willing to submit this request 
to the committee’s chairman. The sanctions committee examines whether – in case of an 
exemption from the assets freeze – the daily life of the individual concerned would be at 
§17); the un special rapporteur (scheinin) determined that they were a “criminal punishment” (un 
doc. A/62/223, §16).
40 In international law, it is recognized that punitive decisions or decisions of a criminal nature – considering 
their enormous impact on those affected – render those affected by these decisions particularly 
vulnerable. see further, e.g., ectHr, Engel and others v. The Netherlands, 5100/71 (november 23, 1976); 
Ozturk v. Germany, 8544/79, ECtHR (Plenary), Judgment (Merits) (february 21, 1984), §54.
41 e.g., paragraph 6(d) of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee Guidelines (2013); un sc 
1989 (2011) 14th preambular paragraph; see further, e.g., un special rapporteur emmerson, report 
2012, §54-56. 
42 report of the un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights, (scheinin) un GA doc. 
A/65/258 (August 6, 2010), §52.
43 The chances of success of these review procedures will be discussed in section 6 together with the 
procedural guarantees offered in these review processes. 
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stake, for example the inability to pay for basic expenses, if the exemption is not granted. 
Basic expenses include:
… payments for … rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance 
premiums, and public utility charges, or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional 
fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services, 
or fees or service charges for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds or other financial 
assets or economic resources.
This reference further demonstrates the impact of a sanction on the daily lives of the 
individuals concerned and their families. If an exemption is not granted – this will be the 
case for most requests for exemptions – the individual will not be able to access any of their 
bank accounts or other financial means to pay these expenses. Thus, although there is a 
system to mitigate part of the consequences of the sanctions, its procedure is cumbersome; 
individuals cannot file the request themselves, there is a high threshold imposed to file a 
request, and there is no independent assessment of the request. The effectiveness of the 
exemption procedure to mitigate the consequences for those affected is therefore highly 
questionable. 
In conclusion, those affected by a designation can be deemed to be particularly vulnerable. 
The draft Model suggests that these factors of vulnerability, at a minimum, diminish the 
discretion enjoyed by authorities to realize inclusionary governance and increase the level 
of scrutiny to be exercised when reviewing the conduct of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions committee. Thus, in the analysis of the inclusionary governance realized by the 
sanctions committee in steps 4-6 of the application of the draft Model (sections 4-6 of this 
chapter), a more in-depth assessment of the level of inclusionary governance is conducted, 
including the question of whether further measures should be adopted by the sanctions 
committee and the ombudsperson to ensure inclusion of those who are particularly 
vulnerable. Throughout the chapter reference is made to these factors of vulnerability and 
whether they may influence benchmarks discussed. 
44 see, e.g., §11 (a) and (b) of the committee Guidelines of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee.
45 for problems with the exemption procedure and why it may be practically impossible for certain 
individuals to find a state willing to support their request, see, e.g., l. van den Herik, ‘Peripheral 
Hegemony in the Quest to ensure security council Accountability for its Individualized un sanctions 
regime’ (2014) Grotius Centre Working Paper 2014/026-PSL, at 8.
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3. Preliminary Assessment: Do Arbitrary Features Exist in the 
Decision-Making and Review Procedure 
vulnerability is not the only factor influencing the level of discretion accorded and the 
level of scrutiny to be exercised in the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. In general, 
the draft Model recognizes that the criterion of non-arbitrariness functions to constrain 
public authorities from abusing their public power. Moreover, whenever a decision-making 
procedure and/or review procedure has arbitrary features, increased scrutiny should be 
exercised of the overall level of inclusionary governance realized by public authorities. This 
section will examine, therefore, whether the decision-making procedure of the IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida sanctions committee has such arbitrary features. 
An arbitrary decision is one that is not sufficiently guided by procedural rules and guarantees 
but is rather a decision reached by one or a small number of people and adopted within the 
public authorities’ full discretion. The draft Model suggests that an initial screening of arbitrary 
features within the decision-making and/or review procedure entails an assessment of whether 
authorities provided common core guarantees to those affected. This includes, amongst others, 
a duty to inform, an entitlement to those affected to be heard, a duty to provide a reasoned 
decision and a duty to realize an effective review of the decision made. furthermore, when 
public authorities enjoy unfettered discretion in the exercise of their powers, it is a signal of a 
potential arbitrary use of powers. whenever the decision-making procedure is considered to 
have arbitrary features, further scrutiny (that is, in-depth analysis) of the entire decision-making 
procedure is required, including rules of evidence, standard of proof and burden of proof. 
Applying this framework to the sanctions committee shows that the decision-making 
procedure has certain arbitrary features. Although it will be discussed in detail in the various 
sections below, it may now already be pointed out that: 
- those designated have very limited access to the evidence underlying their designation;
- states enjoy unfettered discretion to qualify information (evidence) as confidential 
in the decision-making procedure and withhold this information from the sanctions 
committee, those affected and the review body; 
- there is no opportunity to participate in the designation procedure; and 
- there is only a limited right to a remedy. 
Hence, the procedure of the sanctions committee has some inherent arbitrary features. 
Accordingly, stricter scrutiny is required of the decision-making and review procedure of 
the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, and, for instance, review of the burden 
46 for a further explanation and justification of the notion of arbitrariness and its function as a trigger 
factor, see chapter 6 section 2.2.
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of proof and standard of proof requirements is also necessary to assess the fairness of the 
review procedure. 
In the remainder of this chapter, these dynamics, the apparent arbitrary features and the 
factors of vulnerability will be taken into account: the sanctions committee’s decision-
making and review procedure is assessed through the lens of the dynamic draft IGM, in 
which less discretion is accorded to authorities. Accordingly, stricter scrutiny is exercised 
for an in-depth assessment of the inclusionary governance realized, including the burden 
and standard of proof within the procedure. The analysis will be structured along the lines 
of the three dimensions of the draft Model: the entitlement to information, the entitlement 
to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure and the entitlement to an 
effective remedy (sections 4-6). 
4. Informational Entitlements 
The draft Model for Inclusionary Governance encompasses two distinctive entitlements to 
information: an entitlement to public interest information and an entitlement to personal 
information. The sanctions committee holds information that is both of a public interest 
nature and of a personal nature. In the two sections below, it will be assessed whether, 
and to what extent, the sanctions committee fulfills its duties in relation to these two 
entitlements. 
The analysis in this section will follow the building blocks of the informational entitlements 
as identified in the draft Model: what constitutes public interest information or personal 
information in the context of designation procedures, who holds the information, who is 
entitled to access to this information and under what conditions, and whether and to what 
extent further obligations or duties can be identified for the handling of the information. The 
conclusion to this section will address the strengths and weaknesses in the way the sanctions 
committee handles information that is of public interest or of a personal nature. In addition, 
the functionality of the draft Model as a yardstick to identify and analyze the information 
held by the sanctions committee will be evaluated. 
4.1.  Public Interest Information 
The definition of public interest information has two components: (1) the information is 
in the possession of public authorities, and (2) the information is of public interest. when 
applying this definition to the sanctions committee procedure, the rules for procedure, 
the (de)listing criteria, and the rules for the review procedure meet these criteria. This 
information is produced by the decision-making body (i.e., the un sanctions committee) 
and by the review body (that is, the ombudsperson) and is of relevance to everyone who 
  7
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
wants to be informed about the decision-making procedure, the review procedure and what 
the (substantive) standards for listing or delisting are. 
The draft Model suggests that public interest information should be available upon request 
without requiring an interest to be stated; in other words, everyone is entitled to this 
information. The public interest information identified in this section is published on the 
website of the sanctions committee. Accordingly, everyone with access to the Internet can 
access this information. However, one needs to be aware that the information is available 
online only; someone needs to have knowledge of the existence of the un sanctions 
committee to be able to access the information. In addition, un member states are informed 
of these procedures via the un security council resolutions. It should be noted that those 
designated are (also) informed of the possibility of a review and the listing criteria when they 
are informed via the ombudsperson or the Permanent Mission of the country of which they 
are a resident or national. Accordingly, there is not a set standard for how member states 
of the united nations are informed of the public interest information and how individuals 
are informed of this information. In the draft Model, there is no distinction in the type of 
obligations that public authorities owe towards different parties. However, the question of 
whether public authorities have, for instance, a duty to inform those affected will be dealt 
with in the context of the entitlement to meaningful participation in the decision-making 
procedure in section 5. 
In the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, there is no procedure to request 
access to public interest information that has not yet been published online by the sanctions 
committee. Moreover, as will be further addressed in section 6, there is no legal avenue 
available to address this potential lack of access to information. even though a procedure 
to request access to public interest information is lacking, there is currently access to 
information of a public interest nature via the website of the sanctions committee; in 
addition, those designated have to be informed about this public interest information by 
the ombudsperson or the Permanent Mission of the country of which they are a resident 
or national, and member states are informed of this information via un security council 
resolutions. 
Hence, the application of the draft Model’s building block of the entitlement to public interest 
information to the sanctions committee procedure demonstrates that the draft IGM in 
general works; the benchmarks of the building block are sufficiently defined to identify the 
47 one can question whether those interested have access to the Internet to access this information. 
Although everyone may access the information, it is assumed that it is of particular relevance to those 
designated and their family members, as well as to researchers and practitioners. 
48 sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018), para 6(q)-(r).
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strengths and weaknesses in the approach of the sanctions committee to sharing information 
of public interest in their possession. However, the application of the draft Model does show 
that the role of other actors, such as the un member states, in the sharing of public interest 
information is not fully captured by the draft Model.
4.2.  Personal Information 
The draft Model defines personal information as all information that relates to an 
individual. This section will analyze whether the sanctions committee in their decision-
making procedure stores, collects or shares personal information in conformity with the 
draft Inclusionary Governance Model. This research identifies two types of personal 
information in the decision-making procedure of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee that meet this definition: evidence used to support listing and information 
used to identify those designated. each type of personal information will be discussed in 
a separate section. 
The analysis follows the building blocks of the entitlement to personal information of 
the draft Model: what constitutes personal information in the context of designation 
procedures; who holds the information; who may access the information; and whether, and 
to what extent, can obligations or duties be identified for the collection, storage and sharing 
of personal information.
4.2.1. Evidence Supporting Listing
This section will discuss the evidence supporting the listing of an individual or entity in the 
context of the draft Model. This type of personal information can be of a diverse nature 
and includes information derived from intelligence agencies (national or otherwise), law 
enforcement, court orders and judgments relevant to the case at hand, and confessions or 
admissions by the individual in question, or when it concerns a designation of an entity, by 
one of its representatives.
The draft Model suggests that, at a minimum, individuals who are the subject of the 
information have to be given access to this information, and if they are not, the restriction to 
access this information has to be in accordance with the principles of legality, legitimacy, and 
necessity. Moreover, public authorities have to inform the data subjects that their information 
is being collected or stored, unless reasons of necessity require otherwise. furthermore, 
authorities have a duty to realize a review procedure to challenge the legality of the storage, 
collection and/or sharing of the personal information. 
49 §6(h) sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of April 15, 2013). 
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when applying this framework to the sanctions committee, it shows that the sanctions 
committee only partially complies with its duties as required by the draft Model. Individuals 
are not informed by the sanctions committee – nor by other actors as is shown below – of 
the storage and/or collection of their personal information. There is no procedure in place to 
request access to this information. Those designated will gain partial access to their personal 
information once they are notified (by the ombudsperson and/or the Permanent Mission 
of the country of residence or nationality) of the decision. The notification of the decision is 
accompanied by a summary of reasons for the designation. This summary of reasons has to 
include references to the evidence supporting the listing. Practice shows that this summary of 
reasons is quite brief, and it typically does not contain a “detailed explanation of the evidential 
basis on which the assertion [to designate] is made.” Moreover, the designating state, which 
is the state that suggested listing and provided the evidence supporting the listing, has the 
discretion to decide what portions of the statement of case are to be publicly released and 
what parts are deemed confidential and thus excluded. Thus, there is no guarantee that 
those designated will gain access to the evidence used to designate him/her.
The draft Model suggests that when public authorities limit the extent to which individuals 
are entitled to personal information, the principles of legality, necessity and legitimacy 
(tripartite test) should be met. whether a potential limitation can be deemed to be in 
accordance with the tripartite test has to be deduced from the reports, statements, and 
resolutions of the sanctions committee. The lack of access is generally explained by the 
sanctions committee, or by other actors on their behalf, by reference to international 
security reasons requiring confidentiality. At the national level, national security reasons 
are considered to be a legitimate ground for limiting the right to personal information. 
Therefore, reasons of international security may similarly be regarded as a legitimate ground 
for limiting the entitlement to personal information. 
The principle of legality requires that any potential limitation has to be in accordance with 
the law. Thus, when applying this to the designation procedure, it implies that the un 
security council or the sanctions committee has to stipulate under what circumstances 
personal information can be held, stored or shared. often, designating states are the ones 
who hold information of a personal nature – that is, the evidence underlying the designation. 
The sanctions committee guidelines indicate that it falls within the discretion of those states 
holding the personal information whether, and to what extent, they disclose this information 
to other sanctions committee members, to the ombudsperson, and ultimately to those 
50 un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights (emmerson) report, second annual 
report (2012), un doc. A/67/396, §25.
51 sanctions committee Guidelines, (amended version of february 12, 2007) § 6(g), (h). 
52 see, e.g., sanctions committee Guidelines, 6(h)(5).
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designated. The principle of legality encompasses more than a written ground to limit 
an entitlement; legality also requires a certain quality of the law regulating the exercise of 
public power. The draft IGM defines this quality to include, amongst other things, that the 
discretion enjoyed by authorities may not be unfettered, that there should be a possibility 
to request a review and individuals have to be duly informed of the procedure and their 
possibilities. In the given case, states holding confidential information have unfettered 
discretion in determining whether and to what extent information is disclosed to those 
affected, and in addition, whether and to what extent information is disclosed to the (other 
members of the) sanctions committee and/or to the ombudsperson. Although the extent to 
which designated persons have a right to a review will be discussed in section 6, those who 
feel that a public authority did not comply with its duties have no legal avenue available to 
them to challenge such an exercise of public power. 
In the context of the draft Model, the principle of necessity implies that there should be 
a pressing social need to impose the limitation, where the interests of the individual to 
obtain the information have to be balanced against the international institution’s interest 
(i.e., the legitimate aim) protected by the restriction. In relation to the evidence used to 
justify the listing, there is an abstract discussion on whether a pressing social need exists 
and whether the interests of the decision-making body outweigh those of the individual. 
The decision to withhold information rests with each state that relies on and/or submits 
evidence for a designation; the decision does not rest with the sanctions committee. The 
sanctions committee can only vote whether an individual should indeed be designated 
after a designated state requests an individual to be listed. In this process, there is no room 
to take the interests of the individual into account, and therefore interests of the state and 
those of the individual cannot be balanced. In the context of the principle of necessity, the 
quality of the decision-making procedure similarly matters. As already shown in the context 
of the principle of legality, there are serious shortcomings in the quality of the sanctions 
committee’s decision-making procedure. The principle of proportionality is often discussed 
53 see, for instance, the sanctions committee Guidelines, 6(h) (4-5) regarding the statement of case:
 The statement of case should provide as much detail as possible on the basis(es) for listing, including 
but not limited to: (…)
 (4) the nature of the supporting evidence (e.g. intelligence, law enforcement, judicial, open source 
information, admissions by subject, etc.); 
 (5) additional information or documents supporting the submission as well as information about 
relevant court cases and proceedings. The statement of case shall be releasable, upon request, except 
for the parts the designating state identifies as being confidential to the committee, and may be used 
to develop the narrative summary of reasons for listing (...).
54 compliance with the requirement of necessity and legality is difficult to assess as the sanctions 
committee has not referred to the need to limit access to personal information. no insight is therefore 
provided into the policy considerations for this decision. It should be noted though that, in the context 
of the ombudsperson procedure, the ombudsperson has addressed the necessity of confidentiality of 
information on the one side and the need to balance such confidentiality with fair trial rights and due 
procedure safeguards on the other side. see further section 6.2 below. 
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together with the principle of necessity. The former principle refers to the need to choose the 
least restrictive means to achieve the legitimate aim whenever an entitlement is limited. In 
other words, instead of denying all access to the information, the same legitimate aim may 
be obtained when the information is redacted. In practice, however, the access to documents 
is completely refused. In principle, those states classifying evidence are advised to include in 
the summary of reasons the conclusions drawn from the personal information withheld from 
the designated individual. In addition to the redaction of classified parts in the documents, 
the inclusion of the conclusions drawn from the evidence may also constitute a less restrictive 
measure. However, in practice, the summary of reasons is too general and no reference to the 
evidence underlying the designation can be deduced from this summary. 
Therefore, affected individuals enjoy only limited access to their personal information, and 
this limitation does not meet the tripartite test as stipulated in the draft Model. It should 
be noted that the draft Model suggests that public authorities are required to ensure an 
effective remedy whenever access to personal information is partially or fully denied, and 
whenever personal information is stored and collected by public authorities. whether the 
sanctions committee complies with this duty will be discussed in section 6. when assessing 
the procedure as a whole, certain interactions come to the forefront. limiting access to 
personal information may have a crippling effect on two different levels. firstly, this lack of 
access to personal information increases the likeliness that arbitrary decisions are adopted, 
as no other party can assess the accuracy of the information underlying the designation 
once a state qualifies it as confidential. There is no obligation to share such information 
with other parties (states, sanctions committee and/or ombudsperson). Moreover, there is 
practice of states relying on evidence obtained through torture; a practice that is permitted 
by the sanctions committee. The sanctions committee does not uphold rules of evidence, 
nor does it maintain a standard of proof to come to its decision to designate beyond the 
substantive norm of “associated with IsIl and Al-Qaida.” considering that there is a proven 
55 The danger of arbitrariness was already addressed in section 3, but the concept will resurface in each 
section.
56 There is proof of designations that were made solely on the basis of evidence derived from torture. see, 
for example, G. sullivan & M. de Goede, ‘Between law and the exception: the un 1267 ombudsperson 
as a Hybrid Model of legal expertise’ (2015) Leiden Journal of International Law 833-854, at 840; 
referencing to a letter from the like-minded lawyers to un special rapporteur on countering 
terrorism (August 13, 2013), ‘Questions concerning the 1268/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions committee, 
the ombudsperson, and the delisting Process’. sullivan was one of the six authors of the letter. see, 
e.g., Hrcee, General Comment 32, §33; see also the discussion of the ombudsperson procedure and 
the standard of proof used by the ombudsperson (section 6.2.5), which shows that the ombudsperson 
has instead adopted the premise that if there is enough information to come to the credible and reliable 
conclusion that information was obtained through torture, it should not be relied upon. 
57 It should be noted that the draft Model acknowledges that, in principle, public authorities enjoy 
discretion in setting the rules of evidence and burden/standard of proof. However, if the procedure has 
inherent arbitrary features, the rules of evidence and standard/burden of proof used by the review body 
become relevant in the assessment whether a fair review procedure was provided by public authorities, 
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lack of reliability of confessions derived from torture or maltreatment in interrogations, 
the permissibility of such evidence may further lead to arbitrary decisions. Although the 
draft Model does not stipulate rules on the permissibility of evidence, it does stipulate that 
any exercise of public power may not violate ius cogens norms. The prohibition of torture 
constitutes an ius cogens norm, and therefore the permissibility of evidence that is allegedly 
derived from interrogations in which torture was used will violate this norm. secondly, 
the lack of access to the evidence that formed the basis for the designation is presumed to 
negatively affect the designated individual’s entitlement to an effective remedy. Moreover, 
the fact that those responsible for carrying out the review also cannot access the information 
further impacts the fairness of the review procedure. The last point will be evaluated in 
section 6. 
In conclusion, the application of the draft Model to the sanctions committee shows that 
individuals have only a limited entitlement to access the evidence underlying the designation. 
Moreover, personal information is not held exclusively by the sanctions committee; on the 
contrary, designating states are often the ones in possession of the evidence. As a result, it is 
not only individuals who lack access to the information, often others, including the sanctions 
committee members and the ombudsperson, similarly lack access to this evidence. Thus, 
the (benchmarks of the) building blocks of the draft IGM function well, they are capable of 
identifying this lack of access to the information. However, the multiple-actor aspect is not 
sufficiently captured by the draft Model. The draft IGM assumes that the public authority 
taking the decision holds the information (in this case, the sanctions committee), and it does 
not include or exclude others who may be in possession of the evidence. In the remainder 
of the chapter, it will be further assessed whether this multiple-actor aspect is sufficiently 
captured by the draft Model, and whether, and to what extent, it should influence the overall 
level of inclusionary governance realized by an international institution.
4.2.2. The Information that Serves to Identify an Individual in order to Implement the Sanction 
The second type of personal information identified in the context of the sanctions committee 
is the information provided by a designating state to identify the individual and ensure that 
the correct person is being sanctioned. once an individual is designated via a decision by the 
sanctions committee and affirmed in a un security council resolution, the information 
is published online at the website of the sanctions committee and communicated to all un 
member states. The individual or entity to be designated is identified using indicators. for 
individuals, the following entries are used to the extent available:
see further section 6.2.6. 
58 see, e.g., Annex III of un sc res 2368 (2017) in which 6 individuals/entities were listed. The narrative 
summary of reasons and further information per entry can be accessed through the website of the 
sanctions committee: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries.
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family name/surname, given names, other relevant names, date of birth, place of birth, 
nationality/citizenship, gender, aliases, employment/occupation, state(s) of residence, 
passport or travel document and national identification number, current and previous 
addresses, current status before law enforcement authorities (e.g. wanted, detained, convicted), 
location.
This information is included in the narrative summary of reasons and published online, 
provided to all states and sent to the Permanent Mission of the country of residence and/or 
nationality. Thus, everyone can access this information and see who is listed by the sanctions 
committee. The Model suggests that authorities should protect personal information 
that they hold and should prevent unauthorized access to it by third parties. Personal 
information may only be shared with third parties with the consent of the individual and/
or whenever the tripartite test of legality, legitimacy and necessity is met. considering the 
type of decision-making procedure and the type of personal information being published, it 
is safe to conclude that the individuals did not consent to their information being published 
online. As argued in the previous section, the sanctions committee could explain that for 
the legitimate reasons of protecting (inter)national peace and security, the publication of 
this information is warranted. legality requires that the limitation, and thus the sharing of 
personal information with third parties, should be laid down in a law and that this law should 
be of a certain quality. un sc resolution 2368 and the sanctions committee Guidelines 
recommend that the sanctions committee, when it lists a person to be sanctioned, also 
publishes this information online; moreover, it urges states to – in the implementation 
of the designations – inform custom agencies, banks etc. to freeze the assets and enforce 
the travel ban, and when it exists, to place these persons on a domestic sanctions list. The 
quality requirement of the draft Model implies that, at a minimum, whenever personal 
information of individuals is published, the individuals affected should have a right to 
rectification and removal of said information if the information is not accurate. The extent 
to which these affected individuals are entitled to such effective remedy will be discussed 
in section 6. 
The principle of necessity requires that there has to be a pressing social need to publish the 
information without the consent of the individual concerned. The interests of the authorities 
in publishing this information have to be balanced against the interests of the individuals in 
protecting their privacy. In this case, the argument can be made that there is a pressing social 
need to publish this information online without the consent of the individuals designated. 
59 sanctions committee Guidelines, (amended version of september 5, 2018), principle 6(g). similar 
entries exist for designating entities, see further the sanctions committee Guidelines. 
60 The information is sent along with the summary of case. The Permanent Mission of the country of 
residence and/or nationality has the obligation to inform those designated. The entries should enable 
the Permanent Missions to contact those designated and inform them accordingly. 
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The prevention of terrorism constitutes a pressing social need. As stated by the un security 
council:
Reaffirming that terrorism in all forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious 
threats to peace and security and that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable 
regardless of their motivations, whenever, wherever, and by whomsoever committed, and 
reiterating its unequivocal condemnation of the Islamic state in Iraq and the levant (IsIl, also 
known as da’esh), Al-Qaida, and associated individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities for 
ongoing and multiple criminal terrorist acts aimed at causing the deaths of innocent civilians 
and other victims, destruction of property, and greatly undermining stability,
Recognizing that terrorism poses a threat to international peace and security and that 
countering this threat requires collective efforts on national, regional and international levels 
on the basis of respect for international law and the charter of the united nations.
The information is published online to inform everyone that these individuals are being 
sanctioned because of their association with IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida. 
The draft Model suggests that a crucial factor in the tripartite test is whether those affected 
are entitled to an effective remedy. This factor will be examined in section 6. It is not only 
those persons designated by the sanctions committee who may face the consequences 
of published information; other individuals may also face the consequences of sanctions. 
This can happen, amongst other reasons, when there is no requirement of a standard of 
proof for listings, and when no minimum number of entries is required to correctly identify 
individuals. when the designation is based on only a few entries, the wrong person can be 
identified as the person to be designated and can face the consequences of the sanction then 
imposed. In general, public authorities enjoy full discretion when setting the standard of 
proof for a decision. nevertheless, the draft IGM does suggest that any exercise of public 
power may not be arbitrary, and when listings are based on a low number of entries, it may 
lead to arbitrary decisions. Accordingly, the lack of guiding rules on the proper identification 
of those to be designated constitutes a risk factor for arbitrary decisions. considering this 
risk factor and the apparent arbitrary features already signaled in section 3, the remainder of 
the assessment conducted in this chapter will be focused on this risk of arbitrariness when 
evaluating whether, and to what extent, the sanctions committee provides inclusionary 
governance towards those affected. In particular, further risk factors for arbitrariness will be 
examined, and whether the sanctions committee has adopted any procedural guarantees to 
prevent arbitrary decisions from being made. further, those who may face consequences of 
61 un sc res. 2368 (2017), the preamble’s first two paragraphs. 
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a listing due to a mistaken identity should be considered to be affected by the decision, and 
should therefore similarly be entitled to an effective legal remedy. 
4.3.  Conclusions
This section illustrated how the draft Model can serve as a yardstick to analyze whether 
and to what extent the sanctions committee holds information, what the nature of this 
information is, and whether and to what extent the guarantees recognized within the draft 
Model are provided to those affected by the designations. The application of the draft IGM 
to the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee’s decision-making procedure reveals 
that the sanctions committee holds both public and personal interest information. The 
public interest information concerns the listing criteria and the rules of the decision-making 
and review procedure. Although there is no possibility to request access to information of 
public interest, the information identified to be of a public interest nature is accessible online 
to everyone. In other words, although de iure there is no entitlement to access public interest 
information as defined by the draft Model, de facto individuals can have access to the 
information. However, the lack of knowledge of the existence of the sanctions committee, 
as well as whether people have access to the website of the sanctions committee, limits the 
extent to which individuals have access to the public interest information.
In the context of the entitlement to personal information, the situation is more complex; a 
variety of actors hold and store personal information that is used for the designation and 
identification of individuals. The draft Model identifies public authorities as the principal 
duty bearers. Thus, in this case, the sanctions committee is the duty bearer. However, the 
practices of the sanctions committee demonstrate that information is held by designating 
states, who have unfettered discretion to determine whether to disclose this information to 
the sanctions committee whenever they suggest someone for designation. As a result, the 
sanctions committee often does not have access to the evidence underlying a suggestion 
to list, nor does the ombudsperson or the petitioner have such access. consequently, the 
sanctions committee only partially complies with its duties under the draft Model as 
those designated only receive a summary of reasons for their designation. Moreover, the 
information is withheld indefinitely. There is no entitlement to access this information and no 
procedure to request access; the individual is dependent on the willingness of a designating 
state to disclose parts of the evidence underlying a designation decision in the summary of 
case. Practice shows that the summary of case often only contains generic reasons. As section 
6 will further address, there is no legal remedy available to those designated to request access 
to this information. Instead, the petitioner is completely dependent on the assessment of the 
available evidence by the ombudsperson, who, in some instances, may gain access to the 
evidence underlying a designating decision. nevertheless, even if the ombudsperson can 
receive access to the evidence, this information will not be shared with the petitioner.
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The application of the draft Model to IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee 
shows that a contextual assessment is warranted as the inclusionary governance norms 
interact with each other. first, as signaled throughout this section, the entitlement 
to information influences the entitlement to an effective remedy. for instance, those 
individuals whose personal information has been stored, collected and/or published should 
be entitled to access their personal information and ask modification or rectification 
whenever the personal information stored and/or used is not accurate. further, when 
information is stored without a legal ground, they should be allowed to ask the removal of 
the information. second, the lack of access to personal information (i.e., the evidence) is 
expected to have a crippling effect on other elements of the draft Inclusionary Governance 
Model. for instance, the entitlement to personal information is closely related to, and 
interlinked with, other obligations of authorities under the draft Model. Think here of the 
duty to provide reasons for any decisions made, the duty to duly inform those affected to 
ensure a meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure, and the duty to duly 
inform those affected to ensure an effective remedy. overall, the lack of access to personal 
information is presumed to negatively affect the fairness and thus the effectiveness of a 
legal remedy (section 6). This second argument ties in with the problem already flagged in 
section 3: the decision-making procedure of the sanctions committee has inherent arbitrary 
features. The remainder of this chapter will further evaluate whether the application of the 
draft Model to the designation procedure reveals signs of norm interacting and whether, 
and to what extent, it influences the overall level of inclusionary governance realized by the 
sanctions committee. 
The next section will evaluate whether, and to what extent, the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions committee ensures meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure 
for those who may be designated. 
5. The Entitlement to Meaningful Participation in the Decision-Making 
Procedure
The draft Inclusionary Governance Model recognizes a duty for public authorities to ensure 
that those who will be affected by a decision participate in a meaningful manner in the 
decision-making procedure before a decision is made. There are several elements that serve 
62 It should be noted that an overlap is expected between the assessment of the duty to give reasons and the 
analysis conducted in this section on the entitlement to personal information. The evidence underlying 
the designation, which is of a personal nature, constitutes the reasons for the designation procedure. 
Therefore, the entitlement of those designated to access this evidence is examined in section 4. However, 
as section 5 will show, the duty to give reasons – and thus, the duty of the sanctions committee to 
explain the evidence substantiating the reason for listing – is assessed in the context of the entitlement 
to meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure. 
  7
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
to ensure that the participation is meaningful, and not merely pro forma: those affected have 
to be duly informed of the upcoming decision and the possibility to be heard, those affected 
have to be heard, these views have to be duly taken into account, and authorities have to 
provide a reasoned decision. Authorities have wide discretion in organizing the participatory 
processes as long as the result is meaningful participation in the decision-making for those 
affected.
In the context of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, those affected are 
not able to participate meaningfully in the decision-making procedure. no participatory 
processes are realized by the sanctions committee. Thus, designated individuals are not 
properly informed of the upcoming decision and its procedure, there is no opportunity to 
present one’s views, and accordingly, there is no participatory process before the designation 
takes place. 
Those designated are informed once the decision has been made. They have to be 
informed about the decision made, its consequences, the reasons underlying the decision, 
and the possibility of review by the ombudsperson procedure. In general, the draft Model 
suggests that the duty to provide reasons requires authorities to provide the legal basis 
for the decision and an explanation of the reasons underlying the decision. In particular, 
the reasons have to address the views presented and how they were taken into account. 
In the situation of the sanctions committee, there is no participatory process; reasons 
are however provided for the designation. nevertheless, as the previous section showed, 
the reasons provided are limited and often do not contain references to the evidence 
underlying the decision. 
The benchmarks of the building blocks of the entitlement to meaningful participation in 
the decision-making do not encompass limitation grounds. In principle, the argument can 
be made that the lack of participation in the decision-making procedure may be justified 
for (inter)national security reasons. After all, when someone is considered to be associated 
with a terrorist organization by, for instance, offering financial support, informing them 
beforehand may be counterproductive as assets can be moved before the sanction is adopted. 
This would nullify the effect of the sanction. However, the draft Model does suggest that 
the permissibility of a limitation is dependent on the overall quality of the decision-making 
procedure. As shown, the decision-making procedure has inherent arbitrary features and 
thus lacks a certain quality in the procedure. considering that in casu, since participation is 
63 The notification procedure has some flaws that concern the way in which individuals are actually 
reached. see 1.3 above. 
64 Across the international instruments, no general approach to limitations to the right to participation 
could be detected, which can partly be explained by the right’s procedural nature. see further chapter 4. 
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not provided under any circumstances there is a complete denial of the right to participation. 
In its resolutions and guidelines, the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee does 
not justify the denial of participation in the designation procedure. However, in the un 
sc resolutions, references are made to the “need to combat by all means (…) threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts” while doing so “in accordance with 
the charter of the united nations and international law, including applicable international 
human rights, refugee and humanitarian law.” The lack of a possibility to participate in 
the decision-making procedure, combined with limited access to personal information 
and the limited reasoning for the listing, constitutes risk factors for arbitrary decisions and 
thus negatively influences the overall quality of the procedure. Hence, the complete lack of 
participation in the decision-making procedure is not in accordance with the benchmarks 
of the draft Model. 
In conclusion, the building blocks of the entitlement to meaningful participation in the 
decision-making procedure of the draft Model is sufficiently clear to be applied to the practice 
of international institutions. The application of the Model reveals that the IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida sanctions committee has completely denied those affected a possibility to 
participate in the decision-making procedure. 
The next section will examine whether, and to what extent, those designated enjoy an effective 
remedy, and accordingly, whether there is an entitlement to challenge a decision made and 
the lack of participation in the decision-making procedure. 
6. The Entitlement to an Effective Remedy 
The entitlement to an effective remedy has two components: an entitlement to a review and 
an entitlement to reparation. The components are intrinsically linked to each other; both 
need to be provided to those affected to ensure an effective remedy. The draft Model suggests 
that any remedy has to be adequate, accessible and effective in repairing the harm suffered. 
This section will analyze whether, and to what extent, the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions committee provides for an effective remedy to those affected in the context of 
the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. The previous sections demonstrated already the 
dynamic nature of the draft Model. This dynamic nature is further visible in the context of 
the entitlement to an effective remedy and manifests itself in two different ways. firstly, 
considering the particularly vulnerable situation of those designated and given the apparent 
65 see, e.g., un sc res. 1989 (2011), 5th paragraph of the preamble. 
66 see for a more elaborate discussion of these interactions and how they influence the draft Model 
chapter 6, sections 1.2 and 2. 
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arbitrary nature of the decision-making procedure, the content and scope of the entitlement 
to an effective remedy has been influenced as follows: 
- Authorities enjoy less discretion in implementing their obligations as formulated in the 
draft IGM; in particular, further positive obligations may be required to ensure that 
those particularly vulnerable have access to the review procedure.
- More strict scrutiny of compliance by authorities is to be exercised. Moreover, rules of 
evidence and the burden and standard of proof are taken into account in the assessment 
of whether those affected have (had) a fair review procedure. 
secondly, the outcome of the assessment conducted in the previous sections further influences 
the content and scope of an effective remedy. In other words, the analysis of whether the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee realized the entitlement to information and to 
meaningful participation for those affected aided in identifying the grounds and demands 
for an effective remedy, as summarized below:
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In other words, the draft Model gives indications of the type of legal remedies that should be 
available for those affected in the context of the sanctions committee’s designations. taking 
these dynamics into account, the following sections will evaluate whether, and to what extent, 
the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee guarantees an effective remedy to 
those affected. The entitlement to review in the context of the sanctions committee contains 
67 It should be noted that this list is not meant to be exhaustive. The analysis conducted in this section 
examines further whether there are (other) grounds for a review, who may request a review, and the 
extent to which legal remedies are realized for those entitled to these remedies. 
Entitlement to 
information
Those whose personal 
information is stored 
and collected




participation in the 
decision-making 
Those who were not 
able to participate in a 
meaningful manner in 
the decision-making 
procedure
Decision to designate 
Those designated




Table 16: Grounds for review
Entitlement to an 
effective remedy
entitlement to challenge 
the legality of the 
storage or collection 
of the information 
(i.e., legality/accuracy 
evidence) 
entitlement to a 
rectification and 
removal of information 
published, if it is not 
accurate (mistaken 
identity) 
entitlement to challenge 
the legality of the 
publication of the 
information 
entitlement to challenge 
the lack of meaningful 
participation 
entitlement to a review 
decision (a delisting 
request)
entitlement to challenge 
the implementation of 
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three elements: the internal review procedure of the sanctions committee, its delisting 
procedure and the review procedure of the ombudsperson. In section 6.1, the internal 
review procedure and the delisting procedure of the sanctions committee will be analyzed. 
section 6.2 will discuss the ombudsperson procedure. The entitlement to reparation will 
be discussed in section 6.3. In section 6.4, the overall conclusions will be presented as to 
whether, and to what extent, the sanctions committee provided for an effective remedy to 
those affected.
6.1. Internal Review Procedure by the Sanctions Committee 
This section will discuss the review procedures of the sanctions committee in the context 
of the entitlement to a review as part of the entitlement to an effective remedy. The section 
will have a two-fold purpose. first, the sanctions committee refers to these procedures 
as forming part of the way in which the committee provides an effective remedy to those 
affected. Accordingly, it is examined whether, and to what extent, these procedures fall within 
the ambit of the benchmarks identified for the entitlement to a review of the draft Model. 
second, this section will assess whether, and to what extent, these procedures contribute to 
providing inclusionary governance for those affected, and accordingly, how they should be 
regarded from the perspective of the draft Model.
There are two related review procedures of the sanctions committee discussed here: the 
internal review procedure, which (re)examines on a triennial basis the list of designated 
individuals and entities, and the internal review procedure triggered by a request for 
delisting by a member state. The draft IGM defines the entitlement to a review as 
encompassing a review by an independent and impartial review body for those affected by 
decisions. However, a two-tier procedure is also permitted; this implies that review by an 
independent and impartial review body is preceded by a review by a higher authority within 
the same decision-making body. 
68 The other sanctions committees work with the focal Point and not with an ombudsperson procedure. 
The focal Point procedure is a bilateral procedure in nature and offers a lower standard of procedural 
guarantees than the ombudsperson procedure.
69 In un sc res. 2083 (2012), it was decided that the review will be annual, §48-51; see also §10(d)-(h) of 
the sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of April 15, 2013). 
70 see particularly un sc res. 2083 §39-42 (2012); §10 (a-k) of the sanctions committee Guidelines 
(2013). 
71 see further the sanctions committee’s website, and section 7 of the sanctions committee Guidelines 
(2013).
72 The draft Model suggests that a right to a review can be either two-tier or one-tier. A two-tier procedure 
implies that authorities prescribe that individuals first need to request an administrative review within 
the same decision-making body, which is to be conducted by a higher authority than the authority 
that made the decision. only if this administrative review is not to the satisfaction of those affected, 
may they request a review by an independent and impartial review body established by law. A one-tier 
procedure implies that individuals can directly request this independent and impartial review body to 
review the decision.
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Although the procedures are discussed more at length below, both review procedures of 
the sanctions committee have an inter-state nature, with a key role given to the reviewing 
states, which are the designating states and the states of residence or nationality. The two 
procedures can be summarized as follows: 
regardless of the procedural guarantees offered by a review body, the essence of the 
entitlement to a review as recognized in the draft Model is that a review can be requested 
by those affected by the decision. However, as the table shows, neither review procedure can 
be triggered by a request from a listed individual or entity; in contrast, those designated play 
no role within these procedures and are only informed if the procedures result in delisting. 
Moreover, the review is not conducted by a different body or by a higher authority within 
the same decision-making body. There will be no independent review of the original listing. 
Thus, the conclusion is that the internal review procedure and the delisting procedure of the 
73 It should be noted that the members of the sanctions committee were the (co)designating states in over 

























Table 17: Internal review procedures of the Sanctions Committee
Characterization review 
process
Inter-state procedure: the 
reviewing states decide 
whether to suggest delisting;
If the reviewing states suggest 
delisting a five-day no-
objection period is followed;
states may also provide 
additional information 
to enhance the indicators 
(entries for identifications)
Inter-state procedure: if 
requested by designating 
state, a name is removed 
unless all sanctions 
committee members vote 
for listing or if the matter is 
submitted to un sc; 
If the request comes from 
another state, consensus 
must be reached in the 
sanctions committee to 
delist 
Role for individual 
affected 
no, they are not informed 
of the procedure, there 
is no participation in the 
procedure, they are only 
informed if delisted 
no, they are not informed 
of the procedure, there 
is no participation in the 
procedure, they are only 
informed if delisted
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sanctions committee do not meet the definition of a review procedure within the framework 
of the draft Model.
Although the internal review procedures do not qualify as a review procedure within the 
context of the draft Model’s right to a review, both review procedures have been characterized 
by the sanctions committee as contributing to the level of procedural guarantees offered for 
review procedures within the context of the designation decisions and are therefore worth 
discussing further. 
Triennial review procedure
from 2008-2010, the first large (internal) review of individuals and entities designated by 
the sanctions committee was conducted. In 2012, the un security council decided that 
a triennial review of all entries will be conducted by the sanctions committee with the 
assistance of the Analytical support and sanctions Monitoring team pursuant to resolutions 
1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning IsIl (da’esh), Al-Qaida and the taliban and 
associated individuals and entities (‘the Monitoring team’ or ‘Mt’). As the table indicates, 
the triennial review procedure is an inter-state procedure. designated individuals are not 
informed when this review of their designation takes places, nor are they involved in the 
procedure. The actors involved are the sanctions committee, the reviewing states and the 
Monitoring team; their respective roles in this procedure are discussed below. 
The reviewing states and the sanctions committee members decide whether an individual 
is eligible for delisting. The reviewing states are the designating state(s) and the states of 
nationality or residence of the listed person or entity. The reviewing states can be part 
of the sanctions committee if they are at that moment a member of the un security 
council. when an entry (in other words, individual or entity designated) is up for review, 
the Monitoring team sends the designating state(s) copies of the documents they had 
74 directed by un security council res. 1822 (2008), §25.
75 un sc res. 2083 (2012), §48-51; see similarly §10(d)-(h) of the sanctions committee Guidelines 
(amended version of september 5, 2018).
76 The Analytical support and sanctions Monitoring team support the sanctions committee in the 
internal review procedure. The Mt currently consists of 10 experts who have been chosen for their 
specialism; the un security council resolution 1526 (2004), establishing the Monitoring team in 
2004, listed that its members should: 
 demonstrate one or more of the following areas of expertise related to activities of the Al-Qaida 
organization and/or the taliban, including: counter-terrorism and related legislation; financing of 
terrorism and international financial transactions, including technical banking expertise; alternative 
remittance systems, charities, and use of couriers; border enforcement, including port security; arms 
embargoes and export controls; and drug trafficking. 
 un sc res. 1526 (2004) at 7. The team is based in new york. Its mandate is quite extensive and 
includes: assistance to the un sanctions committee in the triennial review of those listed, identify 
those designations that lack sufficient identification indicators to ensure an effective implementation 
of the measures, review whoever has been reported as deceased, review whatever listing (individual or 
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submitted and the original listing proposals. The states of residence or nationality receive 
the narrative as published online, the evidence as made available upon the designation and 
any other information to which designating states consented to disclose. within a three-
month timeframe, the reviewing states have to respond to the review request and send any 
additional information they would like to share with the sanctions committee. Thereafter, 
the Monitoring team and the sanctions committee members may submit any additional 
information within a one-month timeframe. The sanctions committee will discuss the 
information collected and the case files of those individuals under review to determine 
whether an individual should be delisted. similarly, as in the designation procedure, only 
the designating state has access to the reasons and evidence underlying an original decision 
to designate, which makes a thorough review by other states difficult. A simple objection by 
a member state of the un sanctions committee and/or by a reviewing state is sufficient for 
retaining the designation. The statistics demonstrate that the persons delisted were removed 
from the list due to a mistaken identity or because they had died; no one has been delisted 
as the result of a review of substantive grounds for listing or a (re)assessment of the evidence 
used. 
Review procedure triggered by delisting requests made by member states
This review procedure is triggered by a delisting request by a un member state to the sanctions 
committee. The procedure is quite similar to that of the triennial review procedure of the 
sanctions committee with regard to the key role accorded to the designating state(s). 
In general, the procedure differs when the designating state requests delisting from when any 
other state does so. If the designating state submits a name for delisting, the person designated 
will be delisted unless reverse consensus is reached within the sanctions committee to retain 
a listing. If any other member (i.e., another sanctions committee member, the state of 
nationality or another un member state) suggests delisting, the sanctions committee must 
entity) has not been reviewed in the last three years, and assist the ombudsperson in the information 
gathering phase. see, for example, Annex 1 to un sc res. 2368 (2017); further, for an example of the 
work of the Mt, see report un doc. s/2018/14 (January 26, 2018.
77 sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018), paragraph 10.
78 10(f)(iv) of the sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018).
79 for example, the first large review (2008-2010) examined 488 names. The review was directed by the 
un security council res. 1822 (2008), §25, to ensure that the list of designated individuals and entities 
was up-to-date and as accurate as possible, thus confirming that the listing was still appropriate. The 
sanctions committee decided that 45 of the 161 delisting proposals would be approved, thus resulting 
in a delisting, and 39 were to be rejected. It postponed a decision on 63 proposals, and 14 proposals were 
withdrawn by the proposing state. 217 narrative summaries of reasons for listing (including information 
on the identification of the individuals) were amended. The 45 designations that were approved were 
either delisted because they had died or because it concerned a wrong identity.
80 Idem, un sc res. 1822 (2008).
81 sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018), 7(a).
82 Idem, 7(q)-(s). 
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reach consensus to delist. The state suggesting delisting has to support its request with new 
evidence that challenges the evidence underlying the original listing. In most cases, only 
the designating state has access to all evidence underlying the decision; other states have 
only access to the summary of reasons for the listing. Hence, regardless of whether states are 
willing to submit a delisting request of an individual or entity, its success rate is questionable 
due to the lack of access to the relevant information. As opposed to the triennial procedure, 
this review can only result in retention of a listing or in delisting; neither the accuracy of 
the information (and the indicators) nor the completeness of the evidence is reviewed in 
the procedure. There are no statistics available for the requests of member states to delist 
someone. 
In both review procedures, there is no independent review body in charge of the assessment. 
The same un sanctions committee members decide whether a person should be delisted, 
with a vital role recognized for the designating state. The procedures do not meet the 
benchmarks of the draft Model’s entitlement to a review, and accordingly are not considered 
an effective remedy.
nevertheless, the delisting procedure initiated by a member state can aid individuals 
in getting delisted. However, its success is completely dependent upon the willingness of 
member states to file a request and on the willingness of the sanctions committee members 
to cooperate. However, considering the inherent arbitrary features of the procedure, extra 
– although imperfect – review procedures may be a positive influence. The triennial review 
procedure may enhance the quality and accuracy of the identification indicators, and 
accordingly, ensure that the proper person is identified to be listed. when the accuracy of 
the listing is improved by including further indicators, there is a smaller chance that others 
will face the consequences of a listing due to a mistaken identity. further, as noted in section 
2, not only those designated face the consequences of the sanctions; direct family members 
may also be affected. when someone designated dies, the sanctions will remain in place and 
impact the lives of their relatives until the sanctions committee decides to delist someone 
upon receiving evidence of their death. 
83 sanctions committee Guidelines (amended version of september 5, 2018), 7(d).
84 Although statistics are not available, the annual reports of the sanctions committee suggest that 
individuals may be delisted without a petition filed through the ombudsperson procedure, which 
suggests that it is the result from one of the two internal review procedures. see, for example, the 2016 
Annual report:
 34. Both the committee and the ombudsperson can receive delisting requests. during the reporting 
period, 20 individuals and one entity were listed. six individuals were delisted, of whom three were 
delisted following the submission of a petition through the office of the ombudsperson. In addition, 
one entity was delisted. The committee approved amendments to the existing entries of 23 individuals 
and one entity on its sanctions list. 
 IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, Annual report, un sc res. s/2016/115 (december 
30, 2016). 
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
In conclusion, the analysis shows that the benchmarks of the right to a review are sufficiently 
clear to determine that the internal review procedures cannot be qualified as a review 
procedure within the scope of the draft IGM. Thus, on the basis of the existing elements 
of the draft Model, the role of the internal review procedures within the accountability 
framework of the sanctions committee cannot sufficiently be captured. This shortcoming 
will be further discussed in the concluding sections of this chapter. 
The next section will examine whether the ombudsperson procedure complies with the 
benchmarks of the entitlement to a review as defined within the draft Model. 
6.2. The Entitlement to a Review Provided by the Ombudsperson Procedure 
The office of the ombudsperson was established in 2009 to receive delisting requests 
submitted by “or on behalf of, an individual, group, undertaking, or entity” on the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. This section will discuss whether, and to what extent, 
the ombudsperson procedure provides a review procedure meeting the standards of the 
draft Inclusionary Governance Model. The draft Model includes the following benchmarks 
for the entitlement to a review:
- Those affected are duly informed about the review procedure. 
- They are entitled to access the review body. 
- There is a procedure in place to request a review of the decision .
- The review is conducted by an independent, impartial review body that has been 
established by law. 
- The review procedure is fair. 
- The decision is duly reasoned. 
85 un sc res. 1904 (2009), Annex II. The ombudsperson procedure was created to address the criticism 
raised against the sanctions committee’s procedures and their lack of fairness and due process. see, 
e.g., un sc res. 2161 (2014) “welcoming the establishment of the office of the ombudsmen…. 
noting the office of the ombudsperson’s significant contribution in providing additional fairness and 
transparency....” at p. 2. As stated by the ombudsperson:
 It resulted from the fair process problems related to the use of targeted sanctions, particularly with 
respect to the Al-Qaida regime and was driven in no small part by litigation here in europe 
 (remarks by Prost, ombudsperson, security council Al-Qaida sanctions committee, to the 49th 
meeting of the committee of legal Advisors on Public International law of the council of europe 
(strasbourg, March 20, 2015). see also the remarks made by various members of the un security 
council at the 5474th meeting of the unsc. during this meeting, the effectiveness of the sanctions 
regime was discussed. see, for example, the speech of the delegation of the united kingdom under 10, 
of the delegation of Japan under 13, of the delegation of the russian federation under 17, and of the 
delegation of france under 18 at the un sc 5474th meeting, (June 22, 2006), un doc. s/Pv.5474; see 
also the report of the informal working group on the general issues of sanctions, as annexed to un sc 
res. s/2006/997 (december 22, 2006), §3, 14-16. 
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The sections 6.2.2-6.2.8 will apply these benchmarks to the ombudsperson procedure. first, 
however, an overview will be given of the review procedure (section 6.2.1). 
6.2.1. The Review Procedure
The review procedure has three phases: the information gathering phase, the dialogue 
phase and the decision-making phase, as summarized in this diagram developed by the 
ombudsperson office below. 
This section sets out the main characteristics of the procedure. The subsequent sections will 
examine whether, and to what extent, this review procedure meets the conditions of the 
entitlement to a review as defined within the draft Model. 
86 section 6.2.1 corresponds with step 1 of the draft Model as identified in chapter 6, section 4. In this 
chapter, step 1 of the draft Model was split into two parts. The descriptive overview and context of the 
designation procedure is discussed in section 1 and the review procedure in section 6.2.1. 
87 https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/sites/www.un.org.sc.suborg/files/procedure_chart.pdf 
Figure 1: Flowchart of the Ombudsperson procedure
Procedure for requests for delisting submitted to the Office of the Ombudsperson (S.C. resolution 2368 (2017)) 
Approximately 8 to 16 months 
Reasons for the decision 
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Committee Discussion, Decision and Reasons 
The delisting request is accepted 
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Information gathering phase
The procedure starts with the issuance of a receipt of the delisting request submitted by the 
petitioner. In this phase, information on the petitioner will be gathered from relevant states, 
the sanctions committee and other un bodies, and further research will be conducted 
to obtain all reliable and relevant information on the case. The main body responsible for 
further investigation is the Monitoring team. It collects all relevant information, including 
news articles, court decisions and information from states or international organizations. 
furthermore, the Monitoring team conducts a “fact-based assessment of the information 
provided by the petitioner” and may also ask the ombudsperson to ask certain questions 
on their behalf to the petitioner in the dialogue phase. At the end of this phase, the 
ombudsperson provides a written update of the information gathered to the sanctions 
committee. There is no contact with the petitioner.
Dialogue phase
In the dialogue phase, the ombudsperson contacts the petitioner. The ombudsperson poses 
questions that were put forward by the Monitoring team or relevant states. furthermore, the 
ombudsperson may request further information on his/her own initiative. each petitioner 
is asked to sign a written statement to testify that they are not associated with IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida or that they will undertake actions in that direction in the future. Thereafter, 
the ombudsperson, if possible, meets with the petitioner and hears their point of view. 
This is the first moment that the petitioner will be heard in the procedure. The petitioner 
has the right to submit written reasons to substantiate the delisting request. The replies of 
the petitioner to the questions asked are forwarded to the relevant states, the Monitoring 
team and the sanctions committee. At the end of the dialogue phase, the ombudsperson 
submits a report to the sanctions committee with a recommendation on the delisting 
request, including a summary of the findings in support of this recommendation. In coming 
to a recommendation, the ombudsperson should give serious consideration to the opinions 
of designating states and other states coming forward with relevant information. The 
sanctions committee has no obligation to publish this report or to make it available to the 
petitioner. 
88 see below in the conclusions of section 6.2.8, where the role of the Mt will be further explained. 
89 un sc res. 2161 (2014) Annex II, §4(b).
90 §7 of Annex II to un sc res 2161 (2014).
91 un sc res. 2368 (2017), Annex II, 7(b)
92 dialogue takes place via email exchanges, telephone discussions, and if possible, in face-to-face 
interviews. see, e.g., the report of the office of the ombudsperson pursuant to security council 
resolution 2083 (2012), 6th report, un doc. s/2013/452, §10.
93 §7(d) of Annex II to un sc res. 2161 (2014). 
94 §7(h) of Annex II to un sc res. 2161 (2014).
95 ombudsperson report to the un sc, un doc. s/2012/590, §38-43; see similarly the un special 
rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights (scheinin) report 2010, at 56, un special 
rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights (emmerson), report 2012, §50. 
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Committee deliberation and decision phase
when the ombudsperson recommends to retain an individual on the list, the petitioner 
remains designated unless a sanctions committee member submits a delisting request. If 
the ombudsperson recommends delisting, the petitioner is removed from the list unless 
the sanctions committee decides by reverse consensus to retain a listing or if the matter 
is referred to the un security council for a vote. After a decision has been reached 
regarding delisting or retaining the listing, the petitioner is informed by the ombudsperson 
of the decision, including of the “publicly releasable factual information gathered by the 
ombudsperson.” 
In the subsequent sections, this review procedure is analyzed through the lens of the draft 
Model. The following benchmarks will be addressed in the subsequent sections 6.2.2-6.2.7: 
the qualities of the review body, who is entitled to a review, the grounds for review, the 
standard of review, the fairness of the procedure, and the duty to provide reasons. section 
6.2.8 will provide the conclusions on whether, and to what extent, the review procedure of 
the ombudsperson meets the benchmarks of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. 
6.2.2. The Requirements for a Review Body
The draft Model suggests that those affected are entitled to a review by an independent, 
impartial, competent review body established by law. This section will assess whether the 
ombudsperson procedure meets these criteria. In general, authorities enjoy wide discretion 
in setting up the review body according to these qualities. 
The competence requirement in the draft IGM implies that a review authority should be 
sufficiently competent to hear a complaint in a given case and possess the mandate to provide 
an effective remedy. In the review procedure, the ombudsperson adopts a recommendation 
to retain the listing or to delist the petitioner on the basis of the submission. This 
96 Annex II, §19-9 un sc res. 2161 (2014).
97 In these cases, the consensus procedure will be followed: all sanctions committee members have to 
consent to delisting the individual. This is the procedure discussed in section 1. see further §14 of 
Annex II to un sc res. 2161 (2014).
98 It should be noted that, initially, this procedure was different. It was amended to ensure further 
independence of the ombudsperson. under the old procedure, whenever the ombudsperson 
recommended delisting, consensus was still required from the members of the sanctions committee. 
In sc res. 1989 (2011), the ombudsperson procedure was adjusted, further strengthening the role of 
the ombudsperson by adopting of a no-objection procedure instead of the consensus procedure when 
a recommendation for delisting is submitted. see also §15 of Annex II to un sc res. 2161 (2014); see 
further the Address by Prost, ombudsperson, cAdHI, council of europe, (March 20, 2015), at 3; for a 
critical review of the old procedure, see, e.g., un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human 
rights (scheinin) report 2010, §56.
99 §17 (b) of Annex II to un sc res. 2161 (2014). It is questionable, however, to what extent any received 
evidence falls under this category. furthermore, it does not include the information received from 
states. 
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recommendation can be overturned by the un sanctions committee by reverse consensus, 
or the issue can be referred to the un security council. The reverse consensus procedure 
implies that only by agreement of all sanctions committee members can a decision of the 
ombudsperson be overturned. Thus, the ultimate authority to decide to retain a listing or 
to delist an individual or entity stays with the un security council and the sanctions 
committee. The ombudsperson does not have the final say. so far, however, the sanctions 
committee has not yet overruled a delisting recommendation by the ombudsperson. 
The un security council stipulates that the ombudsperson should be: 
an eminent individual of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high 
qualifications and experience in relevant fields (…) and that the ombudsperson shall perform 
these tasks in an independent and impartial manner and shall neither seek nor receive 
instructions from any government.
Thus, the regulatory framework stipulated by the un security council recognizes that 
the ombudsperson should be impartial, of high integrity and that he/she carries out his/
her functions in an independent and impartial manner. till this day, there have been no 
complaints about the impartiality of the ombudsperson in the exercise of their functions nor 
about their personal independence. 
so far, there have been three ombudspersons: kimberly Prost (2010-2015), catherine 
Marchi-uhel (2015-2017), and daniel kipfer fasciati (2018-2021). ombudsperson fasciati 
was appointed on May 24, 2018. 
However, the analysis of the institutional structure of the ombudsperson shows that there 
are some structural flaws in the institutional setting that may affect the ombudsperson’s 
100 un sc res 1989 (2011); un sc res 2161 (2014), §15.
101 It should be noted that if the issue is voted upon in the un security council, the official voting procedure 
applies (article 27 of the un charter, rule 40 of the Provisional rules of Procedure): a decision is 
adopted by a majority vote of 9 out of 15 members, but the permanent five members of the un security 
council have a veto right. see articles 25, 39 and 41 of the un charter. 
102 As explained in the beginning of this chapter, this chapter focuses primarily on the listing of 
individuals, but the majority of the analysis is equally applicable to any listed entities. where there is 
a difference in the procedural guarantees offered to individuals and to entities, the distinction will be 
made, otherwise, the term (listing of) individuals should be read as to include the listing of entities by 
sanctions committees (i.e. those designated). 
103 for instance, the website of the ombudsperson indicates that the ombudsperson is mandated by the 
un sc to assist the sanctions committee in delisting requests. https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
ombudsperson/approach-and-standard.
104 un sc res. 1904 (2009), §20.
105 letter dated May 24, 2018 from the secretary-General addressed to the President of the security 
council (May 31, 2018) un sc doc. s/2018/514.
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independence and impartiality. The draft Model suggests that the independence is, for 
instance, ensured through an institutional setting that is indicative of the independence 
enjoyed by the review body. At a minimum, this implies that there has to be a form of 
separation of powers between the administrative and/or executive branch and the review 
branch. As the discussion above revealed, the office of the ombudsperson is dependent 
on the sanctions committee and/or the security council in the effective carrying out of 
its tasks. Aware of the flaws that may affect the impartiality and/or independence of the 
ombudsperson, the office of the ombudsperson requested the sanctions committee to 
adopt informal arrangements in an attempt to strengthen the independence and impartiality 
of the office. In 2017, the following arrangements were adopted: 
- The performance evaluations of staff supporting the office should reflect the input of the 
ombudsperson;
- Involvement of the ombudsperson in the recruitment process of staff for the 
ombudsperson office and the views of the ombudsperson shall be taken into account 
in this process;
- The ombudsperson is allowed full access to all material relevant for the works of the 
office;
- The ombudsperson gains full editorial control of the website of the ombudsperson 
office. 
Thus, although there are still some inherent weaknesses in the institutional design of the 
office of the ombudsperson, the independence and impartiality of the ombudsperson has 
strengthened over the years. These improvements show that the position of the ombudsperson 
is being strengthened; the ombudsperson is increasingly independent and impartial 
from the un security council and the sanctions committee. furthermore, it shows that 
achieving accountability is a continuous dynamic process, where contestation from within 
the international institution of practices that have a negative effect on the overall level of 
accountability is a good step in the right direction to ensure more inclusion. nevertheless, 
the fact that the ombudsperson’s recommendation is not automatically accepted may have 
a negative effect on the independence of the review mechanism and the effectiveness of the 
remedy. 
The following sections will further analyze the ombudsperson review procedure through 
the lens of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. 
106 statement of ombudsperson Marchi-uhel made during the open briefing for member states (May 8, 
2017), available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/selected-presentations.
107 As also highlighted by the Hrcee, when an executive or political body has the power to control or 
direct a (quasi) judicial body, it “is incompatible with the notion of an independent tribunal”. see, e.g., 
un special rapporteur emmerson, report 2012 §33, 32-35; Hrcee, General Comment 32, §19.
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6.2.3. Who is Entitled to Review and on What Grounds?
Based on the draft Model, individuals are entitled to a review whenever his/her substantive 
rights are allegedly violated. Those affected by decisions and in certain circumstances their 
direct family members and/or next of kin are entitled to a review. In regards to the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida designations, three different categories of affected individuals can be 
identified based on the reports of the un sanctions committee, the ombudsperson and 
the Monitoring team supporting the sanctions committee: those (incorrectly) designated, 
those who face the consequences of the listing due to a mistaken identity, and those who face 
the consequences as direct family of a person listed. 
The review procedure of the ombudsperson is only open to those designated by the sanctions 
committee. family members of those designated (whether deceased, or (in)correctly listed) 
and those who face the consequences of the sanctions due to a mistaken identity cannot 
request a review by the ombudsperson; their limited possibilities to a remedy will be 
discussed in section 6.3. 
The draft Model suggests that the grounds for review may be procedural and/or substantive 
in nature, depending on the alleged violation. for instance, the analysis of whether the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee complied with its duties under the first two 
dimensions of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model (informational entitlements and 
entitlement to meaningful participation) brought certain grounds for review to the forefront. 
In casu, however, those designated do not have the possibility to challenge the decision-
making procedure, the legality of the storage or collection of their personal information or 
their lack of ability to participate in the procedure. when taking the table as discussed in the 
introduction of section 6 as a point of departure, it shows that the ombudsperson procedure 
only provides a ground for review for one particular situation. Those designated can file a 
delisting request to challenge the designation as follows: 
108 whether direct family members and/or next of kin are entitled to a review depends on the reparation 
claimed and the substantive right that was allegedly violated. 
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The other possible grounds for review mentioned in the table do not fall within the ambit 
of the ombudsperson procedure. section 6.3 will address how the lack of inclusion of these 
other grounds for review in the scope of the ombudsperson procedure influences the overall 
level of inclusionary governance realized. 
6.2.4. Access to the Review Procedure 
The previous sections addressed who may request a review and on what grounds and assessed 
the first benchmark of the entitlement to a review: the requirements for a review body. This 
section will discuss whether, and to what extent, access to the review procedure is realized, 
which constitutes the second benchmark. The draft IGM suggests that those designated 
should be able to access the review procedure and request delisting. concretely, this requires 
the sanctions committee and/or the ombudsperson: (i) to duly inform those affected of the 
review procedure; (ii) to explain how to file a delisting request and its conditions; and (iii) 
when the circumstances so require, assist those affected in gaining access to the review body. 
each of the elements will be discussed below.
Right to information
Those whose personal 
information is stored 
and collected
Those whose personal 
information is 
published
Right to participation 
in the decision-making 
Those who were not 
able to participate in a 
meaningful manner in 
the decision-making 
procedure 
Decision to designate 
Those designated




Table 18: Summary of all the grounds for review, including that of the Ombudsperson procedure
Right to an effective 
remedy
right to challenge 
legality of storage or 
collection (i.e. legality/
accuracy evidence) 
right to rectification and 
removal if not accurate 
(mistaken identity) 
right to challenge the 
legality of information 
publication
right to challenge lack of 
participation 
right to challenge 
the decision (request 
delisting)
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Individuals designated by the sanctions committee have to be informed of the delisting 
procedure by the ombudsperson or via the Permanent Mission of the country of residence 
or nationality. As explained in section 1.3 of this chapter, not everyone designated is 
notified in practice. If they are not notified, those designated will realize that they are listed 
when they are confronted with the effects of the designation in their daily lives, for instance, 
when they cannot access their assets or cannot travel. 
Individuals listed may submit a delisting request to the ombudsperson. In the request, 
petitioners have to prove their identity and that they are currently designated by the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee. other persons may submit a delisting request 
on behalf of the listed individual if it is accompanied with authorization to act on behalf of 
the designated person. Public authorities enjoy discretion in realizing the review procedure; 
authorities may impose admissibility criteria and/or format requirements as long as the 
procedure remains accessible for those affected and the conditions imposed do not impair 
the essence of the right. The delisting request to the ombudsperson has as its only format 
requirement that it has to be submitted in writing. Petitioners may submit the request in any 
language; however, preference is given to one of the six official un languages. Petitioners 
who send a delisting request have to explain in their request the reasons/justifications for 
delisting and have to address the acts/activities referred to in the narrative summary of the 
reasons for listing that indicate why an individual is considered to be associated with IsIl 
(da’esh) and/or Al-Qaida. where possible, petitioners have to support their arguments with 
evidence. only new requests or old requests with additional information will be taken into 
consideration. However, if a request for delisting was previously submitted to the focal 
Point, the request to the ombudsperson will be seen as a first submission. 
whenever individuals affected by a decision are considered particularly vulnerable, the 
draft Model suggests that authorities may be required to adopt positive measures to 
enable them to access the review procedure. Measures may include a legal aid scheme, 
legal assistance and/or the use of interpreters. The current un sanctions regime includes 
109 It should be noted that when individuals are not notified of the decision and only discover that they 
have been designated when they face the consequences of the listing, they will only then have to access 
the website of the ombudsperson to find out how to file a delisting request. see section 1.1 for an 
explanation of how an individual is notified of the decision. 
110 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/application. 
111 idem. 
112 see section 1.1 above, where the listing criteria were addressed.
113 un sc res. 2161 (2014), Annex II, §1. 
114 The focal Point procedure was the previous review procedure in place, which applied to those designated 
by the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee, before the ombudsperson procedure was 
created. In short, it is an inter-state procedure with no or a limited role for those affected and did 
not constitute an independent or impartial review of the designation. see further footnote 11 to this 
chapter.
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the possibility for petitioners to be represented by a lawyer. In practice, however, one of 
the problems is that lawyers representing the petitioners do so pro bono. to date, there 
is no legal aid scheme available for petitioners to be represented in the ombudsperson 
procedure. It should be noted that petitioners are only able to pay the legal fees after a 
successful plea for a humanitarian exemption (basic need exemption). This combined 
with the fact that most petitioners are poor, the lack of access to legal aid may negatively 
affect who is able to access the ombudsperson procedure, and moreover, it may affect the 
fairness of the procedure. 
The application of the draft Model to the ombudsperson procedure shows that – once 
those affected are informed and aware of the review procedure – there is a relatively low 
threshold to submit a delisting request. There are no hard deadlines for the submission of 
such a request, no fees to initiate procedures, and very few format requirements. Thus, those 
designated have access to the review procedure of the ombudsperson. The lack of legal aid 
does not impair the right to access the review procedure as the ombudsperson procedure 
does not impose any court or procedural fees to initiate a procedure. However, as will be 
assessed in section 6.2.6, the lack of legal aid may have a detrimental effect on the overall 
level of fairness of the procedure. In conclusion, the benchmark of the entitlement to access 
the review procedure as the building block of the entitlement to a review is formulated in 
such a way that it is sufficiently clear to be applied in practice. 
6.2.5. Standard of Review 
As discussed in section 3, considering the inherent arbitrary features of the procedure, the 
burden and standard of proof upheld by the review body are also of relevance in assessing 
the extent to which the review procedure can be considered fair, effective and not arbitrary.
The ombudsperson categorizes the review of the designation as a de novo review. The review 
considers “whether today the continued listing of the individual or entity is justified based 
115 un sc res. 2368, (2017) Annex II. 
116 see, e.g., un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights emmerson, report (2012), 
§52.
117 sullivan lecture (2014). sullivan explained in this lecture hat he was part of lobby group that discussed 
the possibility of legal aid scheme with the un security council members. Most un sc members – 
particularly permanent members – clearly stated to be opposed to such a scheme. 
118 see above in section 2 where the criteria for a successful exemption were discussed.
119 It should be noted that a distinction can be made between those that are de facto poor as all their 
assets have been frozen as a result of the designation, and those individuals that were already poor 
before the imposition of the sanctions. It is the latter category that is disproportionally affected by a 
designation. see, e.g., sullivan who explains that the majority of petitioners he has represented before 
the ombudsperson did not have sufficient means. 
120 report of the un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and Human rights, emmerson, (2012), §52. 
121 see above where it was argued that, considering the arbitrary features inherent to the decision-making 
procedure, authorities enjoy less discretion, and accordingly, issues such as rules of evidence, standard 
of proof and burden of proof become relevant.
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on all the information now available.” The ombudsperson assesses whether – at the time 
of the review – the petitioner can be considered to be “associated with” IsIl and Al-Qaida 
or related organizations. The ombudsperson does not assess the substantive or procedural 
legality of the original listing. As will be shown in section 6.3, this fact strongly limits 
the possible reparation that may be offered, and accordingly, it has a detrimental effect on 
the effectiveness of the remedy in repairing the harm. The ombudsperson developed its 
own standard to review whether the criteria are met – that is, whether there is “sufficient 
information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for listing”. According to the 
ombudsperson, the sanctions are not intended to punish criminal conduct; they are 
preventive and intended to: 
hamper access to resources in order to impede, impair, isolate, and incapacitate the terrorist 
threat from Al Qaida and to encourage a change of conduct on the part of those who are 
members of this group or ‘associated with’ it.
In other words, as explained by the ombudsperson, the standard of review is of “adequate 
substance” and takes into account the “direct and considerable impact” of the sanctions 
on the lives of individuals and the indeterminate length of the sanctions in light of the 
preventive nature of the sanctions. It should be noted that the sanctions committee has 
122 website of the ombudsperson, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson. 
123 This includes the following activities: 
“(a) Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities 
by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of; 
(b) supplying, selling or transferring arms and related materiel to; or
(c) recruiting for; or otherwise supporting acts or activities of Al-Qaida, IsIl, or any cell, affiliate, 
splinter group or derivative thereof.”
 un sc res. 2368 (2017). 
124 for a discussion of this point, see also the address by the ombudsperson Prost to the cAdHI of the 
council of europe (March 20, 2015), at 3.
125 The ombudsperson developed this standard after studying the various national standards for review 
procedures, and she (ombudsperson Prost, and others it confirmed after her) explained why, taking 
the context of the un sanctions regime into account, a different approach was warranted than that 
applied at a national level. The approaches studied at the national level included: reasonable grounds for 
suspicion, reasonable grounds for belief, and proof on the balance of probabilities. see for a discussion 
thereof the report of un special rapporteur emmerson, report (2012), §56. 
126 Idem; see also the discussion above in section 2 in the context of qualifying the sanctions as preventive 
in nature and how this qualification influenced the level of procedural guarantees to be provided thus 
the discussion what procedural guarantees should be in place.
127 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/approach-and-standard 
128 Idem.
129 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/approach-and-standard:
 The standard must also reflect the express intent of the security council with regard to the purpose of 
the sanctions namely “that the measures…are preventative in nature and are not reliant upon criminal 
standards set out under national law”… At the same time, it must be a measure of adequate substance 
to sustain the serious restrictions imposed on individuals and entities through the application of the 
sanctions.
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not adopted a standard of proof for its decision-making procedure to consider the listing of 
individuals. Thus, this is the first moment in the decision-making and review procedure in 
which a standard of proof is used to assess whether someone should be listed.
The draft Model provides no benchmark for the appropriateness of a standard of review. 
However, when there are inherent arbitrary features in the procedure, the standard of review 
should also be taken into account when assessing the level of inclusionary governance realized 
by the public authority. In other words, the standard of review is to be assessed in the context 
of the whole review procedure, and whether, and to what extent, the different benchmarks 
together enable a fair review procedure and an effective remedy to those designated. 
Therefore, the next section will analyze the different factors that (further) contribute to the 
fairness of the review procedure. 
6.2.6. Fairness of the Procedure 
The draft Model suggests that a review procedure should be fair, and it acknowledges 
the wide discretion of public authorities to organize such a procedure. The fairness of the 
procedure is assessed by several benchmarks: whether those entitled to a review were duly 
informed, whether there was equality of arms between the parties, whether there was a 
timely procedure that is not prohibitively expensive and whether the authorities provided 
reasons for the decision reached. In general, the benchmarks are to be considered together 
and one has to assess whether, when considering the procedure as a whole, there was a fair 
review procedure. The assessment conducted in the previous sections informs the analysis of 
the fairness of the review procedure: 
- considering the arbitrary features, the standard and burden of proof, and the rules of 
evidence are to be taken into account when assessing the overall fairness of the review 
procedure.
- The analysis conducted in section 4 demonstrates that those designated do not have 
access to the evidence relied upon in the original listing.
- The analysis conducted in section 5 shows that there is no opportunity to participate in 
the decision-making procedure for those affected. Thus, the first time they will interact 
with the international institution is in the dialogue phase of the ombudsperson review 
procedure. 
- section 6.2.4 revealed that although access to the review body is realized for those 
designated, there is no legal assistance or legal aid available to them. 
The lack of access to information results in a situation in which designated individuals are 
required to submit a petition for delisting, to sustain his/her claim with evidence, without 
knowing the exact evidence on which the designation was based. even though the un 
security council recommends that designating states reveal their identities to the petitioners, 
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it does not require them to do so. ombudsperson Prost already recommended in 2012 
that the ombudsperson should be in the position to disclose the identity of the designating 
state(s) to the petitioner if fairness requires so; however, until now the un security council 
has not supported this recommendation. As a result, the petitioner often does not know 
who the designating state is. This makes it difficult to properly rebut the arguments for 
listing, considering that the petitioner has no access to the evidence either. The set-up of 
the ombudsperson procedure, and the standard of review of “whether there is sufficient 
information to provide reasonable and credible basis for listing” has the effect in practice 
that the burden of proof rests on the petitioner to demonstrate that he/she does not meet 
the listing criteria (anymore). considering the lack of access to relevant information, those 
designated start the review procedure in a disadvantaged position.
In the review procedure, there is a similar lack of access to information. In the information 
gathering phase, the ombudsperson collects information (evidence) from the sanctions 
committee and its Monitoring team, states, the petitioner, other individuals, and 
international organizations. At the end of this phase, a written update is given to the un 
sanctions committee; however, the information gathered is not necessarily shared with the 
petitioner. 
In the dialogue phase, the ombudsperson hears the views of the petitioner. It should be 
noted that this phase is the only moment of interaction that a designated individual has with 
the public authorities involved. As the previous section showed, there is no possibility to 
participate in the designation procedure. one can therefore only present his/her views on 
the designation in the review procedure with the ombudsperson. However, this opportunity 
is similarly constrained by a lack of access to information. The petitioner will not gain access 
to the full report, which contains the evidence, the analysis of the ombudsperson, and the 
opinions of the relevant states in regards to the delisting request. This lack of access further 
negatively impacts the fairness of the procedure, particularly considering the current practice 
in the dialogue phase. The ombudsperson engages in a practice that has been termed by 
lawyers as “speculative lawyering.” The ombudsperson may refer to information collected 
to ask the petitioner’s view on it, without providing a copy of the evidence to the petitioner 
130 un sc res. 1989 (2011) §14. 
131 report of the ombudsperson to the un sc, un doc. s/2012/590, §45; see similarly un special 
rapporteur on counter-terrorism and Human rights, emmerson, report (2012), §44. 
132 report of un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and Human rights (emmerson)(2012), §44.
133 The information gathering phase is the first phase; it is followed by the dialogue phase and the decision 
phase. see for a brief overview section 6.2.1; un sc res. 2161 (2014) Annex II, §4.
134 un sc res. 2161 (2014) Annex II, §4.
135 see for a brief overview section 6.2.1.
136 Idem. 
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as the information is deemed classified. for instance, a lawyer may be informed by the 
ombudsperson that a petitioner was seen in country A with a person of interest based 
on intelligence information, without disclosing who that person is or giving the specifics 
of the information gathered. The petitioner is then asked who they met in that country, 
and the petitioner would most likely list all persons they met within the timeframe. If a 
petitioner stays listed, all those persons that the petitioner has met may then be listed by 
the sanctions committee under the “associated with someone associated with Al-Qaida” 
criterion. Accordingly, it becomes very difficult for a petitioner to rebut these allegations if 
no precise information is provided by the ombudsperson as to who the petitioner allegedly 
met and when and where this meeting allegedly took place. 
In regards to the lack of access to confidential information, the ombudsperson also concludes 
that “the reality remains that the ombudsperson process is not a transparent one.” further, 
the lack of access to information has a similar negative impact on the equality of arms within 
the review procedure. to put it more strongly, there is no equality of arms within the review 
procedure as a petitioner not only lacks access to the evidence, he/she has no possibility to 
question the evidence used, cross-examine witnesses, or question the motives of designating 
states (if they know which state designated at all), or the motives of other states or actors 
who have an interest in the procedure and asked the ombudsperson to ask questions on 
their behalf. 
Those designated can be represented by legal counsel in this procedure; however, there is no 
access to legal assistance for those designated. considering that most designated persons are 
poor, they depend completely on the willingness of lawyers to represent them pro bono. 
However, the situation is even more complex considering that the ombudsperson does 
not always have access to all the information either. As of 2011, the ombudsperson has 
137 lecture by Gavin sullivan on the practice of listing by the un sc and the ombudsperson procedure. 
He has been one of the lawyers representing individuals designated by the sanctions committee in the 
review procedure with the ombudsperson. see further G. sullivan and M. de Goede, ‘Between law and 
the exception’ (2013) Leiden International Law Journal 833-854. 
138 Idem. 
139 lecture by Gavin sullivan (free university of Amsterdam, 2015); see further sullivan and de Goede, 
‘Between law and the exception’ (2013) 833-854. 
140 Briefing by the ombudsperson at the security council’s open debate on “working methods of the 
security council” ((s/2014/725): ‘enhancing due Process in sanctions regimes’ (october 23, 2014), 
available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/selected-presentations at 3. see also 
the ombudsperson Prost’s address to the cAdHI of the council of europe (2015), at 5.
141 sullivan and de Goede, ‘Between law and the exception’ (2013) 833-854; lecture by sullivan. 
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started to conclude bilateral arrangements and agreements with states in which the state 
consents to share confidential information with the ombudsperson. This information will 
not be shared with the petitioner. so far, only 20 countries have arranged to share their 
intelligence information. with regard to other states holding relevant (confidential) 
information, the ombudsperson is dependent on ad hoc agreements. The un security 
council has urged states to share confidential information with the ombudsperson, but does 
not impose a duty to do so. Thus, in practice, whenever a state decides not to disclose its 
confidential information to the ombudsperson, the ombudsperson has to come to his/her 
finding without this information. It should be noted, however, that this concerns purely 
the access to the information by the ombudsperson; each state may conclude their separate 
arrangements with other state(s) with whom they wish to share their information. The 
situation may occur that all sanctions committee members have access to the information 
while the ombudsperson and the petitioner do not have access to this information. As the 
ombudsperson stated in an interview:
A state can choose whatever information they want to give me. I know states are choosing 
not to give me certain pieces of information and that’s fine. It might not even be classified 
information. …. some states have just decided: ‘well we had this information way back then, 
but we don’t want to bother [because] we are not opposed to delisting’. so, they just don’t give 
me information and that’s also perfectly fine. … can I do a proper review? I can do a proper 
review of the decision I have to make … because it will be based solely on what they give me.
142 The first arrangements were with switzerland (february 25, 2011), Belgium (April 19, 2011), united 
kingdom (october 7, 2011), costa rica (november 10, 2011) and new Zealand (november 23, 2011). 
Thereafter followed Germany, Australia, Portugal, liechtenstein, france, the netherlands, finland, 
luxembourg, Ireland and denmark. see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/
assessment-information. 
143 The website of the office of the ombudsperson distinguishes between arrangements and agreements. 
The first agreement of the ombudsperson on the sharing of confidential information was with Austria 
(July 27, 2011). recently the ombudsperson concluded an agreement with romania (June 15, 2017), 
both are available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/classified_information. 
144 see for criticism e.g., un special rapporteur on counter-terrorism and human rights report 2010, at 
§56; the ombudsperson also admitted that this is some yet not sufficient progress, see, for example, the 
address by the ombudsperson Prost to the cAdHI of the council of europe (strasbourg March 20, 
2015), at 5. furthermore, it is not clear of the 20 arrangements what was actually arranged and thus 
what reservations to disclose information were agreed upon as they were not made public. only the 
agreements with Austria and romania are made public. see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
ombudsperson/classified_information.
145 un sc res. 1989 (2011), §25.
146 see for a critical discussion of this practice, e.g., un special rapporteur emmerson, 2012 report, §38-
44. 
147 only certain states have agreements to share intelligence reports with each other. This often concerns 
like-minded states – for instance the co-sponsors of designation, etc. 
148 Interview with the ombudsperson conducted by sullivan in new york in 2012. Parts of the transcript 
were published in G. sullivan and M. de Goede, ‘Between law and the exception’ (2013) 833 at 844. 
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The office of the ombudsperson considers access to confidential information to be “essential 
for a proper consideration and understanding of the delisting petition” as noted on the 
ombudsperson website. The position of the ombudsperson is that the procedure can still 
be fair if there is an “independent and objective review of the classified/confidential material 
even if it cannot be shared further by the ombudsperson.” ombudsperson Marchi-uhel 
explained: 
now I would like to explain the type of fairness issues which may arise from my access to 
and reliance on classified information to reach my recommendation. other practitioners than 
me, generally judges dealing with challenges related to the imposition of sanctions, operate 
in legal frameworks allowing them to access classified material ex parte. under certain 
conditions, they may even rely on it without disclosing it to the party concerned. like them, 
I must strike a balance between the security interests at stake and the human rights of the 
persons or entities seeking their delisting from the IsIl and Al-Qaida sanctions list. 
This ombudsperson’s rationale has some merits, including at the national level. due to 
security reasons, denying access to classified information may be justified. However, in 
these cases, when there is little or no access to information for those affected, the benchmarks 
of the draft Model stipulate that a more critical review should be conducted of the overall 
level of fairness. The problem is that the ombudsperson is dependent on the consent of a 
state holding this information to be able to access it. Thus, an independent review of the 
classified material cannot be guaranteed by the ombudsperson as he/she is dependent on the 
willingness of states to share this information. 
As to the independent review to be conducted by the ombudsperson, the rules of evidence 
followed by him/her are indicative of how the ombudsperson would evaluate the material. 
As stated, considering the inherent arbitrary features of the decision-making procedure, the 
rules of evidence should be taken into account when assessing the fairness of the review 
procedure. within the review procedure, the ombudsperson collects information from 
the sanctions committee and its Monitoring team, states, the petitioner, and international 
organizations. In analyzing this information, the ombudsperson adopts a methodology 
149 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/classified_information.
150 Idem.
151 statement of ombudsperson Marchi-uhel, open Briefing to Member states – 22 november 2016, 
available at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/20161107_
open_briefing_to_ms_22_november_2016_check_against_delivery.pdf.
152 see, e.g., chapter 3, section 2.4, where the scope of the right to personal information was discussed, and 
section 2.6, where the recognized limitations to that right were discussed. 
153 As explained in section 6.2.1, the Monitoring team is the actor responsible for the active collection and 
gathering of information in the information gathering phase of the ombudsperson review procedure, 
and it will forward this information to the ombudsperson. 
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that is appropriate to the international context and he/she does not “admit or exclude” 
information in his/her review, nor does he/she apply rules of evidence “of any one legal 
systems.” The ombudsperson reasons that “the method is consistent with the preventive 
nature of the sanction measures and the applicable criteria and standards.” Although all 
evidence is assessed by the ombudsperson, the information will be evaluated in regards to their 
relevance, specificity and credibility. It is then within the discretion of the ombudsperson to 
decide on whether to rely on certain information. for information that has allegedly been 
obtained by torture, the ombudsperson should give such allegations “careful and serious 
consideration.” In practice, this means that the ombudsperson will examine whether there 
is “sufficient information to provide a reasonable and credible basis for the allegation of 
torture” whenever a petitioner voices allegations of information obtained by torture that 
was subsequently used as evidence for the designation. If the ombudsperson concludes that 
the information was obtained through torture, it will be deemed “inherently unreliable.” 
The ombudsperson is dependent however on the input of the states and other un bodies 
to determine whether the information was indeed obtained through torture. Practice shows 
– as states are not required to submit exculpatory evidence – that some states may withhold 
information that would indicate that a confession was obtained by torture or maltreatment. 
Another element of a fair review procedure is that the procedure has to be conducted 
expeditiously, and thus within a reasonable timeframe. In general, the review procedure 
by the ombudsperson complies with this benchmark. As stated by ombudsperson Prost, 
“the [sanctions] regime is subject to strict timelines and, as a result, the cases are dealt with 
efficiently and there is no backlog.” The procedure takes approximately 8 to 16 months; 
in each phase it is clearly defined what the time frame is and whether, and to what extent, 




157 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/assessment-information; the approach 
of the ombudsperson differs in this regard with the listing procedure. In the decision-making procedure, 
no rules of evidence apply, and the usage of evidence obtained through torture is permitted. 
158 see further https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/assessment-information. see 
particularly note 5 in the document. 
159 Idem; for a critical review of this approach, see the un special rapporteur (emmerson) report 2012, 
§46-49.
160 It should be noted that there were several cases in the past where a designation was based on torture-
induced evidence, in one case, such material seemed to have been the sole reason for listing. un special 
rapporteur on counter-terrorism and Human rights (emmerson) report 2012, §45. sullivan & de 
Goede, (2013), at 849. Hrcee, General Comment 32, §14. 
161 office of the ombudsperson, 6th report of the office of the ombudsperson pursuant to security 
council resolution 2083 (2012), un doc. s/2013/452, § 28. In §32, the ombudsperson concludes “the 
ombudsperson process operates in compliance with the fundamental principles of fairness”; see also 1st 
report of the office of the ombudsperson pursuant to security council resolution 1904 (2009), un 
doc s/2011/29 (January 24, 2011), §22-25.
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ombudsperson position (2017-2018), was it questioned whether the time frame was still 
reasonable. within this transition period, the dialogue phase was not conducted for those 
petitions under consideration, and in one case, the period had already been extended 
twice, which was beyond the standard limit. In general, the draft Model is not intended 
to analyze whether inclusionary governance was provided in one particular instance, but 
rather the focus is on a systematic analysis of an international institution’s accountability 
vis-à-vis those affected by the decisions. so, if there is a small period in which the reasonable 
timeframes cannot not be realized, it does not have to affect the overall findings on the 
level of inclusionary governance realized. Instead, it is flagged as a potential weakness in 
the procedure if there is no back-up solution for this type of problem. Hence, overall, the 
ombudsperson office provides a review procedure within a reasonable timeframe. 
Although the draft IGM does not prescribe a format or procedure for hearings, it does 
prescribe that the procedure has to be fair. considering the inherent arbitrary features 
within the decision-making procedure, stricter scrutiny is exercised of the fairness of the 
review procedure. As the application of the draft Model to the ombudsperson procedure 
has revealed, although the individuals are heard during the review procedure in a timely 
manner, the petitioner finds himself/herself at a substantial disadvantaged position within 
the review procedure due to the lack of access to information, the fact that the burden of 
proof seems to rest with the petitioner, combined with speculative lawyering and the fact 
that the ombudsperson often does not have access to all information. All these factors have 
a negative effect on the fairness of the procedure. when considering the low substantive 
and evidentiary threshold for designations, combined with the review procedure offered by 
the ombudsperson, the review offered falls short of meeting the standards of fairness as 
imposed by the draft Model. 
The procedural framework for the ombudsperson as stipulated by the un security council 
and the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee has structural flaws that have 
detrimental effect on the fairness of the procedure. Moreover, the fact that states often 
do not share (intelligence) information with the ombudsperson and never share this 
information with the petitioner has a further negative effect on the level of fairness of the 
procedure. within this institutional setting, the office of the ombudsperson pushes for 
further procedural guarantees within the review procedure. The role of the ombudsperson 
in realizing a review procedure that is “as fair as possible” within the given legal framework 
and context should be acknowledged when evaluating the inclusionary governance realized 
for those affected. The development of a standard of proof, rules of evidence, and, when 
possible, conducting an independent review of the classified material are all factors that 
162 see the letter of the legal officer supporting the office of the ombudsperson (february 14, 2018) un 
doc. s/2018/120. 
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contribute positively to the fairness of the review procedure and were all developed on the 
initiative of the ombudsperson. Although there is improvement in the level of fairness of 
the review procedure of the ombudsperson, the procedure therefore currently falls short of 
meeting the standards of fairness due to the structural flaws in the procedure. 
Hence, the application of the benchmark of a fair review procedure as the building block of 
the entitlement to review of the draft IGM to the ombudsperson review procedure reveals 
that the benchmark is sufficiently clearly defined to identify whether and to what extent the 
ombudsperson procedure constitutes a fair review procedure for the petitioner. 
6.2.7. Duty to Provide Reasons
The duty to provide reasons refers to the obligations of authorities to provide reasons for the 
decision reached at the end of the review procedure. un sc res. 2083 (2012) stipulates the 
obligation of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee to provide reasons for the 
decisions on delisting requests. It should be noted that the obligation to provide reasons rests 
with the un sanctions committee and not with the ombudsperson. Moreover, if a delisting 
decision is referred to the un security council, the security council does not have an 
obligation to provide reasons. The practice until recently was that the written reasons for the 
decisions were brief, often excluding factual details or reference to the evidence supporting 
the decision. further, as noted by ombudsperson Prost in 2013, there were significant delays 
in the decisions on delisting requests and in the provision of reasons. ombudsperson Prost 
advocated for the need to inform those affected of the reasons underlying the decision: the 
reasons should “be reflective of the analysis and conclusions of the independent mechanism.” 
The reasons letter is based on a summary of the ombudsperson’s analysis contained in the 
comprehensive report, which must be approved by consensus by the sanctions committee. 
163 The latter may occur when there is no consensus in retaining a listing and a sanctions committee 
member requests the issue to be brought before the un security council. 
164 §36-41, 6th report, un sc res. s/2013/452. The ombudsperson noted with concern that “while 
delivering reasons, even at a later stage, remains beneficial for the fairness of the process, such 
delays obviously reduce the effectiveness of such a practice in demonstrating the transparency and 
reasonableness of the process,” §38. 
165 §40, 6th report, the ombudsperson. un sc res. s/2013/452; see similarly the briefing by the 
ombudsperson at the security council’s open debate on “working methods of the security council” 
(s/2014/725): ‘enhancing due Process in sanctions regimes’ (2014), at 3. see also the address by the 
ombudsperson Prost to the cAdHI of the council of europe (2015), at 5.
166 see, for instance, the statement made by former ombudsperson Marchi-uhel during the open briefing 
for member states on May 8, 2017. further, see un sc res. 2368 (2017), Annex II (ombudsperson 
procedure):
 “13. upon the request of a designating state, state of nationality, residence, or incorporation, and with 
the approval of the committee, the ombudsperson may provide a copy of the comprehensive report, 
with any redactions deemed necessary by the committee, to such states, along with a notification to 
such states confirming that:
(a) All decisions to release information from the ombudsperson’s comprehensive reports, including 
the scope of information, are made by the committee at its discretion and on a case-by-case basis;
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In late 2016, ombudsperson Marchi-uhel informed the security council of a set-back in 
the content of the reasons letter to be provided to the petitioner. The sanctions committee 
got increasingly involved in the drafting of the summary reasons; as a result, the sanctions 
committee would suggest that the ombudsperson make major redactions in order to get the 
consent of all committee members. At a minimum, according to ombudsperson Marchi-
uhel, this practice was very time-consuming; at worst, it would lead to omitting responses 
of the ombudsperson to key arguments of the petitioner. This practice encroached on 
the independence of the office of the ombudsperson. In un security council res. 2368 
(2017), the procedure was adapted. The summary must now accurately describe the principal 
reasons for the recommendation of the ombudsperson as reflected in the analysis of the 
ombudsperson. Thus, as required by the draft Model, the petitioner should receive the 
reasons underlying the adopted decision. 
The reasons should be provided to the petitioner when the petitioner is informed of the 
decision on the delisting request. The ombudsperson notifies the petitioner immediately if 
the sanctions committee follows the recommendation of the ombudsperson, regardless of 
whether the decision is to delist or to retain the listing. If the sanctions committee does 
not follow the recommendation, the petitioner is only informed if the decision was adopted 
by the sanctions committee; if the decision is adopted by the un security council there is 
no obligation to provide the reasons underlying the decision to the designated individual. 
In conclusion, the practice of the ombudsperson/sanctions committee is in accordance with 
the requirements of the draft Model. Although it did not yet happen that a case is referred 
to the un security council or that the sanctions committee overrules the ombudsperson’s 
recommendation, there is however no obligation to provide reasons for the decision reached 
in these instances. 
(b) The comprehensive report reflects the basis for the ombudsperson’s recommendation and is not 
attributable to any individual committee member; and
(c) The comprehensive report, and any information contained therein, should be treated as strictly 
confidential and not shared with the petitioner or any other Member state without the approval 
of the committee.”
167 see the statement made by former ombudsperson Marchi-uhel during the open briefing for member 
states on May 8, 2017, report s/2017/685, §30.
168 Idem. 
169 un sc res. 2368, Annex II, §16.
170 see, e.g., report s/2017/685, §30. In this report ombudsperson Marchi-uhel speaks of this positive 
change. Before, the ombudsperson had to wait with notifying the petitioner in case of a decision to 
retain the listing. This practice already existed informally for decisions to delist. un sc resolution 
2368 (2017) formalized the notification practice that the ombudsperson can notify the petitioner 
immediately if the sanctions committee agrees with the ombudsperson’s recommendation irrespective 
of it being a decision to retain the listing or to delist. 
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6.2.8. Conclusion 
section 6.2 analyzed the content and scope of the review procedure by the ombudsperson 
through the lens of the draft Model. The application of the draft Inclusionary Governance 
Model to the review procedure of the ombudsperson shows that there are some inherent 
weaknesses in the procedure. 
first, the ombudsperson procedure is not available for all those affected by the designations. 
Those affected by a designation due to a mistaken identity and the direct family members 
and next of kin of those designated cannot request a review of the decision, or for reparation 
via the ombudsperson procedure. The next section (6.3) will address whether and to 
what extent reparation is available to these affected individuals to repair their harm, and 
accordingly, whether there is an effective legal remedy available to them. In short, other 
affected individuals can, at most, receive a form of reparation via the sanctions committee, 
whether it is through the focal Point or via the internal review procedures of the sanctions 
committee. 
second, the lack of access to information has a detrimental effect on the overall fairness of 
the review procedure. Those designated receive only a summary of reasons when they are 
notified of the designation; they are not aware of the evidence against them, and they often 
do not know who the designating state(s) may be. Therefore, the petitioners start the review 
procedure in a disadvantaged position, and the lack of access to (confidential) information 
is not remedied in the procedure. The review procedure is similarly characterized by a lack 
of access to information deemed confidential, which puts the petitioner in a disadvantaged 
position. There is no equality of arms between the ombudsperson and the petitioner, as 
the petitioner cannot question or cross-examine witnesses, and has only limited access 
to evidence. furthermore, the petitioner’s interaction with the ombudsperson can be 
characterized as the petitioner responding to questions of the ombudsperson (and others), 
rather than a more adversarial procedure. The lack of access to information can only partially 
be remedied by the ombudsperson. An independent review of the confidential information by 
the ombudsperson, may guarantee that the standard of proof is upheld and that the decision 
is not made on arbitrary grounds; however, it does not provide the petitioner with access to 
the information, nor is an independent review guaranteed. After all, the ombudsperson is 
dependent on the willingness of states to share confidential information with him/her. 
Third, the fact that the ombudsperson does not review the original listing negatively impacts 
the adequacy and effectiveness of the legal remedy as will be further discussed in 6.3. More 
specifically, it prevents the ombudsperson from reviewing both the procedure and the 
standard of proof used in the designation procedure. 
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overall, the application of the draft Model to the ombudsperson review procedure shows 
that those designated have access to a review procedure that, when successful, results in 
delisting. As noted by ombudsperson kipfer fasciati, almost 85 percent of the petitions filed 
resulted in delisting. Although there are certain structural and institutional weaknesses in 
the procedure, it is important to note that accountability is a continuous and dynamic process, 
and the review procedure has improved since its establishment in 2009. This is particularly 
visible in the stronger mandate of the ombudsperson and the expanding procedural 
guarantees offered. The application of the draft Model mapped this interaction between 
the sanctions committee and the ombudsperson, which can be seen as a contestation 
by the ombudsperson of the lack of safeguards in the procedure and a demand by the 
ombudsperson for further safeguards. The contextual assessment showed the strengths and 
weaknesses in the current institutional setting of the review procedure, and the attempts of 
the ombudsperson to realize an “as fair as possible” review procedure for the petitioners. 
The major factor that has a negative effect on the overall review procedure is the lack of 
access to confidential information, which is something that the ombudsperson addresses by 
concluding bilateral agreements and arrangements with states to share the information with 
the office of the ombudsperson. combined with the fact that the burden of proof seems to 
rest with the petitioner, it places the petitioner in a difficult situation to have an adequate and 
effective remedy. 
The application of the draft Model to the review procedure further shows that a variety 
of actors are involved in the review procedure besides the sanctions committee and the 
ombudsperson. designating states, reviewing states, other states, the Monitoring team, the 
focal Point and the un security council all play a role in the procedure as well. The yardstick 
was able to capture the roles of most of these actors. However, the draft Model does not 
encompass benchmarks for internal review procedures; the building block of the entitlement 
to review and its benchmarks focus on the (role of the) review body, and it therefore does 
not address potential review roles by other actors. Accordingly, the peculiar role of the 
Monitoring team in the review procedure (and in the decision-making procedure) was not 
fully captured by the draft Model. 
171 ombudsperson kipfer fasciati, open briefing to Member states (August 2, 2018), available at https://
www.un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/selected-presentations.
172 This argument is based on an analysis of the various public speeches and official reports of the 
ombudsperson to the sanctions committee and the un security council. see, e.g., https://www.
un.org/securitycouncil/ombudsperson/classified_information, and the statement of ombudsperson 
Marchi-uhel, open Briefing to Member states – november 22, 2016, available at https://www.
un.org/securitycouncil/sites/www.un.org.securitycouncil/files/20161107_open_briefing_to_ms_22_
november_2016_check_against_delivery.pdf.
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
The Monitoring team is composed of a small group of experts, each with a relevant expertise 
related to activities of the Al-Qaida and/or IsIl organization. The Monitoring team plays 
a limited explicit role within the designation procedure; however, its role within the review 
procedures and as a support for the day-to-day functioning of the sanctions committee is 
larger. The Mt has an extensive supportive mandate to, amongst other things, 
… assist the ombudsperson in carrying out his or her mandate… to assist the committees 
in the consideration of listing proposals, to assist the sanctions committee in regularly 
reviewing names on the sanctions lists; to gather information on behalf of the committee 
… and to provide cases of non-compliance and recommendations to the committee 
on actions to respond to such cases of non-compliance for its review; to consult with the 
committees, the Government of Afghanistan, or any relevant Member states, as appropriate, 
when identifying individuals or entities that could be added to, or removed from, the lists; 
to consult, in confidence, with Member states’ intelligence and security services, including 
through regional forums; to make recommendations to assist Member states to implement 
the measures.
Moreover, the Monitoring team has extensive investigate tasks to gather and collect 
information on a wide variety of topics related to the designation procedures. The 
recommendations and reports of the Mt to the sanctions committee are publicly accessible, 
and provide a glimpse into the debate within the un sanctions framework in regards to the 
level of inclusion to be realized for those affected. for example, in regards to the first annual 
review conducted, the Monitoring team notes:
[a]lthough the measures are preventive many states regard their effect as punitive and 
therefore requiring basic legal protection for the listed parties. The sanctions measures also 
have no expiry date, which some states see as compounding their lack of fairness. 
The Monitoring team facilitates the internal review procedure, and the Mt can also, on its 
own initiative, provide further information and suggest amendments to the entries on the 
173 see, e.g., the resolution that established the Monitoring team, un sc res. 1526 (2004), §7: the following 
potential expertise was listed, including: 
 counter-terrorism and related legislation; financing of terrorism and international financial 
transactions, including technical banking expertise; alternative remittance systems, charities, and use 
of couriers; border enforcement, including port security; arms embargoes and export controls; and 
drug trafficking.
174 see sections 1 and 1.2 above. 
175 un sc res. 2368 (2017), Annex 1. 
176 report of the Analytical support and sanctions Monitoring team on the outcome of the review 
described in paragraph 25 of resolution 1822 (2008), submitted pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 
1904 (2009), un doc. s/2010/497, §11. 
  7
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
sanctions list. Their role within the ombudsperson review procedure is similar; it is primarily 
responsible for the collection and sharing of information. Thus, although the benchmarks 
of the draft Model were not fully able to capture the role of the Monitoring team, the 
functioning of this actor should be considered as part of the accountability framework of the 
sanctions committee vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. 
The next section will assess whether the ombudsperson, under the circumstances, can 
provide for reparation that is effective in addressing the harm caused. Moreover, it will 
discuss whether those affected who cannot initiate a procedure with the ombudsperson have 
another avenue available to them to request reparation effective in remedying their harm.
6.3. The Entitlement to Reparation 
The entitlement to reparation is the second component of the entitlement to an effective 
remedy of the draft Inclusionary Governance Model. The draft Model suggests that 
authorities have to provide reparation that is effective and adequate in repairing harm; how 
this is achieved is left to the discretion of authorities. However, the effectiveness of a remedy 
does not have to be determined by a single remedy. The criteria can similarly be met by a 
combination of remedies. Moreover, the effectiveness of the remedy is assessed both based on 
the entitlement to a review that is available to those affected and on whether the competent 
review body can provide reparation that can remedy the harm suffered by those affected. 
Thus, the analysis conducted in this section builds on the conclusions drawn in the previous 
sections and will cross-reference where necessary. 
The draft Model recognizes an entitlement to reparation for those affected by decisions and, 
in some circumstances, for their direct family members and/or next of kin, depending on the 
reparation claimed and the alleged violation. In regards to the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida 
sanctions committee’s designations, three different groups of affected individuals may be 
identified based on the reports of the sanctions committee, the ombudsperson and the 
Monitoring team supporting the sanctions committee.
The table below provides an overview of those affected and what is to be expected of 
reparation. The three groups are summed up in the first column of the table. The second 
column represents the harm identified and what may represent an adequate and effective 
reparation to remedy the harm caused. The third column describes which (review) authority 
is competent in determining whether, and to what extent, reparation is provided in a given 
case. The last column describes the actual reparation provided. each category will be further 
discussed and illustrated below. 
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
regarding the first category, those designated can file a delisting request with the 
ombudsperson and/or their designation may be reviewed by the sanctions committee as part 
of an internal review procedure. The determinative factor for the type of reparation offered 
is that the designations are qualified as a preventive measure. This qualification negatively 
influences the possible reparation. The ombudsperson’s official position is that the review is 
a de novo examination of the listing on the current conditions, and accordingly, the original 
listing is not assessed. consequently, the outcome can be the retention of a listing or a delisting, 
but there is no acknowledgement of any wrongdoing as there is no review of the substantive 
and procedural legality of the original listing. Automatically, when there is no decision as to 
whether the original listing was valid, there is no avenue for designated individuals to claim 
damages. It should be noted that there can be quite some time between the decision to delist 
and the implementation of that decision by the member states. Although the remedy should 
be effective in regaining access to assets, regaining the ability to travel and removal from the 
list when a petition results in delisting is, in practice, often more complicated. In some cases, 
delisting by the ombudsperson has resulted in listing of the same individual by another 
sanctions committee, which implies that this individual needs to go through the focal 
177 example mentioned by the ombudsperson Prost, Briefing by the ombudsperson at the security 
council’s open debate on “working methods of the security council” (s/2014/725): ‘enhancing due 
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Point procedure, which does not offer an independent review mechanism. Petitioners can 
submit a request for delisting directly to the focal Point or through their state of residence 
or citizenship. However, the focal Point is merely an administrative secretariat registering 
the request. The actual review is conducted by the reviewing states; that is, the designated 
state(s) (state who listed the individual) and the state of citizenship and residence. There are 
still major procedural flaws in the focal Point procedure as it is an inter-state procedure in 
which the individual has no right to be heard, no independent review of the listing will take 
place, and no access to information or to the reasons for retaining the listing is provided.
furthermore, even if a person is successfully delisted, the extent to which one can access 
their assets and travel without restrictions is questionable. The designation decisions by 
the un sanctions committee require a member state to implement the sanctions and “to 
circulate it widely, such as to banks and other financial institutions, border points, airports, 
seaports, consulates, customs agents, intelligence agencies, alternative remittance systems 
and charities.” As a result, in order to implement the measures, states often develop national 
sanctions lists; for instance, the eu maintains its own, similar sanctions list. Moreover, as 
stated on the eu website:
The application of financial sanctions and more precisely the freezing of assets constitutes an 
obligation for both the public and private sector. In this regard, a particular responsibility falls 
on credit and financial institutions, since they are involved in the bulk of financial transfers.
178 The focal Point for delisting was established in 2006, and part of its mandate is: “to ensure that fair and 
clear procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and for removing them, as 
well as for granting humanitarian exemptions” un sc res. 1730 (2006), preamble, (december 19, 2006); 
un sc res. 1730 (2006) is applicable to the sanctions committees pursuant to un sc res. 1718 (2006) 
concerning the democratic People’s republic korea; un sc res 1636 (2005) concerning lebanon; un 
sc res. 1591 (2005) concerning sudan; un sc res. 1572 (2004) concerning cote d’Ivoire; un sc res. 
1533 (2004) concerning drc; un sc res. 1521 (2005) concerning liberia; un sc res. 1518 (2003) 
concerning Iraq/kuwait; un sc res. 1267 (1999) Al-Qaida; un sc res. 1132 (1997); un sc res. 918 
(1994), and un sc res. 751 (1992) concerning somalia. 
179 for instance, the representative of Qatar concluded in a un sc meeting discussing the establishment of 
the focal Point that: 
 [t]he council established a focal point that lacks independence, neutrality, standards or controls for 
delisting. Therefore, this point of contact does not at all constitute an effective means of fairness. 
 (record of the text of speeches delivered at the 5599th meeting of the un sc discussing un sc res. 
1730 (2006), un doc s/Pv.5599 (december 19, 2006) p. 3-4. 
180 Member states are obliged to implement those measures adopted by the un security council under 
chapter vII of the un charter, article 25 un charter, article 103 un charter. The designations are 
measures adopted under chapter vII of the un charter. 
181 see, e.g., sanctions committee guidelines, 5(c). 
182 see, e.g., http://data.europa.eu/euodp/data/dataset/consolidated-list-of-persons-groups-and-entities-
subject-to-eu-financial-sanctions.
183 Idem.
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Accordingly, the private sector often maintains its own sanctions lists. when an individual 
is delisted by the un sanctions committee, the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions 
committee sends out a press release that explains that an individual is removed from the 
list, and that the sanctions no longer apply to the name set out below. Member states are 
informed of the delisting, and although the sanctions should be removed, often it is required 
that an individual has to petition delisting from each separate list. The private or national/
regional lists can use the same criteria but may also have wider criteria for designations. 
for example, the us sanctions list requires one to be present in a us territory in order to 
file for a delisting request. Accordingly, these circumstances complicate the extent to which 
individuals have access to the actual reparation (that is, the ability to move freely and use the 
assets previously frozen). 
The situation is even more complicated for the other two categories of affected people, who 
are not the addressee of the decision but are similarly impacted by it. The second category 
concerns those affected by the designation due to a mistaken identity. These are persons 
whose assets may be frozen or whose right to travel may be denied by authorities as they 
share some of the identification entries used as indicators to identify the people targeted by 
the sanction. un member states receive a list of those designated by the sanctions committee 
and the relevant indicators and are required to implement the sanctions by – based on these 
indicators – assessing whether these persons have assets within their countries, and if so, 
freeze the assets, and monitor whether they may want to enter or leave their country, and if 
so, deny the travel. These persons are therefore incorrectly identified, and they are similarly 
affected by the sanctions, as well as their families and direct relatives. The chance of a mistaken 
identity can be diminished if a certain number of entries would be required. This enhances 
the accuracy of the identification and thus the accuracy of the implementation measures. 
The persons who have been targeted due to a mistaken identity cannot file a request to the 
un sanctions committee. They are dependent on the internal review procedure of the un 
sanctions committee. Through the internal review procedure, the Monitoring team and 
the sanctions committee have to gain more information on those designated and should 
thereby be able to fill in more entries, which as a result would ensure higher accuracy of 
184 for example, a press release (sc/13787, https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/sc13787.doc.htm) of April 
22, 2019 reads as follows:
 on 22 April 2019, the security council committee pursuant to resolutions 267 (1999), 1989 (2011) 
and 2253 (2015) concerning IsIl (da’esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings 
and entities removed the entry below from its IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list. The entry 
was deleted after the committee concluded its consideration of the delisting request for this name 
submitted by the designating state following the 2017 Annual review conducted in accordance with 
paragraphs 80 and 81 of resolution 2253 (2015).
 Therefore, the assets freeze, travel ban and arms embargo set out in paragraph 1 of security council 
resolution 2368 (2017), and adopted under chapter vII of the charter of the united nations, no longer 
apply to the name set out below.
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the designations. At most, those affected due to a mistaken identity will no longer suffer 
the consequences of the listing. If the sanctions committee concludes that there was a 
mistaken identity, member states are informed thereof and should accordingly adapt their 
implementation measures (i.e., inform banks, airports etc.) of the correct indicators and 
remove the erroneous ones. However, there is no establishment of any wrongdoing, nor is 
there a possibility to request damages. 
The third category concerns the direct relatives of those designated who similarly face the 
consequences of any sanctions. Here a distinction needs to be made between those who are 
family members of someone correctly listed and those who are family members of someone 
incorrectly listed. regarding the former, it is only possible to not face the consequences of the 
sanction if the relative of the person designated is able to show or testify that he/she is not (or 
no longer) associated with the listed person. However, there is no clear procedure available, 
nor is it clear to which review authority they have to direct their request. regarding the 
latter, if someone is incorrectly listed and their relatives face the consequence as well, those 
affected have as their only option that the designated person petitions for delisting with the 
ombudsperson. If successful, the person will be delisted, and the relatives should no longer 
face the consequences of the listing. However, there is no possibility to request damages or 
acknowledgement of any wrongdoing. 
The relatives of a deceased person can inform, with the proper documentation, the Permanent 
Mission of the country of residence or nationality of the death of the person designated. 
The Permanent Mission or the country of residence or nationality should then inform the 
sanctions committee and/or Monitoring team to remove that person from the list. It should 
be noted that this procedure is cumbersome, and its success is dependent on the ability and 
willingness of a state to speak on behalf of the family. The available remedy is the delisting 
and the fact that the relatives will no longer suffer the consequences of the listing; there is no 
possibility to request damages. 
In conclusion, the reparation is not effective in repairing the harm suffered by those 
designated. At most, a request to remedy any harm suffered results in a delisting; however, 
there is no declaration of wrongdoing and no possibility of being awarded any damages. 
6.4.  Conclusions
The entitlement to an effective remedy has several benchmarks; overall, the draft Model 
suggests that the remedy should be accessible to those affected, adequate in addressing 
the harm and effective in remedying the harm suffered. The application of the yardstick to 
185 see further the website of the office of the ombudsperson https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/
ombudsperson/application. 
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the review procedures of the sanctions committee served two purposes. The first purpose 
was to assess whether, and to what extent, those affected by the designations are entitled 
to an effective remedy. The second purpose was to assess whether, and to what extent, the 
benchmarks of the entitlement to an effective remedy of the draft Model are sufficiently 
defined to capture the context in which the review procedures are provided and to determine 
whether, and to what extent, inclusionary governance is provided to those affected. 
regarding the former, the analysis showed that although the ombudsperson procedure may 
be accessible to those designated, there are some structural flaws in regard to the fairness 
of the review procedure and the effectiveness of the reparation offered. several of the flaws 
derive from the institutional set-up by the sanctions committee, the mandate given to 
the ombudsperson, and constraints imposed on the (functioning of the) ombudsperson 
by the security council and by the un member states. The lack of access to confidential 
information – not only for the petitioner but also for the ombudsperson and the sanctions 
committee members – has a crippling effect on the overall level of inclusion that can be 
realized. However, the application of the draft IGM also shows the improvements made 
over the years and how, through advocacy by the ombudsperson, amongst others, the 
position of the office of the ombudsperson is strengthened. furthermore, the application 
of the draft Model to the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee demonstrates 
how the different building blocks influence each other and how the draft Model is capable 
of identifying these interactions. As signaled at the beginning of section 6, the lack of access 
to personal information (section 4.2) was expected to have a crippling effect on the (overall 
level of) fairness of the review procedure. The analysis conducted in section 6.2.6 confirmed 
this crippling effect, and showed the existence of inequality of arms between the petitioner 
and the ombudsperson, which negatively impacts on the opportunity for one to present 
their views in the review procedure. 
regarding the latter – whether or not the building blocks are formulated sufficiently clearly 
– the quick answer is that the draft Model works. The application of the draft Model to 
the review procedure of the sanctions committee resulted in a systematic analysis of the 
inclusionary governance realized vis-à-vis those affected by the decisions of the sanctions 
committee. The benchmarks of the building blocks of the entitlement to an effective remedy 
are sufficiently defined to assess the extent to which those affected by the designations are 
entitled to an effective legal remedy, to identify the strengths and weaknesses in the review 
procedure, and to take the context in which the international institution operates into account. 
Moreover, it demonstrated how certain external factors have a decisive effect on the level of 
inclusionary governance realized within a review procedure. for example, the qualification of 
the designation decision as preventive in nature without recognizing its punitive nature has 
influenced the standard of review and the standard of proof upheld by the ombudsperson.
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However, the analysis also demonstrated that there are multiple actors involved in the review 
procedures, and the review procedures offered in the context of the IsIl (da’esh) and Al-
Qaida sanctions committee not only include the official independent review mechanism 
by the ombudsperson, but they also include internal review mechanisms and other similar 
mechanisms that aim primarily to enhance the quality of the review procedure. Although 
the draft Model recognizes that other actors can be involved and play a role in the exercise 
of public power and in the realization of the inclusionary governance norms, the question 
is whether the descriptive-analytical questions guiding the first step of the draft Model 
sufficiently embrace this complexity of multiple actors and multilevel decision-making 
procedures. for instance, the analysis conducted in this section following the steps of the 
draft IGM did not sufficiently grasp the role of the Monitoring team in the realization of 
inclusionary governance vis-à-vis those affected by the decisions of international institutions.
Thus, the question has to be asked whether the content of the (building blocks of the) draft 
yardstick should be adjusted to accommodate the circumstances in which international 
institutions exercise public power. sections 7 and 8 will address this aspect and provide for 
the overall conclusions of the application of the draft IGM to the sanctions committee 
designation procedure.
7. Conclusions: Outcome of the Demonstration of the Functioning of 
the Draft IGM 
This chapter intended to serve a dual purpose: to demonstrate the functioning of the draft 
Model and to test whether the formulation of the building blocks of the three dimensions 
of the draft Model is sufficiently clear and accurate to analyze the extent to which the IsIl 
(da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee is accountable towards those it has designated. 
In the conclusions, the accuracy of the yardstick will be analyzed in light of the three questions 
that were formulated to guide the testing of the functionality of the draft IGM: 
1. whether the formulation of the different building blocks is sufficiently clear to be applied 
as a yardstick to international institutions;
2. whether the identified dynamics and contextual factors of the draft IGM sufficiently 
capture the context in which each international institution operates; and
3. whether the draft Model is complete and sufficiently sophisticated to deal with the 
everyday reality of international institutions, or whether there are other issues that the 
draft Model does not yet sufficiently capture.
This chapter applied the draft Inclusionary Governance Model to the IsIl (da’esh) and 
Al-Qaida sanctions committee to demonstrate its functioning. The analysis showed 
how the draft Model allows for an in-depth assessment of the accountability framework 
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
of an international institution while taking the context in which an institution operates 
into account. The application of the yardstick showed the extent to which the sanctions 
committee is accountable towards those affected by its decisions. furthermore, this chapter 
identified potential shortcomings and weaknesses in the procedure as will be discussed in 
this and the next section. 
The draft Model is dynamic in nature. The concepts of vulnerability and of arbitrariness 
serve as trigger factors for these dynamics. The preliminary review of the level of inclusionary 
governance realized by the sanctions committee shows that the decision-making procedure 
has certain inherent arbitrary features. This determination triggered stricter scrutiny of the 
procedure. In this more detailed scrutiny, authorities enjoy less discretion and the issues 
of burden and standard of proof are taken into account in the assessment of the fairness 
of the review procedure. furthermore, considering that those designated are regarded as 
particularly vulnerable, the level of discretion enjoyed by authorities decreased. The outcome 
of this analysis can be summarized as follows: 
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DRAFT INCLUSIONARY GOVERNANCE MODEL
The ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee designation procedure
InforMAtIonAl entItleMents: entItleMent to PuBlIc Interest InforMAtIon 













Entitlement to a 
review
The sanctions committee holds information of a public interest nature (rules 
of procedure, (de)listing criteria, and the rules for the review procedure) and 
publishes this information online on its website.
Individuals can access this information, if they have access to the Internet and 
if they are aware of the information published. There is no possibility to request 
access to (other) public interest information, nor is there a procedure to request 
access or appeal a lack of access. 
The sanctions committee holds two types of personal information: evidence 
used to support (de)listing and information used to identify those designated
evidence: limited access to the evidence for those designated, no procedure to 
request access to the information, no procedure to challenge the legality of the 
storage/collection of the information. further, in practice, the designating states 
have unfettered discretion to determine whether or not to qualify evidence 
as classified. The sanctions committee does not always have access to the 
information either. 
Identification indicators: The sanctions committee publishes the information 
that serves to identify those to be designated online on the sanctions committee’s 
website. There is no minimum number of indicators required to identify those 
to be designated, which may lead to mistaken identification and others may be 
affected by the decisions. There is no right to rectification or removal of the 
information published. 
The sanctions committee has not developed a participatory procedure. There 
is no opportunity to participate in the decision-making procedure for those 
designated. Those affected are informed of the decision once it is adopted. 
The sanctions committee provides a summary of reasons to those designated by 
the sanctions committee. 
There are three types of review procedures: the triennial internal review 
procedure, the delisting procedure triggered by a request from a (designating) 
state, and the review procedure by the ombudsperson. only the last one can be 
triggered by a request of the designated individual. only the review procedure 
by the ombudsperson meets the majority of the elements of an entitlement 
to review as described below. The triennial internal review procedure and the 
delisting procedure triggered by request from a state constitute inter-state 
procedures with no further procedural guarantees recognized. 
Individuals are informed of the possibility of review when they are notified of 
the designation by the Permanent Mission of the country of nationality and/or 
residence, or by the ombudsperson.
entItleMent to MeAnInGful PArtIcIPAtIon In tHe decIsIon-MAkInG Procedure
entItleMent to An effectIve reMedy: revIew And rePArAtIon
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
Entitlement to 
reparation 
An individual may file a delisting request with the ombudsperson whenever he/
she is listed by the sanctions committee. There are few format requirements. 
The ombudsperson is, in principle, independent and impartial; however, the 
recommendation to delist or retain the listing may be overruled by the sanctions 
committee by reverse consensus.
standard of review upheld by the ombudsperson: “whether there is sufficient 
information to provide reasonable and credible basis for listing.” 
fairness of the procedure: there are various factors that play a role. In general, 
reasonable timeframes are upheld by the office of the ombudsperson. However, 
the lack of access to information (the evidence and reasons underlying the 
original listing decision, and the identity of the designating state(s)) negatively 
affects the fairness of the procedure and puts the designated individual in 
a disadvantaged position. Thus, there is no equality of arms between the 
ombudsperson and the petitioner. furthermore, the interaction or dialogue 
between the petitioner and the ombudsperson may result in speculative 
lawyering and does not give the petitioner a fair chance to present his/her views 
when he/she does not have access to the information underlying the decision. 
combined with the fact that the burden of proof rests on the petitioner, that he/
she does not have access to the evidence underlying the original decision and 
without knowing who were the designating states, the fairness of the procedure 
becomes questionable. An independent review executed by the ombudsperson 
of the evidential information (when states consent to disclose) may mitigate to 
some extent the lack of access.
There are different groups of affected individuals: (1) those (incorrectly) 
designated (2) those affected by the designation due to a mistaken identity (3) 
those who face the consequences as a family member and/or next of kin of 
(deceased) designated individuals. 
Ad 1) those designated can – at most – get delisted. As the measures are deemed 
preventive in nature, there is no establishment of wrongdoing and accordingly 
no compensation.
Ad 2) those affected have to ask the sanctions committee or the focal Point to 
be ‘delisted’ ( that is, to enhance the indicators preventing a mistaken identity); 
there is no establishment of wrongdoing and no damages.
Ad 3) Those affected have to ask the sanctions committee or ombudsperson 
to have a deceased person delisted; a death certificate is required. further 
family members have to attest non-association with IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida, 
in order to be no longer considered to be associated with someone originally 
designated. There is no establishment of wrongdoing, no possibility to receive 
damages.
Table 20: Application of Draft IGM to designation procedure of the Sanctions Committee
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In addition, as the draft Model stipulates, there are certain constraints on the exercise of 
public power by public authorities, regardless of the context in which the power is exercised. 
A brief summary of the findings in this regard is summarized below: 
PUBLIC POWER IS TO BE EXERCISED BY PUBLIC AUTHORITIES:
In accordance with the law
not in an arbitrary manner
May not constitute a 
violation of ius cogens 
norms
limitations are only 
permitted if the conditions 
of the tripartite test of 
legality, necessity and 
legitimacy are met
Any decision-making 
procedure has to be low-
cost, timely and fair
The powers of the sanctions committee and of the ombudsperson are, 
in general, regulated and stipulated in the corresponding un security 
council resolutions and/or accompanying sanctions committee 
Guidelines. However, there are problems with the quality of law: the 
discretion accorded is not clearly defined, there are no procedural 
safeguards in place to prevent arbitrary decisions, and there is only a 
limited right to a review. 
The application of the draft Model shows that there are inherent 
arbitrary features in the procedure; for instance, there is only limited 
access to the evidence underlying the decision, there is no possibility to 
participate in the decision-making procedure and only limited reasons 
are provided for the decision.
The practice indicates that there is a risk that evidence is used that was 
obtained through torture. The sanctions committee has no substantive 
or procedural safeguards to prevent designations to be made relying 
on evidence obtained through torture. The ombudsperson does not 
accept evidence obtained through torture. Allegations thereof will 
be scrutinized strictly. In the review of the allegations, however, the 
ombudsperson is dependent on the willingness of states to cooperate 
and inform the ombudsperson in this regard. 
In regards to each of the situations identified as falling short of the 
minimum level of guarantees required and although the principle of 
legality in sensu stricto is often met, the corresponding requirement of 
the quality of the procedure is more problematic.
considering the lack of a participatory procedure and the lack of a 
procedure to request access to information, only the review procedure 
of the ombudsperson is assessed under this heading. This review 
procedure is, in general, low-cost and timely. However, considering the 
lack of access to financial means and the fact that the majority of the 
petitioners are poor, the lack of legal aid may have a negative effect on 
the fairness of the procedure. 
Table 21: Application of the requirements for exercise of public power of the Draft Model to the 
designation procedure
lIstInG By tHe un securIty councIl sAnctIons coMMIttee
furthermore, as was also demonstrated above, the dynamic nature of the yardstick enables 
one to map interactions between the norms, to identify whether a lack of certain norms 
has a crippling effect on the overall level of inclusionary governance (to be) realized 
by the international institution in relation to those affected, and to identify strengths 
and weaknesses in the procedure as a whole. Moreover, the analysis demonstrated why 
inclusionary governance norms should not be assessed in isolation, and why instead the 
decision-making and review procedure should be assessed as a whole. for instance, the 
withholding of evidence from the designated individual was identified as having a crippling 
effect on the level of inclusionary governance that can be realized throughout the decision-
making and review procedure. In other words, the building blocks of the three dimensions 
of the draft Model and their benchmarks operate as communicating vessels.
8. Conclusions: Assessing the Accuracy and Clarity of the Yardstick 
Although the draft Model is capable of assessing the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected, the testing of the draft Model has shown that the draft 
IGM in certain situations is not able to sufficiently grasp the practice of the sanctions 
committee and thus the context in which the international institution operates. 
The draft Model is designed to focus on the relationship between the domestic authorities 
adopting an administrative decision and the individual affected by the decision. Public 
authorities are the primary duty bearers to ensure inclusionary governance to those affected 
by the decisions. The application of the draft Model to the designation procedure of the 
IsIl (da’esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions committee demonstrates that the practice is more 
complex, as there is a variety of actors involved. Although the draft Model enabled the 
identification of the different actors involved, the current benchmarks do not sufficiently 
grasp this complexity. The relevance of the bigger picture, taking the multiple actors into 
account, is particularly visible in the analysis of the discretion enjoyed by public authorities 
in the fulfillment of their obligations. whereas this discretion is sensu stricto enjoyed by the 
sanctions committee, the designating states are the ones who actually exercise the discretion 
(they hold the information and decide whether or not to classify it). furthermore, in the 
internal review procedure, the reviewing states (the designating state, the state of nationality 
and state of residence) play a key role in determining whether an individual should be listed. 
The multiple actors involved create a form of a multilevel governance. The way in which such 
a multilevel governance structure can influence the procedure and what this may mean for 
the level of inclusionary governance is not sufficiently grasped by the draft Model. 
Moreover, the benchmarks of the right to a review as incorporated in the draft Model are 
not sufficiently precise to analyze in a systematic manner the type of review procedures 
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realized by international institutions. The building blocks of the right to a review and its 
benchmarks focus on the role of the review body and therefore do not address potential 
review roles by other actors. Accordingly, the role played by the Monitoring team in the 
sanctions committee’s review procedure (and in the decision-making procedure) was not 
fully captured by the draft Model. 
The following Part Iv will discuss the way in which the draft Model can be fine-tuned taking 
these observations into account. The result will be an Inclusionary Governance Model for 
International Institutions.   
186 see further section 6.2.8 of this chapter where this argument was first introduced. 
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Part III tested the functionality of the draft Model as a yardstick to analyze the accountability 
of international institutions by applying it to the designation procedure of the IsIl (da’esh) 
and Al-Qaida sanctions committee. In Part Iv, the draft Inclusionary Governance Model 
will be fine-tuned in light of the shortcomings identified in the previous chapter. chapter 8 
will present the dynamic Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions. In 
chapter 9, some final remarks of this research will be presented. 8
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A dynAMIc Model for InclusIonAry GovernAnce for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
This chapter will present the fine-tuned Inclusionary Governance Model (‘Model’ or ‘IGM’). 
The Model serves as a yardstick to analyze and address the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. section 1 will discuss how the draft 
Model will be adjusted to better accommodate the context in which international institutions 
operate. section 2 will provide a schematic overview of the IGM and present in a step-by-
step scheme how the yardstick is to be applied in practice. furthermore, section 2 will 
illustrate how the Model meets the two underlying criteria that are required for a yardstick 
to be considered capable of systematically analyzing the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions, as formulated in chapter 1. The general 
relevance of the Model will be demonstrated by making references to the practices of other 
international institutions adopting decisions directly affecting individuals in the elaboration 
of the steps of the Model.
1. Accommodating the Context in which International Institutions 
Operate: A Fine-Tuned Inclusionary Governance Model
The testing conducted in chapter 7 showed that the draft Model developed in Part III 
required some fine-tuning. The draft Model in its current form is not able to sufficiently 
grasp the complexity of multilevel governance structures of international institutions and, 
thus, how a variety of actors may influence the procedure and the impact thereof on the 
level of inclusionary governance realized. related to this point, the benchmarks of the 
entitlement to a review are not sufficiently defined to capture review procedures other than 
those initiated by affected individuals. Therefore, the first step of the application of the draft 
Model – the descriptive overview of the decision-making procedure – should be expanded 
to better capture this complexity of multilevel governance by multiple actors. 
Multilevel and multiple-actor governance structures of international institutions
step 1 of the application of the yardstick requires one to describe the circumstances in 
which a public authority operates (for instance, the type of public power exercised and the 
institutional setting of the public authority concerned) and to provide a description of this 
public authority’s decision-making and review procedure(s). In order to better grasp the 
complexity of the context and the institutional setting of the international institution, this 
research suggests to also include in the first step a description of the governance structure in 
relation to this exercise of public power and to map how various other actors are involved in 
1 The two criteria as set out in chapter 1 are: 
1. The yardstick identifies the procedural arrangements necessary to decrease the accountability deficit; 
2. In the identification of the elements of the yardstick, a proper balance is to be struck between the 
general nature of the accountability problem and each institution’s specific circumstances.
 The criteria are further explained in section 3, chapter 1. 
2 see chapter 6, section 4.
  8
An InclusIonAry GovernAnce Model for InternAtIonAl InstItutIons
the decision-making and review procedure. Moreover, a description of the relations between 
an international institution and its member states, as well as third states, would also be a 
beneficial addition to the first step. By expanding this step, the respective role of each actor 
within the decision-making and/or review process can be further analyzed in light of the 
accountability framework. The content and scope of the benchmarks of the inclusionary 
governance framework do not change with this expansion of step 1; instead, it contributes 
to an enhanced understanding of the context in which a particular international institution 
operates, and it will allow for a better understanding of the complexities and reality of the 
practice of the respective institution. 
Accordingly, by expanding this first step in the application of the yardstick, it becomes easier 
to detect weaknesses in the procedures; one is better able to identify why there is a (certain) 
lack of inclusionary governance for those affected by the decisions of an international 
institution. does the lack of inclusion derive from a failure by an international institution 
to provide a legal framework to realize inclusion for those affected? does it derive from a 
failure of a decision-making body to ensure these guarantees? does the legal framework 
accord too much discretion to authorities to exercise their public power vis-à-vis those 
affected by their decisions? And/or does it derive from a lack of compliance by other organs 
of the international institution? when one takes this type of question into account in the 
assessment, the systematic analysis of the accountability of an international institution vis-à-
vis those affected by their decisions will become more nuanced. 
The fine-tuning of the draft Model constitutes the last step of model-building conducted in 
this book. The outcome is an Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions. 
The following section will discuss the content and scope of this Model and will show the 
relevance of a general yardstick to analyze the accountability of international institutions 
vis-à-vis those affected 
2. An Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions 
The fine-tuned Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions serves as a 
yardstick to analyze and address in a systematic manner the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. In short, the developed yardstick identifies 
the procedural arrangements that are needed to decrease the accountability deficit, and the 
elements needed to strike a proper balance between the general nature of the accountability 
problem and the specific context of each institution. In other words, the two criteria identified 
in chapter 1 of this book for an accountability framework for international institutions have 
been met. The Inclusionary Governance Model can be summarized as follows:
3 see further chapter 1, section 3, in which the research question and research design is further explained. 
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INCLUSIONARY GOVERNANCE MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
International institutions, possibly multilevel and/or multiple actor, shall exercise their 
public power:
in accordance with the law;
not in an arbitrary manner; and
it may not constitute a violation of an ius cogens norm.
limitations are only permitted if the tripartite test of legality, necessity and 
legitimacy are met
The decision-making procedures followed have to be low-cost, timely and fair.
Dynamic aspects of the Model:  
factors of vulnerability result in more positive obligations for international institutions,  
less discretion and more scrutiny
when arbitrary features are present, higher scrutiny should be exercised of the inclusionary 
governance realized
INFORMATION ENTITLEMENTS: INFORMATION OF A PUBLIC INTEREST NATURE 





Duty to ensure 
meaningful parti­







duty to provide access to information 
duty to provide reasons for a refusal to disclose information
duty to provide information on a procedure to request information and 
to review the refusal 
duty to realize a review procedure to challenge a refusal to disclose 
information
duty to realize a procedure through which individuals can request 
access to, or modification or removal of personal information held by 
international institutions
duty to duly inform those affected of the information held and how to 
access it
duty to protect information held by international institutions from 
unauthorized access or usage by third parties 
duty to realize a review procedure to challenge the legality of information 
stored
duty to duly inform those affected
duty to ensure meaningful involvement in the decision-making 
procedure 
duty to duly take into account the views expressed
duty to provide a reasoned decision 
duty to ensure access to the review procedure 
duty to establish a competent, independent and impartial review body 
duty to realize a fair review procedure 
reparation provided has to be adequate and effective in addressing the 
harm suffered
DUTY TO REALIZE MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION IN THE DECISION-MAKING 
PROCEDURE 
Table 22: Inclusionary Governance Model (schematic overview)
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The different elements of the Inclusionary Governance Model can be summarized as follows:
- The building blocks (information entitlement, entitlement to meaningful participation 
in the decision-making procedure, entitlement to an effective remedy) constitute the 
core elements of the Model and correspond with the initial three identified dimensions 
of inclusionary governance. 
- The benchmarks are the minimum standards identified for each building block, against 
which the exercise of public power by international institutions is evaluated. 
- The constraints are those limitations identified for the exercise of public power by 
international institutions, regardless of what type of public power they exercise.
- The trigger factors of non-arbitrariness and vulnerability influence the content and scope 
of inclusionary governance in a given context. 
The Inclusionary Governance Model for international institutions enables one to analyze 
and address – in a systematic manner – whether and to what extent a particular international 
institution is accountable to those affected. The analysis of the accountability of international 
institutions is a contextual one; the decision-making and review procedure should be assessed 
in their entirety. Moreover, the Model is dynamic in nature: the minimum standards set out 
here are to a certain extent dependent on the context, and authorities are given discretion 
in the fulfillment of these benchmarks for entitlement to information, for meaningful 
participation in the decision-making procedure and for an effective remedy. factors of 
vulnerability and the substantive limitation of non-arbitrariness may limit this discretion. 
Thus, depending on the circumstances, the scope of obligations for international institutions 
may vary, which makes the Model dynamic. As explained, potential multilevel and multiple-
actor governance structures are taken into account in the accountability assessment. The 
incorporation of this multilevel aspect allows one to determine the strengths and weaknesses 
of the decision-making and review procedure and how the various actors that play a role in 
the procedure influence this assessment. The analysis of the sanctions committee and the 
contestation by the ombudsperson of the relatively weak procedural guarantees in place are 
a case in point. 
to demonstrate how the Model functions as a yardstick to analyze the accountability of 
international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions, the remainder of this 
section will discuss the steps of the Model and illustrate them by referring to the practice 
of other international institutions that exercise public power directly affecting individuals. 
references to such practice are illustrative in demonstrating how one, through the application 
of the Model, is able to grasp the different contexts in which various institutions operate 
while simultaneously analyzing the accountability of a specific international institution vis-
à-vis those affected. Thus, the discussion of the practice in this section is not meant to serve 
4 for an illustration of this point, see, for instance, chapter 7, sections 6.2.6 and 6.2.8. 
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as an in-depth analysis of the accountability of the respective international institution vis-à-
vis those affected. These non-exhaustive functional studies will be engaged in to demonstrate 
the suitability of the yardstick and to illustrate how the various circumstances of each 
international institution are taken into consideration in the application of the Model. 
The functional studies are chosen on the basis of two criteria: (i) it concerns international 
institutions that make decisions directly affecting individuals, and (ii) these international 
institutions have been facing criticism for the lack of accountability vis-à-vis those affected 
by their decisions. 
The steps that guide the application are those steps that were developed in different phases of the 
model-building as set out in chapter 6, section 4 of this book. However, the fine-tuning of the 
Model in section 1 of this chapter resulted in an adjustment of the first step of the application. 
As a result, one also assesses in step 1 whether there are multilevel and multiple-actor aspects 
in the decision-making procedure and how this influences the accountability framework set 
out by a given institution. Per step, various guiding questions have been identified. Below, a 
description of the steps and further elaboration and illustration of the function of each step is 
given via references to the various practices of international institutions. 
1.   A descriptive overview of the institutional setting of the decision-making procedure
Who exercises public power? Who exercises a form of supervision or monitoring over whom? 
Can an organogram be drafted that incorporates the potential multilevel and multiple-actor 
institutional structures? If multilevel governance or different actors are in the picture, further 
questions are required per respective step. For instance, who holds information? Who has access 
to the information? Who enjoys a form of (decisional) discretion? Who exercises supervision 
over what and over whom? 
knowing the differences in institutional settings between the various international institutions 
under assessment, and being able to identify the various actors involved, enables one to ask 
more detailed questions in order to understand whether, and to what extent, inclusionary 
governance is realized in practice. In other words, it leads to a better understanding of the 
context of a given case, and it therefore enables an in-depth analysis of the different push 
and pull factors of inclusionary governance. for instance, when applying the Model to 
the un High commissioner for refugees (unHcr), differences surface in regards to the 
setting and realizing of inclusionary governance standards. The unHcr Headquarters sets 
the procedural and substantive standards for refugee status determination procedures and, 
additionally, decides where and under what circumstances Mandate rsd procedures take 
place and who falls within the rsd mandate. The actual Mandate rsd is however executed 
5 unHcr, ‘note on determination of refugee status under International Instruments’ (August 24, 
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in its field offices. field offices are accorded a significant amount of discretion by unHcr 
Headquarters to further develop rsd procedures and to further define corresponding 
procedural guarantees to be provided. In the Procedural standards Manual for unHcr 
rsd procedures, three different types of discretion can be identified when examining the 
language used: field offices have to do something, field offices are advised to do something, 
and field offices are informed of the best practices in regard to a certain procedural element. 
As a result, field offices have administrative leeway to provide further or less protection with 
regard to some of these discretionary standards. understanding these dynamics within an 
institution, and with other actors involved in the decision-making procedure, enables one 
to better map and identify whether and to what extent inclusionary governance is realized 
within the institution and within a particular level of governance (such as a particular field 
office). 
2.   Assessment of vulnerability factors
Can factors of vulnerability be identified in the context of the decision-making procedure under 
assessment? If so, does the international institution recognize the vulnerability factors of those 
affected? Does it recognize various categories of vulnerability? If so, does the institution provide 
further procedural guarantees for those considered to be vulnerable as required by the Model? 
when applying the Model in practice, it shows that the majority of international institutions 
making decisions directly affecting individuals recognize that those affected are to a 
certain extent vulnerable and that further procedural safeguards should be provided for 
these individuals. for instance, both the unHcr and the world Bank recognize that their 
decisions on, respectively, the recognition of refugee status and the financing of development 
projects, respectively, have a certain impact on the daily lives of individuals, which therefore 
renders those affected vulnerable. The unHcr holds that the impact of rsd decision 
cannot be understated – a “wrong decision can cost the person’s life or liberty” – which 
1977), ec/scP/5, available at http://www.unhcr.org/excom/eXcoM/3ae68cc04.html. 
6 for example, the 2005 Manual for unHcr rsd procedures emphasizes that due to the “very diverse 
and challenging operational environments” in which unHcr field offices carry out rsd, each field 
office is responsible for (further) developing and implementing the rsd procedures as stipulated in 
the unHcr’s Procedural standards for refugee status determination under unHcr’s Mandate 
(Procedural standards Handbook), at 1-2, unit 1, available at https://www.unhcr.org/4317223c9.pdf. 
7 The lebanon field office, for instance, provides access to the rsd documents and to evidence for those 
affected, whereas the procedural safeguards of 2016 does not oblige field offices to do so. Instead, the 
Procedural standards Handbook stipulate that legal representatives of asylum seekers may consult the 
relevant rsd form at the unHcr premises and gain access to all expert reports. Thus, the Handbook, 
advises that field offices should accord access to the legal representatives of asylum seekers only and 
does not stipulate an obligation to provide access to asylum seekers. The majority of asylum seekers 
however does not have a legal representative and will thus not have access rights to this information. 
It should be noted that before the 2016 change, no one (that is, no lawyer and no asylum seeker) had 
access to the rsd report nor to the export reports. see the 2003 procedural safeguards. 
8 unHcr, Determination of Refugee Status, rld 2 (1989), chapter 2, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
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triggers the necessity for certain procedural safeguards. Moreover, there are certain (groups 
of) individuals that are particularly vulnerable and that warrant the need for further 
safeguards. for example, unaccompanied minors, the elderly, disabled asylum seekers, 
and persons manifestly in need of protective intervention are considered to be particularly 
vulnerable, which implies that the unHcr rsd officers have to take this into account by, 
for example, giving them priority in registration procedures, identifying whether there are 
immediate protection needs, and creating the correct conditions for their rsd interview. 
Moreover, when an asylum seeker’s case is assessed in light of the exclusion clause of Article 
1F, the unHcr imposes extra procedural guarantees for the exclusion examination. 
The vulnerability of these affected individuals originates from the serious implications of 
the Article 1F decision-making procedure: part of the assessment concerns the question 
whether the respective asylum seeker has allegedly committed an international crime. As 
a result, the unHcr upholds a higher standard of proof than the one applicable to normal 
asylum procedures. furthermore, in the context of an exclusion examination, the burden of 
proof shifts to the unHcr, whereas in the standard rsd procedures the applicant and the 
unHcr share the burden. 
within the policies and procedures of the world Bank, references to the concept of 
vulnerability can similarly be found. for instance, the world Bank (wB) acknowledges 
that the enormous impact of involuntary resettlements on individuals and/or groups of 
individuals renders them particularly vulnerable. Amongst others, involuntary resettlement 
imposes “economic, social and environmental risks,” which may result in a weakening of 
community institutions and social networks, which in turn may result in cultural identity 
refworld/pdfid/3ae6b35c0.pdf; see also kagan who describes the role of the unHcr as gatekeeper:
 The [unHcr] effectively decides among asylum seekers who can be saved from deportation and in 
some cases released from detention, who can get humanitarian assistance, and often who can apply to 
resettle to third countries.
 M. kagan, ‘The Beleaguered Gatekeeper: Protection challenges Posed by unHcr refugee status 
determination’ (2006) 18 International Journal on Refugee Law, 1 at 2.
9 The unHcr deems asylum seekers who may have special needs to be particularly vulnerable (stated 
in the Procedural standards Handbook, unit 3.4.1) Although the special needs of asylum seekers may 
sometimes be evident, unHcr staff often only discovers the existence of special needs during the 
registration interview or at a later time. 
10 unit 3.4 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook.
11 In the context of article 1f of the 1951 refugee convention, rsd officers of the unHcr examine 
whether one of the exclusion grounds apply and thus whether the asylum seeker is undeserving of 
protection.
12 unit 4.8.1 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook. see further unHcr, Guidelines of 
International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses Article 1F of the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (september 4, 2003) unHcr doc. Hcr/GIP/03/05. 
13 see unHcr Background note, at 105. However, as explained in the Background note, the burden of 
proof may be reversed leading to a “rebuttable presumption of excludability.” 
14 world Bank, oP 4.12 – Involuntary resettlement (december 2001; revised in April 2013), at 1. 
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and traditional authority becoming diminished or completely lost. In practice, it results in 
“project affected people” being forced to leave their homes, their land being taken and/or 
their livelihood being damaged. The world Bank policies are intended to mitigate these risks 
and thereby encompass further procedural safeguards in cases of involuntary resettlement. 
furthermore, the wB has developed a policy with additional procedural safeguards whenever 
indigenous peoples may be affected by its decisions to finance development projects. 
The world Bank acknowledges that indigenous peoples often constitute one of the most 
marginalized and vulnerable segments of a population and that extra protection is therefore 
warranted. This implies that when the world Bank finances a development project that 
affects indigenous peoples, free prior and informed consultation should take place with the 
affected communities before decisions are made. The ultimate goal of this participatory 
procedure is to ensure that “broad support from representatives of major sections of the 
community,” and thus the affected indigenous peoples, is obtained. 
Hence, one identifies in this step whether there are factors of vulnerability and whether 
the international institution concerned recognized this and acted accordingly by providing 
further safeguards. As the Model suggests, when there are factors of vulnerability, it influences 
the analysis conducted in steps 4-6. This determination, or lack thereof, constitutes a key 
moment in the procedure. when authorities do not recognize or identify the vulnerability 
of those affected, less inclusion will, in all probability, be realized than the Model requires. 
Moreover, in the context of the wB, there is not only a problem with the lack of recognition 
of a factor of vulnerability, but often there is already a problem with the assessment of who 
is considered to be affected by the project, whether vulnerable or not. If someone is not 
recognized as being affected by a particular decision, individuals and/or groups will not 
be informed about the upcoming decision nor of their entitlement to be included in the 
decision-making procedure. As a result, these people are often excluded from that procedure. 
15 Idem, at 1. 
16 Project affected people, or PAPs, is a term used by the wB to refer to those individuals, groups, 
communities and companies that are affected by the world Bank’s exercise of public power. 
17 oP 4.12, at 1. 
18 BP 4.10 (indigenous peoples) (July 2005, revised in April 2013).
19 oP 4.10, last sentence paragraph 2.
20 BP 4.10 (indigenous peoples) (July 2005, revised in April 2013), at 2. 
21 BP 4.10, at 7, and oP 4.10 (indigenous peoples) (July 2005, revised in April 2013), at 1.
22 Idem. 
23 The world Bank Inspection Panel, Nepal: Arun III (1994), Ir §19. The Inspection Panel referred to the 
recurring occurrence across the world Bank’s development operations of underestimating the number 
of project-affected people. In nepal-Arun III, for instance, only those who lost land were considered to 
be project affected people while others were similarly affected and their rights and interests should also 
have been taken into consideration. 
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3.   Preliminary assessment of arbitrary factors 
Do actors enjoy unfettered discretion in their exercise of power? Is there a lack of access to 
information, for instance, about the reasons for a decision? If there are arbitrary factors, stricter 
scrutiny should be exercised. In particular, when assessing the fairness of the procedure, issues 
such as rules of evidence and the burden and standard of proof should be considered.
The analysis that is to be conducted in this step requires an assessment of the common core 
guarantees realized by an international institution. for instance, a quick assessment of the 
decision-making procedures of international territorial administrations shows that these 
procedures have inherent arbitrary features. to give an example, the office of the High 
representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoyed unfettered discretion in determining who 
acted in contravention of the dayton Peace Agreement and, accordingly, who should be 
removed from holding public office. Those who were to be removed from office had no 
opportunity to participate in the procedure leading to that decision, nor did they have an 
opportunity to request its review. Although, such a decision was often based on serious 
24 A temporary international administration of territory (ItA) can be defined as the temporary governance 
of a territory by an international organization or group of states in a post-conflict situation. examples 
thereof are the united nations Interim Administration Mission in kosovo (unMIk) in kosovo, the 
united nations transitional Administration in east timor (untAet) in east-timor, and the office of 
the High representative of the international community, Bosnia and Herzegovina (oHr) in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). ItAs exercise extensive public power, and such missions are argued to:
 …assume all-encompassing authority to exercise public power within a given territory for a temporary 
period of time and…this authority is ultimate in nature: that is, it supersedes all governing institutions 
possibly existing at the local – that is, the national – level.
 A. Momirov, Accountability of International Territorial Administrations – a Public Law Approach, 
(utrecht: eleven Publishing, (2011), 49; for the lack of inclusionary governance, see further the 
argument presented in M. schaap, ‘evaluating a demand for inclusionary governance in post-conflict 
situations’ (2011) 2 International Journal of Rule of Law, Transitional Justice and Human Rights 107-120, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2004250. 
25 since 1997, the office of the High representative (oHr) has the power to adopt binding decisions. This 
means, amongst other ramifications, that the oHr has the power to dismiss or remove persons from 
holding public office when they work against the spirit of the dayton Peace Agreement: 
 …persons holding public office or officials who are absent from meetings without good cause or who 
are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace 
Agreement or the terms for its implementation.
 emphasis added, Peace Implementation council. PIC Bonn Conclusions (8/12/1997), §XI, available at 
http://www.ohr.int/. The security council endorsed this reinterpretation in un sc res. 1144 (1997). 
26 As summarized in a report of the european commission for democracy through law of the council 
of europe: 
 The majority of [these] removals concerned persons not cooperating with the International criminal 
tribunal for the former yugoslavia. others removals were the result of corruption, mismanagement 
of public assets or other offences including interference with the judiciary. 
 (european commission for democracy through law of the council of europe (venice commission), 
Opinion on the Constitutional Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Powers of the High 
Representative (venice, March 11, 2005) cdl-Ad (2005)004 at §92. 
27 see, for instance, the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the council of europe, resolution 
1384 (2004) available at http://assembly.coe.int, §13; the Parliamentary Assembly considered it: 
 irreconcilable with democratic principles that the High representative should be able to take 
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grounds, no standard of proof was upheld, and often no evidence was submitted to support 
the claim. As a result, the chance of decisions made on arbitrary grounds significantly 
increased. Thus, whenever there are arbitrary features in the decision-making procedure, 
one should examine more critically the inclusionary governance realized by the international 
institution, and when assessing the fairness of the procedure, the burden and standard of 
proof should be taken into account. 
4.   When authorities hold information of public interest or personal nature, certain 
obligations should be met: 
When public authorities hold public interest information, are individuals entitled to request 
access to this information? Is there a procedure in place to request access? Is public interest 
information accessible for everyone? Is there a possibility of challenging a denial of access to 
such information? 
When public authorities hold personal information, are individuals entitled to request access 
to, modification of, or removal of the personal information in their possession? Additionally, 
does the institution, if they store or collect information, have a legal basis to do so, and has the 
institution adopted measures to prevent third- party access to the information? 
In this step, one analyzes first what type of information the international institution holds, 
and whether such information is of a personal and/or of public interest nature. for instance, 
both the unHcr and the world Bank sanctions Board hold information of a personal 
nature and of a public interest nature. 
The unHcr collects and stores personal information in the course of their decision-
making procedure to determine whether an asylum seeker is eligible for refugee status. 
The Model suggests that those affected are entitled to access personal information held by 
public authorities. Asylum seekers are, in principle, permitted to access all documents that 
they have provided to the unHcr. The disclosure of other information only takes place 
enforceable decisions without being accountable for them or obliged to justify their validity and 
without there being a legal recourse.
 see also, constitutional court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, AP-954/05, Milorad Bilbija i Dragan Kalinić 
(July 8, 2006) available at <www.ccbh.ba> (accessed on July 21, 2009) at §35. 
28 see, for instance, the case of the removal of Mr. raguz. He was held responsible for not making the city 
stolac sufficiently safe. An elderly serbian refugee couple got killed after they had returned to stolac, 
and the High representative held raguz politically responsible for their murder although it provided 
no evidence for raguz’s complicity in the murder; M. Parrish, ‘The demise of the dayton Protectorate’ 
(2007) 1 Journal of Intervention and State Building 11 at 14. 
29 They should be provided with the originals or copies of the documents (unHcr, Procedural standards 
Handbook, unit 2.1.2); see, in contrast, the Concluding Observations of the Human rights committee 
on Bulgaria where the Human rights committee held that it was concerned about the national rsd 
procedure for, amongst other things, the lack of access to the personal files by the applicants and 
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when a protection staff member appointed to that end under the established confidentiality 
procedures of the unHcr has approved the disclosure. regardless of this assessment, the 
asylum seeker will not have access to the rsd file that forms the basis of the rsd assessment, 
nor to the expert reports or medical reports prescribed by the unHcr. At most, if an 
asylum seeker has a legal representative, which is rare, the legal representative may access 
these rsd files and expert reports, but only on the premises of the unHcr. 
In light of the world Bank Group sanctions mechanism to fight fraud and corruption in 
wB-financed projects, the department of Institutional Integrity (Int) of the world Bank 
Group collects personal information, or evidence, related to those under investigation for 
fraudulent or corrupt practices. The world Bank sanctions framework stipulates that any 
evidence found and/or produced in the context of such an investigation has to be provided 
to those affected unless one of the restrictions applies. However, all evidence that may 
mitigate the responsibility of, or have an exculpatory effect on, those to be sanctioned (in 
other words, those affected) always has to be provided. As argued by the world Bank’s 
sanctions Board such evidence has to be disclosed by the Int as it is: 
their legal representatives before a decision was taken. Hrcee, Concluding Observations on Bulgaria 
(ccPr/c/BGr/co/3, (August 19, 2011), 16.
30 unit 2.1.2 of the unHcr, Procedural standards Handbook. 
31 un High commissioner for refugees (unHcr), UNHCR RSD Procedural Standards - Legal 
Representation in UNHCR RSD Procedures, 2016, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/56baf2c84.
html [accessed August 13, 2018].
32 when the sanctions committee concludes that “contractors, bidders, suppliers, consultants and 
individuals involved in activities with the world Bank through procurement or consultancy activities 
have committed fraud, corruption, coercion, collusion, and/or obstructive practices,” they can be 
sanctioned accordingly. There are five possible administrative sanctions: Public letter of reprimand, 
debarment, conditional non-debarment, debarment with conditional release, and restitution. see 
world Bank sanctions Procedures, section II (r), section III A.1.01 (a) of the sanctions committee 
procedure (issued June 28, 2016), available at https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/sanctions-
system#3; see also l. Boisson de chazournes and e. fromageau, ‘Balancing the scales: The world Bank 
sanctions Process and Access to remedies’ (2012) 23 European Journal of International Law 963 at 967.
33 The sanctions Board often uses as a yardstick the premise whether the evidence is necessary for the 
respondent to “mount a meaningful response.” see, for instance, world Bank sanctions Board, Decision 
no. 64, Sanctions Case 122 IDA Credit 3746 KH cambodia (March 31, 2004), §32. In this case, the Int 
had concealed information on the records of interviews conducted by the Int, including information 
on the identity of the alleged bribe beneficiaries. As held by sanctions Board, the respondent had 
no opportunity to verify the record, therefore it was not probable that the respondent had exercised 
sanctionable conduct. Accordingly, the temporary suspension was ended. see also world Bank 
sanctions Board, Decision no. 63, Sanctions cases 119, 124, IDA Credit no 3771 TA, Tanzania (January 
31, 2004), §41. 
34 There is however a discussion about whether these limitations are sufficiently restrictive, and whether 
they do not, in the end, give the Int too many grounds for not providing the evidence to the respondent. 
for instance, the committee may in its discretion and upon request by the Int withhold certain 
evidence if there is a reasonable basis to conclude that providing such information may endanger “the 
life, health, safety or well-being of a person,” section 7 (a) and (c) of the sanctions committee procedure.
35 In contrast, in the context of the sanctions committee decision-making and review procedure, there is 
no obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. see above in chapter 7, sections 4.2 and 6.2.5-6.2.6.
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…a matter of fundamental fairness and is essential to the sanctions Board’s ability to identify 
and weigh all relevant factors in reaching its sanction decision and to provide possibility to 
respondent to review and comment on evidence.36
In general, respondents will gain access to the information when they receive a statement of 
Accusation and evidence. In other words, although the two international institutions operate 
in a different context, the Model allows for an analysis of whether, and to what extent, those 
affected are entitled to access their personal information that is in the possession of the 
decision-making body. The Model also enables one to identify any strengths and weaknesses 
in the way personal information is handled by each institution, or by other actors involved. 
In general, information of a public interest nature can only be accessed by individuals if 
the international institution in question has published this information online. only some 
international institutions have adopted a procedure to request access to information of a 
public interest nature. for example, the world Bank has adopted an Access to Information 
Policy. This policy addresses the proactive publication of information and the possibility of 
requesting access to information that is of public interest. everyone has a right to request 
access to public interest information in the world Bank’s possession; this information may 
only be refused if one of the exceptions applies. Those whose request for information has 
been denied may appeal the decision, first to the Access to Information committee, and if 
the conditions are met, thereafter to the Independent Appeals Board. As stated in the 2018 
year report of the world Bank Group sanctions regime: 
rules, guidance, and data should be public, not just for the sake of transparency, but also to 
ensure consistency and stability. Public reporting ensures accountability to team members, 
management, and other internal audiences, as well as external stakeholders. This in turn 
bolsters the system’s credibility. 
36 world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 56, Sanctions case 177, MDTF Grant TF056894 Indonesia 
(June 10, 2013) §32; see on access to evidence also world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 65, 
Sanctions case 173, IBRC Loan no. 4769 Russian Federation (May 2, 2014) §32.
37 see further http://www.worldbank.org/wbaccess. The policy was initiated in 2010. since then, the 
world Bank has published online more than 150,000 documents to be accessed via the website using 
the general search function; annual report fy 2013, at 1.
38 Paragraph 2 of the world Bank Policy on Access to Information (July 1, 2013) doc no. 79034.
39 The Access to Information (AI) Appeals Board is comprised of three independent external experts and 
assesses whether the “world Bank has improperly or unreasonably restricted access to information 
that it would normally disclose under the Policy”(see further http://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-
information/ai-appealsboard). see, e.g., AI Appeals Board decision, Case Numbers AI4300 and AI4409 
Certain information related to the Empowerment and Livelihood Improvement “Nuton Jibon” Project 
(february 3, 2017). In this decision, the Appeals Board concluded that the world Bank had correctly 
applied the exception in regards to certain information as it had been given to the world Bank in 
confidence by a member country or third party. 
40 world Bank Group sanctions system Annual report fy18 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/
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for instance, all information that is considered to be of public interest in relation to 
sanctioning by the world Bank Group is available online.
5.   The duty to ensure meaningful participation in the decision-making procedure for 
those affected: 
Have the public authorities concerned established a participatory procedure for those affected? 
Did authorities sufficiently inform those affected of the participatory process and provide them 
with information to participate in a meaningful manner? Have the authorities provided an 
opportunity to those affected to participate in a meaningful manner in the decision-making 
procedure? Did the authorities concerned duly consider the views of those affected? Did the 
authorities provide reasons for their decision? 
International institutions enjoy discretion in realizing a meaningful participatory procedure 
for those affected. This discretion is however diminished when those affected are considered 
to be (particularly) vulnerable; in these cases, authorities have to do more to ensure that 
the participation is in fact meaningful for those affected. for example, the Model stipulates 
that in order for the participatory process to be meaningful, authorities have to duly inform 
those affected. The institutions enjoy wide discretion in choosing the means to achieve this 
result. Thus, international institutions can choose the medium to inform those affected 
and the language in which the international institution would like to inform them, as long 
as those affected are duly informed. The assessment is a contextual one. for instance, the 
world Bank Inspection Panel (‘wB IP’ or ‘Panel’) held in several cases that the world Bank 
failed to duly inform those affected as the medium or language it used to inform those 
affected posed obstacles, for example by providing information only in english, by using 
too many technical terms when informing those affected, or by providing information 
only via the Internet. A lack of access to information has a crippling effect on the overall 
level of inclusionary governance. As held by, for instance, the world Bank sanctions Board, 
when information is withheld from those affected by the decision, it limits their ability to 
participate in a meaningful manner.
en/227911538495181415/wBG-sanctionssystemArfy18-final-for-web.pdf, at 41. 
41 see further, https://www.worldbank.org/en/access-to-information.
42 wB IP, Papua New Guinea: smallholder Agriculture (2009), Ir §212-213
43 wB IP, Nigeria/Ghana: West African Gas Pipeline (2006), Ir §344.
44 wB IP, India: Mumbai Urban Transport (2004), Ir §353-354.
45 see, for instance, world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 64, Sanctions Case 120: IDA Credit No. 
3746-KH IDA Grant No. H034-KH Cambodia (March 31, 2004). The sanctions Board held in §32 
that considering that the Int had concealed information (including the identity of the alleged bribe 
beneficiary), it had negatively affected the ability of the respondent to mount a meaningful response. In 
an earlier decision, the wB sanctions Board explained that the Int investigation procedure combined 
with the review by the suspension and debarment officer (sdo) has to adhere to basic principles of 
fairness, which: 
 require, among other protections, that interviewees be informed in due course of the possible 
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overall, the Inclusionary Governance Model recognizes the wide discretion authorities have 
in organizing the participatory processes; in other words, authorities may choose the format, 
duration, timeframe, as long as participation of those affected in the decision-making 
procedure remains meaningful and the views of those affected are duly considered. Thus, 
solely informing those affected of the upcoming decision is not sufficient in the context of 
the Model; their views should be heard and taken into account. Along similar lines, the wB 
IP concluded that “information sessions” held by the world Bank about upcoming projects 
in which those affected are only informed by public authorities of the upcoming decision do 
not meet the standards of meaningful participation. Instead, the wB IP held that what is 
required is to hold consultation sessions in which those affected can present their views on 
the upcoming decision in question. 
The Model suggests that the amount of discretion that is conferred upon authorities in 
setting the participatory format and its conditions is determined, inter alia, by factors 
of vulnerability. The approach the world Bank uses in regards to its decisions to finance 
development projects seems to follow this line of reasoning. depending on the type of 
project and who is affected, different policies and safeguards of the world Bank apply. several 
different conditions for the participatory process have to be specified for the various policies 
and safeguards; for instance, for both the situation of involuntary resettlement and when 
indigenous communities are adversely affected, separate policies have been adopted. In 
regard to the latter, an obligation exists to obtain the prior informed consent of indigenous 
communities when they are adversely affected by world Bank projects. The operational 
policy describes the obligations of the world Bank’s task team. one of such obligations is 
outcome of an investigation, and be provided an opportunity to mount a meaningful response to any 
allegations against them.
 wB sanctions Board, Decision no. 60 (september 9, 2013), case no. 170, §58. see further for the role of 
the office of suspension and debarment, https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/sanctions-system/
osd. 
46 The Inspection Panel stated that although information sessions may be necessary as “a preliminary to 
‘informed’ consultation, they are not consultations.” wB IP, India Coal Sector Environmental & Social 
Mitigations (2001), Ir 437. The IP concluded: 
 when meetings with PAPs took place, ‘consultation’ with them seemed to be more in the nature of 
telling them what was to occur than engaging them in meaningful discussion on alternative options 
that might better meet their needs. The Panel finds that in addition to the lack of consultation on 
alternative resettlement sites, there was a lack of meaningful consultation on other elements of the 
Project, such as alternative alignments of the road.
 see similarly wB IP, Ecuador mining development and environmental control technical assistance 
Project (1999), Ir §52, 57, 103; wB IP, Colombia Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental 
Management Project (2004) Ir (es) at 21. 
47 wB IP, India Coal Sector Environmental & Social Mitigations (2001), Ir 437. 
48 The operational Policy on indigenous peoples is intended to ensure that “the development process fully 
respects the dignity, human rights, economies, and cultures of indigenous Peoples,” BP 4.10, at 7, and 
oP 4.10 (Indigenous Peoples) (July 2005, revised in April 2013), at 1.
49 for a brief explanation of the recognition of vulnerabilities by the world Bank, see above in step 2; see 
further, e.g., A naudé fourie, World Bank Accountability (eleven Publishing 2016).
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to conduct a screening early in the project cycle to determine whether indigenous people 
are present in or have a “collective attachment to” the project area concerned. If so, the 
task team informs the borrower thereof, and accordingly, the operational Policies/Bank 
Procedures (oP/BP) 4.10 have to be applied and further procedural guarantees as stipulated 
for indigenous peoples have to be provided. As a result, the borrower has to undertake social 
assessment in order to evaluate the project’s potential positive impact on the indigenous 
people in question and the potential adverse effects. If these adverse effects are significant, it 
has to be determined whether alternative options to the project have to be considered by the 
borrower. The free, prior and informed consent about the proposed project has to take place 
throughout the project cycle. It has to start early, taking into account the decision-making 
processes among indigenous peoples; it has to be a free and voluntarily consultation. 
As illustrated by the world Bank’s participatory processes in relation to the financing of 
development projects in a decision-making procedure, a variety of actors are often involved 
in participatory decision-making procedures. when multiple actors are involved, it is 
necessary to map their respective roles. Accordingly, a more nuanced analysis is possible 
of the extent to which inclusion is realized vis-à-vis those affected by the institution and 
how various actors influence the accountability process, whether positively or negatively. 
Moreover, in a decision-making procedure, several decisive moments in the procedure exist 
that influence the level of inclusion required in a given context. consequently, in the analysis, 
one needs to identify these moments and chart who is responsible for what moment, to be 
able to better identify the strengths and weaknesses in the accountability framework of the 
international institution in question. 
50 BP 4.10, at 3 and 4.
51 The term borrower refers to “the recipient of an IdA grant, the guarantor of an IrBd loan” (which 
can be a borrowing member state) or to a “project implementing agency, if it is different from the 
borrower,” oP 4.10. see further, for instance, A. naudé fourie at 58-60. In principle, there is a formal 
division between the obligations of the world Bank and those of the borrower (see, for instance, world 
Bank Inspection Panel, Honduras: Land Administration (2006) Mr, §29). However, the relation of the 
borrower with the wB is far more intricate. naudé fourie stated. that what the “world Bank is to be 
(held) accountable for, is also shaped by the content and scope of Borrower obligations.” A. naudé 
fourie, World Bank Accountability (eleven Publishing 2016) at 114, see further 114-129. It should be 
noted that the world Bank Inspection Panel has competence to assess the accountability of the world 
Bank vis-à-vis those affected, but it has not competence to assess the compliance of the borrower. 
52 BP 4.10, at 3 and 4. 
53 BP 4.10, at 6, and oP 4.10, at 9. It should be noted that a social Assessment (sA) will only be developed 
if, after screening, it is determined that indigenous people are present or have collective attachment to 
the project area. The indigenous people should have free prior informed consent in this sA. The world 
Bank’s task team is responsible to review whether those indigenous peoples will indeed give their prior 
informed consent. They review the terms and process of the sA in this light. 
54 Idem, at 2(c).
55 Idem, BP. 4.10, at 2(a); see also oP 4.10, at 10. 
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within the unHcr rsd procedure, the participatory process is similarly not one singular 
moment of communication with the officials. In the rsd procedure, several moments of 
interaction occur in which the asylum seeker presents his/her reasons for applying for rsd. 
Amongst others, the asylum seeker needs to fill in the rsd application form; its completeness 
and accuracy is verified through an individual and confidential registration interview. 
However, the phase that matters the most is the rsd interview in which the asylum seeker 
presents his/her claims in person to a qualified eligibility officer. The interview is to be used 
to clarify incomplete or contradictory facts or statements, and inconsistencies in the evidence 
provided, also when compared with other sources of relevant information. Asylum seekers 
may bring a legal representative to the interview; moreover, those asylum seekers with a legal 
representative have access to further procedural guarantees. As explained above, asylum 
seekers have in principle no access to their rsd file, nor to the evidence submitted by other 
parties or to the interview transcript. only if they have a legal representative, then their legal 
representative may access the interview transcript files on the premises of the unHcr office. 
However, for those without a legal representative – which is the case for most asylum seekers 
– their participatory process is negatively affected by the lack of access to such information. 
when those affected are considered to be particularly vulnerable, institutions are required to 
do more to realize a meaningful participatory procedure, including fulfilling their obligation 
to provide a safe environment for those affected to present their views and to protect where 
necessary their privacy and safety by holding confidential participatory sessions. Both the 
world Bank and the unHcr have recognized the importance of creating a safe environment 
in which those affected can present their views freely. 
The Model further stipulates that authorities have to provide reasons for their decision. 
The unHcr field offices are required to inform “wherever possible” the asylum seekers 
56 Procedural standards 3.2.4. 
57 Procedural standards 3.2.5.
58 Procedural standards 4.3.1. for further information on the qualification of eligibility officers, see 4.2.2 
and 4.2.3. of the Procedural standards.
59 The legal representative – and not the asylum seeker – is permitted to see medical reports of third 
parties used in the rsd procedure and other expert reports used by unHcr officials. 
60 The wB IP held that this obligation derives from the requirements for “full and informed” consultation, 
as laid down in oPs 4.20 (esp. §8) 4.30, and 4.01, wB IP, China Western Poverty Reduction Project (1999), 
Investigation report, at §116. A key principle in unHcr procedures to ensure a safe environment 
for asylum seekers is the right to confidentiality. After all, asylum seekers come to the unHcr field 
offices as they fear for their lives and live in fear of persecution. The reasons why they believe they face 
persecution and the evidence relied upon to prove their need for protection constitute sensitive and 
personal information, which – if it falls in the wrong hands – may endanger the lives of these asylum 
seekers. The unHcr Procedural standards Handbook therefore stipulate the right to confidentiality 
for applicants for rsd Procedural standards, unit 2.1.1. 
61 unit 6.2 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook. 
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whose claims were rejected of the reasons for the rejection in writing. The field offices are 
advised to use the standard Notification of Negative RSD Decision Letter for informing the 
applicant of a negative decision. The standardized letter contains a list of boxes of reasons 
to reject refugee status. eligibility officers have to tick those boxes that apply to the case of 
the applicant. As a best practice, the Procedural standards Handbook advises the officers to 
provide a brief explanation of the specific facts in the applicant’s claim that are relied upon 
for their conclusion to deny refugee status; in other words, they are encouraged to explain 
why each box is ticked. furthermore, it is advised to include in the completed notification 
of negative rsd decision letter references to the evidence submitted by the applicant that 
was considered insufficient and/or to the evidence that was not accepted by the decision-
maker as well as to include a summary of the reasons why the evidence was rejected. 
The information that formed part of the decision-making procedure will be disclosed to 
the applicant, unless it could jeopardize unHcr staff, prevent unHcr to from working 
effectively, or if the disclosed information could jeopardize the source of the information. 
In practice, this means that the applicant will receive a copy of the evidence they have 
submitted to the unHcr; however, the applicant will not receive a copy of the transcript 
of the rsd interview nor will they receive a copy or summary of the evidence submitted 
by third parties or information relied upon from the government of their country of origin 
or from the host country. when applicants have only limited access to the evidence relied 
upon, and when only limited reasons are provided for the decision reached, it has a crippling 
effect on the overall level of inclusionary governance realized by the institution; including 
on the effectiveness of the remedy available to those affected, which is the step that will be 
discussed next.
62 Idem.
63 see Annex 6-1 to the Procedural standards Handbook for the format. 
64 The reasons include: the information provided in support of the claim was not sufficiently detailed, and 
one did not provide a reasonable explanation for failing to provide this relevant information; and the 
information provided to the unHcr was not considered to be reliable on points that are material to the 
asylum seeker’s claims. The reasons for being considered unreliable include: the harm that the asylum 
seeker fears is not of the nature and/or seriousness that constitutes a form of persecution; the authorities 
in the country of origin of the asylum seeker are able to provide effective protection from the harm 
feared; or the asylum seeker is able to live in another part of his/her country of origin without fear of 
persecution and could reasonably return to live in this area without undue hardship. see the Procedural 
standards Handbook, Annex 6-1, notification of negative rsd decision.
65 see Annex 6-1, and unit 6.2 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook.
66 unit 6.2 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook.
67 Procedural standards, 2.2 and 6.2.
68 After the interview is conducted, a transcript of the interview is read back to the applicant, but no 
hard copy of the document is given to the applicant. see further above with regard to the right to an 
individual interview; see also Procedural standards, 4.3.11.
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6.   The duty to ensure an effective remedy to those affected:
Do those affected have access to a competent, independent and impartial review body; if so, has 
the review body provided a fair review procedure? Did the review body duly reason its decision 
and communicate these reasons to those affected? 
Were those affected provided with reparation to remedy the harm done? 
The first component of the entitlement of an effective remedy is the entitlement to a review. 
The review has to be conducted by a competent, independent and impartial review body. The 
independence and impartiality of the review body has both a de iure and a de facto aspect. 
The difference between these two can best be illustrated by the functioning of the world 
Bank Inspection Panel. The world Bank Inspection Panel was established by a resolution 
of the Board of directors, and the Panel members are appointed by the Board after being 
nominated by the world Bank President. The website of the wB IP highlights that it is an 
“independent complaints mechanism.” However, the Inspection Panel answers directly to the 
Board and the Panel members are bank officials. In other words, one may argue de iure that 
the Panel is not independent. nevertheless, certain safeguards are in place that seek to ensure 
independence of wB IP members from the world Bank; for instance, Panel members may 
not have been employed by the Bank prior to an appointment to the Panel unless more than 
two years has elapsed since the end of their service nor may they be employed by the world 
Bank after they step down. More importantly, the Inspection Panel has established its de facto 
independence from the world Bank through its review of requests from people affected by 
the world Bank’s projects. The world Bank sanctions Board faced similar problems as it 
was comprised of a mix of bank officials and external experts; in 2016, however, the sanctions 
Board’s de iure independence was improved. now, the wB sanctions Board is comprised of 
69 In 1993, the world Bank Inspection Panel was established by resolution IBrd 93–10 of the International 
Bank for reconstruction and development and resolution IdA 93–6 of the International development 
Agency (IdA) (september 22, 1993).
70 website of the wB Inspection Panel: http://ewebapps.worldbank.org/apps/ip/Pages/Home.aspx; 
see also http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ for complaints related to development projects supported 
by other agencies of the world Bank Group, of the International finance corporation (Ifc) and 
of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). These are dealt with by the office of the 
compliance Advisor ombudsman (cAo). for a comparison, see A. naudé fourie and d.d. Bradlow 
‘The operational Policies of the world Bank and the International finance corporation creating law-
Making and law-Governed Institutions?’ 10 International Organizations Law Review (2013), at 3-80. 
71 for a further discussion, see A. naudé fourie, The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial 
Review Oversight, in Search for the ‘Judicial Spirit in Public International Law’. (utrecht: eleven 
International Publishing 2009), at 163-164.
72 see, e.g., naudé fourie, at 186-212 In this regard, see particularly the 1999 China Western Poverty 
Reduction Project (Qinghai) Ir, §116; 2001 Chad Pipeline Development & Pipeline Project, Chad Pipeline, 
IP chairperson address at §8.  
73 According to the website of the world Bank sanction Board, the sanctions Board “is an independent 
administrative tribunal that serves as the final decision-maker in all contested cases of sanctionable 
misconduct occurring in development projects financed by the world Bank Group.”
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only external experts. The sanctions Board offers safeguards to ensure the impartiality and 
independence of its members individually and collectively in the execution of adjudicatory 
tasks. for instance, for two years after the end of their term, members are prohibited to 
accept employment or consulting positions in a firm that appeared as respondent in one of 
the review procedures in which the respective member participated. Moreover, members are 
disqualified from serving as agent, legal representative, or attorney of any respondent in the 
proceedings of the sanctions Board for two years after their term.
In contrast, the unHcr’s review procedure is not executed by external experts or by 
a review body that established its de facto independence. The review is conducted by a 
qualified unHcr eligibility officer (or another unHcr Protection staff member) who 
was not involved in the rsd decision-making procedure at first instance. when possible, 
the appeal should be decided by an eligibility officer (or another Protection staff member) 
who has equivalent or greater experience with rsd procedures than the eligibility officer 
deciding the claim at first instance. In other words, the review is handled, at most, by a higher 
authority within the same decision-making body. There is no possibility of appealing this 
review decision to an independent and impartial review body. 
In addition to the requirements of independence and impartiality, the review body also has 
to be sufficiently competent to provide an adequate and effective remedy. A key factor is 
whether the review body can make a final decision and provide reparation that remedies the 
harm suffered. for instance, the world Bank sanctions Board, the final review instance in 
the sanction proceedings, explained that the principle of finality is a: 
…fundamental aspect of any judicial and quasi-judicial process inclusive international 
administrative tribunal proceedings. finality is essential to provide certainty, prevent re-
litigation of claims already adjudicated, conserve judicial resources and encourage respect for 
adjudicatory outcomes (res judicata).
overall, the world Bank sanctions Board is sufficiently competent to provide an adequate 
remedy. unHcr appeals officers are similarly competent to make a final decision and 
determine whether or not the original rejection of refugee status was correct. However, 
these unHcr officers cannot address potential procedural flaws or other grievances that 
74 statute of the world Bank sanctions Board (october 18, 2016), section III – B.11.
75 unit 7.3 of the unHcr Procedural safeguards, UNHCR RSD Procedural Standards - Appeal of Negative 
RSD Decisions, (2017), available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/5915c1b14.html.
76 Both the statute of the world Bank sanctions Board (article XIv) and the world Bank sanctions 
Procedure (section 8.03(d)) speak of finality of sanctions Board decisions.
77 world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 49, Sanctions Case 130 (May 30, 2012), §47, accessible via 
the website of the world Bank; see also world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 43 (2011), §11-14, 
summarized in the world Bank sanctions digest, (last updated in 2011).
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can influence the extent to which an adequate remedy can be provided. After assessing the 
competence, independence and impartiality of a review body, it needs to be assessed whether 
the provided procedure is fair. 
The Model recognizes the discretion of authorities in setting the format of and conditions for 
a review procedure, as long as the review procedure remains fair. overall, several elements 
play a role in determining the fairness of the review procedure: a reasonable timeframe, 
transparency in the procedure, and equality of arms. The lack of one or more of these 
elements negatively affects the fairness of the procedure. for example, the lack of access to 
detailed reasons, combined with a lack of access to third-party experts’ and doctors’ reports 
and limited access to their personal rsd file puts asylum seekers in a disadvantaged position 
for the review procedure. As a result, there is no equality of arms within the unHcr rsd 
review procedure; an asylum seeker may not cross-examine witnesses or experts, and there 
is a general lack of information made available to the asylum seeker. All these factors have 
a negative effect on the fairness of the review procedure. overall, when a lack of certain 
identified common core guarantees exists in a given review procedure, it is presumed to 
negatively affect the fairness of the procedure. Thus, when those affected are not duly informed 
of the decision-making and review procedure, when authorities do not provide reasons for 
the decision reached, when there is no possibility of presenting one’s view in the decision-
making and/or review procedure, the fairness of this procedure is negatively affected. In its 
consideration of a case, the world Bank sanctions Board takes into account whether such 
factors have negatively impacted the fairness of the procedure. for example, in case of grave 
procedural flaws, the wB sanctions Board may dismiss the case.78 The sanctions Board takes 
other procedural flaws into account when it reviews the merits in a particular case and in 
the determination of appropriate sanctions. In general, when imposing a sanction, the wB 
sanctions Board considers the totality of circumstances and all potential aggravating and 
mitigating factors to determine an appropriate sanction.
78 even though the sanctions Board mentioned the possibility, it did not state when and what procedural 
flaws would have such effect. In the decision at hand, the respondent was unable to sufficiently 
substantiate their claim according to the sanctions Board. see world Bank sanctions Board, Decision 
no. 63, Sanctions Cases no. 119, 124, IDA Credit no. 3771 TA, Tanzania (January 31, 2004); in Decision 
no. 64, the world Bank sanctions Board stated that when more than 10 years (statutory limitations) 
have passed since the alleged fraud or corruption took place, it will result in direct dismissal of the case. 
see world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 64, Sanctions Case 122, IDA Credit 3746 KH Cambodia, 
(March 31, 2004), §30.
79 for instance, see world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 44 (2011), §77, summarized in the world 
Bank sanctions digest, §77. In this case, the sanctions Board argued that “such passage of time may 
impact on the weight sB attaches to the evidence presented as well as the fairness of the process for 
respondents;” see also world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 50, Sanctions Case 117 (May 30, 
2012), §25; world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 38 (2010), §54, summarized in the world Bank 
sanctions digest. 
80 world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 66, Sanctions Case 208, PPIAF Trust Fund Grant NO 
TF023613 Vietnam (May 19, 2014), §32. This decision states: “the choice of sanction is not a mechanistic 
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The second component of the entitlement to an effective remedy is that international 
institutions have to provide reparation that is effective and adequate in remedying the harm 
suffered by those affected. International institutions are accorded wide discretion in achieving 
this result and in determining the type of reparation to be provided to those affected. for 
instance, when the unHcr decides not to grant refugee status to an asylum seeker, there is 
a possibility for the asylum seeker of having this decision reviewed by a higher authority in 
the same decision-making body. The review constitutes a substantive review of the rejection 
of refugee status; in other words, it will be reviewed whether or not the refugee status was 
correctly denied. In this review procedure, the original rsd decision will be re-examined 
to determine whether the decision was based on a “reasonable finding of fact and a correct 
application of the refugee criteria.” The appeal consists of a “thorough review” of the rsd 
file, including the rsd interview transcript and rsd assessment, the appeal form and any 
other information provided by the applicant in support of the appeal. Asylum seekers have 
little opportunity in this review procedure to address procedural flaws in the procedure 
or misconduct by the decision-making authority; however, other review mechanisms are 
available in the unHcr context. 
In addition to the review of the substantive decision upon request by those affected, the 
majority of international institutions has a form of internal review mechanism in place. 
These procedures can provide for another type of reparation. for instance, the unHcr 
works with rsd supervisors who are responsible for the oversight of the rsd operations to 
ensure the quality and integrity of the rsd procedures. An rsd supervisor reports to the 
representative or Head of office who is ultimately accountable for proper implementation 
of the procedural standards. In addition, every unHcr field office has to have a procedure 
in place to receive and respond to complaints of rsd applicants. The complaint procedure 
has to focus on: 
determination, but rather a case-by-case analysis tailored to the specific facts and circumstances 
presented in each case.” world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 40 (2010), §28, summarized in the 
world Bank sanctions digest, §56. There is also a sanctions guideline that provides the sanctions Board 
with “guidance as to the type of considerations potentially relevant to a sanction determination.” In 
Decision no. 66 of the wB sanctions Board, the factors that were considered were, for instance: the 
severity of the misconduct, minor role in the misconduct, voluntary corrective action, cooperation, 
period of temporary suspension; in this case, it resulted in a formal letter of reprimand, §35-51; see 
similarly world Bank sanctions Board, Decision no. 1 (2007), §8.
81 unit 7.4.1. of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook.
82 The interview and/or rsd assessment are not disclosed to the applicant. 
83 unit 7.4.1 of the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook.
84 M. smrkolj, ‘International Institutions and Individualized decision-Making: An example of the 
unHcr’s refugee status determination’, at 1797 and ff. see also unHcr Procedural standards 
Handbook, 4-16.
85 unHcr Procedural standards Handbook, unit 2.6. 
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reporting serious misconduct by unHcr staff, security guards or implementing partners, 
or procedural unfairness (including complaints about the quality, availability or conduct of 
interpreters, or denial of access to unHcr premises or staff or rsd procedures.
These procedures are free of charge, and everyone who approaches a unHcr office will 
receive information regarding the basic rights of asylum seekers and the procedures for 
reporting mistreatment or misconduct in unHcr procedures. However, whether these 
procedures can provide reparation that is effective and adequate in repairing harm suffered 
by those affected depends on various factors, including whether these individuals feel they 
can file their complaints without fear of repercussions, whether the review of these claims 
is conducted while taking into account the proper procedural safeguards required, and the 
type of reparation that the reviewing authority can provide. 
Thus, internal review procedures can contribute to providing reparation to the harm suffered 
by those affected. Moreover, as chapter 7 demonstrated, internal review procedures can form 
an important additional component to assess the overall quality of the procedure, which 
assessment can contribute to the effectiveness of legal remedies offered to those affected. 
7.   What is the overall conclusion of the level of inclusionary governance realized by the 
international institution in question?
In the last step, the decision-making procedure and review procedure are assessed as a 
whole to examine whether and to what extent the international institution in question has 
realized inclusionary governance for those affected, and hence, whether and to what extent 
such institutions are accountable vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. In this step, the 
sum of the assessment is evaluated per step. one evaluates whether and to what extent the 
international institution met the different benchmarks per building block. The yardstick 
allows one to identify the strengths and weaknesses in a given accountability framework 
of an international institution exercising public power vis-à-vis individuals and how these 
affect the overall level of inclusionary governance realized. Accordingly, it enables someone 
to identify potential differences in the extent to which the various actors within the same 
international institution are accountable to those affected. 
for example, the unHcr Procedural standards Handbook on rsd Mandate Procedures 
accords discretion to rsd field officers in determining how extensive the reasons will be that 
are provided for rsd decisions. As illustrated above, the standardized reasons form is by itself 
not a problem; the form suggests that field offices should further explain the reasons beyond 
86 Idem. 
87 Idem. 
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the ticking of the box. However, practice reveals that the field offices often do not provide 
further explanation. Accordingly, when too much discretion is accorded to authorities, it 
constitutes a weak point within the procedure, which may lead to non-compliance with one 
or more benchmark(s), including the duty to give reasons. Moreover, unfettered discretion 
has a negative effect on the overall quality of a procedure. There are nevertheless examples of 
some unHcr field offices providing extensive reasons at their own initiative, and thereby, 
complying with the unHcr’s best practice suggestion.
In this last step of the Model, where the overall level of inclusionary governance realized 
is assessed, these nuances come to the surface. As a result, recommendations can be 
formulated on how the accountability of an international institution can be improved vis-à-
vis those affected by its decisions and how weaknesses in the procedure can be mitigated or 
compensated. 
3. Conclusions
chapter 1 posed two underlying criteria for a yardstick to analyze the accountability of 
international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions: (1) the yardstick is 
to identify the procedural arrangements that are necessary to decrease the accountability 
deficit of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected; and (2) in the identification of 
the elements of the yardstick, a proper balance is to be struck between the general nature 
of the accountability problem and each institution’s specific circumstances. This chapter 
presented the fine-tuned Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions and 
demonstrated that the Model as set out here meets the two underlying criteria for a yardstick. 
section 1 of this chapter explained how the draft Model is fine-tuned to better accommodate 
the specific circumstances in which each international institution operates. In section 2, the 
functioning of the Model as a general yardstick was used to illustrate how the accountability 
of international institutions can be analyzed. The step-by-step application of the IGM 
enables one to use the yardstick to conduct a systematic and thorough analysis of an 
international institution’s accountability framework. Moreover, it enables one to use this 
88 see, e.g., the report published by rsdwatch, ‘no Margin for error: Implementation of unHcr’s 
Procedural Standards at selected unHcr field offices in 2007’ (no Margin for error) (June 2008), 
available at https://rsdwatch.files.wordpress.com/2010/03/nomarginforerror2007.Pdf. The unHcr 
lebanon office actually applied a lower standard and provided only general rejection letters. legal 
representatives of asylum seekers are allowed to see the internal assessment of the case at hand and, 
therefore, become aware of the reasons for rejection. However, those asylum seekers without a legal 
representative (which constitute the majority of the applicants) have no access to these files and will not 
receive the reasons for their rejection, ‘no Margin for error’, at 19.
89 In 2007, for example, the unHcr nairobi office provided individualized reasons for refusing refugee 
status to all applicants who were denied recognition as refugees. see no Margin for error report, at 18. 
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yardstick for internal evaluation purposes, both for an ex ante evaluation of the inclusionary 
governance that has to be realized by an international institution and the legal framework 
that should be developed and for an ex poste evaluation to identify strengths and weaknesses 
in an international institution’s current practice and how it may be improved. Hence, the 
Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions is a dynamic yardstick that 
serves to analyze and address in a systematic manner the accountability of international 
institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. 9
HoofdstuktItel




Increasingly, international institutions make decisions that have far-reaching consequences, 
affecting not only their member states, but moreover, directly affecting individuals. In a time 
where problems often require a transnational and global solution, international institutions 
can be powerful and necessary actors in addressing these problems. each international 
institution that makes decisions that directly affect individuals has as a rationale to address 
the threats against international peace and security, to foster the rule of law, to fight poverty, 
or to address corruption in development projects – but these aspirations are difficult to 
achieve by states independently within their own borders. However, the fact that their 
decisions have far-reaching consequences and directly affect individuals is a problem. 
whenever international institutions act instead of domestic public authorities, individuals 
lose the protection of the law and the procedural safeguards that they would normally have 
within a state governed by the rule of law. In these instances, the question arises: who guards 
the guardians? The argument made by practitioners within international institutions from 
a humanitarian perspective that “we have good intentions, we are not the bad guys” is no 
longer sufficient in this era. This research therefore used a public law approach to analyze 
the exercise of public power at the global level. Public law has a dual function: it serves 
to constitute and constrain the exercise of public power. In any society, constraints on the 
exercise of public power are necessary, regardless of the noble intentions of its authorities. As 
James Madison said already in 1788: 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great 
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the 
place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control 
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
At the global level, it is even more pertinent to have proper constraints in place on the exercise 
of public power by international institutions. The control of member states over the functioning 
of international institutions is limited and the exercise of public power by international 
institutions is expanding in breadth and depth without a legal framework to commensurate 
those powers. There is an increasing use of specialized agencies and expert bodies; this places 
1 see, for instance, the news articles addressing the lawsuit initiated against the Ifc (world Bank Group) 
over how their actions harmed rural communities. v. Maru ‘The world Bank shouldn’t hide when it 
funds projects that harm communities’ The washington Post (May 9, 2018).
2 G. verdirame, The UN and Human Rights: Who Guards the Guardians (cambridge university Press 
2011).
3 This argument was made by an osce official in a lecture on the work of the osce in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and their cooperation with the oHr in the removal of public officials from their office, 
sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, (June 2009)
4 J. Madison, ‘The federalist no. 51- The structure of Government Must furnish the Proper checks and 
Balances Between different departments’ (1788).
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member states of international institutions further away from the decision-making authority. 
As a result, individuals are directly affected by decisions of these institutions without having 
the ability to hold these authorities to account for their exercise of public power. 
The public law approach adopted in this research provides a lens and a language with which 
to understand and map what is happening at the global level, to address the accountability 
deficit of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected by their decisions. The main 
justification for this approach lies in the functional similarity between the exercise of 
public power by an international institution and that by domestic authorities: individuals 
are affected in a similar manner by such exercises of public power, whether the authority is 
exercised at the global or at the domestic level. studies that use public law language to address 
the exercise of public power by international institutions often use an internal yardstick that 
is not made explicit to analyze what is happening and to come with recommendations on 
how to improve the accountability of these institutions. However, when a yardstick is used 
for an accountability analysis that contains value-laden norms and/or commonly understood 
concepts without a clear explanation and justification of the definitional considerations, 
it makes it problematic for other researchers to apply the yardstick: it becomes difficult 
to distinguish between the normative dimension(s) and the descriptive mapping exercise 
within a given research; and, in particular, it easily leads to misunderstandings of, or 
misconceptions about, the norms and their suitability for application in different contexts. 
Particularly in the legal discipline, scholars are often not explicit about their methods and 
methodology used in a research; whether it derives from an underestimation of the necessity 
of discussing the used methodology in comparison to other disciplines or from another logic, 
a lack of a discussion of the methodology negatively affects the overall quality of the research 
conducted. when developing a normative yardstick, it is important to be conscious and 
explicit in the methodological choices made to develop it. The dissatisfaction with existing 
approaches to the accountability deficit faced by international institutions incentivized this 
research to develop a robust normative and evaluative yardstick with which to analyze and 
address the accountability of international institutions vis-à-vis those affected in a systematic 
manner. This book contributes to existing literature by addressing the criticism and sets out 
a dynamic Model with clearly defined benchmarks for each building block. Throughout the 
book, a thorough explanation and demonstration has been given of the path taken to develop 
this yardstick. The contribution of this research lies both in the development of a novel 
normative yardstick with which to analyze the accountability of international institutions 
and in the methodology used, which is the combination of doctrinal legal research with 
model-building and comparative methods. 
5 A. Momirov. and A. naudé fourie, ‘vertical comparative law Methods: tools for conceptualizing the 
International rule of law’ (2009) 2(3) Erasmus Law Review 291. 
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The Inclusionary Governance Model for international institutions 
The normative yardstick (the Inclusionary Governance Model) was developed in steps, 
which included extensive comparative research to evaluate and compare how public power 
is regulated by international law for domestic public authorities and for international 
institutions. As a result, the Model identifies both the nature of the procedural arrangements 
necessary to decrease the accountability deficit and the yardstick’s required elements to be 
able to strike a proper balance between the general nature of the accountability problem 
and the specific circumstances in which each institution operates. Although the benchmarks 
of the building blocks of the Inclusionary Governance Model are formulated as minimum 
norms to be provided by public authorities, there is a general understanding that international 
institutions – or any public authorities – are best suited to determine how the result should 
be achieved. Accordingly, public authorities have a certain amount of discretion in the 
exercise of their public power. This research took a first step in decrypting the black box of 
such discretionary power: the administrative space in which authorities have the freedom 
to make the policy choices best suiting the institution within the inclusionary governance 
framework. The concepts of vulnerability and the substantive limitation of non-arbitrariness 
serve in the IGM as a trigger factor to determine the extent to which international institutions 
enjoy discretion in their exercise of public power. Moreover, these two concepts influence 
the content and scope of the inclusionary governance to be realized in a given context. 
future research will continue to decrypt this by conducting case studies at the domestic and 
international levels of the exercise of public power and its applicable legal framework. 
Although it goes beyond the scope of this research, the way in which the concept of 
vulnerability is currently treated by the monitoring bodies of human rights treaties can be 
criticized. As demonstrated in this book, the various human rights bodies use the term of 
vulnerability to identify an ever-increasing category of individuals or groups of individuals 
in need of further protection by the state. such further protection is triggered by being more 
6 see, for instance, the vulnerability theory developed by fineman. she takes as a point of departure 
the “inherent vulnerability embodied and embedded” in each individual; when addressing these 
vulnerabilities, the extent to which the individuals are resilient is what distinguishes them. shifting the 
focus to examine the extent to which someone vulnerable is resilient, and what is required to make a 
person more resilient, allows one to better understand the more complex social, family and societal 
structures that influence the overall level of inclusionary governance realized. M. A. fineman, ‘The 
vulnerable subject: Anchoring equality in the Human condition’ (2008) 20(1) Yale Journal of Law and 
Feminism 1-23; M.A. fineman, ‘vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality’ (2017) 4(3) Oslo Law Review 
133-149; it should be noted that the Martha fineman’s main argument was developed as a counter 
argument to equality and non-discrimination laws in the us, her response, the vulnerability theory, 
addresses the limitations to this equality argument, and that the state should go beyond formal equality 
and impermissible discrimination. The main argument she puts forward is how the vulnerability theory 
demands for the state to be more responsive, to make individuals more resilient, and as a result, what is 
expected from the different structures to improve the resilience of individuals. Individuals are all equally 
vulnerable, what differs is whether individuals are better positioned and thus more resilient. she explains 
that in situations of inevitable inequality, such as employment contracts, the state is expected to do more. 
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affected than others, by distinguishing the factual, social, legal, and/or personal situation 
of one individual or group versus another and by demonstrating why the state has to 
provide further protection to these people. However, there is a danger in this approach if 
one does not question the application and interpretation of the concept across the various 
treaties. for example, one may wonder whether an ever-increasing recognition of people or 
groups warranting further protection does not lead instead to a diminished general right to 
protection by the state. In other words, if further guarantees can only be offered when the 
vulnerability factor can be demonstrated, it may lead to less protection of individuals instead 
of more, especially of those who are not deemed to be particularly vulnerable. combined 
with the inconsistent and contradicting usage of this concept by treaty monitoring bodies, 
it may lead to a lack of legal certainty as to who has to receive further protection from 
public authorities and under what circumstances. In turn, this may result in the concept of 
vulnerability becoming a hollow or meaningless concept. 
The Inclusionary Governance Model as a yardstick to analyze the accountability of international 
institutions 
The Model serves as yardstick for both internal and external evaluation of the accountability 
framework of an international institution. In general, the elements of the Model are the 
identified minimum standards of both a procedural and a substantive nature, the benchmarks, 
combined with a set of constraints on any exercise of public power. together these serve to 
address the accountability deficit faced by international institutions in a systematic manner. 
The exercise of public power by international institutions is increasingly disorganized, 
involving a variety of actors, and encompassing fewer clear accountability structures 
within the institution and between the various organs and the various parties affected. In 
other words, it often involves multiple levels of governance. Therefore, the dynamic IGM, 
responding to the particular circumstances in which international institutions operate, offers 
a language with which to address these developments. for example, the european union 
(eu) is a prime example of multilevel governance by an international actor that can directly 
affect individuals. The Inclusionary Governance Model provides one with a lens to analyze 
the strengths and weaknesses in the current accountability structure of the decisions made by 
the eu that directly affect individuals. for instance, do citizens-participation initiatives offer 
an opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner in the decision-making procedure 
or is it rather a pro forma process? Are nGos entitled to a review of decisions adopted by 
the eu for lack of compliance with environmental standards? to what extent do the various 
actors involved in a decision-making procedure enjoy certain discretion in the exercise of 
their powers and are the common core guarantees realized to prevent an arbitrary decision? 
In other words, the Model has strong practical relevance considering its wide scope of 
applicability and relevance. As scholars, we need to continue to map, analyze, and compare 
these practices, not only to contribute to an enhanced understanding of the normative 
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development thereof but also to provide input on the functionality of the international 
institutions, and to identify key moments in a decision-making procedure and the strengths 
and weaknesses in the execution of the decision-making procedure.
In this regard, this research builds on and contributes to existing literature on the accountability 
of international institutions. The results of the extensive legal survey conducted provide further 
proof of the necessity to combine both administrative and constitutionalist approaches and 
apply their outcome to the accountability deficit international institutions vis-à-vis those affected 
by their decisions. The adopted public law approach offers a rich set of data on how treaty 
monitoring bodies understand and interpret the exercise of public power by public authorities 
and its constraints. The enhanced understanding of how such public power is, and should be, 
constrained according to international law enables one to further theorize, for instance, the 
role and necessity of discretionary powers and the role of law in ensuring the accountability of 
the various actors operating in the global arena. similarly, whereas rules of evidence, burden of 
proof and standard of proof are only evaluated in the Model when an international institution’s 
decision-making and review procedure have inherent arbitrary features, or in relation to only a 
small set of particular decisions, these concepts are underexplored in the international arena and 
deserve further exploration. Both the analysis of the practices of international institutions and 
the outcome of the legal survey reveal that these are highly contextual concepts. In opposition 
to public authorities at the domestic level whose exercise of public power is challenged less, 
international public authorities are incentivized to more actively discuss and justify their level 
of procedural safeguards and legal framework in place. In defining these concepts, public 
authorities have to find a balance between what is at stake in the given procedure and how the 
given standard is justified in light of the circumstances. The parameters for such a determination 
are the applicable legal framework and the extent to which authorities enjoy discretion to 
determine these concepts. The explanation or justification provided by international institutions 
gives insight into the rationale of a decision-making body, its legal and factual positioning in 
comparison to other relevant actors or into the context of potentially relevant legal frameworks, 
and into the extent to which the specific context is of influence. ensuring the accountability of 
an international institution is a continuous process, which is constantly influenced by internal 
and external factors. The IGM allows one to map these processes, and to assess strengths and 
weaknesses in the institutional design of international institutions and in the execution of 
public power by international institutions. 
In conclusion, the Inclusionary Governance Model for international institutions offers 
an answer to the accountability problem of international institutions. The dynamic and 
normative yardstick accommodates the context in which international institutions operate 
while simultaneously setting benchmarks for the inclusion of those affected in the decision-





Internationale instellingen oefenen steeds vaker publieke bevoegdheden uit die individuen 
en hun leefomgeving ongunstig kunnen beïnvloeden. de meest ingrijpende voorbeelden 
hiervan zijn de lijsten van de sanctiecomités van de vn-veiligheidsraad waarop individuen 
en entiteiten geplaatst worden voor hun vermeende betrokkenheid bij terroristische 
activiteiten. degenen die op de lijst staan worden geconfronteerd met een reisverbod en een 
bevriezing van alle banktegoeden. de impact van deze individuele sancties is groot, niet enkel 
diegenen die op de lijst staan ervaren de effecten ervan, maar ook hun directe familie wordt 
hierdoor geraakt. voor deze individuen is het heel moeilijk om de sancties aan te vechten 
op internationaal niveau, temeer omdat zij vaak niet weten welke redenen ten grondslag 
liggen aan de sanctionering. op gelijkerwijze nemen andere internationale instellingen 
besluiten die individuen direct kunnen raken; zoals, de besluiten van de wereldbank om 
ontwikkelingsprojecten te financieren en de vn Hoge commissaris voor vluchtelingen 
die in meer dan zestig landen bepaalt of asielzoekers recht hebben op een vluchtelingstatus 
wanneer deze landen zelf de administratieve procedure niet uit willen of niet uit kunnen 
voeren. deze internationale instellingen worden bekritiseerd om hun gebrek aan waarborgen 
voor diegenen die geraakt worden door deze besluiten. echter stelt het internationaal recht 
geen duidelijke waarborgen om de positie van geraakte individuen te beschermen en mist 
het regels om de verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen ten opzichte van 
individuen te bewerkstelligen. ondank dat in toenemende mate overeenstemming is dat een 
dergelijke verantwoordingsplicht bestaat, is er tot op heden nog geen duidelijk raamwerk of 
toetsingskader om de naleving van deze plicht door internationale instellingen te analyseren. 
dit onderzoek ontwikkelt een dergelijk raamwerk, dat men ertoe instaat stelt op een 
systematische manier de verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen ten opzichte 
van individuen te analyseren. Het raamwerk dat ontwikkeld wordt in dit boek, Inclusionary 
Governance Model for International Institutions, dient te voldoen aan twee voorwaarden. Het 
is (1) van voldoende algemene aard om minimum standaarden te formuleren die gelden 
voor alle internationale instellingen die besluiten nemen die individuen direct kunnen 
raken, en (2) voldoende flexibel om de specifieke context van elke internationale instelling 
die dergelijke besluiten neemt in acht te nemen. dit onderzoek neemt aan dat de minimum 
standaarden een combinatie zullen zijn van inhoudelijke en procedurele standaarden. 
de procedurele waarborgen die nodig zijn om individuen voldoende te betrekken bij de 
besluitvormingsprocedure, zijn onder te verdelen in drie dimensies: het recht op informatie, 
het recht op participatie en het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel. 
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Hoofdstuk 1 bespreekt de invalshoek van het onderzoek, alsmede de methoden en de 
gebruikte definities. dit boek stelt als uitgangspunt voor de analyse dat de manier waarop 
internationale instellingen publieke bevoegdheid uitoefenen, vergelijkbaar is met hoe 
nationale actoren publieke bevoegdheid uitoefenen op het nationale niveau. op het nationale 
niveau stelt het publiekrecht de grenzen aan overheidshandelen. voor de ontwikkeling van 
het Model wordt er, onder andere, onderzocht hoe de publieke bevoegdheid van nationale 
actoren gereguleerd wordt in het internationaal recht. Het Model wordt in vier stappen 
ontwikkeld, die overeenkomen met de vier delen van dit boek:  
- deel 1: evaluatie van het huidige internationale recht wat van toepassing is op 
internationale instellingen en de bestaande theorieën die zien op de globalisering en het 
gebrek aan verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen op het internationale 
niveau. de uitkomst is een conceptueel model (Conceptual Model).
- deel 2: evaluatie van hoe het internationaal recht de nationale actor die publieke be-
voegdheid uitoefent, reguleert en hoe er invulling gegeven wordt aan de verantwoor-
dingsplicht van deze actoren ten opzichte van individuen wanneer zij besluiten nemen 
die individuen en hun leefomgeving direct kunnen raken. de uitkomst is een concept 
model (Draft Inclusief Governance Model). 
- deel 3: Het demonstreren en testen van het werken van het concept model door 
toepassing op de vn veiligheidsraad sanctie comité inzake IsIl (da’esh) en Al-Qaida. 
- deel 4: verfijning van het concept model. de uitkomst is een aangepast inclusief 
governance model (Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions). 
In deel 1 (hoofdstuk 2) wordt het conceptueel model ontwikkeld op basis van een evaluatie 
van de state of play van de huidige regels van het internationaal recht die van toepassing zijn 
op de regulering en de bevoegdheden van internationale instellingen die besluiten nemen 
die individuen direct kunnen raken. Het huidige internationaal publiekrecht stelt weinig 
grenzen aan de bevoegdheden van internationale instellingen, behalve dat deze uitgeoefend 
dienen te worden in overeenstemming met de constitutie van een instelling en dat algemene 
regels van het internationaal recht beperkingen kunnen op leggen aan de bevoegdheden 
van internationale instellingen. Het rapport van de International law Association inzake de 
verantwoordingsplicht van internationale organisaties is één de gezaghebbende onderzoeken 
die inzicht geeft in de mogelijke inhoud van (zelf)regulering van de verantwoordingsplicht 
van deze internationale instellingen. dit niet-bindende rapport geeft een lijst van 
‘recommended practices and rules’ voor de verantwoordingsplicht van internationale 
instellingen, welke twee type regels en praktijken bevat: die regels en praktijken die zien 
op de regulering van de bevoegdheden van internationale instellingen en die regels en 
praktijken die zien op de procedurele waarborgen. de analyse van de verschillende theorieën 
die het probleem van het gebrek aan verantwoordelijkheid van internationale instellingen 
ten opzichte van individuen adresseren geeft verdere invulling aan de inhoud en reikwijdte 
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van een verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen. Global administrative law 
beschrijft en analyseert administratieve handelingen op het globale niveau. deze theorie 
formuleert procedurele standaarden die globale actoren in acht dienen te nemen wanneer zij 
administratief handelen. de gedachtegang is dat wanneer de administratieve beginselen van 
transparantie, participatie, toegang tot effectieve rechtsmiddelen, en de motiveringsplicht 
aanwezig zijn, de administratieve besluitvormingsprocedure (in principe) legitiem is en de 
desbetreffende globale administratieve organen verantwoordelijk zijn. vanuit de beweging 
constitutionalization of international law, wordt onder andere de globalisering besproken 
en geanalyseerd door een constitutionele lens. ondanks dat de specifieke definitie wat de 
constitutionele lens inhoudt verschilt per schrijver, op zijn minst, houdt het in dat elke 
bevoegdheidsuitoefening een wettelijke grondslag dient te hebben, arbitrair handelen niet is 
toegestaan en het handelen van actoren niet mag leiden tot schenden van dwingend recht. 
voor dit onderzoek is een combinatie van administratiefrechtelijk en constitutioneel denken 
wenselijk. uit de analyse van dit hoofdstuk volgt het conceptueel model voor inclusief 
governance. deze heeft twee sets standaarden: standaarden die grenzen opleggen aan het 
uitoefenen van welke bevoegdheid dan ook door internationale instellingen en procedurele 
waarborgen die in acht genomen moeten worden wanneer er besluiten genomen worden die 
individuen kunnen raken. 
In deel 2 (hoofdstukken 3-6) wordt het conceptueel Model als uitgangspunt gebruikt om 
te analyseren hoe het internationaal recht de publieke bevoegdheden van publieke actoren 
reguleert. Hierbij worden de verschillende verdragen vergeleken met elkaar met inachtneming 
van hun verschillende normatieve relevantie (bovenal mensenrechtenverdragen zowel 
van regionale als universele aard, van algemene en specifieke aard, maar ook bijvoorbeeld 
milieurecht verdragen). de drie dimensies van inclusionary governance: het recht op 
informatie, het recht op participatie in de besluitvormingsprocedure en het recht op een 
effectief rechtsmiddel, worden elk in een apart hoofdstuk besproken. 
Hoofdstuk 3 zet de bouwstenen (building blocks) uiteen van het recht op informatie. dit 
onderzoek identificeert twee verschillende op zichzelf staande rechten op informatie, het 
recht op informatie van algemeen belang en het recht op informatie van personele aard. Beide 
informatierechten worden gekenmerkt door een sterk recht op toegang tot de informatie die 
in bezit is van autoriteiten; een recht wat bestaat zonder dat er een belang getoond hoeft te 
worden. Autoriteiten dienen de informatie op verzoek openbaar te maken, tenzij het recht 
wordt beperkt in overeenstemming met de vereisten van legaliteit, noodzakelijkheid en 
legitimiteit. Het recht op persoonlijke informatie verschilt echter van het recht op informatie 
van algemeen belang, niet alleen in de aard van de informatie, maar ook in de reikwijdte 
van het recht. de taken van de overheid zijn veel uitgebreider. de mogelijke inmenging in 
de materiële rechten van de betrokkenen is ook groter wanneer autoriteiten persoonlijke 
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informatie verzamelt, opslaat en/of deelt. die personen wiens persoonlijke informatie in 
handen is van de overheid hebben het recht om de rechtmatigheid aan te vechten van het 
verzamelen, het opslaan, en/of het delen van deze informatie met derden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 zet de bouwstenen uiteen van het recht op zinvolle participatie in de 
besluitvormingsprocedure. Het recht op participatie, anders dan het recht op informatie, 
heeft zich ontwikkeld op een gefragmenteerde wijze. er zijn slechts enkele verdragen die 
een expliciete rechtsgrondslag voor het recht op participatie in de besluitvormingsprocedure 
bevatten, echter die zijn alleen van toepassing in specifieke omstandigheden. Het recht op 
zinvolle deelname aan de besluitvormingsprocedure is voornamelijk ontwikkeld door het 
werk van toezichthoudende verdragsorganen. de meerderheid van deze verdragsorganen 
heeft het recht herleid uit een van de materiële rechten van het respectievelijke instrument. 
er is aldus in internationaal recht een algemeen procedureel recht op deelname aan de 
besluitvormingsprocedure en enkel in bepaalde situaties bestaat er een expliciet recht. 
degenen die door besluiten worden getroffen hebben het recht om op zinvolle wijze deel 
te nemen aan de besluitvormingsprocedure. de autoriteiten moeten de benadeelden 
voldoende informeren, ervoor zorgen dat zij op een zinvolle wijze betrokken worden in de 
procedure, dat de benadeelden hun standpunten naar voren kunnen brengen en deze in 
overweging genomen worden en autoriteiten dienen het genomen besluit te motiveren. over 
het algemeen beschikken de autoriteiten over een ruime beoordelingsvrijheid bij het bepalen 
hoe deze participatieprocessen -- het formaat, de duur en het tijdsbestek -- moeten worden 
georganiseerd, zolang de deelname van de betrokkenen aan de besluitvormingsprocedure 
zinvol blijft.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt het recht op een effectief rechtsmiddel in het internationaal recht. dit 
recht heeft twee componenten, het recht op een review of een herziening en het recht op 
reparaties. Het recht op een herziening bevat verschillende elementen: het recht op toegang 
tot een beoordelingsinstantie, het recht op een eerlijke beoordeling door een bevoegde, 
onpartijdige en onafhankelijke beoordelingsinstantie, een verplichting om de betrokkenen 
in kennis te stellen van de beoordelingsmogelijkheden en de procedurele vereisten, en een 
verplichting om een met redenen omklede schriftelijke beslissing te geven. Met betrekking tot 
het recht op herstel is de begeleiding van het internationaal recht beperkter. de te verstrekken 
reparatie moet effectief en adequaat zijn om de aangetaste schade aan te pakken; hoe dit wordt 
bereikt -- dat wil zeggen met welk herstel -- valt onder de bevoegdheid van de autoriteiten.
Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert het concept Inclusief Governance Model (draft Inclusionary 
Governance Model of concept Model) en vormt het sluitstuk van deel 2. Het concept Model 
bevat verschillende elementen:
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- de bouwstenen (informatierechten, plicht om zinvolle deelname aan de besluitvor-
mingsprocedure te realiseren, plicht om een effectief rechtsmiddel te realiseren) vormen 
de kernelementen van het concept model en komen overeen met de aanvankelijke drie 
geïdentificeerde dimensies van inclusieve governance.
- de benchmarks zijn de minimumnormen die voor elke bouwsteen zijn vastgesteld, op 
basis waarvan de uitoefening van publieke bevoegdheden door internationale instellin-
gen moet worden beoordeeld.
- de beperkingen zijn die beperkingen die zijn vastgesteld voor de uitoefening van pu-
blieke bevoegdheden door overheidsinstanties, ongeacht het soort openbare macht die 
zij uitoefenen.
Zoals dit hoofdstuk laat zien, is het concept Model dynamisch. er zijn bijvoorbeeld interacties 
zichtbaar tussen de verschillende elementen van het concept Model, en in het bijzonder 
tussen de verschillende geïdentificeerde normen. ten eerste beïnvloeden de rechten elkaar en 
lijken ze elkaar te versterken. Bijvoorbeeld, personen (of groepen) wiens informatierechten 
en/of participatierechten gedeeltelijk of volledig zijn geweigerd, hebben recht op een 
effectief rechtsmiddel. dit recht stelt de getroffenen in staat hun informatierechten en hun 
recht op zinvolle deelname aan de besluitvormingsprocedure af te dwingen. ten tweede 
zijn er overeenkomsten tussen de drie dimensies in de type procedurele vereisten die een 
rol spelen bij het realiseren van inclusieve governance. Bepaalde procedurele waarborgen 
worden als essentieel aangemerkt door verdragsmonitoring organen in de verschillende 
besluitvormings- en herzieningsprocedures: de plicht tot degelijk informeren van een te 
nemen besluit, het recht om gehoord te worden, een verplichting om voldoende input in acht 
te nemen, de verplichting om een besluit schriftelijk te nemen en te voorzien van redenen, 
en als laatste de verplichting om een genomen besluit kenbaar te maken. deze normatieve 
interacties laten de noodzaak zien tot het doen van een contextuele beoordeling van de 
verantwoordingsplicht van autoriteiten die publieke macht uitoefenen die individuen treft.
In het concept Model wordt erkend dat autoriteiten over beoordelingsvrijheid beschikken 
bij het implementeren en nakomen van hun verplichtingen. een aantal factoren bepaalt 
echter de omvang van deze beoordelingsvrijheid en beïnvloedt dienovereenkomstig de 
reikwijdte van de standaarden die moeten worden gerealiseerd. Het verbod op willekeur 
vormt een materiële beperking op de uitoefening van publieke macht door autoriteiten. de 
geïdentificeerde gemeenschappelijke procedurele waarborgen dienen als de belangrijkste 
toetsstenen om een willekeurige uitoefening van openbare macht te voorkomen en de kwaliteit 
van de procedure te garanderen. wanneer de uitoefening van discretionaire bevoegdheden 
niet voldoende wordt gereguleerd, is er een groter risico dat er willekeurige beslissingen 
worden genomen. daarnaast fungeert het concept van kwetsbaarheid (vulnerability) 
fungeert als triggerfactor: het beïnvloedt de reikwijdte en inhoud van verplichtingen van 
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overheidsinstanties en beperkt de beoordelingsvrijheid van overheidsinstanties bij de 
uitvoering van deze verplichtingen. kwetsbaarheid wordt in dit onderzoek breed gedefinieerd 
en verwijst naar zowel de persoonlijke factoren die iemand kwalificeren om als kwetsbaar te 
worden beschouwd, en/of naar de omstandigheden rond de beslissing die iemand kwetsbaar 
maakt. Hoofdstuk 6 concludeert met een stappenplan hoe het concept Model toegepast kan 
worden in de praktijk.  
Het derde deel, hoofdstuk 7, had een tweeledig doel: (i) de werking van het concept Model 
demonstreren en (ii) het evalueren of de formulering van de bouwstenen van het concept 
Model voldoende duidelijk en nauwkeurig zijn om de mate waarin de ‘vn veiligheidsraad 
IsIl (da'esh) en het Al-Qaida sanctiecomité’ verantwoording af legt aan degenen die het op 
de terrorisme lijst heeft geplaatst te analyseren. 
Met betrekking tot het eerste doel laat de analyse in hoofdstuk 7 zien hoe het concept 
Model een diepgaande beoordeling mogelijk maakt van de verantwoordingsplicht van een 
internationale instelling jegens degenen die geraakt worden door hun besluiten, rekening 
houdend met de context waarin een instelling opereert. de toepassing liet zien in hoeverre het 
sanctiecomité verantwoording verschuldigd is aan degenen die door haar besluiten worden 
geraakt. verder werden in dit hoofdstuk mogelijke tekortkomingen en zwakkere punten in 
de procedure geïdentificeerd. de procedure wordt bijvoorbeeld gekenmerkt door maar een 
zeer beperkte toegang tot het bewijs voor de aangewezen personen. er is geen procedure 
om toegang tot de informatie te vragen. verder hebben de staten die de sanctionering 
voorstellen in het sanctiecomité, in de praktijk, onbeperkte beoordelingsvrijheid om te 
bepalen of bewijs al dan niet als vertrouwelijk wordt aangemerkt. uit de analyse bleek verder 
dat hoewel de ombudspersoon procedure toegankelijk is voor de aangewezen personen, er 
enkele structurele tekortkomingen zijn met betrekking tot de fairness van deze procedure 
en de doeltreffendheid van de geboden reparaties. een aantal van deze tekortkomingen 
vloeien voort uit de institutionele opzet van het sanctiecomité, het mandaat dat aan de 
ombudspersoon is gegeven en de beperkingen die door de veiligheidsraad en de vn-
lidstaten aan het functioneren van de ombudspersoon zijn opgelegd. Bijvoorbeeld, het 
gebrek aan toegang tot vertrouwelijke informatie - niet alleen voor de gesanctioneerde, maar 
ook voor de ombudspersoon en de leden van het sanctiecomité - heeft een verlammend 
effect op het algehele niveau van inclusief governance dat kan worden gerealiseerd. de 
toepassing van het concept Model toont echter ook de verbeteringen aan die in de loop 
van de jaren zijn aangebracht en hoe, onder meer op voordracht van de ombudspersoon, 
de positie van het kantoor van de ombudspersoon wordt versterkt. Bovendien laat de 
toepassing van het concept Model op het IsIl (da'esh) en Al-Qaida sanctiecomité zien 
hoe de verschillende bouwstenen van het concept Model elkaar beïnvloeden en hoe 
deze interacties geïdentificeerd kunnen worden. Met andere woorden, het realiseren van 
nederlAndse sAMenvAttInG
verantwoording van een internationale instelling jegens diegenen die geraakt worden door 
hun besluiten, is een proces wat beïnvloed wordt door meerdere factoren. 
Het testen van de werking van het concept Model laat zien dat enerzijds het concept model 
in staat is de verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen jegens benadeelden te 
beoordelen, anderzijds liet het concept Model zien dat in bepaalde situaties de praktijk 
van het sanctiecomité niet voldoende kon bevatten. de context waarin een internationale 
instelling opereert werd niet voldoende in acht genomen. In het kort, het concept Model 
is in zijn huidige vorm niet voldoende in staat de complexiteit van meerlaagse governance 
structuren van internationale instellingen te duiden. Met als consequentie dat in de analyse 
niet wordt meegenomen hoe een verscheidenheid aan actoren de procedure en de impact 
daarvan op het gerealiseerde inclusieve governance kan beïnvloeden. 
daarom wordt er in hoofdstuk 8 uitgelegd hoe het concept Model aangepast wordt om 
deze context beter in acht te nemen. de eerste stap van de toepassing van het Model – het 
beschrijvende overzicht van de besluitvormingsprocedure – wordt uitgebreid om deze 
complexiteit van meerlaagse governance door meerdere actoren beter vast te leggen. In dit 
deel 4 wordt het verfijnde Inclusionary Governance Model gepresenteerd. Het verfijnde 
Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions dient als maatstaf om de 
verantwoordingsplicht van internationale instellingen ten opzichte van degenen die door 
hun beslissingen worden getroffen, systematisch te analyseren en realiseren. kortom, de 
ontwikkelde maatstaf identificeert de procedurele regelingen die nodig zijn om het gebrek 
aan verantwoording te verminderen en de elementen die nodig zijn om een goed evenwicht te 
vinden tussen de algemene aard van het verantwoordingsprobleem en de specifieke context 
van elke internationale instelling. tevens wordt er stapsgewijs uitgelegd hoe het Model 
in de praktijk toegepast kan worden om te illustreren hoe de verantwoordingsplicht van 
internationale instellingen systematisch wordt geanalyseerd. verwijzingen naar de praktijk 
van andere internationale instellingen die publieke macht uitoefenen die rechtstreeks 
gevolgen hebben voor individuen laat zien hoe men door de toepassing van het model in 
staat is de verschillende contexten waarin verschillende instellingen opereren te begrijpen 
en tegelijkertijd de verantwoordingsplicht van een specifieke internationale instelling 
ten opzichte van de betrokkenen te analyseren. door de stapsgewijze toepassing van het 
Inclusionary Governance Model kan men de maatstaf gebruiken om een systematische 
en grondige analyse van het verantwoordingskader van een internationale instelling uit te 
voeren. Het Model kan gebruikt woorden voor interne evaluatiedoeleinden, zowel voor 
een ex ante evaluatie van de inclusieve governance die moet worden gerealiseerd door een 
internationale instelling als voor het juridische kader dat moet worden ontwikkeld, en voor 
een ex post evaluatie om sterke punten en mogelijke tekortkomingen in de huidige praktijk 
van een internationale instelling te identificeren en te bepalen hoe deze kunnen worden 
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verbeterd. Het Inclusionary Governance Model for International Institutions is daarom 
een dynamische maatstaf die dient om op systematische wijze de verantwoordingsplicht 
van internationale instellingen ten opzichte van degenen die door hun beslissingen worden 





P. Allot, Eunomia: New Order for a New World (oxford university Press 1990)
c. f. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations (cam-
bridge studies in International and comparative law) (cambridge university Press 2005)
d. Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International 
Inc. 1991) 
e. Benvenisti, The Law of Global Governance (Hague Academy of International Law 2014) 
c.A. Bishop, Access to Information as a Human Right (lfB scholarly Publishing llc 2012) 
A. von Bogdandy, r. wölfrum, J. von Bernstorff, P. dann, and M. Goldmann (eds.) The 
Exercise of Public Authority by International Institutions: Advancing International 
Institutional law (springer 2010)
l.A. Boland, Model-Building in Economics, its Purposes and Limitations (cambridge 
university Press 2014)
k.e. Boon, A. Haq, d.c. lovelace jr. (eds.) Terrorism Commentary on Security Documents (vol. 
122) UN Response to Al Qaida – Developments through 2011 (oxford university Press 2012)
M.J. Bosschuyt, Guide to the “Travaux Preparatoires” of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Martinus nijhoff 1987) 
s. cassese et al. (eds.) Global Administrative Law: the Casebook (IrPA/IIlJ, 3rd edition, 2012)
A.v. dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (Macmillan, 1st 
ed., 1885)
J. ebbesson and others, The Aarhus Convention: an Implementation Guide (united nations 
Publications 2014) 
M.r. Hanski and M. scheinin (eds.) Leading Cases of the Human Rights Committee (Institut 
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